Cite as 2026 Ark. 150
SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
No. CV-26-131
Opinion Delivered: October 15, 2026
KRISTINA GULLEY
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI
V. COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
ELEVENTH DIVISION
LEE JEFFREY; LEDRIC CALHOUN; [NO. 60CV-26-628]
KINDREA STUCKEY; PULASKI
COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTION HONORABLE PATRICIA JAMES, COMMISSIONERS; SUSAN JUDGE
MEADORS, IN HER OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS CHAIRPERSON OF
THE PULASKI COUNTY BOARD OF MOTION GRANTED; APPEAL
ELECTION COMMISSIONERS; AND DISMISSED.
MICHAEL WHITE AND STEVE
HARRELSON, IN THEIR OFFICIAL
CAPACITIES AS COMMISSIONERS
OF THE PULASKI COUNTY BOARD
OF ELECTION COMMISSIONERS
APPELLEES
COURTNEY RAE HUDSON, Associate Justice
Appellant Kristina Gulley appeals from the Pulaski County Circuit Court’s order
denying her motion for relief from the judgment declaring her ineligible as a candidate for
Pulaski County Justice of the Peace, District 10, and directing appellees, the Pulaski County
Board of Election Commissioners; Susan Meadors, in her official capacity as Chairperson of
the Board; and Michael White and Steve Harrelson, in their official capacities as
Commissioners of the Board (collectively, the Board), not to count any ballots cast for Gulley in the primary election on March 3, 2026. For reversal, Gulley argues that (1) the
circuit court committed reversible error by disqualifying her in the absence of a conviction
as required by Ark. Const. art. 5, § 9; (2) even if a conviction existed, it was legally nullified
by the sealing of her criminal record and a gubernatorial pardon; (3) the circuit court violated
her due-process rights; (4) the circuit court misapplied Arkansas law and the governing
constitutional standard; (5) the circuit court’s ruling improperly burdened her fundamental
rights; (6) the writ of mandamus was improper; and (7) the circumstances created an
appearance of judicial bias and undermined confidence in the fairness of the proceedings.
Our jurisdiction is pursuant to Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 1-2(a)(4) (2025). We grant
the motion of appellees Lee Jeffrey, Ledric Calhoun, and Kindrea Stuckey (collectively,
voter-appellees) to dismiss the appeal as moot.
This is the second appeal regarding Gulley’s eligibility to hold the office of justice of
the peace. Gulley was elected justice of the peace for District 10 in Pulaski County in 2020.
After she filed for reelection in 2022, two individuals filed a petition for declaratory
judgment and writ of mandamus in the Pulaski County Circuit Court alleging that Gulley
was ineligible to be a candidate due to two hot-check convictions in 1997 and 2003. The
circuit court entered an order finding that Gulley had been convicted of two misdemeanor
violations of Ark. Code Ann. § 5-37-302 that were disqualifying “infamous crimes” as set
forth in article 5, section 9 of the Arkansas Constitution. The circuit court granted the
petition, declaring that Gulley was ineligible to hold the office of justice of the peace and to
file for or seek reelection to that office and ordering the Board not to certify Gulley as a
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candidate or count any votes cast for her. See Robinson v. Gulley, No. 60CV-22-2813 (Gulley
I). Gulley did not appeal from that order.
In June 2022, the State of Arkansas and Pulaski County filed a petition for protection
against usurpation of office or, in the alternative, for writ of quo warranto, for recovery of
fees and emoluments of office, and for declaratory judgment against Gulley, seeking to
remove her from office and asking for the return of salary and benefits paid to her during
the time that she served as justice of the peace. The circuit court granted petitioners a
preliminary injunction, finding, in part, that they had demonstrated a likelihood of success
on the merits because Gulley had either pled guilty to, or was found guilty of, two violations
of Arkansas’s Hot Check Law. Gulley appealed, and we affirmed, holding that the circuit
court did not clearly err by finding that Gulley had been convicted of disqualifying offenses
or abuse its discretion in determining that petitioners demonstrated a likelihood of success
and irreparable harm. Gulley v. State ex rel. Jegley, 2023 Ark. 70, 664 S.W.3d 421 (Gulley II).
Following her appeal in Gulley II, Gulley filed as a candidate for justice of the peace
in November 2023, but the Board found that she was ineligible. Gulley filed an action
challenging the Board’s refusal to include her on the ballot, alleging that a criminal
background check did not show her hot-check convictions and that Ark. Const. art. 5, § 9
is unconstitutional. The circuit court granted motions to dismiss by the Board and Pulaski
County on the basis of res judicata and failure to state a claim. See Gulley v. Pulaski Cnty.,
No. 60CV-24-1967 (Gulley III). Gulley failed to perfect an appeal from that ruling.
In November 2025, Gulley again filed as a candidate for justice of the peace in Pulaski
County, District 10, for the March 3, 2026 primary election. On January 13, 2026, voter3
appellees, all of whom are registered voters in District 10, filed a complaint for declaratory
judgment and petition for writ of mandamus against Gulley and the Board. The complaint
alleged that Gulley had previously been found ineligible to hold public office due to her
two prior convictions for “infamous crimes” in Gulley I, Gulley II, and Gulley III. The voterappellees sought a judgment declaring that Gulley remained ineligible to run for public
office under Ark. Const. art. 5, § 9 and a writ of mandamus commanding the Board to
annul any certification of Gulley for the March 3, 2026 primary election and to not count
any ballots cast for Gulley when canvassing and certifying the results of the election. Voterappellees also requested that the matter be expedited pursuant to Ark. R. Civ. P. 78(d) and
Ark. Code Ann. § 16-115-103 (Repl. 2010). Voter-appellees attached as exhibits to the
complaint the certified docket sheets from Gulley’s 1997 and 2003 hot-check offenses and
copies of the circuit court orders in Gulley I, Gulley II, and Gulley III and this court’s opinion
in Gulley II.1
On January 14, 2026, the circuit court scheduled a hearing on the petition for January
21. Gulley filed a motion for continuance on January 16 claiming that she required
additional time to adequately prepare and present her defense. Gulley also filed on that date
a “trial brief” in which she argued that the criminal background checks she had requested
in 2023 showed no record of the prior convictions; that the hot-check matter relied on by
voter-appellees was resolved by a bond forfeiture, which Arkansas law does not recognize
as a conviction; and that she was granted a full pardon by Governor Sarah Huckabee Sanders
1
The docket sheet for the 1997 hot-check case reflects that Gulley pled guilty to that charge, while the docket sheet for the 2003 hot-check case shows a disposition of “GuiltyBond Forf[.]”
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“for the hot-check conviction at issue,” barring any further prosecution or punishment
arising from that same conduct.
Voter-appellees and the Board filed a joint response objecting to Gulley’s motion for
continuance. Appellees asserted that under Ark. R. Civ. P. 78(d), the circuit court was
required to hold a hearing within seven days and that timely resolution of the matter was
important due to the upcoming election. In addition, appellees claimed that Gulley had
adequate time to prepare for the hearing given her participation in Gulley I, Gulley II, and
Gulley III, which involved the same prior convictions. Voter-appellees filed a response to
Gulley’s trial brief on January 20, contending that res judicata barred Gulley from
challenging her ineligibility, that sealing a conviction of an “infamous crime” does not
restore eligibility to seek or hold public office, and that even if Gulley provided evidence
that the governor had pardoned her for both convictions at issue, a pardon does not restore
eligibility for public office.
At the January 21 hearing, Gulley, who was not represented by counsel, again asked
for a continuance, claiming that she needed more time to hire an attorney. The circuit court
denied Gulley’s motion, stating that it was required by law to hold the hearing within seven
days and that appellees opposed a continuance. Voter-appellees testified that they brought
the action against Gulley because of their concern that, if elected as justice of the peace, she
would again be removed from office due to her prior convictions, leaving them without
representation. They also admitted certified copies of the decisions in Gulley I, Gulley II,
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and Gulley III. The Board presented no evidence, stating that it would comply with the
circuit court’s decision regarding Gulley’s eligibility for the March primary election. 2
At the conclusion of voter-appellees’ case, the circuit court asked Gulley whether
she had any witnesses to call, and Gulley replied that she did not. The court then asked
Gulley “to come up and take the witness stand and make a statement[,]” after which the
opposing parties would have the opportunity to question Gulley about her statement. Gulley
responded that she would not be serving as a witness, although she intended “to make a
statement about the situation.” The circuit court asked Gulley, “Okay. You’re going to
make a closing remark then, about the—and so you’re not going to call any witnesses, and
you rest?” Gulley replied, “Yes, ma’am. That’s correct.” The court then reminded Gulley
that closing remarks by attorneys or pro se litigants are not evidence, and Gulley stated, “I
would like to make a closing statement. Yes, ma’am.” During her closing remarks, Gulley
referenced and attempted to introduce evidence that had not been presented at the hearing.
Voter-appellees objected, and the circuit court sustained the objection, explaining to Gulley
that closing argument is not an opportunity to testify or introduce new evidence. Gulley
indicated that she would like to make a statement after all. The court ruled that “the time
to make a statement was before you rested. And making a statement meant coming to take
the witness chair, and allowing people to cross-examine you[,]” which Gulley had declined
to do.
2
Similarly, the Board has not filed a brief on appeal, instead notifying this court that it intends to comply with whatever decision the court renders in this matter.
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The circuit court entered an order on February 2, 2026, granting voter-appellees’
complaint for declaratory judgment and petition for writ of mandamus. The court found
that the testimony and evidence presented at the hearing left it with no choice but to reaffirm
Gulley’s ineligibility to stand for election to public office pursuant to Ark. Const. art. 5, §
9. The court ordered the Board to annul any certification of Gulley for the March 3 primary
election and to not count any ballots cast for Gulley when canvassing and certifying the
results of the primary election.
On February 4 and 11, 2026, Gulley filed a motion and amended motion for relief
from judgment pursuant to Ark. R. Civ. P. 59 and 60(a). She argued that the basis for the
circuit court’s ruling was factually inaccurate because she “was never convicted of a crime;
rather, there was a bond forfeiture.” She further argued that even if she had been convicted,
her criminal record was lawfully sealed following the proceedings in Gulley I, and a sealed
criminal record cannot serve as a basis for disqualification from public office. Finally, she
claimed that she had received a gubernatorial pardon that “restor[ed] her civil rights to the
fullest extent permitted by law.” She contended that the judgment must be altered or
amended under Rule 59 because the judgment contained errors of law or fact, that the
denial of her motion for continuance deprived her of a meaningful opportunity to be heard
and resulted in manifest prejudice, and that allowing the judgment to stand under those
circumstances undermined the integrity of the proceedings. Alternatively, Gulley argued
that the judgment must be set aside under Rule 60(a) because “newly discovered and
corrected factual information” regarding her criminal history undermined voter-appellees’
claims, she was given only a short time to prepare for the hearing and this information was
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not reasonably available to her at the time of the hearing, and her gubernatorial pardon
rendered voter-appellees’ claims moot. Gulley attached several exhibits to her motion,
including criminal background checks conducted in 2023 by the Arkansas State Police and
the Conway City Attorney’s Office indicating that she had no criminal record. She also
attached a July 4, 2024 letter from Governor Sanders simply stating. without any further
details, that she had granted Gulley “a pardon.”
On February 25, 2026, the circuit court entered an order denying Gulley’s amended
motion for relief from judgment. The court found that Gulley had been given a meaningful
opportunity to be heard, noting that she was able to file a trial brief five days prior to the
scheduled hearing, that she appeared at the hearing, and that she had been provided the
opportunity to present a defense. With regard to Gulley’s argument that the court
committed errors of law and fact, the circuit court stated that it had relied on the
uncontroverted testimony and evidence at the hearing and that it could not consider new
evidence that had not been presented during that hearing, “especially when it appears Ms.
Gulley possessed the information and alleged evidence at the time.” The court noted that
the new information and/or evidence that Gulley included in her motion—the criminalhistory report and gubernatorial pardon—was mentioned in Gulley’s prehearing brief and
was not new evidence as envisioned by Ark. R. Civ. P. 59(a).
Gulley filed a notice of appeal on February 27, 2026, designating only the circuit
court’s February 25 order denying her amended motion for relief from judgment as the
order being appealed. On March 3, the day of the primary election, Gulley lodged the
appellate record and filed a motion requesting expedited consideration of her appeal, which
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we denied on March 6. On March 26, voter-appellees filed a “Suggestion of Mootness”
motion, arguing that the primary election results had been certified, that Gulley’s appeal was
moot, and that it should be dismissed. We ordered that the motion be taken with the case.
Gulley raises seven points on appeal challenging the circuit court’s decision.
However, before turning to the merits of her arguments, we must first address the threshold
issue of whether the appeal is moot, as argued by voter-appellees in their motion and brief.
We have consistently held that we will not review issues that are moot because to do so
would be to render an advisory opinion. See, e.g., Keep Our Dollars in Independence Cnty. v.
Mitchell, 2017 Ark. 154, 518 S.W.3d 64; Lott v. Langley, 2013 Ark. 247; Watts v. Searcy Cnty.
Bd. of Elections, 364 Ark. 452, 220 S.W.3d 642 (2005). A case generally becomes moot when
any judgment rendered would have no practical legal effect on a then-existing legal
controversy. Lott, supra. We have recognized two exceptions to the mootness doctrine: (1)
issues that are capable of repetition yet evade review, and (2) issues that raise considerations
of substantial public interest which, if addressed, would prevent future litigation. Mitchell,
supra.
The primary issue raised in this appeal is whether the circuit court erred by declaring
Gulley ineligible as a candidate for Pulaski County Justice of the Peace, District 10 in the
March 3, 2026 primary election and ordering the Board to annul any certification of her as
a candidate and to not count any votes cast for her when canvassing and certifying the results
of that election. Clearly, the March 2026 primary election has already occurred, and the
Board was required to certify the results of the election within ten days––including for the
office of justice of the peace, District 10. See Ark. Code Ann. § 7-7-203(g)(1) (Supp. 2025).
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Gulley did not ask the circuit court to stay its order before she lodged her appeal. As noted
earlier, Gulley did file a motion with this court to expedite her appeal. However, she did
not do so until the day of the election, and more importantly, she did not ask this court to
issue a stay of the Board’s certification of the election results pending her appeal.3
Accordingly, we denied Gulley’s motion. Because we can no longer grant any relief to
Gulley regarding her eligibility for the March 2026 primary election, we agree with voterappellees that this appeal is moot. See, e.g., Lott, supra (holding that appeal of order to remove
appellant’s name from the ballot was moot after election had been held); Watts, supra
(dismissing appeal of circuit court’s refusal to order initiative placed on ballot as moot after
election occurred).
While Gulley argues that this case is not moot because the circuit court’s ruling
continues to operate as an ongoing legal barrier to her eligibility for public office, any
discussion concerning Gulley’s eligibility in a possible future election would be advisory and
inappropriate. Lott, supra. Nor do we hold that this appeal falls within either of the two
recognized exceptions to mootness. Gulley has already been ruled ineligible based on the
same hot-check offenses in several prior cases, and we also addressed her eligibility on appeal
in Gulley II. Thus, this appeal does not present issues that are capable of repetition but evade
review.
We also disagree with Gulley that the second mootness exception applies. We have
previously held that a hot-check conviction, whether based on a plea of guilty or no contest
3
Gulley filed a motion on August 26, 2026, for a limited stay of the circuit court’s order; however, this was well after the Board’s certification deadline, and we denied her motion.
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or based on a finding of guilt, is an “infamous crime” and a public-trust crime that renders
a person ineligible for public office. E.g., Day v. Wardlaw, 2026 Ark. 21, 727 S.W.3d 619.
We have also addressed whether the sealing of a public-trust crime or a pardon restores
eligibility to run for or hold an elected office. See, e.g., Reed v. Yang, 2026 Ark. 32, 728
S.W.3d 375 (holding that pursuant to the plain language of Ark. Code Ann. § 21-8-305(b)(1) (Repl. 2022), the sealing of a public-trust crime under the Comprehensive
Criminal Record Sealing Act of 2013, codified at §§ 16-90-1401 et seq. (Repl. 2022 &
Supp. 2025), did not restore appellant’s eligibility to seek constitutional office); Gray v. Webb
ex rel. Republican Party of Ark., 2020 Ark. 385, 611 S.W.3d 466 (concluding that presidential
pardon for infamous-crime conviction did not restore eligibility to serve in Arkansas House
of Representatives). Accordingly, this case does not involve considerations of substantial
public interest that, if addressed, would prevent future litigation. We therefore grant voterappellees’ motion to dismiss this appeal as moot.
Motion granted; appeal dismissed.
Special Justices CORY COX and BRIAN VANDIVER join.
WEBB and BRONNI, JJ., not participating.
Kristina Gulley, pro se appellant.
Kutak Rock LLP, by: Jess Askew III, Alexander T. Jones, and Shayla Dawson, for
appellees Lee Jeffrey, Ledric Calhoun, and Kindrea Stuckey.
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