In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-26-00243-CR
MICHAEL ANDREW WALLS, APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
On Appeal from the 432nd District Court
Tarrant County, Texas1
Trial Court No. 1875921, Honorable Ruben Gonzalez, Presiding
October 9, 2026
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before PARKER, C.J., and DOSS and PRATT, JJ.
Appellant, Michael Andrew Walls, appeals from a judgment adjudicating him guilty
of the following ten counts: Count One—continuous sexual abuse of a young child,2
1 This cause was originally filed in the Second Court of Appeals and was transferred to this Court
by a docket-equalization order of the Supreme Court of Texas. TEX. GOV’T CODE § 73.001. Where there is a conflict with the precedent of this Court, this appeal has been decided in accordance with the precedent of the Second Court of Appeals. TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3; Mitschke v. Borromeo, 645 S.W.3d 251 (Tex. 2022).
2 TEX. PENAL CODE § 21.02(b).
Counts Two through Six—aggravated sexual assault of a child,3 and Counts Seven
through Ten—indecency with a child by contact.4 After Appellant’s open guilty plea, the
trial court assessed punishment. The trial court found Appellant guilty on all counts and
assessed punishment at sixty years’ confinement for continuous sexual abuse of a young
child, sixty years’ confinement for each count of aggravated sexual assault of a child, and
twenty years’ confinement for each indecency count. The trial court ordered that the
sentences run concurrently but also ordered that the sentences run consecutively with
any sentence handed down in a yet-to-happen revocation and a yet-to-happen parole
revocation in other causes.
By his two issues, Appellant asks us to reform the trial court’s judgment. Appellant
first complains that the trial court reversibly erred by convicting him and punishing him for
continuous sexual abuse of a child and the predicate acts listed in Penal Code section
21.02(c). Appellant also complains that the trial court erred by ordering his sentences to
run consecutively with whatever sentence he might get when his parole in a different case
is revoked. The State concedes both issues. We agree with Appellant and the State and
modify the judgment accordingly.
ANALYSIS
Issue One – Dual Convictions
To begin, a defendant may still raise a double-jeopardy issue for the first time on
appeal when the undisputed facts show the violation is clearly apparent on the face of the
3 TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 22.021(a)(1)(B), (a)(2)(B).
4 TEX. PENAL CODE § 21.11(a)(1).
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record and when enforcement of usual rules of procedural default serves no legitimate
state interests. Gonzalez v. State, 8 S.W.3d 640, 643 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (en banc).
As explained by the Court of Criminal Appeals, “we perceive no legitimate interest in
maintaining a conviction when it is clear on the face of the record that the conviction was
obtained in contravention of constitutional double-jeopardy protections.” Ex parte Denton,
399 S.W.3d 540, 545 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
Here, the trial court convicted and punished Appellant for continuous sexual abuse
of a young child (Count One) and seven predicate offenses listed in section 21.02(c)
(Counts Two through Eight and Count Ten).5 Texas Penal Code section 21.02 explicitly
prohibits a defendant from being convicted in the same criminal action of both continuous
sexual abuse and any predicate offense listed in section 21.02(c) unless the predicate
offense occurred outside the period in which the continuous sexual abuse was committed.
See TEX. PENAL CODE § 21.02(e)(2). In Price v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals made
it clear that the Legislature did not intend to allow dual convictions for continuous sexual
abuse and for offenses enumerated as acts of sexual abuse when based on conduct
against the same child during the same period of time. 434 S.W.3d 601, 606 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2014). Thus, we sustain Appellant’s first issue.
Having determined that a double-jeopardy violation occurred, we must now
consider what is the appropriate remedy. Both Appellant and the State urge that the
appropriate remedy in this case is for this Court to affirm Appellant’s conviction for the
5 Count Nine was indecency with a child by touching a child’s breast, which is not a predicate
offense of continuous sexual assault of a young child. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 21.02(c)(2); see also State v. Payne, 735 S.W.3d 83, 87 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2025, pet. ref’d).
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continuous sexual abuse of a young child (Count One) and vacate the convictions for the
seven predicate offenses listed in section 21.02(c) (Counts Two through Eight and Count
Ten), and we agree. Generally, “[w]hen a defendant is subjected to multiple punishments
for the same conduct, the remedy is to affirm the conviction for the most serious offense
and vacate the other convictions.” Bigon v. State, 252 S.W.3d 360, 372 (Tex. Crim. App.
2008). The “most serious offense” is the offense of conviction for which the “greatest
sentence was assessed.” See id. at 373; see also Boswell v. State, No. 02-25-00205-CR, 2026 Tex. App. LEXIS 4127, at *9 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 30, 2026, pet. ref’d)
(mem. op., not designated for publication). In the present situation, the trial court
assessed the same punishment for the convictions at issue. Therefore, we cannot look
to only the sentences imposed to determine which of these offenses is the most serious.
To resolve this tie, we must look to the statutory relationship between the offenses.
Texas Penal Code section 21.02 expressly defines “act of sexual abuse” to include
aggravated sexual assault. Price v. State, 413 S.W.3d 158, 161 (Tex. App.—Beaumont
2013), aff’d, Price, 434 S.W.3d at 611. Consequently, the individual acts of abuse—
including indecency with a child and aggravated sexual assault of a child—are treated as
lesser-included predicate offenses of the greater offense of continuous sexual abuse.
See generally TEX. PENAL CODE § 21.02(b), (c)(2), and (4); see also Price, 434 S.W.3d at
606. Because indecency with a child and aggravated sexual assault of a child stand as
lesser-included predicate offenses of continuous sexual abuse when committed against
the same victim during the same timeframe, the continuous sexual abuse conviction is
characterized as the more serious, overarching offense. See, e.g., Weber v. State, 536
S.W.3d 31, 37–38 (Tex. App.—Austin 2017, pet. ref’d); see also Price, 434 S.W.3d at
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606. This determination is further supported by the statutory rules governing parole.
Under Texas law, a conviction for continuous sexual abuse of a child is entirely ineligible
for parole. Weber, 536 S.W.3d at 38. Because the continuous sexual abuse conviction
carries stricter parole limitations, it is generally treated as the more serious conviction for
double jeopardy retention purposes. Id. Accordingly, the continuous sexual abuse
conviction (Count 1) should be retained, and we vacate Appellant’s convictions in Counts
Two through Eight and Count Ten.
Issue Two – Cumulated Sentences
By his second issue, Appellant complains that the trial court erred by ordering his
sentences to run consecutively with whatever sentence he might get when his parole in
a different case is revoked. We review a trial court’s decision to order consecutive
sentences for an abuse of discretion. Byrd v. State, 499 S.W.3d 443, 446 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2016). A trial court abuses its discretion if it imposes consecutive sentences where
the law requires concurrent sentences. Id. at 446–47. A sentence for a second offense
cannot run consecutively to a prior sentence for which a defendant has been given parole
if the parole has not been revoked at the time of the second sentence. Id. at 451. Here,
the record reflected that Appellant was still on parole for his prior offense, and no parole
revocation had occurred. Consequently, his new sentences cannot run consecutively to
his prior sentence for which he was on parole. See id. We sustain Appellant’s second
issue.
The remedy for an unauthorized order cumulating sentences is to reform the
judgment and delete the cumulation order. Id. Therefore, we modify the Judgment of
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Conviction by Court – Waiver of Jury Trial to remove the trial court’s cumulation orders
on Appellant’s remaining Counts One and Nine. We affirm, as modified, these remaining
counts against Appellant.
CONCLUSION
Having sustained Appellant’s issues, we vacate the trial court’s judgment on
Counts Two through Eight and Count Ten, and we reform and modify the judgment on
Counts One and Nine to delete the cumulation orders that each be served consecutively
with any sentence imposed in a parole revocation. As modified, the trial court’s judgment
on Count One and Count Nine is affirmed.
Laura A. W. Pratt
Justice
Do not publish.
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