USCA4 Appeal: 25-4469 Doc: 44 Filed: 10/15/2026 Pg: 1 of 7
PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 25-4469
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
JESSE SHANE OWENS,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at
Spartanburg. Jacquelyn Denise Austin, District Judge. (7:18−cr−00674−JDA−1)
Argued: September 16, 2026 Decided: October 15, 2026
Before DIAZ, Chief Judge, and NIEMEYER and BENJAMIN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by published opinion. Chief Judge Diaz wrote the opinion, in which Judge
Niemeyer and Judge Benjamin joined.
ARGUED: Kimberly Harvey Albro, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC
DEFENDER, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. Holly Elizabeth Brown, OFFICE
OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Florence, South Carolina, for Appellee. ON
BRIEF: Bryan P. Stirling, United States Attorney, William J. Watkins, Jr., Assistant
United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greenville,
South Carolina, for Appellee.
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DIAZ, Chief Judge:
Jesse Owens was serving a term of supervised release when he was charged with
several South Carolina state law crimes, including first-degree assault and battery. At a
revocation hearing, the district court found that he’d violated the relevant statute, revoked
his supervised release, and sentenced him to the statutory maximum of two years’
imprisonment. While he didn’t object below, Owens now argues that the district court
erred in deciding that South Carolina first-degree assault and battery is a “crime of
violence” and thus incorrectly calculated the range provided by the Sentencing Guidelines.
We affirm.
I.
In 2018, Owens was convicted of possessing a firearm and ammunition while
subject to a domestic violence restraining order, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(8) and
924(a)(2). For that offense, he was sentenced to 76 months’ imprisonment, followed by
three years of supervised release. He began his term of supervised release in April 2023.
In July 2025, Owens’s probation officer filed a revocation petition alleging that
Owens had committed five violations of supervised release, including four new allegations
of criminal conduct. Two violations related to the same incident, for which he was charged
with first- and third-degree assault and battery in South Carolina state court.
The victim of the alleged assault testified at the revocation hearing. She stated she
went to Owens’s house after he took her dog without permission. When she entered the
home, he locked the door behind her and then bit her arm, choked her, and punched her
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repeatedly. Owens held her there over a period of about eight hours, during which she
passed in and out of consciousness.
She eventually escaped and sought help from a neighbor, who summoned the police.
The government introduced photos of her injuries, showing that she had two swollen black
eyes, bruises all over her body, and bite marks that pierced the skin.
After hearing the government’s evidence, Owens argued that the police
investigation was “surprisingly sparse” and that the victim wasn’t a credible witness. J.A.
74–76.
The district court found that the government had proved the relevant violations by
a preponderance of the evidence and that the conduct constituted first-degree assault and
battery, in violation of South Carolina Code § 16-3-600(C)(1)(b)(i). The court also
assessed the conduct as a Grade A violation. Owens didn’t object to the court’s
characterization of his conduct, nor did he challenge the ruling about the violation’s
severity.
The district court calculated the Sentencing Guidelines advisory range as 12 to 18
months’ imprisonment, based on the Grade A violation and Owens’s criminal history
category of I. The government requested a 24-month sentence, while Owens sought a
sentence within the guidelines range.
The district court revoked Owens’s supervised release and sentenced him to 24
months in prison, plus another 12 months of supervised release. As the court explained,
“the guideline imprisonment range of 12 to 18 months [was] inadequate” and an upward
variance was necessary, largely due to Owens’s “history of violence,” including a prior
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conviction for first-degree assault and battery, and the fact that he “beat the victim
unmercifully.” J.A. 84, 85, 87–88. The court also found that Owens, “as evidenced by his
criminal history, underlying offense, and the current violations, is aware of the
consequences of engaging in new criminal conduct and behavior and appears to have
little . . . regard for the conditions imposed by the court.” J.A. 85.
This appeal followed.
II.
Under the Sentencing Guidelines, Grade A violations include, among other things,
“conduct constituting” a state offense “punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding
one year” that “is a crime of violence.” U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1(a)(1) (2025). A “crime of
violence” is one that “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical
force against the person of another.” Id. § 4B1.2(a)(1).
We apply a categorical approach when analyzing whether a given statute meets this
definition, “asking whether an offense’s statutory elements necessarily require the use,
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.” United States v. Mack, 56 F.4th 303,
305 (4th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up). When a statute is “divisible,” meaning that it “lists
elements in the alternative,” we apply a “modified categorical approach that first identifies
what crime, with what elements, a defendant was convicted of and then asks whether that
offense satisfies the categorical approach.” Id. at 306 (cleaned up); see also Mathis v.
United States, 579 U.S. 500, 504–06 (2016) (explaining both analytical methods).
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We’ve held that first-degree assault and battery in violation of South Carolina Code
§ 16-3-600(C)(1)(b)(i) is a “crime of violence” for purposes of the guidelines. See Mack,
56 F.4th at 306. That statutory provision applies when a person “offers or attempts to injure
another person with the present ability to do so, and the act . . . is accomplished by means
likely to produce death or great bodily injury.” S.C. Code § 16-3-600(C)(1)(b)(i).
Mack’s conclusion rested on two determinations. First, that the level of force
required under the statute rose to the level of violent force. See Mack, 56 F.4th at 306.
And second, that the statute didn’t encompass acts committed recklessly. See id. at 307.*
Although we acknowledged that the statute doesn’t employ “traditional mens rea terms like
willfully, purposefully, knowingly, or recklessly,” we reasoned that “[i]t is hard to imagine
how a person could ‘recklessly offer’ or ‘recklessly attempt’ to do something.” Id.
Owens contends that the Supreme Court of South Carolina has recently undermined
this reasoning in United States v. Clemons, 901 S.E.2d 280, 284 (S.C. 2024), which held
that similar South Carolina offenses may be committed recklessly in at least some
circumstances. We are not persuaded.
For starters, Clemons involved criminal domestic violence of a high and aggravated
nature and second-degree assault and battery, not first-degree assault and battery. See id.
*
The Supreme Court held in Borden v. United States that a statute criminalizing
reckless conduct can’t qualify as a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act.
See 593 U.S. 420, 440 (2021) (plurality op.). Courts rely on precedent interpreting that
statute when evaluating whether an offense constitutes a “crime of violence” under the
guidelines, given the similarity of the statutory definitions. See Mack, 56 F.4th at 305 n.1.
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at 281. The South Carolina high court’s holding that those offenses may be committed
recklessly thus has no bearing on Mack’s analysis of first-degree assault and battery.
To be sure, the offenses bear some similarities. But all the Clemons court held was
that those other offenses may be committed recklessly “under some circumstances,”
without specifying what those might be. See id. at 284. Perhaps the court was referring to
parts of those statutes distinct from the one defining first-degree assault and battery.
Without further clarity, we can’t predict how the court would analyze that offense.
At most, Clemons suggests—but does not hold—that first-degree assault and battery
may also be committed recklessly. But the first-degree assault and battery statute is
divisible, see Mack, 56 F.4th at 306, so we’re concerned only with the offense for which
Owens was charged, see Mathis, 579 U.S. at 505–06.
Section 16-3-600(C)(1)(b)(i) applies to “offers or attempts to injure another person”
and Clemons itself notes that offenses “dealing with attempt may require specific intent.”
901 S.E.2d at 284. While Owens argues that Mack’s characterization of first-degree assault
and battery as divisible was erroneous, nothing in Clemons—a decision that doesn’t even
mention first-degree assault and battery—suggests otherwise.
III.
Even if Mack and Clemons are indeed in tension, it doesn’t follow that Owens would
prevail. Because he didn’t preserve this argument in the district court, we review for plain
error. See United States v. Simmons, 917 F.3d 312, 316 (4th Cir. 2019). Owens would
thus need to show “(1) that the district court erred, (2) that the error was plain, and (3) that
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the error affected his substantial rights.” United States v. Ojedokun, 16 F.4th 1091, 1113
(4th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Owens doesn’t say how the district court plainly erred in following a circuit
precedent that resolves the very same issue he raises on appeal. Indeed, we too are bound
to follow Mack, because “one panel cannot overrule a decision issued by another panel”
unless the prior decision “rests on authority that proves untenable.” United States v.
Williams, 808 F.3d 253, 261 (4th Cir. 2015) (cleaned up).
Owens has failed to clear this high bar. Accordingly, the district court’s judgment
is
AFFIRMED.
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