[Cite as Moore v. Moore, 2026-Ohio-4088.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
WOOD COUNTY
John D. Moore Court of Appeals No. WD-26-005
Appellant
Trial Court No. 2015DR0195
v.
Brenda Lee Moore DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Appellee Decided: October 16, 2026
*****
Sarah Haberland, for appellee.
Martin E. Mohler, and
Michael H. Stahl, for appellant.
*****
OSOWIK, P.J.
I. Introduction
{¶ 1} This matter is before the court on appeal of the judgment of the Wood
County Court of Common Pleas, denying appellant, John D. Moore’s motion to terminate or modify spousal support, finding him in contempt, and ordering him to pay appellee
Brenda Lee Moore attorney fees. Finding no error, we affirm.
II. Background and Procedural History
{¶ 2} Appellant John D. Moore (Husband) and appellee Brenda Lee Moore (Wife)
were married in 1989. On December 4, 2015, Husband filed a complaint for divorce on
the grounds of incompatibility and “by reason of the parties living separate and apart for
a period greater than one year without cohabitation.” Wife lived in Indiana at the time of
filing, and in her answer she admitted to the grounds alleged in Husband’s complaint and
asserted a counterclaim for divorce.
{¶ 3} On September 29, 2016, Husband filed a motion to amend his complaint to a
complaint for legal separation. In his motion, Husband stated that he and Wife “have
verbally reached a settlement agreement for all matters relevant to the requested legal
separation and therefore both parties anticipate the legal separation action proceeding
directly to a final hearing to permit the Court to consider the parties’ consent agreement.”
The trial court granted the motion to amend the complaint, and Husband filed his
complaint, alleging proper jurisdiction, and the matter proceeded to hearing on December
22, 2016.
{¶ 4} Following the hearing, the trial court entered a final decree of legal
separation by consent that required Husband to provide health insurance for Wife through
Husband’s employment, required Wife to pay for any medical costs not covered by
insurance, granted each party exclusive ownership of their respective property, vehicles,
bank accounts, and insurance policies, and divided the joint savings or checking accounts
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equally. The decree also equally divided the marital portion of Husband’s pension, with
the date of marriage determined as September 2, 1989 through August 29, 2016. Pertinent
to this appeal, the decree contained the following terms regarding support payments:
[E]ffective September 1, 2016, the sum of Five Hundred and Eighty dollars
($580.00) per week. [Husband’s] spousal support payment to [Wife] shall
be accomplished by weekly direct deposit or electronic transfer into
[Wife’s] bank account. Said support obligation shall continue until the first
occurring of any of the following: either party’s death, Wife’s remarriage,
Wife’s cohabitation with another unrelated male person as if married
without the benefit of a ceremonial marriage for a period in excess of thirty
(30) days, or [Husband’s] attainment of full retirement benefits from his
employer. Spousal support shall be modifiable as to the amount of said
support due to a substantial change in circumstances of either party as
defined within the Ohio Revised Code including, but not limited to:
[Husband’s] involuntary retirement from his employer due to disability[.]
{¶ 5} On June 26, 2023, Husband filed a motion to modify and/or terminate
spousal support, alleging that Wife is cohabitating with an “unrelated male person” and
that Husband’s earnings “have substantially decreased,” citing the provisions of the
separation decree permitting modification or termination of support for these
circumstances. On September 28, 2023, Husband filed a second motion, seeking to vacate
the separation decree for want of subject matter jurisdiction. In support, Husband argued
that after he filed his complaint for divorce, he relocated to another state and, therefore,
the trial court lacked jurisdiction to permit amendment to the complaint and enter the
separation decree. Wife opposed the motion to vacate the judgment. The trial court
scheduled the matter for hearing on the motions.
{¶ 6} On December 13, 2023, the parties appeared by Zoom for the hearing before
a magistrate. The only issue addressed was Husband’s argument regarding subject matter
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jurisdiction relative to the complaint for legal separation. Following hearing, the trial
court permitted written briefs as closing argument.
{¶ 7} On February 16, 2024, the magistrate issued the decision, denying the
motion to vacate and finding R.C. 3105.03 requires the plaintiff in a divorce or
annulment action to reside in the state for at least six months prior to filing the action,
with no such requirement for a legal separation. In distinguishing Husband’s legal
argument, the magistrate noted that legal separation actions are often commenced in cases
in which the residency requirements for divorce are not yet met, but the party wishes to
terminate the marriage, with only personal jurisdiction needed for the court to proceed.
However, in the present case, it was clear that Husband had resided in Ohio for the
required period prior to filing his complaint for divorce, satisfying the residency
requirements and establishing jurisdiction of the court over the action, with the
amendment under Civ.R. 15(C) providing continuing jurisdiction to enter the parties’
consent decree for legal separation.
{¶ 8} Husband filed objections to the magistrate’s decision, arguing the residency
requirement is necessary for separation actions and that the amended complaint that
converted the divorce proceeding to a legal separation proceeding did not relate back to
the initial complaint. On April 30, 2024, the trial court overruled the objections and
adopted the magistrate’s decision as the judgment of the court. Husband did not appeal.
{¶ 9} On June 28, 2024, Husband filed a motion to show cause, arguing that Wife
should appear and show cause why she continues to receive spousal support while
cohabitating with an adult male. Husband also filed a motion to escrow his support
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payments. Husband’s June 26, 2023 motion to terminate or modify the spousal support
order remained pending.
{¶ 10} On August 20, 2024, the magistrate held a hearing on Husband’s pending
motions. At the hearing, Husband and Wife resolved the pending motions by consenting
to terminating the spousal support order “forthwith,” and the magistrate issued a
judgment entry on September 11, 2024. The magistrate granted the motion to terminate
spousal support, according to the parties’ agreement, and denied the motion to escrow
support payments as moot. The magistrate dismissed the motion to show cause without
prejudice, granting Husband the right to refile the motion, including the following
language:
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any additional issues involving
the parties’ Qualified Domestic Relations Order, [Husband’s] claim for a
claw back of spousal support from [Wife] and reimbursement of fees and
costs shall be preserved, [Husband] shall be allowed to proceed in those
matters as he sees fit in the future.
{¶ 11} Following the termination of spousal support, by consent, Husband advised
his bank to stop automatic payments to Wife. The bank erroneously stopped payment on
two checks issued on August 9 and August 16, 2024, and Husband took no action to
restore those payments.
{¶ 12} On December 2, 2024, Wife filed a motion to show cause, based on
stopped payment orders placed on two support checks deposited into her account in
August, prior to the effective date of the termination of spousal support by consent in the
September 11, 2024 judgment entry.
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{¶ 13} On June 16, 2025, Husband filed a new motion to terminate or modify
spousal support, arguing that Wife was cohabitating with an unrelated adult male
beginning in December 2016, and seeking “remittance of all overpayments of support by
[Husband] to [Wife].” Husband maintained that all payments, including the two August
2024 payments, were overpayment to Wife and he was entitled to reimbursement.
{¶ 14} On August 14, 2025, the magistrate held hearing on Wife’s motion to show
cause and Husband’s most recent motion to terminate or modify spousal support. The
magistrate determined the court had jurisdiction over the matter and denied the motion to
terminate and/or modify spousal support. The magistrate granted Wife’s show cause
motion and found Husband in contempt for failing to pay the August spousal support to
remedy his bank’s error. Husband filed objections to the magistrate’s decision, with a
memorandum in support and transcripts of the hearings held August 20, 2024 and August
14, 2025.
{¶ 15} On December 29, 2025, the trial court overruled Husband’s objections and
adopted the magistrate’s decision as part of the trial court’s judgment entry. The trial
court found proper subject matter jurisdiction over the action, filed as a divorce but
amended to a complaint for legal separation, with a legal separation granted on December
30, 2016. The trial court further found that the parties terminated the spousal support
order within the separation decree by agreement, effective September 11, 2024.
{¶ 16} As to the pending motions, the trial court found the spousal support order
terminated with the agreed entry of August 20, 2024, and denied Husband’s motion to
modify or terminate the order. The trial court granted Wife’s motion to show cause and
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found Husband in contempt, imposing a suspended three-day jail sentence, with purge
conditions that included reimbursing Wife the sum of “two spousal support payments in
August of 2024 within thirty (30) days of Judgment Entry.” The court determined
Husband was in contempt – not for the stop payment order issued on the two August
checks, but for his failure to take corrective action upon learning of the bank’s action by
having the checks reissued to Wife or otherwise reimburse Wife for the bank’s error.
Finally, the trial court awarded Wife attorney fees pursuant to Local Rule 6.03(B)(3) in
the amount of $600.
{¶ 17} Husband filed a timely appeal of the judgment.
III. Assignments of Error
{¶ 18} In his appeal, Husband asserts the following as error:
1. The trial court erred in failing to address multiple objections raised by
[Husband], resulting in a “rubber stamp” of the magistrate’s decision
without any meaningful analysis.
2. The trial court erred in affirming the denial of [Husband’s] motion to
modify or terminate spousal support.
3. The trial court erred in making a contempt finding without permitting
[Husband] to “show cause” as to why he was not in contempt, and
further erred in imposing attorney fees.
IV. Analysis
A. Jurisdiction
{¶ 19} As an initial matter, we note that Husband challenged the trial court’s
subject matter jurisdiction over the proceedings, arguing that the trial court was without
authority to enter the December 30, 2016 decree of legal separation. While Husband does
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not specifically raise subject matter jurisdiction on appeal, parties may not waive the
requirement for subject matter jurisdiction. Wiczynski v. Hutton, 2024-Ohio-2660, ¶ 22
(6th Dist.), citing Eckart v. Newman, 2019-Ohio-3211, ¶ 8, fn. 1 (6th Dist.); see also
Rosen v. Celebrezze, 2008-Ohio-853, ¶ 45, quoting Pratts v. Hurley, 2004-Ohio-1980, ¶
11 (“subject-matter jurisdiction goes to the power of the court to adjudicate the merits of
a case”).
{¶ 20} “Because subject-matter jurisdiction is a condition precedent to a court’s
power to adjudicate and render judgment in a case, ‘[i]f a court acts without jurisdiction,
then any proclamation by that court is void.’” Ostanek v. Ostanek, 2021-Ohio-2319, ¶ 22,
quoting State ex rel. Tubbs Jones, v. Suster, 84 Ohio St.3d 70, 75 (1998) (additional
citation omitted..). The issue of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised by the court, sua
sponte. (Citation omitted) Doolin v. Doolin, 123 Ohio App.3d 296, 300 (6th Dist.1997).
Therefore, we address the issue as part of this appeal.
{¶ 21} Jurisdiction over divorce and legal separation proceedings is governed by
R.C. 3105.03, which provides:
The plaintiff in actions for divorce and annulment shall have been a
resident of the state at least six months immediately before filing the
complaint. Actions for divorce and annulment shall be brought in the
proper county for commencement of action pursuant to the Rules of Civil
Procedure. The court of common pleas shall hear and determine the case,
whether the marriage took place, or the cause of divorce or annulment
occurred, within or without the state.
Actions for legal separation shall be brought in the proper county for
commencement of actions pursuant to the Rules of Civil Procedure.
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{¶ 22} At the time Husband filed his complaint for divorce, he alleged that he had
resided in Ohio at least six months immediately prior to filing. In filing the amended
complaint for legal separation, Husband reiterated facts of his residency establishing
jurisdiction and did not include any facts regarding his residency at the time of
amendment. However, in amending his pleading, he sought only a legal separation, which
pursuant to R.C. 3105.03, does not have a jurisdictional residency requirement.
{¶ 23} In seeking a legal separation, the complaint only needed to be commenced
“in the proper county” under the Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g., Leathem v. Leathem,
94 Ohio App.3d 470, 472 (3d Dist.1994) (“Upon a party’s filing a complaint for legal
separation in the proper venue, the trial court has jurisdiction over the parties’ assets…”);
see also Gieg v. Gieg, 16 Ohio App.3d 51, 54 (11th Dist.1984) (R.C. 3105.03 creates
jurisdictional residency requirement for divorce or annulment, but the second paragraph
of the statute references only “commencement of actions pursuant to Civil Rules” with
Civ.R. 3 providing venue provisions). In this case, Civ.R. 3(C)(9) set forth the proper
venue for commencing an action for legal separation. Additionally, unlike subject matter
jurisdiction, parties may waive venue requirements and Husband never objected to venue,
but instead, chose the venue for his action. (Citation omitted) In re Guardianship of
Lavers, 2012-Ohio-1668, ¶ 21 (6th Dist.).
{¶ 24} Finally, even if a complaint for legal separation required demonstration of
residency as a jurisdictional matter, Ohio law provides a narrow exception regarding
subject matter jurisdiction and waiver, relative to the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction
in divorce proceedings. We have previously noted that “a litigant may not collaterally
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attack a divorce decree based upon the lack of subject matter jurisdiction… when the
factual predicate for such jurisdiction was originally admitted.” (Emphasis added.)
Wicynski, 2024-Ohio-2660, at ¶ 22 (6th Dist.), citing Eckart, 2019-Ohio-3211, at ¶ 23
(6th Dist.), citing Weightman v. Weightman, 1999 WL 354405, *2 (10th Dist. May 13,
1999).
{¶ 25} Here, Husband alleged facts supporting proper subject matter jurisdiction
in his complaint for divorce. In amending the complaint to a complaint for legal
separation, Husband reiterated facts regarding residency, and the matter proceeded
directly to the 2016 decree of legal separation, entered by consent and containing the
provision for spousal support. Husband did not contest the facts supporting the trial
court’s determination regarding proper jurisdiction over the proceedings prior to entry of
judgment. Husband raised the issue for the first time in 2023. Accordingly, even if a
complaint for legal separation had a jurisdictional residency requirement, the record in
this case demonstrates that narrow exception for waiver, relative to Husband’s collateral
attack on the consent decree for legal separation.
{¶ 26} Having found the trial court properly exercised jurisdiction over the
proceedings, we address Husband’s assignments of error, challenging the judgment.
B. Review of the Magistrate’s Decision
{¶ 27} In his first assignment of error, Husband argues that there was no
independent review of the magistrate’s decision to address Husband’s multiple
objections, arguing the trial court deferred to the magistrate’s finding regarding
jurisdiction and res judicata. In his objections, Husband challenged the magistrate’s
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determination that it lacked jurisdiction to address Husband’s claim to modify his prior
obligation for spousal support or consider evidence of Wife’s alleged cohabitation
beginning in December 2016. Based on Husband’s assertion that Wife’s cohabitation
terminated all obligation for spousal support beginning in December 2016, Husband
further objected to the contempt finding and the award of attorney fees.
{¶ 28} A trial court must conduct an independent, de novo review of the
magistrate’s decision “as to the objected matters to ascertain whether the magistrate has
properly determined the facts and appropriately applied the law.” Kopaniasz v.
Kopaniasz, 2024-Ohio-2493, ¶ 16 (6th Dist.), citing Brancatto v. Boersma, 2013-Ohio3052, ¶ 8 (6th Dist.) (additional citations omitted.). Our review of the trial court court’s
ruling on objections, however, is not de novo; we review the judgment for an abuse of
discretion. Kopaniasz at ¶ 17, citing Funkhouser v. Funkhouser, 2019-Ohio-733, ¶ 31 (6th
Dist.), quoting Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(d). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court
exercises its judgment, in an unwarranted way, regarding a matter over which it has
discretionary authority.” Sweet v. Sweet, 2024-Ohio-4824, ¶ 12 (6th Dist.), citing
Halbeisen v. Fantozz, 2023-Ohio-4340, ¶ 7 (6th Dist.), citing Johnson v. Abdullah, 2021-Ohio-3304, ¶ 35.
{¶ 29} In arguing an abuse of discretion, Husband contends that the trial court
ignored his objections and acted as a “rubber stamp” in adopting the magistrate’s finding
that the consent entry terminating the spousal support order precluded any subsequent
modification. Because Husband believed the trial court possessed jurisdiction over his
motion to modify spousal support, he also challenges the trial court’s finding of contempt
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and award of nominal attorney fees, pursuant to the court’s local rule. In short, Husband
claimed a right to recoup the overpayment to Wife based on her alleged cohabitation, a
terminating event for spousal support, and Husband believed the consent judgment
permitted that claim within the legal separation proceedings. The trial court disagreed and
determined it had no continuing jurisdiction to modify the spousal support order after
termination of the order by consent, further finding Husband’s claim for recoupment
barred by res judicata after settlement.
{¶ 30} As Husband argues, “[a] trial court may not merely rubber stamp a
magistrate’s decision.” Grubb v. Couture-Grubb, 2015-Ohio-74, ¶ 19 (6th Dist.).
However, the substance of Husband’s motion, decided by the magistrate, sought
modification of the spousal support award that had been terminated by consent judgment.
In addressing Husband’s objections to the magistrate’s decision, the trial court determined
it had no basis to consider Husband’s claim for recouping historic spousal support, based
on the alleged cohabitation, finding the court lacked jurisdiction to modify the spousal
support order after settlement and termination. Thus, while Husband argues the trial court
deferred to the magistrate’s findings, it is clear the trial court addressed the motion
seeking modification and applied the law as part of its independent review in overruling
Husband’s objections.
{¶ 31} The issue before the trial court was limited to Husband’s motion for
modification and the court’s authority to modify a spousal support order that was
terminated by the parties’ agreement. Based on this limited issue, the trial court’s ruling
on objections addressed the substantive issues raised, and we presume the trial court
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conducted an independent review lacking Husband’s demonstration to the contrary. Hine
v. Hine, 2019-Ohio-734, ¶ 5 (6th Dist.). Additionally, we find any failure to specifically
address each objection in turn resulted in no error. “When a trial court fails to expressly
address every objection to the magistrate's decision, ‘it is presumed that the trial court,
sub silentio, overruled the objections when it proceeded to enter judgment disposing of
the objections.’” Stump v. Stump, 2026-Ohio-3522, ¶ 14 (3d Dist.), quoting Shaffer v.
Shaffer, 109 Ohio App.3d 205, 212 (3d Dist. 1996); see also Syslo v. Syslo, 2006-Ohio6053, ¶ 30 (6th Dist.) (“Generally, if the trial court fails to rule on a motion or an
objection, an appellate court will presume that the objection or motion was overruled.”)
(citations omitted.).
{¶ 32} Considering the scope of the issues before the magistrate on Husband’s
motion, Husband sought to modify a spousal support order that had already been
terminated by agreement of the parties. The trial court found that the parties agreed to
terminate spousal support “forthwith,” and while Husband preserved his “claim for a
claw back of spousal support,” Husband referenced nothing in the consent entry that
contemplated continuing jurisdiction of the trial court to address such a claim.
Accordingly, we find no error by the trial court in conducting its own review of the issues
presented by Husband’s motion for modification and adopting the magistrate’s decision.
We find Husband’s first assignment of error not well-taken.
C. Husband’s Motion for Retroactive Modification of Spousal Support
{¶ 33} In his second assignment of error, Husband challenges the trial court’s
failure to conduct an evidentiary hearing regarding Wife’s alleged cohabitation and his
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claim for retroactive termination of his obligation to pay spousal support. Husband argues
that he presented evidence that Wife had been living with an unrelated male since
December 2016, and that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to consider this
evidence and order retroactive modification of his spousal support obligation.
{¶ 34} As previously noted, Husband filed a motion to modify his spousal support
obligation after he entered into an agreement to terminate the spousal support order
“forthwith.” R.C. 3105.18 clearly contemplates a court’s authority to “modify an existing
order for spousal support.” (Emphasis added.). Moreover, while the terms of the parties’
agreement included Husband’s preservation of his right to seek reimbursement of funds
he claimed to have overpaid, there were no terms expressing a reservation of jurisdiction
by the trial court to adjudicate such claims after the parties reached their settlement and
terminated spousal support.
{¶ 35} At the time the parties entered into an agreement to terminate spousal
support “forthwith,” there were divorce proceedings filed in another state. Husband’s trial
counsel outlined the agreement reached with Wife in the following colloquy with the
court:
COUNSEL: I represent the plaintiff, Mr. John Moore. And, Your
Honor, the motion that’s pending in front of you today, as you’ve said,
motion terminate and/or modify spousal support, it’s my understanding that
the defendant, Mrs. Moore, has agreed to terminate the support effective
today. The issues that we haven’t dealt with today relate to any claim for a
clawback and also show cause motion, which we would either leave in
abeyance or dismiss without prejudice with the right to re-file.
THE COURT: Okay. If we’re not going to – and I think I expressed
to counsel, I’m unable to continue the pending motion.
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COUNSEL: Right. We understand.
COURT: However, if there’s a provision that counsel wants to
dismiss with the right to re-file, I understand why you’d do that, given that
there’s litigation in another court that might be dealing with those things.
Following this exchange, the parties testified under oath regarding their
understanding of the settlement. As to his claim for overpayment of spousal support,
Husband testified in response to his trial counsel’s questioning:
Q: …And it’s my understanding, Mr. Moore, that you may have a
claim for monies that were paid to spousal support to Mrs. Moore, is that
correct?
A: Yes.
Q: And you also have some questions about the QDRO that was
apparently never filed in this case?
A: Yes, I ---Q: And you’ve been legally separated for about eight years now?
A: Yes, since December ’16.
Q: And you’ve paid spousal support dutifully all that time?
A: Yes, sir, I have.
Q: Okay. You understand now that the support is going to be
terminated as of today?
A: Yes, sir, I do.
Q: And the other issues are going to be either refiled or dealt with in
Indiana. Do you understand that?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Do you have any questions about the proceeding today?
15.
A: No. As long as there’s a chance for me to recover my money.
Q: Okay. You understand the Court is not dealing with that today?
A: Yes, I do, I understand that.
Q: And you may have a claim for fees and expenses, we’re not
dealing with that today as well.
A: Okay.
Q: Correct?
A: Yes, sir. I understand that.
{¶ 36} Wife similarly testified regarding her understanding of the agreement to
terminate spousal support and indicated she filed a complaint for divorce in Indiana,
which remained pending at the time of the hearing. Wife testified that no QDRO was ever
filed in the present case, and that she intended to pursue issues in her Indiana divorce
proceeding regarding life insurance policies that were paid.
{¶ 37} Following the parties’ testimony, the trial court accepted and approved the
consent agreement, terminating spousal support. Trial counsel for Husband agreed to
prepare the judgment entry for the court. The judgment entry recited no reservation of
jurisdiction for the trial court, but instead included only the following:
This 20th day of August, 2024, this cause came on for hearing on the
motion of [Husband to] modify or terminate spousal support. Appearances
were made by the parties and their counsel of record. It being represented to
the Court that the [Wife] has agreed to terminate the spousal support
payments from [Husband] forthwith, the Court finds, for good cause
shown, that the motion of [Husband] should be granted.
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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED
that the spousal support obligation of the [Husband] be terminated
forthwith.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the show cause motion filed by
[Husband] herein be dismissed, without prejudice, with the right to refile
the same against the [Wife].
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion of [Husband] to
escrow spousal support payments be dismissed as moot.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any additional issues involving
the parties’ Qualified Domestic Relations Order, [Husband’s] claim for a
claw back of spousal support from [Wife] and reimbursement for fees and
costs shall be preserved, [Husband] shall be allowed to proceed in those
matters as he sees fit in the future.
{¶ 38} In seeking to pursue his claim to recoup alleged overpayments of spousal
support, Husband filed a motion to modify the spousal support order, retroactively. The
spousal support order, however, terminated pursuant to the parties’ settlement. The
consent entry, drafted by Husband’s counsel, preserved Husband’s right to pursue his
“claim for a claw back of spousal support” but did not include findings reducing the
claim to judgment, and did not include language purporting to grant the trial court
continuing jurisdiction over a preserved claim.
{¶ 39} Procedurally, Husband’s complaint for legal separation had been granted in
2016, with no appeal, and Husband and Wife terminated the spousal support order as
resolution of their dispute over spousal support. Therefore, nothing remained pending
before the trial court at that time, although Wife had a pending divorce action in Indiana
and intended to pursue her additional issues in that jurisdiction. Husband’s motion to
modify the spousal support order, moreover, cited no authority that would permit the trial
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court to revisit spousal support after the parties resolved the matter through a consent
judgment, even if Husband purported to preserve claims independent of that resolution.
{¶ 40} In addressing Husband’s motion to modify the spousal support order, the
trial court determined the matter had been fully litigated and resolved through the parties’
settlement and agreed judgment terminating the order “forthwith.” Therefore, the trial
court determined Husband’s attempt to relitigate the issue of spousal support was barred
by res judicata. We agree.
{¶ 41} The parties fully litigated the matter before the trial court. Therefore, any
attempt to relitigate the issue of spousal support, after settlement, was barred by res
judicata as an issue previously determined by final judgment. See Blymiller v. Blymiller,
111 Ohio App.3d 644, 647 (7th Dist.1996), quoting Hicks v. DeLa Cruz, 52 Ohio St.2d
71, 74 (1977) (res judicata “embraces the doctrine of collateral estoppel,” preventing
subsequent litigation of issues already determined by a final judgment).
{¶ 42} While Husband claims that his obligation to pay spousal support should
have terminated in 2016, the time he believed Wife began cohabitating, this was a matter
to be litigated within the domestic relations proceeding, prior to final judgment. In
Blymiller v. Blymiller, 111 Ohio App.3d 644 (7th Dist.1996), the Seventh District Court of
Appeals considered a similar issue, where the parties settled all issues, including an
agreement that the husband would retain his military pension. After the agreed judgment
entry of divorce, the husband claimed his former wife had converted a pension check
through financial misconduct during the marriage. In affirming the trial court’s
determination that res judicata applied to this claim, the Seventh District held, “Under the
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facts of this case, the property interest of the parties relative to the proceeds of the
pension checks could have and should have been resolved in the domestic proceeding.”
Blymiller at 647.
{¶ 43} The judgment in this case may not preclude all subsequent claims by
Husband against Wife, but Ohio law precludes subsequent property-based injury claims
that were or could have been asserted in the domestic relations court. See Sullinger v.
Sullinger, 849 Fed.Appx. 513, 519–520 (6th Cir. 2021) (interpreting Ohio law), citing
Smith v. Smith, 2007-Ohio-512, ¶ 6 (9th Dist.) (wife’s post-decree challenge, asserting
entitlement to husband’s pension barred where the issue could have been raised in direct
appeal); see also Karras v. Karras, 2016-Ohio-8511, ¶ 21 (2d Dist.) (issue of the right to
possession was resolved in the probate proceeding, barring a different finding in a
subsequent forcible entry and detainer claim regarding the same property) (additional
citations omitted.). While the domestic relations court does not adjudicate property-injury
claims, that court does consider property-injury allegations in determining the “equitable
division of the property that is the subject of those claims” Sullinger at 520, citing Gibson
v. Gibson, 87 Ohio App.3d 426, 431 (4th Dist.1993). The record in this case demonstrates
a divorce proceeding filed by Wife in Indiana and pending at the time of the parties’
settlement within the Ohio case.
{¶ 44} Considering the facts in Husband’s case, he consented to termination of the
spousal support order without pursuing his claim for recoupment, then sought to modify
the support order after it was terminated. Husband cites no authority that would permit
the trial court to modify a terminated order, or address matters that could have been
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resolved prior to the parties’ agreement, ending the litigation. Accordingly, we find the
trial court correctly determined the motion to modify the spousal support order and
Husband’s claim for monetary damages was barred by res judicata. Husband’s second
assignment of error is not well-taken.
D. Contempt Finding
{¶ 45} In his third and final assignment of error, Husband argues the trial court
erred in not permitting evidence of Wife’s cohabitation so that Husband could
demonstrate he was not in contempt of the court’s order regarding spousal support and
the two August payments, canceled by his bank. Husband argues that “the contempt
finding must be vacated, along with the improper award of attorney fees.” Husband raises
no other legal challenge to the trial court’s imposition of attorney fees, pursuant to Wood
County Loc.R. 6.03(B)(3).
{¶ 46} “Contempt for non-payment of spousal support is governed by R.C.
2705.031. Failure to pay court-ordered spousal support is civil contempt.” Kim v. Kim,
2003-Ohio-4969, ¶ 11 (6th Dist.), citing Pugh v. Pugh, 15 Ohio St.3d 136, 139-140
(1984). In reviewing the trial court’s contempt holding, we will not reverse absent an
abuse of discretion. (Citations omitted) Kim at ¶ 4.
{¶ 47} Here, Husband does not dispute any of the facts underlying the trial court’s
findings. He does not dispute that two payments in August 2024 were canceled by his
bank and he does not claim that he repaid Wife the amounts erroneously withheld from
Wife. Instead, Husband’s argument rests on his assertion that he owed no spousal support,
retroactive to 2016, based on evidence of Wife’s cohabitation that the trial court would
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not consider. Having found no error in the trial court’s judgment, relative to Husband’s
motion to modify the spousal support order, Husband’s argument regarding contempt is
also without merit. Accordingly, Husband’s third and final assignment of error is not
well-taken.
V. Conclusion
{¶ 48} Based on the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the Wood County
Common Pleas Court. Husband is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to
App.R. 24.
Judgment affirmed.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
Thomas J. Osowik, P.J.
JUDGE
Gene A. Zmuda, J.
JUDGE
Myron C. Duhart, J.
CONCUR. JUDGE
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.
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