Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(E), the trial court and parties shall not take any
action in reliance upon this opinion until it is certified.
FILED
Oct 16 2026, 9:31 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana
Brian L. Walls,
Appellant-Respondent
v.
Stacy M. Walls,
Appellee-Petitioner
October 16, 2026
Court of Appeals Case No.
26A-DC-221
Appeal from the Hamilton Circuit Court
The Honorable Andrew R. Bloch, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
29C01-2401-DC-661
Opinion by Judge Brown
Judges Bailey and Weissmann concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-DC-221 October 16, 2026 Page 1 of 29
Brown, Judge.
[1] Brian L. Walls (“Husband”) appeals from the trial court’s decree of dissolution
of marriage and raises issues regarding child support, the division of marital
property, and child custody. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] Stacy M. Walls (“Wife”) and Husband were married in 2007 and have three
children, born in 2011, 2013, and 2017. In 2007, Husband was employed as a
paralegal at Simon Property Group, and Wife was employed as a paralegal for
the Marion County Prosecutor’s Office. In 2008, Husband was the mall
manager at Hamilton Towne Center. In 2009, he accepted a promotion as a
mall manager for another Simon Property Group mall, and the parties relocated
to Tulsa, Oklahoma. In Oklahoma, Wife worked as an advocate for the Tulsa
County Prosecutor’s Office. In October 2011, Husband accepted another
promotion as a mall manager for another Simon Property Group mall outside
Chicago, Illinois, and the parties relocated to the Chicagoland area. The parties
decided that it was best for Wife to leave the workforce. In August 2013, the
parties moved to Indianapolis, and Husband joined Keter Environmental
Services (“Keter”).
[3] In November 2021, a private equity firm acquired Keter, and Husband’s
ownership interest in the company yielded him approximately $3.6 million, of
which he reinvested or “roll[ed] forward” $1.0 million back into the company.
Transcript Volume III at 8. Husband’s employment with Keter ended in
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-DC-221 October 16, 2026 Page 2 of 29
January 2024, and his separation agreement provided that his compensation
would extend for approximately six months. Husband’s most recent position
with Keter was Chief Integration Officer, and his annual salary when his
employment ended was approximately $244,000 plus bonuses.
[4] On January 22, 2024, Wife filed a petition for dissolution of marriage. On
March 6, 2024, the parties filed a provisional agreement, which the trial court
approved. The agreement provided that Wife would have primary physical
custody of the children subject to Husband’s parenting time, the parties would
share legal custody with Wife having final decision-making authority if the
parties reached an impasse, Wife would have possession of the marital
residence and Husband would pay all costs associated with the marital
residence, and Husband would pay child support of $596 per week. 1 In June
2024, Husband purchased an ownership interest in Indy Trash Guy, LLC using
funds from his Keter severance payment, and he earns monthly gross income of
$5,000 from the company.
[5] On July 18, 2024, Husband filed a petition to modify provisional agreement
arguing that his severance income was ending on July 31, 2024, he was unable
to secure employment earning the same as his previous employment, and there
had been a substantial and continuing change of circumstances since the
parties’ provisional agreement. In August 2024, Wife obtained employment as
1
The child support obligation worksheet attached to the agreement included weekly gross income amounts
of $4,615.38 for Husband and $961 for Wife.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-DC-221 October 16, 2026 Page 3 of 29
a paralegal earning an annual salary of about $50,000. Wife filed a petition for
contempt and to enforce the provisional agreement alleging Husband violated
various provisions of the provisional agreement including that he did not pay or
reimburse her for certain expenses or provide certain information as required.
In a supplemental petition for contempt, Wife alleged that Husband unilaterally
reduced his child support payments to $120.39 for the weeks of August 16 and
23, 2024.
[6] On October 21, 2024, the court held a hearing. On December 12, 2024, the
court issued an “Order of October 21, 2024 Hearing” (the “December 2024
Order”) stating Husband “is Ordered to resume payments at the $596.00 per
week rate, and pay [Wife] the amounts of past due child support owed under
the prior provisional Order” and, “[a]lthough the amount of child support is
modifiable at any time, neither Party shall modify the amounts payable by way
of unilateral act.” Appellant’s Appendix Volume II at 44. The order also found
Husband’s obligation to carry health insurance for the children had lapsed due
to the cessation of available health insurance under his severance package,
ordered Wife to carry coverage for the children, and required Husband to pay
eighty-three percent of the premiums for the children’s health insurance. 2
[7] On January 13, 2025, Husband filed a “Motion to Correct Error” arguing that
his child support obligation under the provisional agreement was based on his
2
The court’s dissolution decree states that the December 2024 Order found Husband in contempt, but the
order did not make such a finding. The court should correct this error on remand.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-DC-221 October 16, 2026 Page 4 of 29
“current salary, which he will receive for a finite period” and his obligation was
“fully modifiable at any time” and that his July 18, 2024 petition alleged that
“his severance income was about to cease” and he “was unable to secure
employment at the same previous rate and was now earning $60,000.” Id. at
47-48. He argued, when his “severance income ceased, paying child support at
$596 per week and payment of all the marital expenses on a gross income of
$5,000 per month was wholly unreasonable.” 3 Id. at 49. He argued that he
filed his modification petition “approximately twenty-seven days prior to his
reduction in support payments to [Wife] on August 16, 2024.” Id. at 51. He
argued that he did not cease payments, but abated his payments. He argued the
court erred in denying his request to modify his support obligation. The court
denied Husband’s motion.
[8] The trial court held a final hearing over two days in September and October
2025. The multi-million dollar marital estate included the marital residence
without a mortgage, rental properties, investment and retirement accounts,
automobiles, a boat, cryptocurrency, and Husband’s interest in Keter. The
parties submitted proposed findings and conclusions.
[9] On January 20, 2026, the court entered a decree of dissolution of marriage.
The court found that Wife rebutted the presumption of an equal division of the
3
Husband also argued that his income “was not the only substantial change between March 6, 2024, and
October 21, 2024—[Wife] obtained employment. So, while $961 per week was imputed to her in the original
provisional support calculation, she was actually receiving $961 per week in gross income at the time of
hearing.” Appellant’s Appendix Volume II at 51.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-DC-221 October 16, 2026 Page 5 of 29
marital estate and that a distribution which resulted in Wife receiving fifty-five
percent of the marital estate was just and reasonable. The court awarded
physical custody of the children to Wife and awarded Husband parenting time
of every other weekend from Fridays after school until Sundays, every
Wednesday evening, and holidays, special days, and extended parenting time in
the summer as set forth in the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines. It ordered
that the parties share joint legal custody and that, if the parties reach an
impasse, Wife shall have final decision-making authority. The court also
ordered Husband to contribute $15,000 toward Wife’s attorney fees.
Discussion
[10] Husband challenges the trial court’s denial of his request to modify child
support, its division of marital property, and its custody determination.
Because the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, our
review is for clear error. Norris v. Norris, 275 N.E.3d 505, 509 (Ind. 2026). In
conducting this review, we determine whether the evidence supports the court’s
findings and whether those findings support the court’s judgment. Id. We do
not reassess witnesses’ credibility or reweigh evidence. Id. We will reverse only
if the findings lack factual support in the record or if the judgment applies the
wrong legal standard to properly found facts. Id. A finding or conclusion is
clearly erroneous if the appellate court’s review leaves it with the firm
conviction that a mistake has been made. Salyer v. Washington Regular Baptist
Church Cemetery, 141 N.E.3d 384, 386 (Ind. 2020).
A. Child Support
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-DC-221 October 16, 2026 Page 6 of 29 [11] Husband argues the court erred in denying his request to modify his support
obligation, his income fell from approximately $4,700 per week to $1,153.85 per
week, he paid a reasonable amount based on the parties’ actual incomes while
the petition was pending, and he did not act unreasonably as his income had
dropped by more than seventy-five percent. Wife argues that Husband resigned
from Keter of his own volition and reduced his support payment by nearly
eighty percent without judicial approval.
[12] Ind. Code § 31-15-4-15 provides “[t]he terms of a provisional order may be
revoked or modified before the final decree on a showing of the facts
appropriate to revocation or modification.” The provisional agreement
provided:
[Husband] shall pay provisional child support in the amount of
$596/week, pursuant to the [child support obligation worksheet]
incorporated herein, beginning February 16, 2024, and each
Friday thereafter, with the issue of retroactive child support a
reserved issue. The parties acknowledge that said sum is based on
[Husband’s] current salary, which he will receive for a finite
period. Both parties agree that provisional child support is fully
modifiable at any time.
Appellant’s Appendix Volume II at 40.
[13] Husband filed his petition requesting a modification of his support obligation
on July 18, 2024. Husband’s child support obligation of $596 per week was
based on his annual income of approximately $244,000 from Keter, and his
petition to modify provisional agreement stated that his severance income
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-DC-221 October 16, 2026 Page 7 of 29 ended on July 31, 2024. Also, we note that Husband’s severance agreement
contained a two-year non-compete provision. Husband purchased an
ownership interest in Indy Trash Guy, LLC in June 2024, and he receives
$5,000 per month in earnings from the company. Wife’s income is about
$50,000 per year. The parties expressly acknowledged in their provisional
agreement that they anticipated a reduction in Husband’s income and that
Husband’s support obligation was modifiable. Further, the court’s decree
found that the parties did not disagree as to their incomes for child support
purposes and referred to their exhibits stating weekly gross incomes of
approximately $1,153.85 for Husband and $961.54 for Wife. Based on the
evidence, we conclude the trial court erred in denying Husband’s July 18, 2024
request to modify his child support obligation. We remand with instructions to
calculate Husband’s weekly support obligation from July 31, 2024, 4 through the
date of the dissolution decree based on his weekly gross income of $1,153.85
during that period and to determine the extent to which Husband is entitled to
credit for any overpayment. 5
4
As noted, Husband’s petition to modify provisional agreement stated that his severance income ended on July 31, 2024.
5
Husband further argues the court’s December 2024 Order directed Wife to carry health insurance for the children and required him to pay a portion of her premiums even though he had obtained comparable coverage for the children. The child support worksheet attached to the provisional agreement included a credit for Husband for the payment of premiums associated with the children’s health insurance. The December 2024 Order found that Husband’s obligation to carry health insurance for the children had lapsed, ordered Wife to carry coverage for the children, and required Husband to pay a percentage of the premiums for the health insurance. The court on remand should calculate the cost of the children’s health insurance coverage after July 18, 2024, the portion of the premiums for which Husband was responsible based on his weekly gross income of $1,153.85, and any credit to which Husband is entitled.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-DC-221 October 16, 2026 Page 8 of 29 [14] Further, Husband argues that the decree “failed to allocate the child-related
income tax benefits between the parties.” Appellant’s Brief at 36. Husband’s
proposed order included a suggested allocation of the tax benefit. The court on
remand should determine the allocation of any such benefit and enter an
appropriate order.
B. Marital Property
[15] We next address the valuation and division of marital property. We review a
trial court’s division of marital property for an abuse of discretion. Roetter v.
Roetter, 182 N.E.3d 221, 225 (Ind. 2022). A trial court abuses its discretion if its
decision stands clearly against the logic and effect of the facts or reasonable
inferences, if it misinterprets the law, or if it overlooks evidence of applicable
statutory factors. Id. When the trial court enters findings of fact and
conclusions of law, an appellate court may set aside the trial court’s judgment
only when clearly erroneous. Id. The party challenging the trial court’s
division of marital property must overcome a strong presumption that the court
considered and complied with the applicable statute. Id.
[16] The division of marital property involves a two-step process. Id. at 226. First,
the trial court must identify the property to include in the marital estate. Id. at
226-227. This consists of both assets and liabilities and encompasses “all
marital property,” whether acquired by a spouse before the marriage or during
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-DC-221 October 16, 2026 Page 9 of 29 the marriage or procured by the parties jointly. Id. at 227. Once the court
identifies the marital estate, it must then distribute the property in a “just and
reasonable” manner. Id. (citing Ind. Code § 31-15-7-5). The court shall
presume that an equal division of the marital property between the parties is just
and reasonable. Ind. Code § 31-15-7-5. A party, however, may rebut this
presumption with relevant evidence showing that an equal division would not
be just and reasonable. Roetter, 182 N.E.3d at 227 (citing Ind. Code § 31-15-7-5). This evidence may include:
• each spouse’s contribution to the property’s acquisition,
regardless of whether the contribution produced any income;
• the extent to which a spouse acquired property, either before the
marriage or through inheritance or gift;
• each spouse’s economic circumstances at the time of divorce;
• the parties’ conduct during the marriage, as it related to the
disposal or dissipation of assets; and
• the parties’ respective earnings or earning ability.
Id. (citing Ind. Code § 31-15-7-5). This statutory list is nonexclusive, and no
single factor controls the division of property. Id. “So long as it expressly
considers all assets and liabilities, and so long as it offers sufficient findings to
rebut the presumptive equal division, a trial court need not follow a rigid,
technical formula in dividing the marital estate and we will assume that it
applied the law correctly.” Id. at 229. We review a trial court’s valuation of an
asset in a marriage dissolution for an abuse of discretion. Bingley v. Bingley, 935
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-DC-221 October 16, 2026 Page 10 of 29
N.E.2d 152, 154 (Ind. 2010). A trial court has not abused its discretion if
sufficient evidence and reasonable inferences support that valuation. Id.
1. Marital Residence
[17] Husband claims the trial court erred in its valuation of the marital residence.
The record contains appraisals of the marital residence of $750,000, $770,000,
and $880,000. The court valued the residence at $798,000. 6 Husband testified
that, unlike the other two appraisals, the appraisal for $750,000 did not assign a
value to the boat dock and improvements on the property. 7 He testified that he
made improvements to the dock by adding a lift and a canopy and that the
improvements cost about $25,000. As the appraisal for $750,000 did not specify
a value for the boat dock and improvements, we remand with instructions to
amend the dissolution decree to value the marital residence at $825,000, which
is the average of the other two appraisals, and to recalculate the portion of the
parties’ brokerage account to be awarded to Wife (or to divide other property)
to effect an aggregate division resulting in Wife receiving fifty-five percent and
Husband receiving forty-five percent of the marital estate.
2. Personal Property
6
Wife’s proposed findings included a value for the residence of $798,000.
7
The appraisal for $770,000 indicated an adjustment for the dock improvements of $25,000. The appraisal
for $880,000 indicated an adjustment for the improvements of $10,000.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-DC-221 October 16, 2026 Page 11 of 29 [18] With respect to the parties’ vehicles, Husband argues that Wife did not obtain
an appraisal of the Ford Bronco and included an inflated valuation of the
Bronco in her proposed division, and he maintains that his “valuation was
comparing apples to apples, while [Wife’s] was comparing apples to rotten
oranges or spoiled milk.” Appellant’s Brief at 32. Husband introduced Kelley
Blue Book estimates valuing the parties’ Ford Bronco at $38,336 and their Ford
Explorer at $8,609. 8 A spreadsheet submitted by Husband summarizing the
parties’ assets and debts indicated a liability associated with the Ford Bronco of
$49,352.66. Wife introduced an appraisal, dated September 4, 2025, of the
Ford Explorer indicating a value of $6,500 based on the vehicle having 145,891
miles. The record also includes a Kelley Blue Book valuation of the Bronco
indicating an estimated value of $46,351. 9 When asked on cross-examination,
the “real balance [of the debt on the Bronco] as of September 13, 2025, are you
aware, is $38,209.70,” Husband stated, “I’m not aware of the exact balance.”
Transcript Volume III at 98. When asked, “[a]re you aware that [the Ford
Explorer] has 150,000 miles on it,” Husband stated, “I am not.” Id. at 99. On
redirect examination, Husband indicated that he used Kelley Blue Book to
estimate the fair market values of both vehicles, that he was asked on crossexamination about the miles on the Explorer as of the date of the hearing, that
8
The estimate for the Explorer was based on the vehicle having 130,000 miles. The estimates for both
vehicles stated, “Valid . . . through 7/18/2025.” Exhibits Volume VI at 93, 97.
9
This exhibit appears to be a screenshot which does not include a date or the mileage upon which the
estimate was based.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-DC-221 October 16, 2026 Page 12 of 29
it had been nineteen to twenty months since he and Wife separated, and that
Wife did not obtain an appraisal of the Bronco in his possession. The trial court
valued the Ford Bronco at $46,351 with a debt of $38,209.70 and the Ford
Explorer at $6,500. 10 We find that the values the court assigned to the vehicles
were within the evidence and find no abuse of discretion. See Miller v. Miller,
265 N.E.3d 529, 531 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (“[T]he trial court has discretion in
valuing the marital assets to set any date between the date of filing the
dissolution petition and the date of the hearing.”) (citing Eyler v. Eyler, 492
N.E.2d 1071, 1074 (Ind. 1986)), trans. denied.
[19] Husband also argues the court erred in assigning the value of jewelry to him
“when the evidentiary record contains no testimony that [he] possessed any
jewelry or that jewelry was located in [his] possession rather than at the marital
residence.” Appellant’s Brief at 36. Wife responds, “[e]ven assuming arguendo
that this assignment was erroneous, any error was harmless” and “[t]he jewelry
was valued at $5,000 in a marital estate with a net worth exceeding $6.1
million.” Appellee’s Brief at 45 n.2. The court’s schedule of assets valued the
parties’ jewelry at $5,000 and assigned the value to Husband. To the extent the
parties did not present testimony of the value of the jewelry or that Husband
possessed the jewelry, the court on remand should correct its schedule and
10
The court’s schedule listing and providing values for the parties’ assets and debts appears to be nearly
identical to the schedule in Wife’s proposed findings. The schedule in Wife’s proposed findings, in assigning
the value of the Ford Explorer to Wife, appears to have mistakenly used a figure of $500 instead of $6,500.
The schedule in the court’s findings includes the same mistake. The court on remand should correct this
error.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-DC-221 October 16, 2026 Page 13 of 29
adjust the funds awarded to Wife to maintain an aggregate division resulting in
her receiving fifty-five percent of the marital estate.
3. Keter
[20] Husband argues, “[i]n light of the uncontroverted facts regarding the
speculative nature and illiquidity of the Keter reinvestment, the trial court
committed reversible error in both its valuation of the asset and the assignment
of the asset, at an improper value, solely to [him].” Appellant’s Brief at 31.
[21] Husband had an ownership interest in Keter, and a private equity firm
purchased the company in November 2021. During the examination of
Husband, the following exchange occurred:
Q What did that yield? Or what did that look like for you?
A So I think the number was like my share equated to about
$3.6 million. But they wanted all of us to roll over, roll
forward a minimum of $1 million, so you were basically
required to roll forward $1 million and then we got a check
for $2.6 million.
*****
Q What does that look like for you moving forward?
A I have zero control over it. It will – it’s payable when the
company next sells. So the current private equity company
when they next sell to either a strategic buyer or another PE
firm, it’s payable in some short window after that, I’m not sure
if it’s 30 days or what that is. And it could be worth $500,000.
It could be worth $2,000,000. I have no idea. I do not control
it and will not know until it actually sells. If it sells.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-DC-221 October 16, 2026 Page 14 of 29
Transcript Volume III at 8-9.
[22] When asked if he thought it was fair to place “that entire $1 million in your
column” on the balance sheet, Husband replied, “I do not” and testified:
It’s not liquid. It can’t be liquidated. It’s not even – like real
estate isn’t liquid, but you can liquidate it if you control it. There
is zero control over this. . . . [T]he value it could be worth zero
or it could be worth two and a half million. I have no way of
knowing. So I don’t think it’s fair to assign a $1,000,000
valuation on a $6 million maybe estate that’s completely out of
control with unknown future value.
Id. at 9. When asked, “[w]hat’s your proposal with respect to that
reinvestment,” Husband responded, “[t]hat we basically pull it off to the side,
split everything else, and then when that’s transaction, if and when that occurs
split whatever the proceeds are.” Id.
[23] The trial court assigned a value to Husband’s interest in Keter of $1.0 million.
We have found that a trial court is able under certain circumstances to
determine the value of a spouse’s ownership interest in light of marketability
and minority shareholder discounts. See Alexander v. Alexander, 927 N.E.2d 926,
937-939 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. However, Husband did not present
evidence regarding the extent to which his interest should have been discounted
or the proper basis for any such discount. Moreover, the court’s valuation was
not speculative and was based on the evidence that Husband’s “share equated
to about $3.6 million” and that, as part of the private equity firm’s purchase of
Keter in 2021, he “roll[ed] forward $1 million” of the proceeds he received into
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-DC-221 October 16, 2026 Page 15 of 29
the business. Transcript Volume III at 8. We cannot say the court abused its
discretion in valuing Husband’s interest in Keter or awarding the asset to him.
4. Post-Filing Increase
[24] Husband argues his brokerage account “reflected approximately $2.1 million as
of the balance sheet date,[11] but an additional approximately $500,000 in postfiling investment returns was also present in the account as of the time of final
hearing” and he “proposed that the post-filing investment returns from his
management of the account—built through his active investment strategy over
the course of the marriage—be allocated to him, as they resulted from his labor
and skill rather than from marital capital alone.” Appellant’s Brief at 34. He
also argues, “[s]imilarly, the trial court used present values for the mortgage
balances on the parties’ real estate investments rather than the mortgage
balances as of January 2024,” and that, “[b]y including the growth in the
marital estate, the trial court improperly divided [his] post-filing income.” Id.
[25] In the decree, the court found Husband “excluded approximately $500,000.00
of market gains from Fifth Third Brokerage account . . . , suggesting that he
should receive that value due to his co-management of that account with
[Husband’s broker] at Fifth Third Bank.” Appellant’s Appendix Volume II at
25. It also found Husband “used the date of filing mortgage balances on the
11
At trial, Husband referred to his summary of the marital assets which contained a date of January 22,
2024.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-DC-221 October 16, 2026 Page 16 of 29
parties’ five investment [] homes even though the rental income self-funded
payment of those mortgages, resulting in lower values for those assets assigned
to him.” Id.
[26] During his testimony, Husband indicated that he managed the investments in
the brokerage account. When asked, “[s]o you’re doing the direct trading in
that account,” Husband answered affirmatively. Transcript Volume III at 11.
The following exchange occurred:
Q Your value is just a little bit north of $2.1 million, is that
correct?
A Correct.
Q And then [Wife’s counsel’s] proposed value is a little bit more
the $2.6 million, is that correct?
A Correct.
Q What accounts for the difference in those two values?
A Stocks that I’ve purchased.
*****
Q So if you had to tell [the court] why that account has grown
by about half a million dollars, what would you tell him?
A I manage it every single day. Seven days a week. I look at
the account, review the opportunities available, make or
don’t make trades. A lot of it is not make a trade when the
world’s panicking and whatever April 1st this year was called
with tariff day and the market went, you know, lost a couple
hundred thousand dollars . . . . Not selling when things
looked really bleak. And then finding opportunistic buying
opportunities to add to it.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-DC-221 October 16, 2026 Page 17 of 29
Id. at 11-12. On cross-examination, Husband stated, “I would say that if that
should be part of the marital estate, then I’m happy to split it.” Id. at 104.
[27] This Court has noted a distinction between an increase in the value of marital
assets attributable to accumulated interest or appreciation of investments
following the date the dissolution petition was filed, which is divisible as
marital property, and an increase due to contributions from a party’s wages,
which is not included in the marital estate to be divided. See Thompson v.
Thompson, 811 N.E.2d 888, 918 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (“The difficulty
encountered with the valuation at bar is that the increase in the retirement
benefit’s post-filing value derives from two sources: (1) wages withheld from the
beneficiary’s post-filing income, and (2) the increases attributable to the interest
accumulated from the benefit’s value at the time of separation. The former
increase is the result of the beneficiary’s contribution from non-marital property
and may not be divided as a marital asset. The latter increase is the result of the
benefit’s mere existence and is divisible as marital property.”) (citations
omitted), reh’g denied, trans. denied; Niccum v. Niccum, 734 N.E.2d 637, 640 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2000) (“Myra is entitled and subject to any gains, losses and expenses
related to and permitted by the investment plan on her 50% share. However,
after the valuation date she is not entitled to any growth that results solely from
deposits made by John.”). As for the brokerage account, the increase
attributable to the accumulated interest or appreciated value of the assets
constituted marital property to be divided between the parties. We decline to
find that Husband’s management of the investments or trading—selecting funds
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-DC-221 October 16, 2026 Page 18 of 29
or stocks to purchase and deciding when to sell them—rendered the growth of
the funds to be akin to wages or to comprise contributions of non-marital
property. As for the rental properties, the court found the rental income funded
the mortgage payments which increased the parties’ equity in the investments.
Husband does not claim that he contributed funds to the brokerage account or
the rental properties from his separate post-petition earned income. We find no
abuse of discretion.
5. Division
[28] Husband argues the trial court’s “purported 55/45 division in [Wife’s] favor is
not supported by the statutory factors.” Appellant’s Brief at 37. A party may
rebut the presumption that an equal division of the marital property between
the parties is just and reasonable. Ind. Code § 31-15-7-5. To the extent
Husband does not challenge the court’s findings of fact, the unchallenged facts
stand as proven. See In re B.R., 875 N.E.2d 369, 373 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)
(failure to challenge findings by the trial court resulted in waiver of the
argument that the findings were clearly erroneous), trans. denied. The court
found the factors regarding the parties’ contribution to the acquisition of the
marital property and the extent to which the property was acquired through
inheritance or gift to be neutral, and it found the factors of the parties’ economic
circumstances, conduct during the marriage, and earnings or earning ability to
favor Wife. The court found that Wife had rebutted the presumption of an
equal division of the marital property and that an award of fifty-five percent of
the marital estate to Wife was just and reasonable.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-DC-221 October 16, 2026 Page 19 of 29 [29] With respect to the parties’ contributions to the acquisition of their property,
during the marriage Wife worked as a paralegal in Indianapolis until 2009 and
as an advocate in the prosecutor’s office in Oklahoma from 2009 through 2011,
at which point she left the workforce by agreement of the parties. Husband was
employed at Simon Property Group, working as a paralegal and then mall
manager in Indiana, Oklahoma, and Illinois, before returning to Indianapolis
and joining Keter, where he worked until 2024. A private equity firm
purchased Keter in November 2021, and Husband’s ownership interest yielded
him approximately $3.6 million, of which he “roll[ed] forward” $1.0 million
back into the company. Transcript Volume III at 8. Husband’s annual salary
when his employment with Keter ended was approximately $244,000 plus
bonuses. The parties owned the marital residence with no mortgage, held funds
in investment and retirement accounts, and accumulated five rental properties.
The court found that Husband worked long hours outside the home, worked an
average of 50 to 55 hours per week and 70 hours some weeks, traveled 15 to 25
nights per year, and was “on call 24/7” at Simon Property Group and Keter.
Appellant’s Appendix Volume II at 19. It found that Wife provided for all of
the children’s needs, helped them with homework, scheduled and attended all
of their appointments, attended parent-teacher conferences, drove them to
extracurricular activities such as swimming, gymnastics, soccer, dance, and
voice lessons, did the majority of the cooking for the children, and handled
most of the upkeep of the residence. Wife indicated that she “put [her] career
on hold for over 12 years to support him and the house so he could move up the
corporate ladder.” Transcript Volume II at 161. Given that both parties
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-DC-221 October 16, 2026 Page 20 of 29
contributed through their individual efforts, we cannot say this factor weighs
heavily in favor of either party.
[30] The parties agree that they did not receive inheritances or significant gifts. As
for dissipation, dissipation of marital assets refers to “the frivolous, unjustified
spending of marital assets,” and the test for dissipation “is whether the assets
were actually wasted or misused.” Goodman v. Goodman, 754 N.E.2d 595, 598
(Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (citation and quotation marks omitted), reh’g denied. We
cannot say the record reveals frivolous, unjustified spending by either party. As
for their economic circumstances, Wife lived in the marital residence with no
mortgage payment, and the marital estate to be divided was valued at over $6.0
million. The marital property included funds in brokerage or deposit accounts
totaling over $3.0 million, of which the court awarded nearly $2.2 million to
Wife, and retirement funds totaling over $730,000, of which it awarded about
$340,000 to Wife. The court awarded Wife the marital residence and awarded
Husband his $1.0 million interest in Keter, the parties’ rental properties with a
combined equity of over $370,000, 12 funds in brokerage or deposit accounts of
over $800,000, and retirement funds of over $390,000. This factor does not
weigh heavily in either party’s favor.
12
According to the court’s schedule, the value of one of the rental properties assigned to Husband was
$127,000, but the schedule also includes a value for the property of $27,000 in the column containing the
total of the parties’ assets. The court on remand should correct this error.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-DC-221 October 16, 2026 Page 21 of 29 [31] Finally, as for the parties’ earnings and earning abilities, Husband currently
receives gross income of $60,000 per year from Indy Trash Guy, LLC, and
Wife earns approximately $50,000 per year as a paralegal. Wife earned a
bachelor’s degree in legal studies in 2003, worked from 2003 through 2011, left
the workforce in 2011, and obtained employment as a paralegal in August 2024
following the initiation of the dissolution proceedings. Husband is a college
graduate and has worked for many years in a number of demanding and
lucrative positions and “made six figures” throughout most of the marriage.
Transcript Volume II at 161. This factor favors Wife.
[32] While certain facts may have supported a distribution more favorable to
Husband, the standard of review precludes us from substituting our judgment
for that of the trial court. See Roetter, 182 N.E.3d at 221 (“To be sure, . . .
certain facts may have supported a distribution more favorable to the [w]ife. . . .
But, at the end of the day, the standard of review precludes us from substituting
our judgment for that of the trial court.”) (citing Fobar v. Vonderahe, 771 N.E.2d
57, 59 (Ind. 2002) (emphasizing that, rather than reweighing the evidence, an
appellate court only considers the evidence “most favorable” to the trial court’s
judgment)). The trial court reached a reasonable conclusion based on the
evidence. As we consider only the evidence most favorable to the court’s
disposition, we cannot say that Husband has overcome the strong presumption
that the court considered and complied with the applicable statute or that the
trial court reached a just and reasonable conclusion. See Luedke v. Luedke, 487
N.E.2d 133, 135 (Ind. 1985) (observing it was apparent the trial court
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-DC-221 October 16, 2026 Page 22 of 29
considered the source of the property and painstakingly distributed the assets,
and holding the court reached its conclusion in a fair and reasonable manner on
the record and that reversal was not merited).
6. Orders
[33] Husband argues that the trial court’s decree “contains no orders requiring the
execution of title transfer documents, deed transfers, or assignment instruments,
nor any timelines for such transfers” and “lacks the language required to divide
any tax-deferred retirement assets without triggering immediate tax
consequences.” Appellant’s Brief at 35-36. On remand, the trial court’s
amended decree of dissolution should contain any directives necessary to
implement the division reflected in its property schedule within an appropriate
period of time, including any orders necessary to effect the transfer of or title to
the retirement funds, bank and investment accounts, and real property. The
amended decree should also specify the disposition of the parties’ boat and
corresponding debt. 13
C. Custody and Parenting Time
[34] A trial court’s custody determination is afforded considerable deference as it is
the trial court that sees the parties, observes their conduct and demeanor, and
13
While the court’s property schedule divided the value of the boat and associated debt between the parties,
it did not explicitly order a sale, indicate how the net proceeds in the event of a sale would be distributed or
affect the ordered property division, or specify which party was responsible for loan payments, insurance,
storage, and upkeep prior to the sale.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-DC-221 October 16, 2026 Page 23 of 29
hears their testimony. Kondamuri v. Kondamuri, 852 N.E.2d 939, 945-946 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2006). Thus, on review, we will not reweigh the evidence, judge the
credibility of witnesses, or substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. Id.
at 946. We will reverse the trial court’s custody determination only if it is
clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances or the
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Id.
[35] Husband “does not dispute that [Wife] was the primary caregiver during the
marriage while he was the primary earner” but argues “the circumstances
changed fundamentally when the dissolution was filed” and the evidence
“supports equal parenting time as in the best interests of the children.”
Appellant’s Brief at 26-27. He requests remand “with instructions to award
joint legal and physical custody with appropriate dispute-resolution
mechanisms.” Id. at 28.
[36] Ind. Code § 31-17-2-8 provides:
The court shall determine custody and enter a custody order in
accordance with the best interests of the child. In determining the best
interests of the child, there is no presumption favoring either parent.
The court shall consider all relevant factors, including the following:
(1) The age and sex of the child.
(2) The wishes of the child’s parent or parents.
(3) The wishes of the child, with more consideration given to the
child’s wishes if the child is at least fourteen (14) years of age.
(4) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with:
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-DC-221 October 16, 2026 Page 24 of 29
(A) the child’s parent or parents;
(B) the child’s sibling; and
(C) any other person who may significantly affect the
child’s best interests.
(5) The child’s adjustment to the child’s:
(A) home;
(B) school; and
(C) community.
(6) The mental and physical health of all individuals involved.
(7) Evidence of a pattern of domestic or family violence by
either parent.
(8) Evidence that the child has been cared for by a de facto
custodian, and if the evidence is sufficient, the court shall
consider the factors described in section 8.5(b) of this chapter.
(9) A designation in a power of attorney of:
(A) the child’s parent; or
(B) a person found to be a de facto custodian of the child.
[37] Ind. Code § 31-17-2-13 provides that the court may award legal custody of a
child jointly if the court finds that an award of joint legal custody would be in
the best interest of the child. Ind. Code § 31-17-2-15 provides:
In determining whether an award of joint legal custody under section
13 of this chapter would be in the best interest of the child, the court
shall consider it a matter of primary, but not determinative,
importance that the persons awarded joint custody have agreed to an
award of joint legal custody. The court shall also consider:
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-DC-221 October 16, 2026 Page 25 of 29
(1) the fitness and suitability of each of the persons awarded
joint custody;
(2) whether the persons awarded joint custody are willing and able
to communicate and cooperate in advancing the child’s welfare;
(3) the wishes of the child, with more consideration given to the
child’s wishes if the child is at least fourteen (14) years of age;
(4) whether the child has established a close and beneficial
relationship with both of the persons awarded joint custody;
(5) whether the persons awarded joint custody:
(A) live in close proximity to each other; and
(B) plan to continue to do so; and
(6) the nature of the physical and emotional environment
in the home of each of the persons awarded joint custody.
We do not disturb the trial court’s findings of fact which Husband does not
challenge. See In re B.R., 875 N.E.2d at 373 (failure to challenge findings results
in waiver).
[38] The trial court found that both parties love their children. The court found that
Husband worked long hours, “typically finishing work between 7:00 p.m. and
8:30 p.m. and sometimes later,” he purchased an ownership interest in Indy
Trash Guy, LLC in 2024, and he “works basically the same hours with this
start-up company.” Appellant’s Appendix Volume II at 19, 21. It found Wife
“has a flexible work schedule to accommodate her caring for the children and
can often work from home.” Id. at 21. It found Wife believes the “tie-breaking
arrangement is best because she does not believe [Husband] has the desire to coCourt of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-DC-221 October 16, 2026 Page 26 of 29 parent – especially with [the oldest child’s] mental health issues,” Wife believes
Husband will “disagree with her because he hates her,” “[Husband’s] dislike of
[Wife] was palpable in the court room on all occasions they appeared in
Court,” and “[t]he parties’ communications are not good.” Id. at 22. The court
found that Husband had an affair with a subordinate at Keter. It found that, on
January 17, 2024, the parties had a domestic dispute which resulted in criminal
charges against Husband and that he later accepted a diversion of those
criminal charges. The court found that a neighbor testified that Wife was a very
involved mother who walked the children to the bus stop and played outside
with and instructed the children, that Husband was not as involved and worked
long hours, returning to the residence after 8:00 p.m. or 9:00 p.m., Husband
was often gone on weekends, and Wife was the primary caregiver of the
children as a stay-at-home mom. It found that Scott Jones, a mental health
professional, testified that Husband sought to have his patient records altered
and the communications with Husband were tense. The court found that
Husband’s “testimony in several areas lacked credibility and must be
discounted” and he “had no trouble recalling details which he perceived
favorable to his case but was less certain and more confrontational with respect
to facts he felt did not favor his case.” Id. at 24. The court awarded physical
custody of the children to Wife, awarded Husband parenting time consistent
with the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines, and ordered the parties to share
joint legal custody and that, if the parties reach an impasse, Wife shall have
final decision-making authority. Our review of the record does not leave us
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-DC-221 October 16, 2026 Page 27 of 29
with a firm conviction that a mistake has been made, and we do not disturb the
trial court’s custody and parenting time determinations.
D. Attorney Fees
[39] Husband argues the court erred in ordering him to contribute $15,000 toward
Wife’s attorney fees. We review a trial court’s decision to award attorney fees
in connection with a dissolution decree for an abuse of discretion. Thompson,
811 N.E.2d at 927. When making such an award, the court considers the
resources of the parties, their economic conditions, the ability of the parties to
engage in gainful employment, to earn adequate income, and other factors that
are pertinent to the reasonableness of the award. Id. Consideration of these
factors furthers the legislative purpose behind the award of attorney fees, which
is to provide access to an attorney to a party in a dissolution proceeding who
would not otherwise be able to afford one. Id. at 928. In light of the parties’
significant resources and award to Wife of fifty-five percent of the marital
estate, including nearly $2.2 million in brokerage or deposit accounts, we
reverse the trial court’s order that Husband make a payment toward Wife’s
attorney fees.
[40] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for
entry of an amended decree of dissolution consistent with this opinion.
[41] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Bailey, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-DC-221 October 16, 2026 Page 28 of 29 ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Melanie K. Reichert
Broyles & Ricafort, P.C.
Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Andrew Z. Soshnick
Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP
Indianapolis, Indiana
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-DC-221 October 16, 2026 Page 29 of 29