Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(E), the trial court and parties shall not take any
action in reliance upon this Opinion until it is certified.
IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana
FILED
C.J.W., Oct 16 2026, 10:06 am
Appellant-Respondent CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
v.
T.H.,
Appellee-Petitioner
October 16, 2026
Court of Appeals Case No.
26A-AD-1225
Appeal from the Gibson Circuit Court
The Honorable Jeffrey F. Meade, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
26C01-2411-AD-1849
Opinion by Judge DeBoer
Judges Foley and Felix concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-AD-1225 October 16, 2026 Page 1 of 25
DeBoer, Judge.
Case Summary
[1] T.H. (Stepfather) filed a petition to adopt his minor stepson (Child). Child’s
mother, M.H. (Mother), consented to the adoption, but Child’s biological
father, C.J.W. (Father), opposed it. Ultimately, the trial court determined
Father’s consent was not required, found adoption was in Child’s best interest,
and granted the adoption petition. Father appeals, raising three issues which
we restate as:
1) Whether Stepfather was prohibited from adopting Child because of a
previous conviction for Level 5 criminal recklessness;
2) Whether the trial court clearly erred in concluding Father’s consent was
not required; and
3) Whether the trial court clearly erred in concluding adoption by
Stepfather was in Child’s best interest.
[2] The first issue presents a novel question of statutory interpretation, which we
answer by holding Stepfather could adopt Child because his conviction was
more than five years old when the court granted the petition. On the second
and third issues, we find the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the
judgment, does not necessarily lead to conclusions opposite those made by the
trial court. We therefore affirm the court’s decision.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] Child was born in June 2020. Father and Mother never married, had a
mentally and physically abusive relationship, and they broke up about a month
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-AD-1225 October 16, 2026 Page 2 of 25
before Child’s first birthday. Mother started dating Stepfather shortly after that
and married him in October 2021. Since 2021, Stepfather has lived with
Mother, Child, and Mother’s grandparents.
[4] Father last saw Child at his first birthday party in June 2021. Over the next
three years, Father maintained residences in Indiana but often left the state,
spending months at a time in California, Oklahoma, and West Virginia. In July
2021, Mother obtained a protective order against Father, which prohibited him
from contacting her, Stepfather, and Child. The protective order was issued
while Father was in California, and on July 27, 2021, the unserved order was
returned to the court. Consequently, Father was not initially aware that the
protective order had been issued.
Paternity Proceedings
[5] In October 2021, the State initiated a paternity action against Father. 1 Mother
and Father appeared for a hearing on December 7, 2021, during which Father
learned of the protective order. Ater the hearing, the paternity court issued a
support order providing, in part:
Mother has no objection to Father having supervised parenting
time. Therefore, Father . . . shall be given supervised parenting
time at Mother’s discretion . . . . Both Mother and Father
recognize that the Protection Order currently in effect supersedes
1
Though copies of records from the paternity action were not admitted into evidence, the trial court took
judicial notice of them at the final hearing in this matter on April 2, 2026. We’ve accessed the paternity
proceedings using our Odyssey Case Management System.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-AD-1225 October 16, 2026 Page 3 of 25
this case and supervised parenting time will not occur until the
protective order is no longer in effect.[ 2]
The protective order expired in July 2023, but Father never had parenting time
with Child after that date.
Adoption Petition
[6] On November 4, 2024, Stepfather filed a petition seeking to adopt Child, to
which Mother consented. The petition alleged Father’s consent was not
required because, amongst other reasons, Child had been out of Father’s
custody for more than a year, during which time Father “failed, without
justifiable cause, to communicate significantly with [Child] when able to do
so.” Appellant’s Appendix at 14. In the petition, Stepfather disclosed
convictions for Level 5 felony criminal recklessness under Cause Number
26D01-2002-F5-257 and Class C misdemeanor operating a vehicle while
intoxicated under Cause Number 26D01-1903-CM-261. 3
[7] Later that month, Father filed a pro se objection to the adoption in which he
alleged he had tried to communicate with Child but did not have Mother’s
current contact information and did not know where Child was living. Father
also expressed a desire to be a part of Child’s life. After an initial status hearing
in December, a public defender was appointed to represent Father in the
2
Support Order at 1 (December 17, 2021) (No. 26C01-2110-JP-205).
3
The criminal recklessness conviction was entered on June 25, 2020, and the operating while intoxicated
conviction on March 20, 2019.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-AD-1225 October 16, 2026 Page 4 of 25
adoption matter. The court bifurcated the proceedings, meaning it would first
resolve whether Father’s consent was required before holding a hearing on
whether the adoption was in Child’s best interest.
Consent Hearing
[8] On March 18, 2025, the parties appeared for a hearing on the issue of consent.
Stepfather called three witnesses in his case-in-chief, including Father, Mother,
and Father’s stepfather (Grandfather). Father acknowledged he had not seen
Child (who was almost five years old at the time of the hearing) in person since
his first birthday. Father claimed that while he was in California and
Oklahoma, Mother allowed him to speak with Child on video calls, but that
contact stopped after Mother blocked him on Facebook.
[9] When asked to describe “all of the things [he’d] done to try to see [Child] in
th[e last] four years,” Father said that six months before the consent hearing, he
tried to file a motion with the paternity court “to have visitation rights.”
Transcript at 11. He claimed he was unable to file that motion because he
didn’t know Mother’s address, and he admitted he hadn’t tried again to file
anything in the paternity action. He also claimed that at some point he tried to
contact Mother through her grandmother, but those attempts were
unsuccessful.
[10] Father said his relationship with Mother was “toxic[,]” and he described how
he frequently argued with her while they were together. Id. at 14. He admitted
to “smack[ing] her” on one occasion and, on another, calling the police to their
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-AD-1225 October 16, 2026 Page 5 of 25
home after she punctured the tire on his vehicle. Id. He claimed, however, that
Child never witnessed his arguments with Mother.
[11] Mother testified that during their relationship, Father subjected her to mental
and physical abuse on a daily basis. She described some of the injuries Father
had inflicted on her, including bite marks, a busted lip, bruises on her legs, and
an earring ripped from her ear. According to Mother, Father had punched her
in the head one time when she was pregnant with Child, and the incidents of
abuse continued after she gave birth.
[12] Mother described filing for the protective order because she was afraid Father
would kill her, Child, and Stepfather. Father also threatened “to take [Child]
and never give him back.” Id. at 33. Given her fear of Father, Mother
intentionally concealed her whereabouts from Father by telling his grandmother
she had moved. Mother testified that after the protective order expired, Father
did not reach out to schedule supervised parenting time. Had he done so,
Mother said she would have allowed him to exercise supervised visitation.
[13] Grandfather confirmed that Father and Mother’s relationship was “pretty
toxic” but claimed he did not witness any physical abuse. Id. at 47. He then
described “a big blow up” between Mother and Father in April 2021. Id. at 48.
After that incident, Grandfather sent a text message to Mother advising her to
“get [Child] and stay somewhere tonight that [Father] isn’t familiar with”
because Father was “talking pretty crazy stuff” and might “go off the deep
end.” Id. When asked why he sent that message, Grandfather said Father had
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-AD-1225 October 16, 2026 Page 6 of 25
threatened to kill Mother, her family, and himself, and Grandfather “thought
that he was going to by the way he was talking.” Id. at 51.
[14] During his presentation of evidence, Father called his grandmother (GreatGrandmother 1), sister (Aunt), and mother (Grandmother). GreatGrandmother 1 described driving from her home in West Virginia to visit Child
in mid-2022. At the end of the visit, which lasted about forty-five minutes,
Mother told Great-Grandmother 1 she was “not allowed to see [Child]
anymore because it would confuse him if [she wasn’t] going to be in his life all
the time.” Id. at 57. Great-Grandmother 1 did not try to see Child again, even
after she moved to Indiana in 2023.
[15] Aunt described trying to contact Mother and Stepfather three or four times on
social media platforms and through text messages, but they never responded.
She also claimed that she believed Mother and Stepfather had blocked her
social media accounts. Grandmother similarly claimed that Mother blocked
her on Facebook in 2021, though she did not try to contact Child again after
learning about the protective order in December 2021.
[16] After the close of evidence and hearing the parties’ arguments, the trial judge
ruled from the bench that Stepfather had shown by clear and convincing
evidence that for more than a year, Father had failed without justifiable cause
to communicate significantly with Child. The court considered that although
Father claimed he did not have a way to contact Mother, he failed to file
anything in the paternity action seeking visitation after the protective order
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-AD-1225 October 16, 2026 Page 7 of 25
expired. After the hearing, the court issued a written order finding Father’s
consent was “not required for the adoption to proceed.” Appellant’s App. Vol.
2 at 30.
Father’s Motion to Deny Adoption Petition
[17] On April 30, 2025, Father filed a Motion to Deny Adoption Petition alleging
Stepfather did “not meet the statutory requirements of Indiana Code [section]
31-19-11-1(c).” Id. at 31. That statute bars an adoption if the petitioner was
convicted of certain “nonwaivable” offenses, including felony criminal
recklessness, “within the immediately preceding five (5) year period.” Ind.
Code § 31-19-11-1(c)(3) (2026). 4 According to Father, Stepfather’s June 2020
criminal recklessness conviction was less than five years old when he filed the
adoption petition in November 2024, making him ineligible to adopt.
Stepfather responded by arguing, in part, that the five-year disqualification
period was set to expire on June 25, 2025, which at that time was less than two
4
Minor amendments were made to Indiana Code section 31-19-11-1 while this appeal was pending. Because
those amendments do not affect the substance of the statute, we elect to apply the current version.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-AD-1225 October 16, 2026 Page 8 of 25
months away. The trial court took no action on Father’s motion and moved
forward with the second phase of the proceedings on April 2, 2026. 5
Best-Interest Hearing
[18] Stepfather called four witnesses at the April 2026 best-interest hearing: Mother,
Father, Mother’s Grandmother (Great-Grandmother 2), and himself. Mother
described living with Stepfather in Great-Grandmother 2’s home shortly before
Child’s first birthday and that Stepfather has been Child’s father figure since
that time. Mother and Stepfather had another son after getting married, and he
and Child have a strong bond, sleep in bunkbeds, and enjoy hiking, mushroom
hunting, bike riding, and swimming together. Mother testified she “absolutely
consent[ed] to th[e] adoption.” Tr. at 88. She also explained Father had never
requested visitation with Child. She reiterated she would not have denied a
request for visitation if Father had made one after the protective order expired
in 2023.
[19] Mother spoke more about the verbal and physical abuse she suffered during her
relationship with Father, which continued through the first ten months of
5
Attorney conferences were held on May 15, June 6, and July 22, 2025. At the May 15 conference, Father’s
counsel indicated the parties wanted to “make argument[s]” but asked for a continuance to “continue to do
some research and . . . exchange information.” Tr. at 81. It is unclear from the record before us whether
Father’s counsel was referring to a need to hold argument on the motion to deny the adoption, or another
pending motion about Father’s standing to participate in the second phase of the proceedings. On June 6,
Father’s counsel indicated the parties agreed to reset the conference again, moving it to July. We were not
provided with a transcript of the July 22 conference, but the hearing journal entry provides that the parties
discussed whether Father could participate “after consent [was] found not to be required . . . .” Appellant’s
App. Vol. 2 at 6. The court ultimately ruled that Father could participate in the second phase, but that order
did not address Father’s motion to deny the adoption.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-AD-1225 October 16, 2026 Page 9 of 25
Child’s life. Because of that abuse, Mother has PTSD and attends therapy
twice per month. Mother’s PTSD has affected her relationship with Stepfather,
particularly during one incident in September 2022. That night after work,
Mother was using the bathroom while Stepfather was in the shower. Stepfather
got out of the shower and reached around Mother for a towel, which made
Mother panic because she thought Stepfather was going to hit her. She
crumpled to the ground, flailed her arms, and struck herself in the face. GreatGrandmother 2 heard this incident, but did not see it, and the police were called
to the scene. Stepfather was charged with domestic battery, but the case was
later dismissed. At the best-interest hearing, Mother denied any domestic
violence between her and Stepfather.
[20] Father testified about his time outside of Indiana in the years after his
relationship with Mother. He described being convicted of driving under the
influence in Oklahoma and having an active warrant there for violating the
terms of his probation. He again acknowledged his tumultuous relationship
with Mother but denied hitting her while she was pregnant. He also claimed
that after the September 2022 incident, Mother called him, said Stepfather “beat
her up,” and asked Father “to come have drinks with her at a bar.” Id. at 112.
Father said he refused to meet with Mother because of the protective order.
[21] As for Mother’s claim that he had not tried to have visitation with Child, Father
said he contacted the supervised visitation center to schedule visits
approximately three or four times in the past year. When those requests went
unanswered, he blamed his failure to take action in the paternity case on his
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-AD-1225 October 16, 2026 Page 10 of 25
lack of legal training and his inability to afford an attorney to help him. Father
conceded Child deserves stability and consistency, and he had “not been able to
give consistency to him.” Id. at 118.
[22] Great-Grandmother 2 explained that Mother and Stepfather lived with her
since they married, have a stable relationship, and are “very loving [to] their
children.” Id. at 122. When asked to describe Stepfather’s relationship with
Child, she said “[h]e takes good care of [Child]” and often spends time with
him fishing, hunting, and doing other outdoor activities. Id. She said that
while Mother and Stepfather occasionally had loud arguments, she had never
seen any violence between them. In contrast, when Mother and Father were
together, Great-Grandmother 2 often heard hitting and crying coming from
their room. Great-Grandmother 2 also said on two occasions, her entire
household had to leave home for the night because she thought Father would
hurt her, Mother, Child, and other family members. She added that Father had
not tried to get in contact with her since shortly after Child’s first birthday in
2021.
[23] Next, Stepfather testified that he never hit Mother, including during the
incident in 2022. Stepfather also explained that the circumstances surrounding
his November 2020 criminal recklessness conviction occurred before he met
Mother and stemmed from a depressive episode he went through in February of
that year where he fired a gun at the ground and threatened to commit suicide.
After that incident, Stepfather began attending therapy and taking medication
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-AD-1225 October 16, 2026 Page 11 of 25
for anxiety and ADHD. He then discussed his 2019 OWI conviction, testifying
that he successfully completed probation and participated in AA.
[24] Finally, Stepfather testified that he has a close bond with Child, he “raised”
Child, and Child has “always called [him] Dad.” Id. at 136. He said raising
Child became his “main focus” after he began dating Mother, and he worries
about his children (including Child) “more than anything in the world.” Id. at
147. According to Stepfather, Mother had never prevented Father from
communicating with Child, and Father’s absence was “attributable to a lack of
effort by [Father].” Id. at 140.
The Trial Court’s Judgment
[25] On April 9, 2026, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law
in an order granting Stepfather’s petition to adopt Child and terminating
Father’s parental rights. Father now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[26] A trial court’s authority to grant or deny an adoption petition is governed by
Indiana Code section 31-19-11-1. Under that statute, the court must grant the
petition if it finds, as relevant here, “the adoption requested is in the best
interest of the child;” “proper consent, if consent is necessary, to the adoption
has been given;” and “the petitioner for adoption is not prohibited from
adopting the child as the result of an inappropriate criminal history described in
subsection (c) . . . .” I.C. § 31-19-11-1(a)(1, 7-8).
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-AD-1225 October 16, 2026 Page 12 of 25 [27] When reviewing an adoption decree, “we presume that the trial court’s decision
is correct, and the appellant bears the burden of rebutting this presumption.” In
re Adoption of O.R., 16 N.E.3d 965, 972 (Ind. 2014) (quoting In re Adoption of
J.L.J., 4 N.E.3d 1189, 1194 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied). In family law
matters, we show considerable deference to the trial court, recognizing “the trial
judge is in the best position to judge the facts, determine witness credibility, ‘get
a feel for the family dynamics,’ and ‘get a sense of the parents and their
relationship with their children.’” Id. at 973 (quoting MacLafferty v. MacLafferty,
829 N.E.2d 938, 940 (Ind. 2005)). We will not disturb the trial court’s decision
“unless the evidence leads to but one conclusion and the trial judge reached an
opposite conclusion.” In re Adoption of C.A.H., 136 N.E.3d 1126, 1128 (Ind.
2020) (quoting In re Adoption of T.L., 4 N.E.3d 658, 662 (Ind. 2014)).
[28] We will reverse the trial court’s findings and judgment only if they are clearly
erroneous. Adoption of O.R., 16 N.E.3d at 973. Clear error occurs “when there
is no evidence supporting the findings or the findings fail to support the
judgment.” Id. (quoting In re Paternity of K.I., 903 N.E.2d 453, 457 (Ind. 2009)).
We examine only the evidence most favorable to the judgment and will neither
reweigh evidence nor assess witness credibility. Id. We show no deference,
however, to the court’s legal conclusions. In re Adoption of A.M., 930 N.E.2d
613, 616 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-AD-1225 October 16, 2026 Page 13 of 25
1. Stepfather’s Criminal Recklessness Conviction
[29] Father first argues the trial court should have denied Stepfather’s petition
because of his criminal recklessness conviction. An adoption petition cannot be
granted if the petitioner has been convicted of any “nonwaivable offense . . . ,”
I.C. § 31-19-11-1(c), including felony criminal recklessness, Ind. Code § 31-9-2.1-168(11) (2026). 6 But such a conviction is not disqualifying “if the date of
the conviction did not occur within the immediately preceding five (5) year
period.” 7 I.C. § 31-19-11-1(c). The parties here disagree on the meaning of the
phrase “immediately preceding five (5) year period.” According to Father,
subsection (c) prohibited Stepfather from adopting because his conviction was
less than five years old when he filed the petition. But Stepfather argues the
petition was properly granted because the conviction was more than five years
old “when the court act[ed] on the petition . . . .” Appellee’s Br. at 20 (emphasis
added).
[30] Because no Indiana appellate court has previously addressed what date
subsection (c) sets as the anchor to calculate the five-year disqualification
period, it is an issue of first impression. Statutory interpretation is a question of
law reviewed de novo. R.R. v. State, 106 N.E.3d 1037, 1040 (Ind. 2018). Our
6
The definition of “nonwaivable offense” was previously provided by Indiana Code section 31-9-2-84.8,
which was repealed and recodified as section 31-9-2.1-168 effective July 1, 2026, while this appeal was
pending. Because recodification did not change the substance of the definition, we again elect to apply the
current statute. See supra note 4.
7
The statutory definition of “nonwaivable offense” similarly excludes felony criminal recklessness if the
conviction was not “within the past five (5) years.” I.C. § 31-9-2.1-168(11).
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-AD-1225 October 16, 2026 Page 14 of 25
goal is to carry out the legislature’s intent by giving an unambiguous statute “its
clear and plain meaning.” Suggs v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1190, 1194 (Ind. 2016)
(quoting State v. Evans, 810 N.E.2d 335, 337 (Ind. 2004), reh'g denied). We
resort to rules of statutory construction only if a statute is ambiguous, meaning
it “admits of more than one interpretation.” Id. In our review, we must
“examine the statute as a whole,” reading “sections of an act together so that no
part is rendered meaningless if it can be harmonized with the remainder of the
statute.” Alvey v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1031, 1033 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), aff’d on reh’g
by 15 N.E.3d 72.
[31] We begin with the text and structure of section 31-19-11-1, which we find to be
unambiguous. Subsection (a) outlines various elements that, if satisfied, require
the court to “grant the petition for adoption and enter an adoption decree.”
I.C. § 31-19-11-1(a). Subsections (b), (c), and (d) then describe circumstances
under which the petition “may not” be granted, each of which negates an
element of subsection (a). Subsection (b), for instance, requires denial if an
affidavit has not been filed indicating whether a putative father is entitled to
notice of the proceedings. This mirrors subsection (a)(4)’s requirement that
such an affidavit must be filed for the petition to be granted. Under subsections
(c) and (d), an adoption may not be granted if the petitioner has been convicted
of certain offenses, which reflects subsection (a)(8)’s requirement that the
petitioner must not be “prohibited from adopting . . . as the result of an
inappropriate criminal history described in subsection (c) or (d).”
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-AD-1225 October 16, 2026 Page 15 of 25 [32] The fact that subsection (c) relates back to subsection (a)(8) gives us a clear
anchor date for determining whether a conviction was “within the immediately
preceding five (5) year period.” Subsection (a) provides that its elements must
be satisfied “whenever the court has heard the evidence . . . .” (emphasis added).
By instructing the court to rule on the merits only after it “has heard the
evidence,” the statute requires that the petition be granted if the court, after the
close of evidence, finds the elements of subsection (a) to be satisfied. A necessary
corollary is that under subsection (c), the petition must be denied if the
petitioner’s criminal history makes him ineligible to adopt when the court enters
its final order, regardless of his eligibility at the time the petition was filed.
[33] This conclusion finds further support in the plain text of subsection (c).
Subsection (c) limits the trial court’s power to enter an adoption decree by
providing that “the court may not grant an adoption if a petitioner for adoption
has been convicted of a nonwaivable offense” unless “the date of the conviction
did not occur within the immediately preceding five (5) year period.” I.C. § 31-19-11-1(c). Because subsection (c) is concerned with the court’s power to grant
an adoption petition rather than the petitioner’s eligibility to file, it’s clear the
phrase “immediately preceding five (5) year period” refers to the date the court
rules on the petition, not the filing date. Indeed, if the legislature intended
otherwise, it could have explicitly referred to the date the petition was filed, as it
did elsewhere in the adoption statutes. See Ind. Code § 31-19-9-8(a)(1) (2023)
(providing parental consent is not required “if the child is adjudged to have
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-AD-1225 October 16, 2026 Page 16 of 25
been abandoned or deserted for at least six (6) months immediately preceding the
date of the filing of the petition for adoption”) (emphasis added).
[34] Father’s contrary arguments are not persuasive. In his opening brief, Father
claimed that notwithstanding the plain text of section 31-19-11-1, section 31-19-2-7.5 “reveals that the anchor point is no later than the start of the first hearing
on the adoption petition.” Appellant’s Br. at 14. Under section 31-19-2-7.5, a
petitioner must have a criminal history check done through DCS or a licensed
child-placing agency, and the results of that check must then be reported to the
court under Indiana Code section 31-19-8-5. On their face, these statutes do not
affect a petitioner’s eligibility to adopt; they merely ensure the trial court has the
necessary information to determine whether the petitioner satisfies section 31-19-11-1’s criminal history requirements.
[35] Yet Father points to Indiana Code section 31-19-8-9, which provides that “[a]s
soon as possible after” the criminal history check (among other requirements)
“have been satisfied, the court shall proceed to hear and determine the petition
for adoption.” Father reads “as soon as possible after” to mean a petitioner’s
eligibility to adopt is determined by the date “of the first hearing on the . . .
petition,” which cannot happen until after the criminal history report is filed.
Appellant’s Br. at 14. But this argument fails on its own terms. Here, the court
bifurcated the proceedings and did not hear evidence about Stepfather’s
eligibility to adopt until April 2, 2026, at which time more than six months had
passed since the five-year anniversary of Stepfather’s conviction. Indeed, the
child-placing agency didn’t file Stepfather’s criminal history report until
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-AD-1225 October 16, 2026 Page 17 of 25
January 6, 2026, at which time Stepfather’s criminal history no longer made
him ineligible to adopt under section 31-19-11-1(c).
[36] Apparently recognizing this pitfall, Father took a different tack in his reply
brief. There, Father argued public policy considerations require setting an
anchor date “fixed at a point unaffected by the pace of litigation.” Appellant’s
Reply Br. at 5. According to Father, the criminal history requirements are
intended “to keep a specific class of recent, serious convictions out of the
adoption process altogether,” a policy best served by making petitioners “wait
out the remainder of the five-year period before filing at all.” Id. at 6-7.
[37] While we understand Father’s policy concerns, “[i]t is not a proper function of
this court to, in effect, rewrite a statute in order to render it consistent with our
view of sound public policy,” let alone Father’s version of sound public policy.
Robinson v. Monroe Cnty., 663 N.E.2d 196, 198 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), on reh’g of
658 N.E.2d 647 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995), trans. denied. We reiterate that if the
legislature intended to make petitioners wait to file until section 31-19-11-1(c)’s
five-year disqualification period expired, it could have required as much. But
there is no such requirement in section 31-19-11-1. While the adoption statutes
require a petitioner to disclose certain convictions, mandate criminal
background checks, and bar the adoption if the petitioner’s criminal history is
disqualifying, nothing prevents a person with prohibitive convictions from filing
the petition in the first instance.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-AD-1225 October 16, 2026 Page 18 of 25
2. Father’s Lack of Consent
[38] Father next challenges the trial court’s conclusion that the adoption could be
granted without his consent. Given the fundamental importance of the parentchild relationship, “[a] natural parent enjoys special protection in any adoption
proceeding, and courts strictly construe our adoption statutes . . . .” In re
Adoption of I.B., 163 N.E.3d 270, 274 (Ind. 2021). Among those protections is a
requirement that when a petitioner seeks to adopt a child born out of wedlock,
consent must generally be given by both the mother and biological father (if
paternity has been established). Ind. Code § 31-19-9-1(a)(2) (2023).
[39] But “‘under carefully enumerated circumstances,’ the adoption statutes allow
‘the trial court to dispense with parental consent and allow adoption of the
child.’” Adoption of I.B., 163 N.E.3d at 274 (quoting In re Adoption of N.W., 933
N.E.2d 909, 913 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), opinion adopted on trans. by 941 N.E.2d
1042). One such circumstance is relevant here:
Consent to adoption . . . is not required from . . . [a] parent of a
child in the custody of another person if for a period of at least
one (1) year the parent . . . fails without justifiable cause to
communicate significantly with the child when able to do so.
I.C. § 31-19-9-8(a)(2)(A). Stepfather, as the party alleging Father’s consent was
not required, had the burden to prove this circumstance applied by clear and
convincing evidence. Adoption of I.B., 163 N.E.3d at 274.
[40] Several key facts are undisputed, including that Child has been out of Father’s
custody for more than a year and Father has not significantly communicated
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-AD-1225 October 16, 2026 Page 19 of 25
with Child since Child’s first birthday. Father argues, however, that he had
justifiable cause for this lack of communication because Mother thwarted his
and his family members’ efforts to communicate, and he lacked resources or
knowledge of the law necessary to file a motion in the paternity action.
Stepfather contends, among other things, that even after the protective order
expired in July 2023, Father made no effort to communicate with Child until
the adoption proceedings began in November 2024.
[41] Our appellate courts have struggled to define a standard for determining
whether a non-custodial parent had justifiable cause for failing to communicate
with his child. See E.B.F. v. D.F., 93 N.E.3d 759, 764 (Ind. 2018). In E.B.F.,
our Supreme Court offered some guidance but nonetheless explained the
question “is highly dependent upon the facts and circumstances of each
particular case” and requires an examination of “the totality of the
circumstances . . . .” Id. at 764-65. One relevant circumstance is whether the
custodial parent “assumed [an] obligation to put forth a good-faith effort in
arranging communication . . . .” Id. at 766. While the custodial parent
generally doesn’t have that obligation, the E.B.F. Court found the custodial
parent assumed it by agreeing parenting time would be “at such times and upon
such conditions as the parties [were] able to mutually agree.” Id. (alteration in
original).
[42] Here, Father contends Mother similarly “assumed the obligation to put forth a
good-faith effort to arrange communication between Father and Child because
[she] had complete control over whether Father was permitted to contact Child
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-AD-1225 October 16, 2026 Page 20 of 25
or see Child at all under the paternity court’s order.” Appellant’s Br. at 16. He
then points to several facts he claims show Mother failed to act in good faith:
she concealed her location from Father; she blocked Father and his family
members on social media; and Father’s requests for parenting time went
unanswered.
[43] But Father omits from his analysis that the protective order was issued months
before the December 2021 support order. Mother and Father explicitly agreed
the protective order “supersede[d]” the support order and “supervised parenting
time [would] not occur until the protective order [was] no longer in effect.” 8 As
such, even if Mother was obligated to exercise her discretion in good faith to
permit Father to have supervised visitation with Child, that obligation did not
go into effect until the protective order expired in July 2023. Indeed, Mother’s
admitted efforts to cut off contact with Father and shield her and Child’s
whereabouts from him while the protective order was in place were reasonable
under the circumstances, including Father’s repeated infliction of physical
abuse, threats to kill Mother and her family, and his statement that he intended
to take Child and not return him to Mother.
[44] We also note that neither Father nor his family members described trying to
contact Mother after the protective order expired. 9 Grandmother, for example,
8
Support Order, supra note 2, at 1.
9
While Aunt described attempting contact after the protective order expired, Stepfather denied she had done
so. We will not reweigh that conflicting evidence.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-AD-1225 October 16, 2026 Page 21 of 25
said she did not try to speak with Child after December 2021. GreatGrandmother 1 admitted she last saw Child in mid-2022 and made no further
effort to see him despite moving to Indiana in 2023. Similarly, Father described
no effort to contact Mother in 2023 or 2024, and said he first requested
supervised visits in early 2025. That would place Father’s first visitation request
around six months after Stepfather filed the adoption petition in November
2024. However, “a parent’s conduct after the petition to adopt was filed is
‘wholly irrelevant to the determination of whether the parent failed to
significantly communicate with the child for any one[-]year period.’” In re
Adoption of S.W., 979 N.E.2d 633, 640 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (quoting In re
Adoption of Subzda, 562 N.E.2d 745, 750 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990)).
[45] Even if Father’s post-petition conduct was relevant, Mother disputed Father’s
claim that he requested supervised visits during the adoption proceedings,
explaining that if he had, she would have permitted it. In any event, by
Father’s own account, he failed to communicate with Child or request
supervised visits for over a year before Stepfather filed the adoption petition,
which is dispositive on this issue. Cf. In re Adoption of G.S., 254 N.E.3d 1071,
1079 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (affirming trial court’s finding of justifiable cause
where a mother ignored the father’s repeated requests to see or speak with the
child), trans. denied.
[46] As such, we find no clear error in the court’s conclusion that Father’s consent
was not required because he failed without justifiable cause to communicate
significantly with Child when able to do so.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-AD-1225 October 16, 2026 Page 22 of 25
3. Child’s Best Interest
[47] Finally, Father argues the trial court erred in concluding adoption was in
Child’s best interest. Even when, as here, a natural parent’s consent is not
required, “the court must still determine whether adoption is in the child’s best
interests.” Adoption of O.R., 16 N.E.3d at 974 (quoting In re Adoption of M.S., 10
N.E.3d 1272, 1281 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014)). The “court is required to look to the
totality of the evidence to determine the best interests of a child.” Adoption of
M.S., 10 N.E.3d at 1281. “Relevant factors include, among others, a parent’s
historical and current inability to provide a suitable environment for the child . .
. and the child’s need for permanence and stability.” Id.
[48] Father claims that “many circumstances weighed against [the] adoption being
in Child’s best interest.” Appellant’s Br. at 19. We reiterate that the scope of
appellate review does not include reweighing evidence. Father points to the
fact that Stepfather has “a violent criminal conviction.” Id. But as we
explained in Part 1, Stepfather’s criminal recklessness conviction was not
disqualifying, and it was the trial court’s role, not ours, to determine what
weight, if any, to give Stepfather’s criminal history. Indeed, Stepfather
committed criminal recklessness before he met Mother and during a time when
he was struggling with his mental health. He has since sought treatment, and
there was no evidence that his past mental health struggles affect his ability to
care for Child.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-AD-1225 October 16, 2026 Page 23 of 25 [49] Next, Father claims “there were numerous occasions that police had to be
called to the home due to arguments between [Stepfather] and Mother.” Id.
But the trial court acknowledged that Mother and Stepfather “have experienced
marital difficulties” and determined “the evidence demonstrates they are
addressing and working through those issues.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 178.
Because that finding is supported by the testimonies of Mother and Stepfather,
we will not second-guess the trial court’s judgment in this regard.
[50] Finally, Father asks us to disregard the strong bond Child has with Stepfather
because “Father was never given the opportunity to” be a part of Child’s life or
develop a similar bond with him. Appellant’s Br. at 19. We reject that
argument for the reasons outlined in Part 2 and add that Father himself testified
that Child deserves stability Father has been unable to provide. The evidence
showed that Stepfather is a loving and capable father figure who has cared for
Child essentially his entire life. Child is bonded with his half-sibling, considers
Stepfather his dad, and has not seen Father since his first birthday. On this
record, we find no error in the trial court’s conclusion that adoption was in
Child’s best interest.
Conclusion
[51] For these reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
[52] Affirmed.
[53] Foley, J., and Felix, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-AD-1225 October 16, 2026 Page 24 of 25 ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Cara Schaefer Wieneke
Wieneke Law Office, LLC
Brooklyn, Indiana
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Jason Spindler
Spindler Law
Princeton, Indiana
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-AD-1225 October 16, 2026 Page 25 of 25