Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(E), the trial court and parties shall not take any
action in reliance upon this Opinion until it is certified.
FILED
Oct 16 2026, 9:20 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana
Harve Hensley,
Appellant-Defendant
v.
State of Indiana,
Appellee-Plaintiff
October 16, 2026
Court of Appeals Case No.
26A-CR-586
Appeal from the Jefferson Superior Court
The Honorable Blaine S. Goode, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
39D01-2510-F6-001062
Opinion by Judge Felix
Chief Judge Tavitas and Judge Bradford concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-586 October 16, 2026 Page 1 of 21
Felix, Judge.
Statement of the Case
[1] Despite numerous decisions from courts of this State, Harve Hensley has
continued to claim ownership of certain real property and to harass its true
owner. Hensley was charged with and convicted of stalking and perjury, and
he was sentenced to a total of six years of incarceration. Hensley appeals and
raises several issues for our review, which we reorder and restate as follows:
1. Whether the trial court erred by granting the State’s motion to amend the
charging information;
2. Whether the trial court clearly erred by denying Hensley’s Indiana Trial
Rule 41(B) motion;
3. Whether the stalking conviction relies on a fatal variance;
4. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support Hensley’s
perjury conviction; and
5. Whether Hensley’s sentence is inappropriate under Indiana Appellate
Rule 7(B).
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] In 2006, Hensley’s father Bronson Hensley, Sr. (“Bronson Sr.”) created a
revocable living trust (the “Trust”). The Trust did not name Hensley as a
beneficiary “[u]pon the death” of Bronson Sr. Ex. Vol. IV. at 206. Instead, the
Trust indicated that Bronson Sr. had “paid $3,576.96” to Hensley during
Bronson Sr.’s life. Id. The Trust named Bronson Hensley, Jr. (“Bronson Jr.”),
another one of Bronson Sr.’s sons, as a successor trustee to Bronson Sr.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-586 October 16, 2026 Page 2 of 21 [4] After Bronson Sr.’s death in 2017, Bronson Jr. was appointed trustee. In July
2019, the trial court administering the trust proceedings granted Bronson Jr.’s
petition to sell Trust-owned property (“the Property”) in West Deputy, Indiana.
The petition was granted over Hensley’s opposition. Hensley had claimed that
he was the trustee and sole beneficiary of the Trust.1 The trial court rejected
this claim, finding that Hensley was “not . . . the trustee of the Trust” and
Hensley’s interest in the Trust had been “ade[emed]” through “inter vivos cash
gifts” from Bronson Sr. 2 Ex. Vol. II at 39.
[5] On October 7, 2019, acting as trustee, Bronson Jr. sold the Property to
Gabrielle Hubbard. Days later, Hensley went to the Property at night,
confronted Hubbard and her parents, and insisted that the Property belonged to
him.
[6] In October 2020, Hensley called Hubbard’s father Mark Nay and accused him
of “stealing” timber from the Property. Tr. Vol. II at 156. Also that month,
Hensley posted on Facebook, “If anyone sees that piece of sh[*]t, bankruptcy
filing, slug on society [Mark,] tell him that Harve Hensley is looking for him
1
Hensley claimed this was so under the “doctrine of acts of independent significance” because (1) he was
“named as a child of issue” in Bronson Sr.’s will but was “not named as a member of the remainderman class
of beneficiaries in the Trust,” (2) he was “not omitted” in Bronson Sr.’s will, (3) he “only received a cash gift
under the Trust,” and (4) “the terms of the trust instrument specifically create a position for an individual
person to be sole beneficiary and Trustee.” Ex. Vol. II at 31.
2
Hensley’s appeal of this and related rulings was dismissed. Hensley v. Hensley, 150 N.E.3d 1089, No. 19ATR-2376 (Ind. Ct. App. July 17, 2020) (mem.).
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-586 October 16, 2026 Page 3 of 21
and that I got something for him. I’ll be in the Deputy area until I get up with
him.” Ex. Vol. I at 90.
[7] Between late 2019 and 2020, Hensley changed his postal address to the
Property and received mail there. In December 2020, Hensley attempted to
record several quitclaim deeds purporting to transfer the Property along with
other properties from the Trust to himself. Hensley was convicted of forging
the documents. During his sentencing hearing, Hensley said that after he was
released from prison, he planned to live at the Property, which was “available”
to him. Ex. Vol. VI at 26. This court affirmed Hensley’s forgery conviction,
concluding that “he was both aware that he did not possess the authority to
convey the Propert[y] and that he was not entitled [to] receive the
conveyances.” Ex. Vol. III at 160; see Hensley v. State, 225 N.E.3d 173, No.
23A-CR-601, slip op. at ¶ 10 (Ind. Ct. App. Nov. 27, 2023) (mem.), trans.
denied, 230 N.E.3d 889 (Ind. 2024).
[8] In February 2021, Hensley purported to be the Trust’s sole trustee, leased the
Property to a farmer, and collected an up-front payment. Hensley was
convicted of theft after refusing to return the payment when the farmer learned
that Hensley did not own the Property. This court affirmed Hensley’s theft
conviction, rejecting his claim that he “believed in good faith that he was the
sole valid trustee” of the Trust and “thought he had the authority to lease” the
Property. Ex. Vol. III at 202; see Hensley v. State, 219 N.E.3d 122, No. 22A-CR2056, slip op. at ¶ 18 (Ind. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2023) (mem.). While this was
happening, in April 2021, Hensley paid taxes on the Property.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-586 October 16, 2026 Page 4 of 21 [9] In June 2021, Hubbard obtained a protective order against Hensley for herself
and her family. During the hearing on the protective order, Hensley “said that
he ha[d] been on the [P]roperty before,” insisted that it belonged to him, and
called Hubbard a “heathen.” Tr. Vol. II at 88.
[10] In 2022, Hensley filed a certification of trust in the trust proceedings. The trial
court in the trust proceedings stated, “Any Certification of Trust filed by Harve
Hensley stating that he is the trustee or a beneficiary of the residue of the [Trust]
is a nullity and shall be considered null and void. Any recording of such
Certification of Trust, executed by Harve Hensley, shall be considered a nullity
and of no force or effect.” Ex. Vol. II at 88.
[11] In May 2023, the trial court extended the protective order through 2028. In
February 2024, Hensley filed in the protective order case a different certification
of trust purporting to be trustee of the Property. In April, Hensley paid taxes on
the Property. In September, Hensley filed an amended certification of trust in
the protective order case, still purporting to be trustee of the Property.
[12] In April 2025, Hensley again paid taxes on the Property. On September 22,
Hensley filed another certification of trust (“Certification Under Oath”), this
time in the Jefferson County Auditor’s Office, purporting to be trustee of the
Property. In the document, Hensley “declare[d] under penalty of perjury that”
his claims were “true and correct.” Ex. Vol. I at 11.
[13] The next day, Hensley purported to be the “Landowner” of the Property and
mailed a “10 Day Notice to Vacate” the Property to Hubbard’s attorney. Ex.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-586 October 16, 2026 Page 5 of 21
Vol. I at 81. Hensley claimed Hubbard was “an unauthorized
occupant/tenant” and that her possession of the Property was “unlawful.” Id.
In October, Hensley filed an eviction action against Hubbard. 3
[14] Hubbard felt “terroriz[ed]” and “harass[ed]” by Hensley, and she “fear[ed]”
him because he was “constantly trying to take” the Property from her. Tr. Vol.
II at 120. Hubbard removed the Property’s mailbox because she was scared
that Hensley would “show up at the [P]roperty to get his mail.” Id. at 115.
Hubbard also tore down the Property’s residence and barn so that “there’s
nowhere for [Hensley] to hide over there or say he even lives there.” Id. at 116.
Before traveling to the Property, Hubbard informs others of her travel
arrangement because she is “scared for [her] life.” Id. at 114.
[15] On October 3, 2025, the State charged Hensley with stalking as a Level 6
felony 4 and perjury as a Level 6 felony 5. The State alleged the stalking occurred
“between February 20, 2024[,] and September 26, 2025,” Appellant’s App. Vol.
II at 17; the State alleged the perjury was based on Hensley’s filing of the
Certification Under Oath in the county auditor’s office. On December 11, 27
days before trial, the State filed a motion to amend the stalking charge to a
3
The trial court took judicial notice of this action, as do we. See Ind. Evidence Rule 201(a)(2)(3) (providing
that the court may take judicial notice of “records of a court of this state”).
4
Ind. Code § 35-45-10-5(a).
5
I.C. § 35-44.1-2-1(a)(1).
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-586 October 16, 2026 Page 6 of 21
Level 5 felony 6. The trial court granted the motion on December 16 after
holding a hearing. 7
[16] During the bench trial, Hensley represented himself. At the close of the State’s
case-in-chief, Hensley made an oral motion for dismissal under Trial Rule
41(B), which the trial court denied. Hensley then testified in his own defense,
arguing that when Bronson Sr. died, the Trust “bec[a]me irrevocable and the
living trust expired [and] bec[a]me a separate trust,” of which Hensley was the
sole trustee and beneficiary. Tr. Vol. II at 170.
[17] The trial court found Hensley guilty as charged. In finding Hensley guilty of
stalking, the trial court “considered” 11 of Hensley’s actions:
• In 2020, (1) attempting to record the quitclaim deed regarding the
Property;
• In 2021, (2) changing his mailing address to the Property, (3) renting the
Property, and (4) paying taxes on the Property;
• In 2024, (5) filing the certification of trust in the protective order case, (6)
paying taxes on the Property, and (7) filing the amended certification of
trust in the protective order case; and
• In 2025, (8) paying taxes on the Property, (9) again paying taxes on the
Property, (10) sending the notice to vacate the Property to Hubbard’s
attorney, and (11) filing the eviction action.
Tr. Vol. II at 194. The trial court stated that Hensley’s actions would be
“entirely lawful” if Hensley was the Property’s owner, Tr. Vol. II at 196, but
6
I.C. § 35-45-10-5(b)(2).
7
No transcript for this hearing is included in the appellate record.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-586 October 16, 2026 Page 7 of 21
they were “harassing and unlawful” because he was not, id. at 197. As for the
perjury count, the trial court found that Hensley falsely claimed to be trustee
because there was “one trust” and trusteeship thereof “ha[d] been litigated”
already. Id. at 199.
[18] During the sentencing hearing, Hensley maintained he was “the rightful
owner” of the Property. Tr. Vol. II at 215. The trial court sentenced Hensley to
consecutive prison sentences of five years for stalking and one year for perjury.
This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
1. Hensley Has Waived His Claim that the Trial Court Erred by
Granting the State’s Motion to Amend the Charging Information
[19] Hensley contends the trial court erred by granting the State’s motion to amend
the charging information to allege stalking as a Level 5 rather than a Level 6
felony. But Hensley did not include or request a transcript of the hearing on the
State’s motion, as required by Indiana Appellate Rule 9(F)(5). This rule
requires an appellant’s Notice of Appeal to designate “all portions of the
Transcript necessary to present fairly and decide the issues on appeal.” Ind.
Appellate Rule 9(F)(5).
[20] “[A]lthough not fatal to the appeal, failure to include a transcript works a
waiver of any specifications of error which depend upon the evidence.” Lifeline
Youth & Fam. Servs., Inc. v. Installed Bldg. Prods., Inc., 996 N.E.2d 808, 814–15
(Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (quoting In re Walker, 665 N.E.2d 586, 588 (Ind. 1996)).
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-586 October 16, 2026 Page 8 of 21
Furthermore, although we have a well-established preference for deciding cases
on their merits rather than on procedural grounds like waiver, Pierce v. State, 29
N.E.3d 1258, 1267 (Ind. 2015) (quoting Roberts v. Cmty. Hosps. of Ind., Inc., 897
N.E.2d 458, 469 (Ind. 2008)), if a party’s failure to comply with the Appellate
Rules is “sufficiently substantial to impede our consideration of the issue
raised,” we will not address the merits of that issue, id. (quoting Guardiola v.
State, 375 N.E.2d 1105, 1107 (Ind. 1978)).
[21] The issue Hensley raises requires us to be able to review the transcript from the
hearing. Without a transcript, we cannot determine whether Hensley even
objected to the State’s motion, much less verify Hensley’s claim that the trial
court “failed to conduct any prejudice inquiry,” Appellant’s Br. at 29.
Hensley’s failure to request a transcript of the hearing substantially impedes our
consideration of his argument and results in waiver.
2. The Trial Court Did Not Clearly Err by Denying Hensley’s Trial
Rule 41(B) Motion
[22] Hensley also argues that the trial court erred by denying his Trial Rule 41(B)
motion for dismissal. We review the denial of a Trial Rule 41(B) motion for
clear error. Williams v. State, 892 N.E.2d 666, 670 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (citing
Thornton-Tomasetti Eng’rs v. Indianapolis-Marion Cnty. Pub. Libr., 851 N.E.2d
1269, 1277 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006)), trans. denied.
[23] In a criminal bench trial, once the State has completed its case-in-chief, the
defendant “may move for a dismissal on the ground that upon the weight of the
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-586 October 16, 2026 Page 9 of 21
evidence and the law” the State has not met its burden of proof. T.R. 41(B).
Such a motion “is essentially a test of the sufficiency of the State’s evidence.”
Workman v. State, 716 N.E.2d 445, 448 (Ind. 1999) (citing State v. Vowels, 535
N.E.2d 146, 147 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989)). The trial court should grant the motion
if the State “fail[s] to prove the essential elements of the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Vowels, 535 N.E.2d at
147.) In ruling on the motion, the trial court “may reconcile, reject, accept or
weigh the evidence and determine the credibility of the witnesses.” Id. (quoting
Vowels, 535 N.E.2d at 147).
[24] Hensley only challenges the denial of his Trial Rule 41(B) motion regarding his
stalking conviction. To convict Hensley as charged of stalking as a Level 5
felony, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) Hensley
knowingly or intentionally harassed Hubbard repeatedly or continually; (2)
Hensley’s conduct would have “cause[d] a reasonable person to feel” and
“actually cause[d]” Hubbard “to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, or
threatened,” Ind. Code § 35-45-10-1; and (3) a protective order had been issued
to protect Hubbard from Hensley. See id. § -5(b)(2). “Harassment” means
“conduct directed toward a victim that includes but is not limited to repeated or
continuing impermissible contact that would cause a reasonable person to suffer
emotional distress and that actually causes the victim to suffer emotional
distress.” I.C. § 35-45-10-2. Neither stalking nor harassment includes
“statutorily or constitutionally protected activity.” Id. §§ -1, –2.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-586 October 16, 2026 Page 10 of 21 [25] The State’s evidence proved that the trial court in the trust proceedings
appointed Bronson Jr., not Hensley, as trustee and ruled that Hensley had no
interest in the Trust. Hensley participated in the proceedings and was aware of
the trial court’s ruling. Bronson Jr. obtained authorization to sell the Property,
and he lawfully sold it to Hubbard. Although Hensley had no interest in the
Property, he listed the Property as his address, frequented the Property, paid
taxes on it, attempted to file a quitclaim deed on it, and rented it out from
beneath Hubbard. Hensley also made threatening social media posts about
Hubbard’s father. Due to Hensley’s actions, in 2021, Hubbard obtained a
protective order, which was extended in 2023.
[26] Despite the protective order, Hensley did not stop engaging in conduct that
Hubbard believed was harassing and/or intimidating. In 2024, he again paid
taxes on the Property and filed in the protective order case a certification of
trust asserting ownership of the Property, as well as an amended document to
the same effect. In 2025, Hensley again paid taxes on the Property and sent a
letter to Hubbard’s attorney demanding that she vacate the Property.
[27] Given Hensley’s history of actions regarding the Property, his conduct between
February 20, 2024, and September 26, 2025, was sufficient to prove stalking
through repeated harassment. The actions demonstrate repeated conduct
directed toward Hubbard to assert Hensley’s unfounded interest in the Property
and dispossess Hubbard of it. The actions would cause a reasonable person to
suffer and did cause Hubbard to suffer emotional distress—she felt
“terroriz[ed]” and “harass[ed]” by Hensley and “fear[ed]” him because he was
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-586 October 16, 2026 Page 11 of 21
“constantly trying to take” the Property from her, Tr. Vol. II at 120. Hubbard
removed structures from the Property so Hensley could not “hide” there, id. at
116, and she does not feel safe going to the Property without taking
precautions.
[28] Hensley argues that his actions cannot constitute stalking because they were
“lawful.” Appellant’s Br. at 20. Hensley’s actions were not lawful because he
did not own the Property or have any interest therein. Hensley further argues
that he had a reasonable belief in his status as Trustee and that he had an
interest in the Property. Had this belief been reasonable, Hensley’s conduct
might have been something other than stalking. Hensley’s “beliefs,” however,
disregarded numerous clear rulings from courts of this state. A belief not
grounded in reality, in other words, a delusional belief, that results in repeated
harassment, as it did here, is sufficient to establish stalking.
[29] The trial court did not clearly err by denying Hensley’s Trial Rule 41(B)
motion. Moreover, the evidence was sufficient to support Hensley’s stalking
conviction.
3. Hensley’s Stalking Conviction Does Not Rely on a Fatal Variance
[30] Hensley argues that his stalking conviction relies on a variance between the
charging information and the trial court’s findings. “Because the charging
information advises a defendant of the accusations against him, the allegations
in the pleading and the evidence used at trial must be consistent with one
another.” Blount v. State, 22 N.E.3d 559, 569 (Ind. 2014) (citing Simmons v.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-586 October 16, 2026 Page 12 of 21
State, 585 N.E.2d 1341, 1344 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992)). “A variance is an essential
difference between the two.” Id. (citing Mitchem v. State, 685 N.E.2d 671, 677
(Ind. 1997)). “Not all variances, however, are fatal.” Id. (citing Mitchem, 685
N.E.2d at 677). “Relief is required only if the variance (1) misled the defendant
in preparing a defense, resulting in prejudice, or (2) leaves the defendant
vulnerable to future prosecution under the same evidence.” Id. (citing Winn v.
State, 748 N.E.2d 352, 356 (Ind. 2001)). We review variance claims as
challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence because “the defendant’s essential
argument is the evidence produced at trial so differed from the charging
information that it was insufficient to convict him as charged.” Id. at 565
(citing Mathews v. State, 978 N.E.2d 438, 444 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied).
[31] Hensley argues that his stalking conviction relies on a fatal variance because,
whereas the charging information alleged that the stalking occurred “between
February 20, 2024, and September 26, 2025,” Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 17,
the trial court relied on Hensley’s conduct outside these dates—in 2020, 2021,
and October 2025. “A charging information must only state ‘the date of the
offense with sufficient particularity to show that the offense was committed
within the period of limitations applicable to that offense.’” Blount, 22 N.E.3d
at 569 (quoting I.C. § 35–34–1–2(a)(5) (2014)). “Where, as here, time is not an
element of the offense, the State is not required to prove the offense occurred on
the precise date alleged, and its presentation of evidence is not limited to events
on that date.” Id. (citing Neff v. State, 915 N.E.2d 1026, 1032 (Ind. Ct. App.
2009), adhered to on reh’g, 922 N.E.2d 44 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010)).
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-586 October 16, 2026 Page 13 of 21 [32] Even if we assume that the State had to prove the stalking occurred exactly
between the charging dates of February 20, 2024, and September 26, 2025, no
fatal variance occurred. The trial court “considered” five of Hensley’s actions
that took place outside the dates in the charging information. Tr. Vol. II at 194.
Those actions included Hensley attempting to record a quitclaim deed
regarding the Property, changing his mailing address to the Property, renting
the Property, paying taxes on the Property, and filing the eviction action. The
trial court also considered six of Hensley’s actions that took place within the
charging information dates: Hensley thrice paid taxes on the Property, he filed
a certification of trust and an amended certification of trust in the protective
order case, and he sent a letter to Hubbard’s attorney demanding that she
vacate the Property.
[33] The six actions that took place within the charging information dates are
sufficient to support Hensley’s stalking conviction. See supra ¶¶ 22–29. The
five actions that took place outside the charging information dates provide
context for Hensley’s other conduct and were not the basis for independent
convictions. Any variance between the charging information and the trial
court’s findings is not fatal and does not warrant reversal.
4. The State Presented Sufficient Evidence to Support Hensley’s
Perjury Conviction
[34] Hensley argues that the State presented insufficient evidence at trial to support
his conviction for perjury. Our standard of review for such a claim is as
follows:
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-586 October 16, 2026 Page 14 of 21
“A conviction is supported by sufficient evidence if ‘there is
substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element
of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have
found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’” HanczBarron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Willis
v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1065, 1066 (Ind. 2015)). This Court reviews
only the evidence most favorable to the verdict and the
reasonable inferences therefrom, and will reverse only where it is
shown that “no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of
the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” [Teising v. State,
226 N.E.3d 780, 783 (Ind. 2024)].
Konkle v. State, 253 N.E.3d 1068, 1090–91 (Ind. 2025). We do not reweigh the
evidence or reassess witness credibility. Id. at 1090 (quoting Teising, 226
N.E.3d at 783).
[35] To convict Hensley as charged of perjury as a Level 6 felony, the State had to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Hensley made a “false, material
statement under oath or affirmation, knowing the statement to be false or not
believing it to be true.” I.C. § 35-44.1-2-1(a)(1). The State alleged that Hensley
perjured himself in the Certification Under Oath. In this document, Hensley
“declare[d] under penalty of perjury that” he was the “one (1) named Sole
Beneficiary” and “one (1) Sole Trustee” of the Trust. Ex. Vol. I at 11. The
document disregards the trial court’s rulings in the trust proceedings that
Hensley was “not . . . the trustee of the Trust” and that Hensley’s interest in the
Trust had already been adeemed. Ex. Vol. II at 40.
[36] Hensley claims his statements do not constitute perjury because they were
“disputed legal interpretations,” Appellant’s Br. at 21, regarding “ongoing civil
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-586 October 16, 2026 Page 15 of 21
litigation” in the trust proceedings, id. at 22. Hensley relies on Goble v. State,
which held that “[a] statement as to the legal effect of certain facts, or mere
conclusion of law, ordinarily will not constitute perjury.” 766 N.E.2d 1, 7 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2002) (quoting Blackburn v. State, 495 N.E.2d 806, 808 (Ind. Ct. App.
1986), reh’g denied, trans. denied).
[37] Trusteeship and Hensley’s interest in the Trust had already been adjudicated in
the trust proceedings in which Hensley was an active participant. Hensley had
been instructed in those proceedings that any certification of trust he filed
claiming to be trustee of the Trust would be “null and void.” Ex. Vol. II at 88.
Whether or not Hensley believed he should be the trustee or a beneficiary of the
Trust, the fact remains he was neither. Similarly, several appellate decisions
reiterated that Hensley was neither the trustee of the Trust nor held any interest
in the Property. Hensley was aware of these rulings; he chose to disregard
them. The trial court could reasonably find that Hensley knowingly made a
false, material statement under oath. The State thus presented sufficient
evidence to support Hensley’s perjury conviction.
5. Hensley’s Sentence Is Not Inappropriate under Appellate Rule 7(B)
[38] Last, Hensley argues that his sentence is inappropriate under Appellate Rule
7(B). 8 The Indiana Constitution authorizes us to independently review and
8
Hensley also claims that the trial court abused its discretion by “relying on improper aggravating factors”
and “failing to find appropriate mitigating factors.” Appellant’s Br. at 25. Hensley, however, does not
identify which aggravators that the trial court found are erroneous, nor does he identify which mitigating
factors the trial court should have found. Hensley has waived his abuse-of-discretion argument by not
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-586 October 16, 2026 Page 16 of 21
revise a trial court’s sentencing decision. Tillett v. State, 278 N.E.3d 359, 366
(Ind. 2026) (citing Ind. Const. art. 7, §§ 4, 6), reh’g denied (July 9, 2026). That
authority is implemented through Appellate Rule 7(B). The defendant must
produce compelling evidence that the sentence is inappropriate based on the
nature of the offense, the defendant’s character, or both. Id. (quoting Childress v.
State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006)); Lane v. State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 126
(Ind. 2024) (quoting Connor v. State, 58 N.E.3d 215, 219 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)).
[39] Whether a sentence is inappropriate “turns on our sense of the culpability of the
defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad
other factors that come to light in a given case.” Tillett, 278 N.E.3d at 366
(quoting McCain v. State, 148 N.E.3d 977, 985 (Ind. 2020)). “[W]e are not
limited to the mitigators and aggravators found by the trial court,” Brown v.
State, 10 N.E.3d 1, 4 (Ind. 2014), and we focus on the aggregate sentence rather
than its components, Lane, 232 N.E.3d at 122 (quoting Cardwell v. State, 895
N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008)). Considering the trial court’s wide discretion
on sentencing matters, only “exceptional cases” warrant sentence revisions,
Tillett, 278 N.E.3d at 366 (quoting Russell v. State, 234 N.E.3d 829, 856 (Ind.
2024), cert. denied).
providing cogent reasoning in support thereof. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a); Miller v. Patel, 212
N.E.3d 639, 657 (Ind. 2023) (quoting Dridi v. Cole Kline LLC, 172 N.E.3d 361, 364 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021)).
Hensley has similarly waived his argument that his sentence is unconstitutionally disproportionate because
he fails to present a cogent argument supported with citations to authority. App. R. Ind. Appellate Rule
46(A)(8)(a).
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-586 October 16, 2026 Page 17 of 21 [40] A trial judge may impose any sentence within the statutory range without
regard to the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors. Anglemyer v. State,
868 N.E.2d 482, 489 (Ind. 2007), as amended (July 10, 2007), clarified on reh’g,
875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). When considering the nature of the offense, we
start with the advisory sentence. Brown, 10 N.E.3d at 4 (citing Anglemyer, 868
N.E.2d at 494). Here, Hensley was convicted of and sentenced on one Level 5
felony and one Level 6 felony. “A person who commits a Level 5 felony . . .
shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between one (1) and six (6) years, with
the advisory sentence being three (3) years.” I.C. § 35-50-2-6(b) (emphasis added).
On his Level 5 felony conviction, the trial court sentenced Hensley to five years
of incarceration. “A person who commits a Level 6 felony . . . shall be
imprisoned for a fixed term of between six (6) months and two and one-half (2
½) years, with the advisory sentence being one (1) year.” Id. § 35-50-2-7(b)
(emphasis added). On his Level 6 felony conviction, the trial court sentenced
Hensley to one year of incarceration.
[41] The trial court found as aggravators (1) that the “harm, injury, loss, or damage
suffered by [Hubbard] was significant and greater than the elements necessary
to prove the commission of the offense”; (2) Hensley’s criminal history; (3) the
offenses were “premeditated”; and (4) Hensley showed a lack of remorse. Id. at
224. The trial court found no mitigators. Hensley was ordered to serve his
sentences consecutively, for a total of six years in prison, which is above the
advisory sentence.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-586 October 16, 2026 Page 18 of 21 [42] We first look to the nature of Hensley’s offenses and consider, among other
things, “whether there is anything more or less egregious about the offense
committed by the defendant that makes it different from the ‘typical’ offense
accounted for by the legislature when it set the advisory sentence,” T.A.D.W. v.
State, 51 N.E.3d 1205, 1211 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (quoting Holloway v. State, 950
N.E.2d 803, 806–07 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011)), as amended (May 26, 2023). We also
consider whether the offense was “accompanied by restraint, regard and lack of
brutality.” Tillett, 278 N.E.3d at 366 (quoting Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d
111, 122 (Ind. 2015)).
[43] Hensley’s offenses form only the most recent chapter in his multi-year
campaign to dispossess Hubbard of the Property. Hubbard purchased the
Property more than six years ago. Not only has Hubbard been unable to enjoy
it, but she also lives in fear due to Hensley’s prolonged, premeditated, and
incorrigible actions. The nature of Hensley’s offenses counsels against revision
of his sentence.
[44] In considering the character of the offender, “we engage in a broad
consideration of a defendant’s qualities,” T.A.D.W., 51 N.E.3d at 1211 (citing
Aslinger v. State, 2 N.E.3d 84, 95 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), clarified on other grounds on
reh’g), including whether the defendant has “substantial virtuous traits or
persistent examples of good character,” Tillett, 278 N.E.3d at 366 (quoting
Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122).
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-586 October 16, 2026 Page 19 of 21 [45] Despite felony forgery and theft convictions related to his unfounded interest in
the Property, Hensley continues to claim ownership thereof at Hubbard’s
expense. Hensley’s offenses were premeditated, and he expressed no remorse
for them. Though he claims he “pursued” his rights “through legal processes,”
Appellant’s Br. at 26, Hensley disregarded legal process. The record does not
reveal compelling evidence demonstrating that the nature of Hensley’s offense
or his character renders his sentence inappropriate. See Lane, 232 N.E.3d 119;
Russell, 234 N.E.3d at 855–56.
Conclusion
[46] In sum, Hensley has waived his claim that the trial court erred by granting the
State’s motion to amend the charging information, the trial court did not clearly
err by denying Hensley’s Trial Rule 41(B) motion, Hensley’s stalking conviction
does not rely on a fatal variance, the State presented sufficient evidence to
support Hensley’s convictions, and Hensley’s sentence is not inappropriate
under Appellate Rule 7(B). We affirm the trial court on all issues raised.
[47] Affirmed.
Tavitas, C.J., and Bradford, J., concur.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Jonathan D. Harwell
Harwell Criminal Defense
Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-586 October 16, 2026 Page 20 of 21 Theodore E. Rokita
Indiana Attorney General
Michelle Hawk Kazmierczak
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-586 October 16, 2026 Page 21 of 21