Envoy Air, Inc. v. Jada Creagh

Rel: October 16, 2026

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.

SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA

OCTOBER TERM, 2026-2027

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Envoy Air, Inc.

v.

Jada Creagh

Appeal from Mobile Circuit Court

(CV-19-902572)

PER CURIAM.

Envoy Air, Inc. ("Envoy"), has appealed from a final judgment that

the Mobile Circuit Court entered in favor of Jada Creagh on her claim of

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retaliatory discharge. That judgment, which was based on a jury's

verdict, awarded Creagh $250,000 in compensatory damages for mental

anguish and $425,000 in punitive damages. For the reasons set forth

herein, we affirm the judgment insofar as it holds Envoy liable for

Creagh's harm, but we remand the case to the trial court with

instructions for that court to provide written findings in support of its

refusal to remit both the compensatory damages and the punitive

damages.

Facts and Procedural History

In 2018, Creagh was an employee of Envoy, which operates

commercial flights. On October 25, 2018, Creagh was working the final

flight of the night at the Mobile Regional Airport when she slipped and

fell on a set of stairs, which resulted in an injury to her shoulder. Creagh

reported the injury to her shift supervisor, Cody Arthur, who, according

to Creagh, told her that "the last person who had reported getting hurt

on the job was no longer there." Arthur denied making any such

statement and testified that he "didn't imply that [Creagh] c[ould] be

terminated for getting hurt at work." Either way, Creagh told Arthur

that she was "hurting," and Arthur "said okay" and left to attend to other

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duties. Creagh then went home. Pursuant to Envoy's policies in effect

at that time, any on-the-job injury should have been documented "within

two hours of the injury or as soon as possible." However, Arthur did not

document Creagh's injury until sometime the following day because he

was "unfamiliar with the process at the time" and because her injury had

occurred "very late at night."

Creagh was scheduled to work the following morning, but, when

she awoke that morning, she telephoned her shift supervisor for that day

-- someone other than Arthur -- "to let him know that [she] got hurt last

night" and that she was "really in pain and need[ed] to call out." The

shift supervisor told Creagh that "he didn't have any report of [her] being

hurt," that "[Arthur] didn't mention it," and that there were "already …

people out" that day so she "need[ed] to come in." Creagh thus went to

work as scheduled, but, when her shift supervisor saw her, he "realized

that [she] was hurt" and, at that point, told her that she "need[ed] to go

see the doctor now." The doctor who treated Creagh told her that she

needed to remain out of work for several weeks and restricted her from

"lifting [anything] greater than 10 pounds" when she returned to work.

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However, Creagh's normal duties required her to be able to lift "50

pounds at least" and required much "[p]ushing, pulling, [and] lifting."

Creagh's manager at Envoy was Brigitte Atkinson, and Creagh

testified that she and Atkinson "got along great before [her] injury."

Specifically, Creagh testified that Atkinson "seemed like a great woman"

and was "[f]riendly," that Atkinson "would say good morning" and "would

compliment [her]," and that she and Atkinson would "laugh about things

in passing." In short, Creagh testified that she "didn't have any issues

with [Atkinson] to begin with." However, Creagh testified that, when she

returned to work on November 21, 2018, her interactions with Atkinson

"were dry" and that Atkinson "seemed agitated," "no longer spoke to [her]

in the morning," and "[s]ometimes … would walk past and not say

anything." In addition, Creagh testified that she had reported to

Atkinson that she was "having problems with pushing, pulling, [and]

lifting anything over 10 pounds" but that Atkinson had failed to ensure

that she was "always provided help," even though Envoy had agreed that

"[a]ssistance w[ould] be provided [to Creagh] for lifting anything over 10

[pounds]."

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Creagh also testified regarding interactions she had witnessed

between Atkinson and other Envoy employees around that time:

"Q. Did you see Atkinson interact with other employees at

Envoy before November 30, 2018?

"A. Yes.

"Q. Based upon that observation that you saw, what was she

like?

"….

"A. She was mean. She was terrifying. She would talk down

to them. She would yell at them. A lot of us tried to avoid

her, just to stay off her radar.

"Q. When [Atkinson] came out of the office did you have an

opportunity to see what the other employees did?

"….

"A. They would scatter. They would try to stay out of her way.

She would pick one person and zoom in -- we were already

short staffed. She would threaten our jobs. Stated the Mobile

station would no longer exist if we didn't do what she was

telling us to do or if we didn't straighten up.

"….

"Q. What were the time pressures that she was referring to?

"….

"A. On-time departures. Delays. The lines at the ticket

counter. Fuel. Even if the delay wasn't on us … she would

still blame us and say [we] [were] not doing anything.

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"Q. Did you ever … before November 30 have an opportunity

to hear her talk about people missing work?

"A. Yes.

"Q. Tell us about that.

"….

"A. One day we were in the break room … in between flights.

We had worked two morning flights and then we were

relaxing or trying to relax before the next one. She came out

of her office yelling and screaming, where is everyone; we are

having to borrow employees from other stations. No one

should be taking off work. It doesn't matter what they have

going on. This is important. They need to be here so that we

can get things done. You could hear her and passengers could

hear her too."

On November 30, 2018, Creagh returned to her doctor for a followup appointment and was given a return-to-work note that continued to

place physical restrictions on her work. However, there are two returnto-work notes in evidence, both pictured below, and there is conflicting

evidence as to which note Creagh gave to Atkinson. The first return-towork note has two computer-generated X's in the boxes next to two

preprinted restrictions, which restricted Creagh from "overhead work"

and from lifting anything heavier than 10 pounds. The second return-towork note, which we will refer to as "the altered note," has those same

two computer-generated X's, but those two computer-generated X's have

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been partially covered by two handwritten X's. There is also a third

handwritten X in the box next to the preprinted restriction against any

"push/pull" activity, but no computer-generated X appears in that box on

either return-to-work note.

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Creagh testified that she did not write the three handwritten X's on

the altered note and that "that [is not] the note that [she] handed to

[Atkinson]." Atkinson testified, however, that the altered note is the note

she received from Creagh and that, either that same day or the next day,

she telephoned Valerine Conerly -- one of Envoy's worker's compensation

analysts stationed in Texas -- and "told her that [Creagh's return-to-work

note] doesn't look right." Atkinson then sent a copy of the altered note to

Conerly. Conerly later contacted Creagh's doctor and asked for a copy of

the return-to-work note that had been given to Creagh, and the doctor

sent Conerly a copy of the return-to-work note that does not contain the

three handwritten X's.

On December 3, 2018, Creagh arrived at the airport to work her

scheduled shift. During that shift, Creagh reported to Atkinson that she

was "not really getting the help" she needed and that other employees

were "complaining," and Atkinson responded by telling Creagh that she

had been "getting reports or complaints that [Creagh] [was] being

combative." Creagh denied those allegations and insisted that she was

"just asking for help." According to Creagh, Atkinson then asked her if

she "fe[lt] like [Envoy] was a good fit for [her]," and Creagh said that she

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"like[d] working here" and "just need[ed] help until [she] g[ot] better."

Creagh testified that, at that point, Atkinson "got mean or mad and …

said [she] [would] find a way to get rid of [her]." According to Creagh,

Atkinson did not "bring up the three [handwritten] X's" during that

conversation or otherwise "make any complaint … whatsoever about the

November 30, 2018, return-to-work slip." After that conversation,

Creagh continued to work as scheduled, and at least once she reiterated

to Atkinson during the following days that she was "still not getting the

help that [she] needed." According to Creagh, Atkinson said that she was

"working on it."

On December 12, 2018, Conerly emailed Bridgette Warren-Murrell,

Envoy's Director of Human Resources ("HR") Operations, who was

stationed in Texas, and David Barrera, who also worked in Envoy's HR

department in Texas. That email stated:

"I'm looping you in on this. This employee has a worker's

compensation claim. She presented a work status note from

her physician. The GM, Brigitte Atkinson, stated it appeared

to be tampered with. We requested the nurse on her claim

obtain a work status note directly from her doctor. The notes

are different. This appears to be fraud."

That same day, Warren-Murrell replied with the following email: "FYI …

In the past, we usually separate for falsifying documents as it violates

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our guiding principles." Later that day, Barrera sent Atkinson the

following email: "When you return to your station, engage [Creagh] in

conversation as to why there is a discrepancy in her Work Status Note

that she presented. If her responses don't add up, we can set-up a debrief

and compare so that we can talk about any disciplinary steps."

On December 28, 2018, Atkinson called Creagh into her office and

"started to question [Creagh] about [the] doctor's note." According to

Creagh,

"[Atkinson] showed me the doctor's note and it looked similar

to mine. She asked me whose is this. I said, this is my doctor's

note but that's not the one that I gave you. She showed me

another one with just two computer-generated X's like the one

that I had given her. She said, who put these X's on the other

one? I said, I don't know. The doctor's nurse … just prints

them out or she does that and gives them to me and I bring

them here. She said, well, someone did it. I said, it wasn't

me. She said, well, we are going to suspend you pending an

investigation. I said, I didn't do this. She said, I'm going to

need your badge and keys."

Following that conversation, Atkinson emailed Conerly, Barrera, and

Warren-Murrell. That email states, in pertinent part:

"I just had a conversation with [Creagh] …. I gave her a copy

of the form she gave me and asked her if this is the one [the

doctor] gave [her] and … she replied yes. So I then gave her

the second one and she said that it was a different one. I said

this is what the doctor's office sent to us. She said she knows

nothing about it that they gave her this one. She said [the

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nurse] printed it out and she was the one that put the X's in

the box because there weren't any there and I said yes there

were if you look you can see them underneath the original

ones, she said well I don't know that is what they gave me.

She said are you accusing me of doing it, I said I am asking

you if you did it and she stated no [the nurse] put the X's in

the boxes."

It appears that Conerly shared that information with Johnathan Wilson,

another of Envoy's HR employees stationed in Texas, and, that same day,

Wilson sent Atkinson the following email:

"Per our conversation, the employee has now been provided

the opportunity to speak to the discrepancy between the

document that she provided and the document that was

provided by the doctor's office. The employee has not provided

sufficient reason as to why the two documents are different.

The resulting conclusion is that the document was altered

after leaving the doctor's office, and prior to being turned in

to Envoy. The altering of official documentation is considered

a violation of Envoy Guiding Principles and Business Ethics.

Specifically, the Guiding Principles say, 'We conduct

ourselves with the highest standards of honesty, integrity and

fairness -- obeying all the laws of the communities in which

we work or do business. We must all understand and comply

with our business ethics policies.'

"Please suspend the employee immediately, and proceed with

off-boarding based upon the above determination."

Later that same day, Atkinson provided Creagh with a letter that

stated, in pertinent part: "Effective today, December 28, 2018, you are

being suspended pending the outcome of an investigation into the

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documents you provided to this office. We will conduct our investigation

as expeditiously as possible and once we have the results will advise you

accordingly." During Atkinson's deposition, parts of which were read into

evidence, Creagh's counsel questioned Atkinson about that letter and the

investigation to which it alluded, and Atkinson testified as follows:

"Q. … [Y]ou say, 'We will conduct our investigation as

expeditiously as possible and once we have the results will

advise you accordingly.' Do you see that?

"A. Yes, sir.

"Q. Did you conduct an investigation regarding this matter

after December 28, 2018?

"A. It was more of the HR department did that.

"Q. Okay. But … to your knowledge, what you're saying is the

HR department conducted an investigation after December

28, 2018?

"A. Yes, sir."

Creagh likewise testified that Atkinson had told her during their

December 28, 2018, meeting that "an investigation still needed to be

done."

On January 4, 2019, Atkinson sent Creagh the following email:

"The investigation has been completed if you could please report back to

work on Monday the 7th at 9 am." As requested, Creagh returned to

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work on January 7, 2019, and, after working part of her shift, went to

Atkinson's office at Atkinson's request, at which point Atkinson told

Creagh that she was "being let go." Atkinson also provided Creagh with

a termination letter, which was signed by only Atkinson. That letter

informed Creagh that her employment had been terminated for

"falsification of documentation" because the return-to-work note that she

had allegedly given to Atkinson "appeared to have been altered when

compared to the one the doctor's office had sent." As noted, Creagh

disputed the allegation that she had created the altered note, and she

testified that she experienced -- and continues to experience -- mental

anguish as a result of the allegedly wrongful termination of her

employment.

Regarding the termination letter that Atkinson provided to her,

Creagh testified as follows:

"Q. Now, on that letter that you received did it have anyone

else's name on it other than [Atkinson]?

"A. No.

"Q. Who fired you?

"A. [Atkinson]."

Atkinson testified as follows regarding the termination letter:

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"Q. Anywhere in that [termination] letter does it say that this

decision to fire [Creagh] is made by anyone other than you

with your signature on there?

"A. We can't terminate an employee without HR's --"Q. Go ahead. Finish.

"A. Sorry. I have to have HR's authorization in order to

terminate an employee.

"Q. Does -- and -- and my question was anywhere in that letter

does it say that this is HR's decision?

"A. No, sir. Let me see that. That was one was actually mine.

"Q. Is there anything … that you want change about the

testimony that you've given?

"….

"A. Does it not … in the paragraph at the bottom represent

that it's following the guiding principles of Envoy …? So --"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yeah.

"A. Okay. So that's -- they have to give me authorization to

terminate her. I … can't do that on my own. If HR says no,

then you don't do it.

"….

"Q. I mean, so are you telling me … that the decision to fire

[Creagh] was made by HR …?

"A. I'm telling you that the decision to fire [Creagh] was made

by HR, yes, sir, because they have to give me authorization."

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However, Charles Davis, one of Envoy's regional managing

directors and a defense witness, testified that Atkinson did in fact have

the authority to discharge an employee. Specifically, Davis testified as

follows on direct examination:

"Q. In a situation where a station manager has referred an

employment matter to HR for investigation, for example, if an

employee is thought to have … altered a doctor's note and

then HR does an investigation, who makes the decision on

discipline?

"A. In that case it would be HR. As soon as we take the issue

to HR it's going to be their decision.

"Q. Did the station manager independently have authority to

terminate any employee?

"A. Technically they could. It's not our process."

On cross-examination, Davis testified as follows:

"Q. Technically they could terminate, correct?

"A. Yes.

"Q. That's part of the policies and procedures at Envoy,

correct?

"A. It's not.

"Q. But technically they could. What do you mean by

technically?

"A. As the general manager if they sign a termination form

they could terminate someone. However, our process would

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be to go through HR so we can ensure that everything is

followed correctly."

Davis was also asked on cross-examination about Envoy's response to

Creagh's requests for production:

"Q. Let's get back to the technicality that we talked about with

the HR. Let me show you what has been marked as Plaintiff's

[Exhibit] 178 where Envoy responded. Have you seen this

document before?

"A. No, I don't believe so.

"Q. In the question it says, identify by name, address and job

title the supervisory chain of command on the date of

termination of the plaintiff from the plaintiff up to the highest

ranking officer of the company. Can you read for the jury

what Envoy's answer was?

"A. The plaintiff was terminated by Brigitte Atkinson, station

manager.

"Q. Does it say anything else?

"A. No.

"Q. Is that a technicality?

"….

"A. I'm not a lawyer. I'm not sure.

"Q. You used the word. I didn't pick it. You picked it.

"A. I didn't say technicality. I said technically an agent of the

company, being Brigitte Atkinson, could have signed to hire

an employee or signed to terminate an employee. However,

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our process is to ensure we go through our HR department or

our recruiting department.

"Q. Does it say what your policy is there? Does it say that HR

was involved in this in any way?

"A. It does not."

During the cross-examination of Davis, the trial court admitted into

evidence a copy of Envoy's job description for its HR employees. That

document states that an HR employee "provide[s] counsel and

recommendations to supervisors and managers in matters of employee

conduct, performance, corrective and disciplinary action, consistent with

company policies and applicable federal and state labor laws." Davis

then testified as follows regarding that document:

"Q. Under here it says, key required skills: Ability to conduct

and manage complex investigations and recommend action,

provide counsel and recommendation to supervisors and

managers. Did I read that correctly?

"A. Yes.

"Q. The word is 'recommendations,' correct?

"A. Yes.

"Q. Doesn't say final decision maker, does it?

"A. It says recommendation.

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"Q. It specifically talks about applying to managers, which

would be Brigitte Atkinson. Right?

"A. Yes."

As part of her case, Creagh read into evidence the following

excerpts from Conerly's deposition:

"Q. I just marked Exhibit 17, and it's a job description for HR

consultant and business partners. Do you see that?

"A. Yes.

"….

"Q. If you go to the second page of Exhibit 17 where it has key

required skills, do you see that?

"A. Uh-huh.

"….

"Q. It says, ability to conduct and manage complex

investigation and recommend action. Did I read that

correctly?

"A. Yes.

"Q. Okay. So you know you testified previously in response to

a question about what your understanding of what HR did, is

that consistent with your understanding, that HR would

conduct and manage complex investigations and recommend

action?

"A. Yep.

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"Q. Okay. And they're recommending action to who, the

operational people?

"A. When you say operational, are you meaning like the

station managers or leaders?

"Q. Yes.

"A. Yes, uh-huh.

"….

"Q. And then it says, provide counsel and recommendations to

supervisors and managers in matters of employee conduct,

performance, corrective and disciplinary action consistent

with company policies and applicable federal and state labor

laws. Did I read that correctly?

"A. That's the way I read it, uh-huh."

Josh Hernandez, a "senior business partner for Envoy," testified for

the defense regarding the email that Wilson sent to Atkinson and the

investigation that occurred in conjunction with Creagh's discharge.

Specifically, Hernandez testified as follows on direct examination:

"Q. The last sentence of the email [that Wilson sent to

Atkinson], that is a directive as I'm reading it from [Wilson]

to [Atkinson]?

"A. Yes.

"Q. At any point in any of the materials that we have reviewed

so far related to this investigation did [Atkinson] make the

decision to terminate Creagh without anyone else's input?

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"A. No.

"Q. Based on this email do you believe that Atkinson made the

determination to terminate Creagh without input from

anyone else?

"A. No.

"….

"Q. I'm going to hand you what has been admitted as

Defendant's [Exhibit] 13. Do you recognize that?

"….

"A. [It is the December 28, 2018,] suspension letter.

"….

"Q. Read the last sentence of the first paragraph.

"A. We will conduct our investigation as expeditiously as

possible and once we have the results we will advise

accordingly.

"Q. Here is the question, once the findings that are put into …

that email from Wilson, once that email is sent from an HR

perspective at Envoy is that the end of the investigation?

"A. It is not.

"Q. What else has to happen before an investigation is

concluded?

"A. In a case where it would lead to termination there are a

number of things we have to do to prepare to do that which

include writing up a termination letter, putting it in our

system to make sure that -- we are going to be removing this

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employee from several systems so a number of things have to

happen before we can say this investigation is now closed or

this investigation is completed. All of that wraps into when

we say the investigation has not yet been completed.

"Q. If there is a delay between the time that person is

suspended and they are actually terminated, is that what is

happening in terms of completing the investigation?

"A. Yes, that's what is happening.

"….

"Q. I show you Defendant's [Exhibit] 14. If you will, take a

look at that for me. What is that?

"A. A termination letter.

"Q. Who is that letter to?

"A. Jada Creagh.

"Q. Who signed that termination letter?

"A. Brigitte Atkinson.

"Q. We just saw that email … where Wilson is the one who

made the directive to terminate Creagh. Why did Atkinson

sign the termination letter?

"A. She signed it because [Creagh] reported to her.

"Q. Is that in accordance with Envoy's policies; your direct

supervisor is the one to sign the letter?

"A. Yes."

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On cross-examination, Creagh's counsel reminded Hernandez, and

Hernandez acknowledged, that Envoy's job description for its HR

employees indicates that they "provide advice and recommendations

regarding hiring and firing." However, Hernandez insisted that Wilson

had made the decision to terminate Creagh's employment. Creagh's

counsel then questioned Hernandez as follows:

"Q. Well, where is Wilson, the guy you say made the decision?

"A. He is no longer with Envoy.

"….

"Q. So, you are in here testifying about a decision that Wilson

allegedly made even though he is the consultant that provides

recommendations and advice saying that he made a decision?

"A. Yes."

In May 2022 -- before the trial in this case occurred -- Envoy

terminated Atkinson's employment. When asked why her employment

had been terminated, Atkinson testified: "They told me -- I'm trying to

remember. I don't honestly remember, but they told me -- I thought they

told me that I had failed a couple of audits." However, Ann Marie De La

Paz, one of Envoy's regional managing directors, testified in her

deposition -- parts of which were read into evidence -- that she had

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terminated Atkinson's employment because Atkinson "was not a good

manager," "didn't take any ownership for her failure to lead the team,"

did not "exercise the highest standards of integrity" and "fairness," did

not "exercise good judgment," did not "act in the best interest of Envoy"

and its customers, and did not "work as a team with other coworkers."

The termination letter that De La Paz provided to Atkinson, which was

admitted into evidence, corroborated De La Paz's testimony in that it

indicated that Atkinson's employment had been terminated based on her

"egregious" behavior, including a "lack[] [of] empathy," the "inability to

provide a safe and productive work environment," "poor judgment," and

the fact that "[her] outstation ha[d] failed multiple safety and compliance

audits."

In 2019, Creagh filed a complaint against Envoy, in which she

asserted only a claim for worker's compensation benefits -- a claim the

parties would eventually settle. During the course of discovery, Envoy's

original counsel, Anthony Fox, provided Creagh with a set of unsigned

answers to interrogatories, one of which -- the answer to Interrogatory

14 -- stated that Creagh had voluntarily resigned her employment. Fox

later provided a signature page that purportedly contains Conerly's

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signature as the authorized agent of Envoy. However, it is undisputed

that Creagh's employment was terminated and that the signature page

was forged. Although Fox accepted responsibility for the incorrect

answer to Interrogatory 14, contending that he had mistakenly assumed

that Creagh had resigned, he denied responsibility for the forged

signature page. Envoy also disavowed any responsibility for the forged

signature page, and it subsequently dismissed Fox, retained new counsel,

and amended its response to Interrogatory 14 to reflect that Creagh's

employment had been terminated for "falsifying documents."

In 2020, Creagh amended her complaint to assert a claim of

retaliatory discharge, alleging that Envoy had terminated her

employment "solely because she claimed or sought to recover worker's

compensation benefits." Discovery in this case was contentious, to say

the least, and not simply because of the issues with Envoy's original

answer to Interrogatory 14, though that is the only discovery issue

relevant to this appeal. Thus, the trial court appointed a special master

to manage the discovery disputes. Following an evidentiary hearing, the

special master entered a detailed order in which he found "that the

responsibility for drafting the incorrect answer to Interrogatory 14 lies

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with Fox, not with any Envoy employee." The special master also stated

that he was "unable to reach a conclusion as to who forged Conerly's

signature" and that the forgery was a "mystery." Thus, in the opinion of

the special master, Creagh should not "be permitted to put on evidence

to the effect that the signature was forged" because that issue was

"collateral to the question of whether Envoy had a legitimate basis … for

terminating [Creagh]" and "[t]he salacious nature of the issue would be

a distraction to the jury and would probably overwhelm every other issue

in the case."

After the special master entered his order, Envoy filed a motion in

limine in which it sought to have its original answer to Interrogatory 14

excluded from evidence. The record does not contain a written order from

the trial court ruling on that motion, but it appears that the parties

discussed the motion before trial and that the court made some sort of

ruling adverse to Envoy at that time. However, as Envoy's counsel noted

during oral arguments before this Court, that discussion and oral ruling

were not transcribed for the record.

During the trial, but outside the presence of the jury, the trial court

and the parties revisited the issue of Envoy's original answer to

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Interrogatory 14. During that discussion, Envoy's counsel stated that

she "want[ed] some clarity" as to "what [the trial court] [was] doing with

Interrogatory 14." The trial court ruled that Creagh would be permitted

to "offer into evidence that [Envoy] stated early on in the litigation

process" that Creagh had "voluntarily resigned her job." The trial court

also ruled that Creagh could present the forged signature page, but the

court clarified that Creagh could not "mention [one word] about [the

signature page] being falsified or any of that." Following that discussion,

and while still outside the presence of the jury, the trial court admitted

Plaintiff's Exhibit 155 into evidence. At that time, the exhibit contained

three pages -- the first page of Creagh's interrogatories, the page

containing Envoy's original answer to Interrogatory 14, and the forged

signature page.

At the close of Creagh's evidence and again at the close of its own

evidence, Envoy moved for a judgment as a matter of law ("JML"),

arguing that Creagh had failed to establish a prima facie case of

retaliatory discharge. The trial court denied the motion both times.

During closing arguments, Creagh's counsel revisited Conerly's

testimony and reminded the jury that, in response to Interrogatory 14,

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Envoy had originally answered that Creagh had voluntarily resigned her

employment. Creagh's counsel then said: "Is that a witness swearing

falsely to a material fact?" Envoy's counsel immediately objected and

requested a mistrial, noting that the trial court had previously ruled that

Creagh's counsel was "not allowed to argue [Conerly] had lied." After

removing the jury from the courtroom, the trial court agreed that

Creagh's counsel's argument "was in clear violation of [the court's]

ruling," but the court declined to grant a mistrial. Instead, the trial court

stated:

"This is what I'm going to do. I want you to substitute that

exhibit. It has not gone back to the jury. Take out the

signature page of Conerly's signature, put an unsigned copy

into evidence. I will do a limiting instruction to the jury. … I

want the defense to give me what they propose that limiting

instruction ought to be. I think it should be somewhere along

the lines of letting the jury know that contrary to what

[counsel] has said, Conerly never signed those interrogatory

responses."

When the jury was brought back into the courtroom, the trial court

stated: "Ladies and gentlemen, contrary to what [Creagh's counsel] said,

I want to point out that Valerine Conerly never submitted a response to

Interrogatory 14 that was sworn to by her." In accord with the trial

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court's ruling, the version of Plaintiff's Exhibit 155 that was given to the

jury contained a blank signature page.

As noted, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Creagh and

awarded her $250,000 in compensatory damages for mental anguish and

$425,000 in punitive damages. Following the trial, Envoy filed a written

motion for a JML, continuing to argue that Creagh had failed to establish

a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge. Envoy also challenged the

damages awarded by the jury, arguing that both the compensatory

damages and the punitive damages were excessive and that the issue of

punitive damages should not have been submitted to the jury in the first

place. The trial court denied that motion following a hearing, and Envoy

filed a timely notice of appeal.

Discussion

Envoy raises the following arguments on appeal: (1) that the trial

court erred by denying its motion for a JML, (2) that the court erred with

respect to several evidentiary rulings, (3) that the compensatory damages

are excessive, and (4) that the evidence did not support any award of

punitive damages or, alternatively, that the punitive damages are

excessive.

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I. Envoy's Motion for a JML

Envoy argues that the trial court erred by denying its motion for a

JML because, it says, Creagh failed to establish a prima facie case of

retaliatory discharge. Alternatively, Envoy argues that, even if Creagh

carried that burden, it "offered a legitimate non-discriminatory reason

for Creagh's termination (falsification of a medical note)" and that

Creagh failed to prove that this reason was pretextual. Envoy's brief, p.

44.

" 'We review as follows a trial court's ruling on a motion for a

JML made after a verdict has been returned:

" ' "The standard of review applicable to a

ruling on a [renewed] motion for [a JML] is

identical to the standard used by the trial court in

granting or denying a motion for [a JML]. Thus,

in reviewing the trial court's ruling on the motion,

we review the evidence in the light most favorable

to the nonmovant, and we determine whether the

party with the burden of proof has produced

sufficient evidence to require a jury determination.

" ' "….

" ' "… In ruling on a [renewed] motion for a

[JML], the trial court is called upon to determine

whether the evidence was sufficient to submit a

question of fact to the jury; for the court to

determine that it was, there must have been

'substantial evidence' before the jury to create a

question of fact. '[S]ubstantial evidence is

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evidence of such weight and quality that fairminded persons in the exercise of impartial

judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the

fact sought to be proved.' "

" 'American Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. v. Hughes, 624 So. 2d 1362,

1366-67 (Ala. 1993) (citations omitted).' "

Complete Cash Holdings, LLC v. Powell, 239 So. 3d 550, 556 (Ala. 2017)

(quoting Lee v. Houser, 148 So. 3d 406, 414 (Ala. 2013)).

"Additionally, this Court noted in Liberty National Life

Insurance Co. v. Daugherty, 840 So. 2d 152, 156 (Ala. 2002):

" ' " 'A judgment as a matter of law is proper

only where there is a complete absence of proof on

a material issue or where there are no

controverted questions of fact on which reasonable

people could differ and the moving party is entitled

to a judgment as a matter of law.' " Southern

Energy Homes, Inc. v. Washington, 774 So. 2d 505,

510-11 (Ala. 2000), quoting Locklear Dodge City,

Inc. v. Kimbrell, 703 So. 2d 303, 304 (Ala. 1997).' "

Lawson v. Moore, 25 So. 3d 417, 420 (Ala. 2008).

To establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge, a plaintiff

must prove "1) an employment relationship, 2) an on-the-job injury, 3)

knowledge on the part of the employer of the on-the-job injury, and 4)

subsequent termination of employment based solely upon the employee's

on-the-job injury and the filing of a workers' compensation claim."

Alabama Power Co. v. Aldridge, 854 So. 2d 554, 563 (Ala. 2002) (emphasis

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added). See also § 25-5-11.1, Ala. Code 1975 (providing that "[n]o

employee shall be terminated by an employer solely because the

employee has instituted or maintained any action against the employer

to recover workers' compensation benefits" (emphasis added)).

"There is no dispute between the parties that [Creagh]

established the first three elements of a retaliatory-discharge

claim. The disagreement … concerns the fourth element, i.e.,

whether [Creagh] established that [she] was fired 'solely'

because of [her] workplace injury and the filing of a workers'

compensation claim.

" 'Because direct evidence demonstrating that an

employer has discharged an employee solely

because the employee has filed a workers'

compensation claim is not often easily obtained, an

employee may establish by circumstantial

evidence that the actual reason for the discharge

was the employee's filing of a workers'

compensation claim.'

"Hatch v. NTW Inc., 35 So. 3d 623, 628 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009).

" 'This Court identified in [Alabama Power Co. v.]

Aldridge[, 854 So. 2d 554 (Ala. 2002),] certain

factors that can be considered as circumstantial

evidence of a causal connection between an

employee's filing a workers' compensation claim

and that employee's discharge[:]

" ' " '1) knowledge of the compensation

claim by those making the decision on

termination, 2) expression of a negative

attitude toward the employee's injured

condition, 3) failure to adhere to

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established company policy, 4)

discriminatory treatment in

comparison to similarly situated

employees, 5) sudden changes in an

employee's work performance

evaluations following a workers'

compensation claim, and 6) evidence

that the stated reason for the discharge

was false.' "

" '854 So. 2d at 564-65 (quoting Chhim v.

University of Houston, 76 S.W.3d 210, 218 (Tex.

Ct. App. 2002)). Furthermore, we observed that

"[m]any states also consider '[p]roximity in time

between the filing of the workers' compensation

claim and discharge' a persuasive factor in

establishing a causal connection." Aldridge, 854

So. 2d at 565 (quoting Rebarchek v. Farmers Coop.

Elevator & Mercantile Ass'n, 272 Kan. 546, 555,

35 P.3d 892, 899 (2001)).'

"Flint Constr. Co. [v. Hall], 904 So. 2d [236,] 248 [(Ala. 2004)]."

Ex parte Isbell, 153 So. 3d 8, 17-18 (Ala. 2013). "Once the plaintiff has

established a prima facie case [of retaliatory discharge], the burden shifts

to the defendant to present legitimate reasons for the plaintiff's

discharge; if the defendant presents legitimate reasons the burden …

shift[s] back to the plaintiff to prove that the stated reasons are

pretextual." Aldridge, 854 So. 2d at 567.

Envoy argues that Creagh failed to establish a prima facie case of

retaliatory discharge because, it says, she failed to prove that her

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employment was terminated solely on the basis of her worker's

compensation claim. In support of that argument, Envoy contends that

"the termination decision undisputedly was made by a … decision-maker

in another office, in a different department, in another state," i.e., Wilson,

and that Wilson's email to Atkinson reflects that he made that decision

based on his conclusion that Creagh had "falsified a medical document

changing her work restrictions." Envoy's brief, pp. 19, 37. Envoy then

notes that, under Alabama law, "if there is uncontradicted evidence of an

independently sufficient basis for [an employee's] discharge then the

defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Aldridge, 854 So.

2d at 568.

The problem with Envoy's argument is that it was not undisputed

that Wilson made the decision to terminate Creagh's employment.

Although there is some evidence to support such a finding, there is also

evidence to support a finding that Atkinson made that decision.

Specifically, Envoy stated in response to a discovery request that "[t]he

plaintiff was terminated by Brigitte Atkinson" (emphasis added), and it

was Atkinson who signed Creagh's termination letter. That evidence

alone provided a basis upon which the jury could have found that

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Atkinson made the decision to terminate Creagh's employment. Envoy

attempts to minimize that evidence, arguing that Wilson's email to

Atkinson was a "directive" to terminate Creagh's employment and that

the mere fact that Atkinson signed and delivered the termination letter

does not "elevate her to decision-maker." Envoy's reply brief, p. 8. In

other words, Envoy contends that Atkinson was merely "carry[ing] out

the termination as instructed" by Wilson. Id. However, that was an

argument to make to the jury. The role of this Court is to consider the

evidence in a light most favorable to Creagh, and, applying that standard,

the fact that Envoy unequivocally stated in response to a discovery

request that Creagh "was terminated by Brigitte Atkinson" provided a

basis upon which the jury could have found that Atkinson made the

decision to terminate Creagh's employment.

In addition, Envoy's own witness testified that Atkinson had

"independent[] … authority to terminate [an] employee" and that the

"process would be to go through HR [to] ensure that everything is

followed correctly." Likewise, Atkinson did not testify that she could not

make the decision to discharge an employee but, instead, testified only

that she had to "have HR's authorization in order to terminate an

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employee." (Emphasis added.) Also, Envoy's job description for its HR

employees states that they "provide counsel and recommendations to

supervisors and managers in matters of employee conduct, performance,

corrective and disciplinary action." (Emphasis added.) All of that

evidence, when considered in a light most favorable to Creagh, supports

a finding that Atkinson made the decision to terminate Creagh's

employment and that HR merely authorized or signed-off on that

decision. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

has observed: "When a formal decisionmaker acts merely as a cat's paw

for or rubber-stamps a decision, report, or recommendation actually

made by a subordinate, it is not inconsistent to say that the subordinate

is the actual decisionmaker or the one principally responsible for the

contested employment decision …." Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics

Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 290 (4th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added),

overruled in part on other grounds by Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557

U.S. 167 (2009).

Then there is the evidence regarding Envoy's investigation. As

noted, the letter that Atkinson gave to Creagh on December 28, 2018 --the same day that Wilson sent his email to Atkinson -- stated that Creagh

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was "being suspended pending the outcome of an investigation into the

documents [she] provided to [Envoy]." It was not until January 7, 2019

-- approximately 10 days later -- that Creagh was informed that her

employment had been terminated. That evidence, when considered in a

light most favorable to Creagh, supports a finding that Wilson's email to

Atkinson was not a directive to terminate Creagh's employment and that,

instead, that decision was made sometime later following further

investigation, which, as noted, culminated in a termination letter signed

only by Atkinson. Envoy correctly notes that one of its witnesses

provided testimony indicating that the "investigation" was actually

nothing more than "time for internal administrative tasks … to be

completed prior to the official termination date." Envoy's reply brief, p.

10. However, that testimony merely gave rise to a conflict in the

evidence, and that conflict created a question of fact for the jury to

resolve. Foster v. North Am. Bus Indus., Inc., 236 So. 3d 70, 78 (Ala.

2017). In resolving that factual dispute, the jury was tasked with

determining how much credibility, if any, to give to the witnesses'

testimony and thus was not required to believe Envoy's self-serving

testimony regarding the investigation that occurred following Wilson's

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email. See Tutor v. Sines, 380 So. 3d 1035, 1040 (Ala. 2023) (noting that

a "witness's credibility is precisely the kind of question the jury must

resolve").

The foregoing evidence, when considered in a light most favorable

to Creagh, provided a substantial basis upon which the jury could have

found that it was Atkinson -- not Wilson -- who made the decision to

terminate Creagh's employment. That said, if the jury did make such a

finding, then there was ample evidence to support a further finding that

Atkinson was motivated solely by the fact that Creagh had filed a

worker's compensation claim. First, Atkinson clearly had knowledge of

that claim, and Creagh testified that her relationship with Atkinson had

initially been friendly but that, following her injury, Atkinson became

cold and even hostile toward her. According to Creagh, Atkinson's

change in demeanor stemmed from her frustration with Creagh's

inability to perform her normal duties without the assistance of other

employees, which pulled those employees from their own duties. The

evidence also indicated that Atkinson's frustration with Creagh's injury

was exacerbated by the fact that, during this time, Atkinson was

concerned about the efficiency of Envoy's operations at the Mobile

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airport. Specifically, Creagh testified that Envoy was "short staffed"

around that time and that, as a result, Atkinson was "threaten[ing]

[employees'] jobs" and telling them that "[n]o one should be taking off

work" "[no] matter what they have going on."

Then, according to Creagh, on December 3, 2018, Atkinson

suggested that Envoy was no longer "a good fit" for Creagh, and, when

Creagh told Atkinson that she wanted to continue working for Envoy,

Atkinson said that she would "find a way to get rid of [Creagh]."

(Emphasis added.) Significantly, Creagh testified that, during that

conversation, Atkinson made no mention whatsoever of the altered note,

despite the fact that Creagh had allegedly given it to her three days

earlier and the fact that there was evidence indicating that Atkinson had

"noticed the X's right away." That evidence supported Creagh's

allegation that it was Atkinson who created the altered note after that

conversation and then used it as subterfuge to accomplish her goal of

"find[ing] a way to get rid of" Creagh, which was Creagh's theory of the

case. 1 Indeed, the only possible conclusion from the evidence was that it

1Creagh's counsel told the jury during his opening statement that

"Atkinson altered [the November 30, 2018, return-to-work] note and

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was either Atkinson or Creagh who created the altered note, which was

a question only the jury could resolve. Foster, supra. Moreover, there

was evidence that cast doubt on Atkinson's credibility -- namely, her

stated reason for the termination of her own employment, which the

evidence demonstrated was far from the complete truth. As we have

already explained, such credibility determinations are solely within the

province of the jury. Tutor, supra.

Two other facts also tend to support the conclusion that Atkinson

terminated Creagh's employment based solely on Creagh's worker's

compensation claim. First, Envoy terminated Creagh's employment on

January 7, 2019 -- less than three months after her injury. This Court

has previously determined that a similar period between the plaintiff's

injury and the termination of his employment tended to support a prima

facie case of retaliatory discharge. See Ex parte Isbell, 153 So. 3d at 18

(noting, in holding that the plaintiff had established a prima facie case of

retaliatory discharge, that the plaintiff had been "fired approximately

three months after filing his workers' compensation claim"). There was

blamed it on [Creagh]," and he reminded the jury during his closing

statement that "Atkinson forge[d] the return-to-work slip."

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also some evidence to support a finding that Envoy had previously

discharged employees who had suffered on-the-job injuries. Specifically,

Creagh testified that, when she reported her injury shortly after it

occurred, her shift supervisor, Arthur, told her that "the last person who

had reported getting hurt on the job was no longer there." A reasonable

inference to draw from that statement, especially when it is considered

in a light most favorable to Creagh, is that Envoy had previously

discharged employees who had suffered on-the-job injuries. It is true that

Arthur disputed making that statement, and arguably there are other

ways to interpret the statement even if he did make it. However, we have

already explained that our role is to consider the evidence in a light most

favorable to Creagh and that conflicts in the evidence created a question

of fact for the jury to resolve.

Given the foregoing evidence, this Court concludes that Creagh

presented substantial evidence indicating that Envoy terminated her

employment based solely on the fact that she had filed a worker's

compensation claim. The burden then shifted to Envoy to "present [a]

legitimate reason[] for [Creagh's] discharge." Aldridge, 854 So. 2d at 567.

Envoy carried that burden by presenting evidence indicating that it

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terminated Creagh's employment based on its conclusion that she had

submitted the altered note to Atkinson. The burden then "shift[ed] back

to [Creagh] to prove that the stated reason[] [was] pretextual," id. at 567

-- a burden that, Envoy says, Creagh failed to carry. We disagree. As we

have already explained, there was evidence to support a finding that it

was Atkinson who created the altered note and then used it as subterfuge

to accomplish her goal of "find[ing] a way to get rid of" Creagh. Thus, the

jury could have found that the altered note was not only a pretext for the

termination of Creagh's employment but also one that Envoy fabricated. 2

In arguing that Creagh failed to carry her burden of demonstrating

pretext, Envoy relies almost exclusively on Coca-Cola Bottling Co.

Consolidated v. Hollander, 885 So. 2d 125 (Ala. 2003), arguing that this

case is "strikingly similar" to that one. Envoy's brief, p. 46. However,

Hollander was not a decision by a majority of this Court and thus is not

2Envoy believes that it presented an independent and legitimate

reason for the termination of Creagh's employment because, it says,

regardless of Atkinson's reason for terminating Creagh's employment,

Wilson's email to Atkinson indicated that his reason for terminating

Creagh's employment was his belief that she had created the altered

note. However, as we have already explained, the jury could have found

that Wilson did not make the decision to terminate Creagh's

employment.

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binding precedent. Ex parte DBI, Inc., 23 So. 3d 635, 647 (Ala. 2009).

Regardless, we find Hollander to be distinguishable on the facts.

In Hollander, Louis Frank Hollander sued Coca-Cola Bottling Co.

Consolidated ("CCBCC"), asserting a claim of retaliatory discharge.

Hollander's theory of the case was that CCBCC had terminated his

employment solely because he had filed a worker's compensation claim,

but CCBCC presented evidence indicating that it had discharged

Hollander for dishonesty. Specifically, CCBCC presented evidence

indicating that Hollander had asked his doctor to backdate a workrelease note, and, although Hollander disputed that allegation, the

doctor's notes reflected that Hollander had made that request. Following

a jury's verdict in Hollander's favor, CCBCC appealed, and this Court's

main opinion concluded that a JML should have been entered in favor of

CCBCC because CCBCC had an independent basis for terminating

Hollander's employment. Hollander argued in response that CCBCC was

not entitled to a JML because there was conflicting evidence as to

whether he had requested the backdated work-release note, but the main

opinion stated:

"[Even] if we accept everything that Hollander says as true,

including that he never asked Dr. Nichols to backdate any

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document, it still would not change the fact that CCBCC

thought that, based on Dr. Nichols's note indicating that

Hollander had asked him to backdate a work-release slip,

dishonesty was a legitimate basis for firing Hollander and

that an investigation would not have changed CCBCC's

decision."

885 So. 2d at 132 (emphasis added). In this case, though, there was

evidence to support a finding that Atkinson created the altered note.

Thus, unlike the evidence in Hollander, the evidence in this case provided

a basis upon which the jury could have found that the person who made

the decision to terminate Creagh's employment knew that Creagh had

not created the altered note.

In sum, Creagh made a prima facie showing that Envoy terminated

her employment solely because she had filed a worker's compensation

claim. Envoy then presented evidence indicating that it had a legitimate

reason for discharging Creagh, and Creagh presented evidence indicating

that Envoy's stated reason was pretextual. Thus, the trial court correctly

concluded that the evidence created questions of fact for the jury to

resolve, and the court therefore did not err by denying Envoy's motion for

a JML. Accordingly, this argument does not entitle Envoy to relief.

II. Evidentiary Issues

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Envoy argues that the trial court erred with respect to several

evidentiary rulings, though most of its arguments challenge the

admission of Plaintiff's Exhibit 155, which was Envoy's original answer

to Interrogatory 14. We will address each of Envoy's arguments in turn,

keeping in mind that evidentiary rulings are "generally left to the

discretion of the trial court" and "will not be reversed except upon a clear

showing of abuse of discretion." Ex parte Loggins, 771 So. 2d 1093, 1103

(Ala. 2000).

First, Envoy argues that the trial court erred by allowing Creagh to

present the jury with "the incorrect response [to Interrogatory 14] and

the forged verification signature," i.e., the forged signature page that

purportedly contained Conerly's signature. Envoy's brief, p. 50

(emphasis in original). According to Envoy, it was unfairly prejudiced by

the admission of the forged signature page because, it says, that evidence

"pre-impeached Conerly before she took the witness stand," even though

the evidence indicated that the signature was not Conerly's. Id. at 15.

However, the version of Plaintiff's Exhibit 155 that was given to the jury

did not contain the forged signature page, and, when Creagh's counsel

suggested during closing arguments that Conerly had falsely sworn to

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Envoy's original answer to Interrogatory 14, the trial court instructed the

jury that Conerly "never submitted a response to Interrogatory 14 that

was sworn to by her" -- an instruction that the jury is presumed to have

followed. Black Warrior Elec. Membership Corp. v. McCarter, 115 So. 3d

158, 166 (Ala. 2012). Thus, for all that appears in the record, the jury

never saw the forged signature page and, more importantly, did not

consider Envoy's original answer to Interrogatory 14 to be the sworn

response of Conerly. 3 Accordingly, this argument does not entitle Envoy

to relief.

Second, Envoy makes the following argument regarding its original

answer to Interrogatory 14:

"As an acknowledged mistake and a known forgery, it did not

even cross the Rule 104 reliability threshold. Ala. R. Evid.

104. The response constituted inadmissible hearsay as it was

not properly verified, containing a forgery. Ala. R. Evid. 801,

[8]02.[4] Additionally, it had no 'tendency to make the

3Envoy contends that Creagh's counsel "showed the jury the version

with Conerly's signature page multiple times, including in a blow-up at

closing." Envoy's brief, p. 13. However, the record citations that Envoy

has provided do not reflect that Creagh's counsel showed the jury the

forged signature page, much less a "blow-up" of it, or even that counsel

showed the jury any exhibit at all.

4Envoy actually cites Rule 102, Ala. R. Evid., rather than Rule 802,

Ala. R. Evid., but, taken in context, it appears that this was a

typographical error because Rule 102 does not address hearsay.

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existence of any fact that is of consequence to the

determination of the action more probable or less probable

than it would be without the evidence.' Ala. R. Evid. 401.

Envoy never changed its story about the reasons for Creagh's

termination[;] rather its former counsel misrepresented the

reason due to an admitted error."

Envoy's brief, pp. 51-52. The foregoing paragraph presents several

single-sentence arguments, each of which is supported by nothing more

than a citation to one or more of the Alabama Rules of Evidence without

any further explanation as to why those rules barred the admission of

Envoy's original answer to Interrogatory 14. In fact, with respect to three

of the four rules it has cited, Envoy has not even bothered to quote the

rules or to discuss their substance. In other words, Envoy has presented

several single-sentence arguments that are supported by, at best, only a

general principle of law. This Court has previously explained that such

arguments do not comply with the requirements of Rule 28(a)(10), Ala.

R. App. P., and are therefore deemed to be waived. See, e.g., Ex parte

Borden, 60 So. 3d 940, 944 (Ala. 2007); and Jimmy Day Plumbing &

Heating, Inc. v. Smith, 964 So. 2d 1, 9 (Ala. 2007) (holding that a "threesentence argument" supported by only "a general proposition of law" did

not comply with Rule 28(a)(10) and therefore would not be considered).

See also Ex parte Riverfront, LLC, 129 So. 3d 1008, 1015 (Ala. 2013)

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(plurality opinion) (refusing to consider an argument that was supported

by only "general citations to the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure").

Thus, we will not consider these arguments. 5

Third, Envoy argues that its original answer to Interrogatory 14

was inadmissible pursuant to Rule 403, Ala. R. Evid., which provides that

relevant evidence may be excluded "if its probative value is substantially

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice." In support of its

argument, Envoy contends that "[t]he admission of [its original answer

to Interrogatory 14] was disastrously prejudicial to Envoy, outweighing

any possible relevance." Envoy's brief, p. 52. However, Rule 403 neither

prohibits the admission of relevant evidence merely because it is

prejudicial, even if the evidence is "disastrously prejudicial," nor

prohibits the admission of relevant evidence merely because its probative

value is "outweighed" by its prejudicial effect. Rather, Rule 403 prohibits

the admission of relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially

5To be clear, we do not suggest that the Alabama Rules of Evidence

cannot serve as the "authority" required by Rule 28(a)(10). After all,

those rules are authoritative. However, to comply with Rule 28(a)(10),

an appellant must do more than merely cite a rule of evidence in support

of a single-sentence argument.

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outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. As this Court has

previously explained:

"Mere prejudice is not a basis for exclusion under Rule 403,

because evidence can be harmful, yet not unfairly prejudicial.

State v. Parker, 740 So. 2d 421 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996),

reversed on other grounds, 740 So. 2d 432 (Ala. 1999). The

proper test for determining whether relevant evidence has

been properly excluded under Rule 403 is to determine

whether 'its probative value is substantially outweighed by

the danger of unfair prejudice.' ([First] [e]mphasis added.)

McElroy's Alabama Evidence clarifies the Rule 403 standard

by stating: 'This principle does not empower the trial judge to

exclude evidence simply because it is prejudicial or because

its prejudice outweighs its probative value. Rather, exclusion

is merited only when the prejudice substantially outweighs

the probative value.' Charles W. Gamble, McElroy's Alabama

Evidence, § 21.01(4) (5th ed. 1996) (footnotes omitted) ([last]

emphasis [in] original)."

Ex parte Vincent, 770 So. 2d 92, 95-96 (Ala. 1999) (some emphasis

added). As noted, Envoy argues that the admission of its original answer

to Interrogatory 14 was "disastrously prejudicial" and that the prejudice

"outweigh[ed] any possible relevance." Envoy's brief, p. 52. Rule 403

makes clear, and Ex parte Vincent confirms, that, even if those

allegations are true, they did not provide a basis for excluding Envoy's

original answer to Interrogatory 14. Thus, this argument does not entitle

Envoy to relief.

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In a related argument, Envoy contends that the trial court

"deprived [it] of any ability to defend itself or explain an interrogatory

response that was solely the fault of Envoy's previous counsel." Envoy's

brief, p. 52. See also id. at 50-51 ("The [trial] court … err[ed] by blocking

Envoy from offering any evidence of how the incorrect response came

about … and how Envoy had no responsibility."). In other words, Envoy

argues that the trial court prohibited it from presenting any evidence

indicating, or even from arguing, that Fox alone was responsible for the

original answer to Interrogatory 14 and that Fox's mistake therefore

should not be attributed to Envoy. However, even if we ignore the fact

that Envoy's argument is not supported by any authority, the record

citations that Envoy has provided (R. 295-316) do not support its

argument. 6

That part of the transcript to which Envoy cites, which occurred

mid-trial, is the first record of any discussion among the trial court and

the parties regarding Interrogatory 14. During that discussion, the

6Envoy relies on Rule 403 in support of this argument. However,

although Rule 403 might have provided a basis for excluding Envoy's

original answer to Interrogatory 14, that rule has no bearing on whether

the trial court erred by allegedly prohibiting Envoy from presenting its

own evidence in response.

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primary issue was whether Creagh would be allowed to present Envoy's

original answer to Interrogatory 14 with the forged signature page or

would be required to present the answer with a blank signature page,

and the trial court ruled that Creagh could present the forged signature

page and admitted it into evidence (though the court later removed it

from evidence). Following that ruling, Envoy's counsel told the trial court

that she was "going to want to put in the two times that [Fox] tried to

clear it up," i.e., to correct his mistake, and the court explained that

counsel could present Envoy's amended answer to Interrogatory 14.

However, at no point during that discussion did Envoy's counsel ask that

she be allowed to present any other evidence. Consistent with its ruling,

the trial court admitted Envoy's amended answer to Interrogatory 14,

which stated that Creagh had been discharged for "falsifying documents,"

and Envoy's counsel argued during closing arguments that Envoy had

"answered the interrogatory wrong once and then corrected it." Envoy's

counsel did not argue that Fox alone was responsible for that mistake,

but the record citations that Envoy has provided do not indicate that the

trial court prohibited counsel from making such an argument.

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As we noted earlier, it is evident that the trial court made some

pretrial rulings regarding the admissibility of Envoy's original answer to

Interrogatory 14, which might have included the rulings that Envoy says

the court made. However, as Envoy concedes, those rulings are not

contained in the record, and it is well settled that "[t]his Court's appellate

review is restricted to the record on appeal" and that we "cannot consider

any evidence or contention that is not supported by the record." Green v.

Ingram, 794 So. 2d 1070, 1072 (Ala. 2001). That said, it is clear from this

part of the transcript that the trial court was concerned about opening

the door to collateral issues concerning Fox -- namely, that Fox might

have been responsible for the forged signature page and that Envoy had

sued him in a separate action. However, there is no indication that the

trial court prohibited Envoy's counsel from making the simple argument

that Fox alone was to blame for the original answer to Interrogatory 14,

which in and of itself would not have opened the door to such collateral

issues. 7

7At one point during the discussion, Envoy's counsel complained

that the trial court had prohibited her from "defend[ing] against" the

forged signature page, which she believed would cast doubt on Conerly's

credibility. That statement, which counsel did not elaborate on, does not

indicate that the trial court had prohibited Envoy's counsel from

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In short, Envoy argues that the trial court prohibited it from

attempting to prove or even from arguing that Fox alone was to blame

for the original answer to Interrogatory 14, but Envoy has not

demonstrated that the court actually did prohibit it from presenting such

evidence or making such an argument. "This Court will not place a trial

court ' " 'in error on matters which the record reveals it neither ruled upon

nor was presented the opportunity to rule upon.' " ' " A.W. ex rel.

Hogeland v. Wood, 57 So. 3d 751, 759 (Ala. 2010) (emphasis and citations

omitted). Thus, this argument does not entitle Envoy to relief.

Fourth, Envoy argues that the trial court erred by "letting Creagh's

counsel, via the De La Paz deposition, read direct quotations from certain

post-termination employee complaints against [Atkinson] even after

granting Envoy's motions to exclude those complaints." Envoy's brief, p.

53 (emphasis in original). According to Envoy, those employee

complaints "were lodged in 2022, years after the 2019 events" that gave

rise to this case, and it alleges that Creagh presented that evidence "as

proof of Atkinson's bad character and her alleged malicious motive

attempting to convince the jury that Envoy was not responsible for the

original answer to Interrogatory 14.

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toward Creagh." Id. Thus, Envoy argues that the "direct quotations"

from De La Paz's deposition were inadmissible under Rule 404, Ala. R.

Evid., which generally prohibits character evidence that is presented for

the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith.

However, Envoy has not identified the "direct quotations" from De

La Paz's deposition that were allegedly inadmissible, and " 'it is not the

duty of [this Court] to search the record for evidence to support [Envoy's]

contention of error.' " Island Girl Outfitters, LLC v. Allied Dev. of

Alabama, LLC, 427 So. 3d 962, 966 (Ala. 2025) (citation omitted). Envoy

has therefore waived this argument for failure to comply with Rule

28(a)(10). See Keaton v. State, 375 So. 3d 44, 108 (Ala. Crim. App. 2021)

(holding that an argument that the trial court had erroneously admitted

" 'many irrelevant, inadmissible, and prejudicial assertions' " did not

comply with Rule 28(a)(10) because the defendant "d[id] not identify [the]

allegedly inadmissible comments"). Furthermore, the trial court

admitted into evidence the termination letter that De La Paz gave to

Atkinson, and that letter references the specifics of several complaints

that Atkinson's inferiors had made against her in 2022. Envoy does not

argue that the trial court erred by admitting that letter, and it is well

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settled that the erroneous admission of cumulative evidence is harmless

error. Ex parte Phillips, 287 So. 3d 1179, 1209 (Ala. 2018). Thus, for

those reasons, this argument does not entitle Envoy to relief.

Fifth, Envoy argues that the trial court erred by "allow[ing]

Creagh's counsel to repeatedly question Envoy's witnesses about whether

Creagh was deprived of her constitutional right to 'due process' prior to

her termination." Envoy's brief, p. 53. To be clear, Envoy points to only

two such questions, which, it says, "carried the very misleading

implication that [it] owed an additional duty to Creagh," even though

"few propositions are better established than … that employees can be

'terminated for any reason or, even for no reason at all.' " Id., pp. 53-54

(quoting Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Campbell, 512 So. 2d 725, 727 (Ala.

1987)). However, Envoy did not object to one of the questions, and,

"[w]hen an appellant 'fail[s] to make a timely objection, there is nothing

for this Court to review.' " Ware v. Timmons, 954 So. 2d 545, 558 (Ala.

2006) (citation omitted). As for the other question, the only objection

Envoy raised at trial was "relevance," which is not the argument it has

raised on appeal. It is well settled that " '[t]he statement of specific

grounds of objection waives all grounds not specified, and the trial court

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will not be put in error on grounds not assigned at trial.' " Ex parte

Coulliette, 857 So. 2d 793, 794 (Ala. 2003) (citation omitted). Thus, this

argument does not entitle Envoy to relief.

III. Damages

We come now to the issue of damages. Envoy argues that both the

compensatory damages and the punitive damages are excessive, and it

sets forth various arguments in support of its contention that this Court

must therefore order a remittitur of those damages. As noted, Envoy

raised these arguments in its postjudgment motion, and, following a

hearing, the trial court denied that motion in a written order that states:

"Defendant's Motion for Renewed [JML] and Alternative Motion for a

New Trial is hereby DENIED." (Capitalization in original.)

In Daniels v. East Alabama Paving, Inc., 740 So. 2d 1033 (Ala.

1999), this Court stated:

" 'We have … recognized that the trial judge is better

positioned [than this Court] to decide whether [a jury's]

verdict is … flawed. He has the advantage of observing all of

the parties to the trial -- plaintiff and defendant and their

respective attorneys, as well as the jury and its reaction to all

of the others. There are many facets of a trial that can never

be captured in a record, so that the appellate courts are at a

special disadvantage when they are called upon to review trial

court action in this sensitive area, although increasingly they

are required to do so. Therefore, it is not only appropriate,

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but indeed our duty, to require the trial courts to reflect in the

record the reasons for interfering with a jury verdict, or

refusing to do so, on grounds of excessiveness of the

damages.' "

740 So. 2d at 1043-44 (quoting Hammond v. City of Gadsden, 493 So. 2d

1374, 1378-79 (Ala. 1986)) (emphasis omitted). Thus, when a trial court

does not provide its reasons for granting or denying a motion for a

remittitur, it is not uncommon for this Court to remand the case for the

trial court to provide written findings to support its ruling. See, e.g., Love

v. Johnson, 775 So. 2d 127, 127 (Ala. 2000) ("We remand this case for the

trial court to enter an order stating the reasons supporting its denial of

the motion for a remittitur."); Hammond v. City of Gadsden, 493 So. 2d

1374, 1379 (Ala. 1986) (noting that requiring the trial court to "state for

the record the factors considered" in granting or denying a motion for a

remittitur serves to assist this Court in "discharg[ing] fairly its role of

review"); and Winn-Dixie of Montgomery, Inc. v. Colburn, 709 So. 2d

1222, 1226 (Ala. 1998) (same).

In this case, the trial court did not provide its reasons for denying

Envoy's motion for a remittitur of the damages that the jury awarded;

instead, the court simply denied Envoy's motion without comment. Thus,

we remand the case with instructions for that court to provide written

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findings in support of its refusal to remit both the compensatory damages

and the punitive damages. The trial court shall file a return to remand

with this Court within 28 days of the date of this opinion.

Conclusion

Envoy has not demonstrated that the trial court erred in denying

its motion for a judgment as a matter of law or that the court erred in

any of its evidentiary rulings. Thus, we affirm the judgment of the trial

court insofar as it holds Envoy liable for Creagh's harm. However, we

remand the case to the trial court with instructions for that court to

provide written findings in support of its refusal to remit both the

compensatory damages and the punitive damages. The trial court shall

file a return to remand with this Court within 28 days of the date of this

opinion.

AFFIRMED IN PART AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

Stewart, C.J., and Bryan, Mendheim, and McCool, JJ., and Minor,

Special Justice,* concur.

Sellers, J., dissents, with opinion, which Parker, J., joins.

Cook, J., dissents, with opinion, which Wise, J., joins.

Shaw, J., recuses himself.

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*Judge Richard Minor of the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

was appointed to serve as a Special Justice in regard to this appeal.

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SELLERS, Justice (dissenting).

I respectfully dissent. The evidence in this case clearly indicates

that Envoy Air, Inc., did not terminate Jada Creagh's employment solely

because she had filed a worker's compensation claim for an on-the-job

injury. See § 25-5-11.1, Ala. Code 1975 ("No employee shall be

terminated by an employer solely because the employee has instituted or

maintained any action against an employer to recover workers'

compensation benefits."). At issue here is a medical note that Creagh

provided to her supervisor regarding her work restrictions following her

injury. Envoy ultimately determined that the medical note had been

altered, and it terminated Creagh's employment. Creagh claims that she

presented a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge because, she says,

her supervisor was the person who altered the medical note and then

used it as subterfuge to have her employment terminated. But this claim

was merely conjecture. And, even if Creagh presented a prima facie case

of retaliatory discharge, it is clear that Envoy provided evidence of an

independent, nonretaliatory reason for the termination. See Alabama

Power Co. v. Aldridge, 854 So. 2d 554, 567 (Ala. 2002) ("Once the plaintiff

has established a prima facie case [of retaliatory discharge], the burden

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shifts to the defendant to present legitimate reasons for the plaintiff's

discharge; if the defendant presents legitimate reasons the burden would

shift back to the plaintiff to prove that the stated reasons are

pretextual."). Here, Creagh gave a medical note to her supervisor, who

believed that the note contained suspicious markings. The supervisor

conveyed her suspicions to a worker's compensation analyst at Envoy,

who, in turn, obtained the original medical note from Creagh's doctor.

The worker's compensation analyst determined that there was a notable

discrepancy between the original medical note and the one that Creagh

had provided to her supervisor. The worker's compensation analyst

shared her findings with other members of the company's humanresources ("HR") team. Creagh was thereafter given an opportunity to

explain the discrepancy and provided a response. After considering that

response, Johnathan Wilson, an HR employee stationed in Dallas, Texas,

sent Creagh's supervisor an email stating that Creagh had not "provided

sufficient reason as to why the two documents [were] different"; that the

"resulting conclusion is that the document [at issue] was altered after

leaving the Doctor's office, and prior to being turned in to Envoy"; and

that the "altering of official documentation is considered a violation of

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Envoy Guiding Principles and Business Ethics." Importantly, the email

directed that the supervisor "suspend [Creagh] immediately, and proceed

with off-boarding based upon the above determination." It is clear from

Wilson's email that he was the person who directed that Creagh be

suspended and ultimately discharged, or off-boarded from her

employment at Envoy. Creagh neither offered evidence to dispute the

authenticity or substance of Wilson's email nor offered any evidence to

indicate that Wilson had any reason to retaliate against her or that he

had any knowledge that the supervisor may have altered the medical

note. As explained in Aldridge, "if there is uncontradicted evidence of an

independently sufficient basis for the discharge then the defendant is

entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 854 So. 2d at 568. Because

Creagh did not demonstrate that the stated reason for the

termination -- providing an altered medical note -- was pretextual, the

jury verdict cannot stand. Thus, I would reverse the judgment based on

that verdict and remand the cause to the Mobile Circuit Court with

instructions for that court to enter a judgment as a matter of law in favor

of Envoy.

Parker, J., concurs.

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COOK, Justice (dissenting).

I respectfully dissent. Alabama's wrongful-termination statute is

perhaps one of the strictest in the country and differs substantially from

federal employment statutes. It requires that, to recover damages, an

employee must prove that she was terminated "solely because" she filed

a workers' compensation action. § 25.5.11.1, Ala. Code 1975 (emphasis

added).

The word "solely" in the statute is not surplusage. As our Court has

recognized, many states' statutes omit that limitation and "require less,

merely calling for a causal connection between the claim for workers'

compensation benefits and the discharge." Alabama Power Co. v.

Aldridge, 854 So. 2d 554, 564 (Ala. 2002) (citing other states' statutes

that highlight that the claim must be only a cause and not the sole cause

of the termination).

To determine whether a plaintiff was terminated "solely because"

she filed a workers' compensation action, we must identify who the

decisionmaker was because the circumstantial factors that might show a

causal connection between an employee's filing a workers' compensation

claim and that employee's termination turn on the state of mind and

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actions of the person or persons who actually decided to terminate the

employee at issue. See Aldridge, 854 So. 2d at 564-65 (quoting Chhim v.

University of Houston, 76 S.W.3d 210, 218 (Tex. App. 2002)) (listing the

following factors: " ' 1) knowledge of the compensation claim by those

making the decision on termination, 2) expression of a negative attitude

toward the employee's injured condition, 3) failure to adhere to

established company policy, 4) discriminatory treatment in comparison

to similarly situated employees, 5) sudden changes in an employee's work

performance evaluations following a workers' compensation claim, and 6)

evidence that the stated reason for the discharge was false' " ). The first

factor expressly refers to the decisionmaker, and the remaining factors

likewise make sense only when evaluated from the perspective of the

individual or individuals who made the termination decision.

Creagh contends that her supervisor and manager, Brigitte

Atkinson, made the decision to terminate her. Envoy insists, however,

that Dallas-based human-resources ("HR") representative Johnathan

Wilson made that decision.

Envoy highlights a string of contemporaneous emails that display

the timeline and decision process for Creagh's firing. Those emails show

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that Atkinson told Valerine Conerly about the note and that Conerly then

emailed members of Envoy's HR team to loop them in. They opined that

altering medical notes is something that usually leads the HR team to

separate an employee, and David Barrera, a member of the HR team,

instructed Atkinson to conduct an interview with Creagh.

Atkinson later emailed Envoy's HR team with the details of that

interview. Shortly after, Wilson detailed his findings that Creagh's

reasons were insufficient and instructed Atkinson: "Please suspend the

employee immediately, and proceed with off-boarding based upon the

above determination." (Emphasis added.)

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In my view, that unrebutted email, contemporaneous with Creagh's

firing, is the linchpin in this case. After reviewing the doctor's note,

Wilson instructed Atkinson: "Please suspend the employee immediately,

and proceed with off-boarding …." The directive was unequivocal. Wilson

did not merely recommend termination; he ordered it. Nothing in the

instruction left Atkinson discretion as to whether Creagh should be fired.

And the only reasoning given was not that Creagh had a workers'

compensation claim and had to be let go, but that Creagh's explanation

for the inconsistent doctor's notes was insufficient. For Wilson, that was

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enough. He required Creagh's termination.

Moreover, it is undisputed that Wilson had a neutral reason for his

decision to terminate -- the provision of an altered doctor's note. And, no

argument was made that Wilson acted solely because of the workers'

compensation claim.

The main opinion takes the position that there was sufficient

evidence for the jury to conclude, instead, that Atkinson decided to

terminate Creagh's employment, that she took steps to do so, and that

she was motivated by the filing of the workers' compensation claim.

However, in my view, we do not need to decide whether Atkinson had

some involvement in the termination decision, because there is still not

sufficient evidence indicating that Atkinson was the only decisionmaker.

The main opinion responds to this argument by citing one case from

the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit -- Hill v.

Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277 (4th Cir. 2004). Hill

involved a termination suit that was brought under Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act and under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("the

ADEA"), see 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 621 to 634.

Alabama's wrongful-termination statute is materially different

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from the federal law being analyzed in Hill. For example, while our law

says that the reason for firing must be the sole cause of the termination,

the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Hill explains that a plaintiff

bringing a claim under Title VII or the ADEA "need not demonstrate that

the prohibited characteristic was the sole motivating factor to prevail, so

long as it was a motivating factor." Id. at 284 (emphasis added). The

difference in the applicable statutes is critical here.

The Alabama Legislature made an intentional decision to require

that the decision to terminate be "solely because" of the filing of a

workers' compensation claim. It is striking that Hill -- the only case cited

by the majority in support of its conclusion that there was sufficient

evidence indicating that Atkinson was the sole decisionmaker --expressly rejects the "sole motivating factor" test -- a test that the

Alabama Legislature expressly codified.

Thus, even assuming that Atkinson also played a role -- whether a

large or a more significant one -- in the decisionmaking framework, we

still have Wilson making his own determination. For that reason, Creagh

did not meet her burden of showing that her workers' compensation claim

was the only cause as Alabama law demands. As a result, her retaliatory67

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discharge claim ought to fail, and we should reverse the trial court's order

denying Envoy's motion for a judgment as a matter of law and instruct it

to enter judgment in favor of Envoy.

Wise, J., concurs.

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