Rel: October 16, 2026
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2026-2027
SC-2026-0410
James McConico, Jr.
v.
Jonathan Haynes and Latasha Jackson
Appeal from Montgomery Circuit Court
(CV-25-351)
WISE, Justice.
James McConico, Jr., appeals from a summary judgment the
Montgomery Circuit Court entered in favor of Jonathan Haynes and
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Latasha Jackson. We reverse the Montgomery Circuit Court's judgment
and remand this case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Facts and Procedural History
On August 12, 2025, McConico, an inmate incarcerated at
Easterling Correctional Facility, filed a complaint in the Barbour Circuit
Court against Michele McConico, his former wife, and Agent Jonathan
Haynes and Officer Latasha Jackson, who were employed at the Alabama
Department of Corrections. In his complaint, McConico alleged that
Michele had called Haynes and falsely stated that McConico had hired
someone to kill her; that Haynes had not exercised due diligence; and
that Haynes had falsely imprisoned McConico in the segregation unit at
Easterling without any notice of charge or due process. McConico also
alleged that he had tried to file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
challenging his alleged false imprisonment. He further alleged that
Jackson had defamed him, denied him access to the courts, and libeled
and slandered him by reading his petition after refusing to notarize it.
Finally, McConico alleged that Michele had libeled, slandered, and
defamed him.
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On June 13, 2025, Haynes and Jackson filed a motion for a change
of venue, arguing that the complaint was, "in substance," a petition for a
writ of certiorari and asking the Barbour Circuit Court to transfer the
case to the Montgomery Circuit Court. On June 23, 2025, McConico filed
a response in opposition to the motion for a change of venue. On August
4, 2025, the Barbour Circuit Court granted the motion for a change of
venue and transferred the case to the Montgomery Circuit Court.
On September 10, 2025, Haynes and Jackson filed a motion for a
summary judgment. On September 15, 2025, the Montgomery Circuit
Court granted the motion.
On September 26, 2025, McConico filed a motion for an extension
of time -- until October 10, 2025 -- to respond to the motion for a summary
judgment. On September 29, 2025, the Montgomery Circuit Court
granted McConico's motion for an extension of time.
On October 15, 2025, McConico filed a motion to alter, amend, or
vacate the summary judgment. In that motion, he stated that he had
received the motion for a summary judgment on September 17, 2025, and
that he had immediately filed a request for an extension of time to file a
response to the motion. Citing Rule 56(c)(2), Ala. R. Civ. P., he argued
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that the Montgomery Circuit Court had erred in granting the motion for
a summary judgment five days after it was filed and without giving him
an opportunity to respond to the motion. On October 17, 2025, the
Montgomery Circuit Court denied McConico's motion to alter, amend, or
vacate.
On October 28, 2025, McConico filed a motion asking for another
extension -- until November 3, 2025 -- to file a response to the motion for
a summary judgment. On October 29, 2025, the Montgomery Circuit
Court denied that motion. On November 12, 2025, McConico filed yet
another motion for an extension -- until November 27, 2025 -- to file a
response to the motion for a summary judgment. On November 13, 2025,
the Montgomery Circuit Court denied that motion as moot. This appeal
followed.1
Discussion
I.
1Although Michele McConico was named as a defendant in the
complaint, the record does not indicate that she was ever served in the
proceeding below. Even though she was not served, because "the
judgment as to [Haynes and Jackson] is final in all other respects, it [is] a final judgment." Rule 4(f), Ala. R. Civ. P.
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McConico argues that venue was proper in the Barbour Circuit
Court and that that court improperly transferred the action to the
Montgomery Circuit Court. However, although he cites some caselaw
and makes arguments about the merits of the motion for a summary
judgment, he has not presented any authority to establish that venue was
actually proper in Barbour County, in contravention of Rule 28(a)(10),
Ala. R. App. P.
" ' "The purpose of Rule 28, Ala. R. App.
P., outlining the requirements for
appellate briefs, is to conserve the time
and energy of the appellate court and
to advise the opposing party of the
points he or she is obligated to make.
United States v. Levy, 391 F.3d 1327
(11th Cir. 2004) (discussing the rule
that issues not briefed are waived and
Rule 28, Fed. R. App. P., which sets out
the requirements for appellate briefs in
the federal courts). Rule 28(a)(10), Ala.
R. App. P., provides that the argument
section of the appellant's brief shall set
out 'the contentions of the
appellant/petitioner with respect to the
issues presented, and the reasons
therefor, with citations to the cases,
statutes, other authorities, and parts of
the record relied on.' Additionally,
' "[i]t is not the function of this Court to
do a party's legal research or to make
and address legal arguments for a
party based on undelineated general
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propositions not supported by
sufficient authority or argument." '
Butler v. Town of Argo, 871 So. 2d 1, 20
(Ala. 2003) (quoting Dykes v. Lane
Trucking, Inc., 652 So. 2d 248, 251
(Ala. 1994))."
" 'Ex parte Borden, 60 So. 3d 940, 943 (Ala. 2007).
…'
"Van Voorst v. Federal Express Corp., 16 So. 3d 86, 92-93 (Ala.
2008).
" ' "It is well established that general propositions
of law are not considered 'supporting authority' for
purposes of Rule 28. Ex parte Riley, 464 So. 2d 92
(Ala. 1985)." S.B. v. Saint James Sch., 959 So. 2d
72, 89 (Ala. 2006). This Court will not "create legal
arguments for a party based on undelineated
general propositions unsupported by authority or
argument." Spradlin v. Spradlin, 601 So. 2d 76, 79
(Ala. 1992). Further, it is well settled that
" '[w]here an appellant fails to cite any authority
for an argument, this Court may affirm the
judgment as to those issues, for it is neither this
Court's duty nor its function to perform all the
legal research for an appellant.' " Spradlin v.
Birmingham Airport Auth., 613 So. 2d 347, 348
(Ala. 1993)(quoting Sea Calm Shipping Co., S.A. v.
Cooks, 565 So. 2d 212, 216 (Ala. 1990)).'
"Allsopp v. Bolding, 86 So. 3d 952, 960 (Ala. 2011)."
Harris v. Owens, 105 So. 3d 430, 436 (Ala. 2012).
Although he makes general conclusory allegations that venue was
proper in Barbour County, McConico has not presented any actual
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authority to support that conclusion. Therefore, his argument in this
regard does not comply with Rule 28(a)(10), and we will not consider this
issue.2
II.
McConico also argues that the Montgomery Circuit Court erred in
granting Haynes and Jackson's motion for a summary judgment without
giving him an opportunity to respond to the motion.
Regarding time and motions for summary judgment, Rule 56(c)(2)
provides:
"The motion for summary judgment, with all supporting
materials, including any briefs, shall be served at least ten
(10) days before the time fixed for the hearing, except that a
court may conduct a hearing on less than ten (10) days' notice
with the consent of the parties concerned. Subject to
subparagraph (f) of this rule, any statement or affidavit in
opposition shall be served at least two (2) days prior to the
hearing."
In Cartron v. Board of Governors of Valley Hill Country Club, Inc., 372
So. 3d 1175, 1177 (Ala. 2022), this Court stated:
2McConico also argues that Haynes and Jackson improperly
characterized his complaint as a petition for a writ of certiorari.
However, we need not address that argument because he has not
established that venue was proper in Barbour County.
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" 'To expedite its business, the court may
make provision by rule or order for the submission
and determination of motions not seeking final
judgment without oral hearing upon brief written
statements of reasons in support and opposition.'
"Rule 78, Ala. R. Civ. P. (emphasis added).
"This Court has previously noted that the language of
Rule 56 'contemplate[s] a hearing upon a motion for summary
judgment,' Lightsey v. Bessemer Clinic, P.A., 495 So. 2d 35,
38 (Ala. 1986), and has held that 'Rule 56(c), Ala. R. Civ. P.,
itself entitles the parties to a hearing on a motion for
summary judgment.' Van Knight v. Smoker, 778 So. 2d 801,
805 (Ala. 2000). Moreover, although Rule 78 provides that a
trial court may rule on some motions without conducting an
oral hearing, that provision applies only to motions 'not
seeking final judgment,' and the Committee Comments on
1973 Adoption of Rule 78 further provide that 'the rule
prohibits the granting of a Motion Seeking Final Judgment
such as a Motion for Summary Judgment without giving the
parties an opportunity to be heard orally.' (Emphasis
added.)"3
In Van Knight v. Smoker, 778 So. 2d 801, 805-06 (Ala. 2000), this
Court explained:
"One purpose of the procedural rights to notice and
hearing under Rule 56(c) is to allow the nonmoving party the
opportunity to discover and to present evidence opposing the
3This Court has recognized "that, under 'certain limited
circumstances, a trial court may rule on a motion for a summary
judgment without conducting a hearing.' Van Knight[ v. Smoker,] 778
So. 3d [801,] 805 [(Ala. 2000)] (citing Pate v. Rollison Logging Equip.,
Inc., 628 So. 2d 337, 341 (Ala. 1993))." Cartron, 372 So. 3d at 1178. This
case does not involve any such exceptions.
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motion for summary judgment. Tharp[ v. Union State Bank],
364 So. 2d [335,] 338 [(Ala. Civ. App. 1978)]. Although the
nonmoving party may waive the requirements of notice and
hearing, the 'waiver requires knowledge, actual or implied, of
the right being waived.' Tharp, 364 So. 2d at 338 (citing
Givens v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 56 Ala. App. 561,
324 So. 2d 277 (1975)). In Tharp, the defendant attended a
hearing conducted for the purpose of considering a motion to
dismiss a counterclaim. However, at that hearing, the trial
court also granted summary judgment in favor of the
plaintiffs. The defendant objected to the entry of summary
judgment on the ground that it was not aware that the
summary-judgment motion would be discussed and decided at
the hearing. The Tharp court held that '[t]his objection to the
entry of summary judgment and the state of the record
showing that ten days had not expired since even the certified
date of service [of the motion for summary judgment] negates
any claim of waiver.' 364 So. 2d at 338. The Tharp court noted
that the plaintiff's argument that the defendant was not
prejudiced by the entry of summary judgment against it was
invalid because Rule 56 'is not prefaced upon whether or not
the opposing party may successfully defend against summary
judgment, [but] it does require that the opportunity to defend
be given.' Tharp, 364 So. 2d at 338."
In Woodruff v. City of Tuscaloosa, 101 So. 3d 749, 753 n.1 (Ala.
2012), this Court stated that
"10 days is considered sufficient time for a party to have a
meaningful opportunity to respond to a summary-judgment
motion. See, e.g, Hill v. Chambless, 757 So. 2d 409, 411 (Ala.
2000) ('Rule 56(c)(2)[, Ala. R. Civ. P.,] establishes the notice
requirement for summary-judgment motions. In order to
ensure that an opposing party has a meaningful opportunity
to respond, this rule requires that the trial court must allow
a minimum of 10 days to pass between the date the hearing is
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set and the date of the actual hearing, unless the parties agree
otherwise.')."
Finally, in Billingsley v. Gordon, 340 So. 2d 743 (Ala. 1976), the
trial court granted an oral motion for a summary judgment that was
made in court on the date the case was set for trial. This Court found
that the trial court had erred, reasoning as follows:
"Rule 56(c) of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure calls
for notice to be given a party against whom a motion for
summary judgment is sought, when it states: 'The motion
shall be served at least 10 days before the time fixed for the
hearing.' The rationale for this requirement is obviously to
give the non-moving party sufficient time to prepare a
rebuttal to the moving party's burden of proving that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact. The results to the
party against whom a motion for summary judgment is
granted are extremely harsh and the rule attempts to ensure
that the court rules on a summary judgment motion only after
it is fully apprised of all the relevant facts and circumstances
of the cause before it. See Wright & Miller, § 2719 (1973).
"It does not appear that the plaintiff had any notice of
the motion prior to the time [the defendant] 'orally' moved for
summary judgment at the hearing held on March 31, 1975,
which was the day for the trial of the case. A motion for
summary judgment should only be granted when substantial
justice is served and when it is apparent that there are no
genuine issues as to any material fact. The trial court's
granting of the defendant's motion for summary judgment
was not only in derogation of the specific requirements of Rule
56, but also violated the spirit of the Alabama Rules of Civil
Procedure."
Billingsley, 340 So. 2d at 744.
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In this case, Haynes and Jackson filed their motion for a summary
judgment on September 10, 2025, and the Montgomery Circuit Court
granted the motion five days later on September 15, 2025. In his motion
to alter, amend, or vacate, McConico stated that he did not even receive
the motion for a summary judgment until September 17, 2025, which was
two days after the Montgomery Circuit Court had granted that motion.
Haynes and Jackson did not dispute or refute that statement. McConico
did not receive either notice of the motion for a summary judgment or an
opportunity to defend against the motion because the Montgomery
Circuit Court had granted the motion two days before he received the
motion. Therefore, under these specific facts, the "[Montgomery Circuit
Court's] granting of the … motion for summary judgment was not only in
derogation of the specific requirements of Rule 56, but also violated the
spirit of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure." Billingsley, 340 So. 2d
at 744; see also Cartron, 372 So. 3d at 1179 (holding that the plaintiff in
that case "was prejudiced and denied the procedural safeguards of Rule
56(c) when the trial court granted the defendants' summary-judgment
motion without first holding a hearing on the motion or otherwise
notifying [the plaintiff] that it had taken the motion under submission").
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Conclusion
For these reasons, we reverse the Montgomery Circuit Court's
summary judgment and remand this case for proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Stewart, C.J., and Cook and Parker, JJ., concur.
Sellers, J., concurs in the result.
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