Rel: October 16, 2026
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2026-2027
SC-2026-0100
Matthew Sherman Phillips
v.
Governor Kay Ivey et al.
Appeal from Montgomery Circuit Court
(CV-25-397)
MENDHEIM, Justice.
Matthew Sherman Phillips, an inmate of the Alabama Department
of Corrections ("ADOC"), appeals pro se from the Montgomery Circuit
SC-2026-0100
Court's orders dismissing his claims against multiple state officials and
entities. We dismiss the appeal.
I. Facts
In 2008, Phillips pleaded guilty to two counts of reckless murder
and one count of assault stemming from a car accident that he caused
while under the influence of methamphetamine that resulted in the
deaths of Jason Campbell and Deborah Campbell and injuries to Gary
Campbell. He was sentenced to two concurrent terms of 25 years in
prison for the reckless-murder counts and a term of 10 years for the
assault count.
On November 17, 2020, Phillips wrote a letter to ADOC and the
Commissioner of ADOC with "several questions and thoughts"
concerning § 15-22-28, Ala. Code 1975, which concerns the duty of the
Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles ("the Board") to investigate "the
feasibility of releasing the prisoners on parole and effecting their
reclamation." Specifically, Phillips requested temporary leave from
prison for a Christmas furlough under § 15-22-28(c). 1 Phillips alleged
1Section 15-22-28(c), Ala. Code 1975, provides:
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that his request was ignored. On May 30, 2021, Phillips wrote a second
letter to ADOC and the ADOC Commissioner in which he again
requested a Christmas furlough. Phillips alleged that this second inquiry
also was ignored. Phillips wrote a third letter to the ADOC Commissioner
on October 13, 2024, once again requesting a Christmas furlough.
Phillips alleged that his request was ignored again.
On January 18, 2017, the parole Board conducted its initial
consideration hearing with respect to Phillips. The Board denied parole
to Phillips. On July 12, 2022, the Board held a second paroleconsideration hearing concerning Phillips. Once again, the Board denied
parole to Phillips. The Board set Phillips's next hearing for April 2026.
"(c) Temporary leave from prison, including Christmas
furloughs, may be granted only by the Commissioner of
Corrections to a prisoner for good and sufficient reason and
may be granted within or without the state; provided, that
Christmas furloughs shall not be granted to any prisoner
convicted of drug peddling, child molesting, or rape, or to any
maximum security prisoner. A permanent, written record of
all temporary leaves, together with the reasons therefor, shall
be kept by the commissioner. He or she shall furnish the
Board of Pardons and Paroles with a record of each leave
granted and the reasons therefor, and the same shall be
placed by the board in the prisoner's file."
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On June 15, 2024, Phillips filed an "Application for Early Parole
Consideration Hearing" pursuant to § 15-22-28(f). 2 On July 10, 2024, the
Board denied Phillips's application based on a finding that he had
"violent disciplinaries during present incarceration." On July 25, 2024,
2Section 15-22-28(f), Ala. Code 1975, provides:
"(f)(1) The board may deviate from the initial parole
consideration date established in subsection (e) or any
reconsideration date prescribed by the board's rules only in
either of the following circumstances:
"a. To comply with the policy and procedural
guidelines in effect on or before January 1, 2019,
issued by the board under Section 15-22-24(e)[ Ala.
Code 1975].
"b. If the prisoner shows, by clear and
convincing evidence, that he or she is more likely
than not to be granted parole and that he or she
would have been considered for parole on an
earlier date under generally applicable rules or
policies previously in effect.
"(2) Any decision by the board to invoke the procedures
of this subsection shall be subject to legal review by the
deputy Attorney General or assistant Attorney General
assigned to the board, prior to the issuance of a parole
certificate and the prisoner's release. If it is determined that
the grant of parole consideration failed to satisfy the
requirements of this subsection or any rule adopted pursuant
to this subsection, the decision shall be reversed and the
prisoner shall be notified by the board."
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Phillips wrote a letter to Board Director Cam Ward and Board
Operations informing them of his belief that the Board and Board
Operations Division ("Board Operations") had applied the law
"discriminately to Phillips," had misinterpreted § 15-22-28(f), and that
this had resulted in an "ex post facto" application of the law. Phillips
alleged that the letter was ignored.
Also on July 25, 2024, Phillips filed two bar complaints against
Attorney General Steve Marshall and Assistant Attorney General
Claudia Kennedy Smith 3 on the ground that they were allowing the
Board and Board Operations to violate the law. On August 23, 2024, the
Alabama State Bar ("ASB") informed Phillips that no action would be
taken with respect to his bar complaints because they did not show any
violations of the Alabama Rules of Professional Conduct. On September
2, 2024, Phillips sent the ASB's Office of the General Counsel a follow-up
letter in which he asserted that Marshall and Smith had committed
fraud, deceit, and violations of criminal law by allowing the Board to
flaunt the parole statute. On September 19, 2024, the ASB informed
Phillips that it did not believe Phillips's letter had raised "any new
3Smith served as the Board's general counsel.
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information that warrants a formal investigation into possible ethical
violations" by either Marshall or Smith.
On September 2, 2024, Phillips filed an open-records request with
the Board asking for access to his parole file. On September 18, 2024, the
Alabama Bureau of Pardons and Paroles ("the Bureau") responded to
Phillips's request, explaining:
"[T]he Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles' Board Action
Sheets constitute public records subject to disclosure. The
Board Action Sheets document the Board's reasons for
granting or denying parole. ... Based on the above, the records
that you requested have been attached to this letter.
"However, the Bureau has determined that an absolute
statutory privilege covers parole files, making them exempt
from disclosure. ... Consequently, the Bureau is statutorily
required to deny requests for inmate parole files."
(Footnote omitted.) That response was submitted on the Bureau's behalf
by Assistant Attorney General Eric Anderson.
In March 2025, Phillips filed another application for early parole
with the Board. (See Rec. vol. II, C. 208.) On March 24, 2025, the Board
denied Phillips's application for early parole.
Phillips alleged that on May 14, 2025, he sent a notification to
ADOC asserting that it had: (1) denied his request for participation in
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the Supervised Reentry Program ("SRP"); 4 (2) denied his request for a
nondriver identification card; and (3) violated the federal Americans with
Disabilities Act and the federal Rehabilitation Act by denying him
needed mental-health treatment. Based on those allegations, Phillips
contended that he was entitled to a release order through a three-judge
panel pursuant to § 14-15-10, Ala. Code 1975. 5
On September 30, 2025, Phillips filed a pro se complaint in the
Montgomery Circuit Court that he styled as a "Complaint [for]
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief." Phillips asserted claims against the
State of Alabama, ADOC, Governor Kay Ivey, Attorney General
Marshall, ADOC Commissioner John Hamm, ADOC Chief Deputy
Commissioner Greg Lovelace, ADOC Deputy Commissioners Chuck
Williams, Dion Robinson, and Stan Goolsby, ADOC Facilities
Management Director Jenny Abbott, and ADOC Classification Director
Angie Baggett (collectively referred to as "the State officials").
4The SRP program exists pursuant to Ala. Code 1975, § 14-8-60 et
seq., and allows inmates, within certain parameters described by ADOC
regulations, to live in communities, seek employment, or study vocational
or educational curricula.
5Section 14-15-10 is part of Alabama Prisoner Litigation Reform
Act, § 14-15-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975.
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Additionally, Phillips asserted claims against the Board, the Bureau,
Board Operations, Board Director Ward, Board General Counsel Smith,
Board Assistant Attorney General Anderson, and Director of Board
Operations Scott Perkins (collectively referred to as "the Board officials").
In his complaint, Phillips alleged that the Board officials and the State
officials had wrongly deprived him of: (1) early parole; (2) access to his
parole file; (3) Christmas furloughs; (4) entry in the SRP program; (5) a
nondriver identification card; and (6) mental-health treatment for his
conditions of bipolar disorder and manic depression.
On November 7, 2025, the State officials filed a motion to dismiss
the claims asserted against them. On November 24, 2025, the State
officials filed an amended motion to dismiss to include ADOC in its
motion. The State officials contended that Phillips lacked standing and
that he failed to state a claim against them. On November 26, 2025, the
Board officials filed a motion to dismiss the claims asserted against them.
The Board officials argued that Phillips lacked standing to assert some
of the claims against them and that the Board had properly denied
Phillips's applications for early parole consideration.
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On November 24, 2025, Phillips filed a response in opposition to the
State officials' motion to dismiss. In that filing, Phillips presented his
own interpretation of § 15-22-28(c) with respect to parole and referenced
the correspondence that he had sent to Commissioner Hamm as evidence
indicating that he had been entitled to a Christmas furlough. On
December 15, 2025, Phillips filed what he styled as an "Objection" to the
Board officials' motion to dismiss in which he sought to counter each of
the arguments presented by the Board officials for dismissing the claims
against them. In particular, Phillips argued that the statutory privilege
prohibiting the disclosure of parole files had been repealed by the
Alabama Criminal Justice Information Commission ("ACJIC") article
("the ACJIC article"). See Ala. Code 1975, § 41-9-590 et seq.
On January 7, 2026, the circuit court entered an order granting the
Board officials' motion to dismiss, with prejudice, concluding that Phillips
"has failed to show that the Board [officials] acted outside their
jurisdiction, contrary to state law, or in any other improper way. ... [T]his
Court further finds that [Phillips] has failed to state a claim for which
relief may be granted." On January 9, 2026, the circuit court entered an
order granting the State officials' motion to dismiss, with prejudice. That
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order did not state the court's reasons for granting the State officials'
motion.
Phillips filed his appeal on February 12, 20226.
II. Analysis
There are two fundamental issues with Phillips's appeal that
necessitate its dismissal: immunity and a lack of appellate jurisdiction.
First, Phillips has purported to assert claims against "the State of
Alabama," ADOC, and the Board. Article I, § 14, Ala. Const. 2022,
expressly states "[t]hat the State of Alabama shall never be made a
defendant in any court of law or equity."
"This constitutional provision 'has been described as a "nearly
impregnable" and "almost invincible" "wall" that provides the
State an unwaivable, absolute immunity from suit in any
court.' Ex parte Town of Lowndesboro, 950 So. 2d 1203, 1206
(Ala. 2006). Section 14 'specifically prohibits the State from
being made a party defendant in any suit at law or in equity.'
Hutchinson v. Board of Trs. of Univ. of Alabama, 288 Ala. 20,
23, 256 So. 2d 281, 283 (1971). Additionally, under § 14, State
agencies are 'absolutely immune from suit.' Lyons v. River
Road Constr., Inc., 858 So. 2d 257, 261 (Ala. 2003).
"....
"... Generally, 'any exceptions to that immunity extend
only to suits naming the proper State official in his or her
representative capacity.' Ex parte Alabama Dep't of Transp.,
978 So. 2d 17, 22 (Ala. 2007) (emphasis added). ...
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"....
"The purpose of the so-called 'exception' to § 14 allowing
declaratory-judgment actions is to give direction to State
officers. Consistent with the other 'exceptions' to § 14
immunity, we hold that only State officers named in their
official capacity -- and not State agencies -- may be defendants
in such proceedings."
Alabama Dep't of Transp. v. Harbert Int'l, Inc., 990 So. 2d 831, 839-41
(Ala. 2008), abrogated on other grounds by Ex parte Moulton, 116 So. 3d
1119 (Ala. 2013). Thus, § 14 requires the dismissal of Phillips's claims
against the State of Alabama, ADOC, and the Board. Moreover, Phillips
has asserted claims against the Bureau and Board Operations as
defendants, but both of those entities exist under the auspices of the
Board. Therefore, the Bureau and Board Operations likewise cannot be
sued.
Second, the gist of Phillips's claims concerning being denied early
parole and being denied access to his parole file revolve around
disagreements with Board rulings.
"Actions of an administrative board or commission are
generally subject to judicial review if that agency comes
within the scope of the Alabama Administrative Procedure
Act ('AAPA'), §§ 41-22-1 through -27, Ala. Code 1975. See
Sellers v. State, 586 So. 2d 994 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991). The
Board [of Pardons and Paroles], however, is exempt from the
AAPA, and no other right of review from the actions of the
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Board has been provided by statute. Sellers, 586 So. 2d at 995
(citing § 41-22-3(3), Ala. Code 1975). In the absence of a
statutory right to appeal, or any other adequate remedy, a
common-law writ of certiorari lies to review the rulings of an
administrative board or commission. Ellard v. State, 474 So.
2d 743, 748 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984), aff'd, 474 So. 2d 758 (Ala.
1985)."
Ex parte Board of Pardons & Paroles, 793 So. 2d 774, 776 (Ala. 2000). See
also Ex parte Alabama Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 849 So. 2d 255, 257
(Ala. Crim. App. 2002) ("Review of proceedings from the Board [of
Pardons and Paroles] is by a petition for a common-law writ of certiorari
filed in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County."). Thus, the correct
avenue for Phillips to challenge the denials of his applications for early
parole and the denial of access to his parole file was a petition for a
common-law writ of certiorari. 6 Instead, Phillips purported to commence
a declaratory-judgment action against the Board officials.
6A common-law writ of certiorari is not a direct action against the
State, which is why it is a permissible filing against the Board. See, e.g., G.W. v. Dale Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 939 So. 2d 931, 934-35 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2006) ("The common-law writ of certiorari is a remedial writ
invoking the ' "supervisory power of a superior over an inferior legal
tribunal." ' City of Birmingham v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 203 Ala.
251, 252, 82 So. 519, 520 (1919). The writ can, under appropriate
circumstances, be used to review decisions of an administrative agency
or board that are judicial or quasi-judicial in nature.").
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Even if we construe Phillips's complaint filed in the circuit court as
a petition for a common-law writ of certiorari, "[t]he Court of Criminal
Appeals has jurisdiction of an appeal from the denial of a writ of a
certiorari attacking the Board's denial or revocation of parole." Ex parte
Alabama Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 849 So. 2d at 257. But Phillips
appealed to this Court, not to the Court of Criminal Appeals.
Consequently, Phillips's claims against the Board and the Board officials
must be dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction.
The same disposition applies to Phillips's claims against ADOC and
the State officials for denying Phillips's requests for Christmas furloughs,
However, the standard of review in circuit court for such writs is
limited:
"Review of the Board's actions by writ of certiorari is
more narrow than review by appeal. The appellate courts of
this state have often characterized certiorari review as
'limited in scope, and ordinarily the courts will only pass on
the question of whether the administrative agency has acted
within its constitutional or statutory powers, whether its
order or determination is supported by substantial evidence,
and whether its action is reasonable and not arbitrary.' Ellard
v. State, 474 So. 2d 743, 750 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984), aff'd, 474
So. 2d 758 (Ala. 1985)."
Ex parte Alabama Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 849 So. 2d 255, 259 (Ala.
Crim. App. 2002).
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not allowing him to participate in the SRP program, failing to issue him
a nondriver identification card, and not providing mental-health
treatment. "We have held that the Court of Criminal Appeals has
jurisdiction to hear an inmate's appeal of the trial court's denial of his
petition for the writ of certiorari challenging a decision of [ADOC]."
Robinson v. State, 12 So. 3d 58, 60 (Ala. 2008). See also Pearson v.
Alabama Dep't of Corr., 89 So. 3d 830, 831 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010) ("This
Court has jurisdiction to hear an inmate's appeal of the trial court's
denial of petition for a writ of certiorari challenging a decision of
[ADOC]."). Thus, again, even if we construe Phillips's action as a petition
for a common-law writ of certiorari, Phillips's claims against ADOC and
the State officials also must be dismissed for lack of appellate
jurisdiction.
It is true that, in an effort to avoid the foregoing jurisdictional
defects, Phillips has attempted to couch his challenges to the parole
denials and Christmas furloughs as misinterpretations of § 15-22-28(c)
and (f), his challenge to the denial of access to his parole file as a failure
to recognize that § 15-22-36(b) has been repealed by § 41-9-603 of the
ACJIC article, and the refusal to allow him to participate in the SRP
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program as contrary to Ala. Code 1975, § 14-8-60 et seq. But any
purported applications of those statutes occurred within the context of
rulings, or lack thereof, personally against Phillips. " '[W]e treat a
pleading and any other filing according to its substance, rather than its
form or style.' " Unum Life Ins. Co. of America v. Wright, 897 So. 2d 1059,
1075 (Ala. 2004) (quoting Ex parte Bender Shipbuilding & Repair Co.,
879 So. 2d 577, 584 (Ala. 2003)). Therefore, any disagreement Phillips
has with the application of law by the Board, the Board officials, ADOC,
or the State officials must be challenged by petitions for a common-law
writ of certiorari, and appeals of such petitions belong in the Court of
Criminal Appeals. Cf. Mitchell v. Hammond, 252 Ala. 81, 83, 39 So. 2d
582, 583 (1949) ("[A] proceeding in declaratory judgment [may not] be
substituted for the remedy of appeal, certiorari or mandamus as the
method of direct review of the judgments, decrees or orders of a judicial
nature, respectively, of lower courts, bureaus, departments, or the
directors or administrators thereof.").
In sum, Phillips's claims asserted directly against the State of
Alabama, ADOC, and the Board are barred by State immunity. The
proper avenue for Phillips to challenge the asserted actions, or lack
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thereof, by the Board and the Board officials and by ADOC and the State
officials was by a petition for a common-law writ of certiorari in the
Montgomery Circuit Court. An appeal from the denial of such a writ
belongs in the Court of Criminal Appeals. Accordingly, we dismiss this
appeal.
APPEAL DISMISSED.
Stewart, C.J., and Shaw, Bryan, and McCool, JJ., concur.
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