In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
NO. 09-24-00350-CV
AMY MICHELLE PAUL, Appellant
V.
GAVIN WILBUR WEST, Appellee
On Appeal from the 418th District Court
Montgomery County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 24-08-12337-CV
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pro se Appellant Amy Michelle Paul (“Paul”) appeals a protective order
finding that she committed the offense of stalking against Appellee Gavin Wilbur
West (“West”). Paul complains the evidence was insufficient to support the trial
court’s decision to grant the protective order. Paul also complains the trial court
violated her due process rights by not allowing her to present evidence in her defense
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and that she had insufficient notice of West’s exhibits. For the reasons explained
below, we affirm the trial court’s order.
BACKGROUND
In February 2024, West filed a Petition for Protective Order against Paul.
West, who had been engaged in a romantic relationship with Paul for approximately
eighteen months, alleged that after he ended the relationship, Paul stole his Rolex
watch and denied committing the theft. West believed he was “under observation”
by Paul because when the police arrived to take his report about the theft, Paul
contacted him and asked him not to file a report. West alleged that Paul was a danger
to her romantic partners because she had a previous arrest for domestic violence,
repeatedly spoke about killing her ex-husband, assaulted her ex-husband, has a
severe drug dependency issue, has been terminated from multiple jobs for being
aggressive, and refused to seek mental health treatment for her emotional instability.
West alleged that Paul had sent him numerous harassing and unstable emails that
West perceived as threatening, and West believed that Paul may cause him bodily
harm or attempt unwanted sexual aggression that would require him to defend
himself. West attached an affidavit in support of his request for a protective order
and evidence including text messages Paul sent him and her ex-husband, police
reports, his small claims petition against Paul for theft, and emails from Paul.
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In September 2024, the trial court conducted a hearing on West’s Application
for a Protective Order under Chapter 7B of the Code of Criminal Procedure for
stalking. The trial court noted the parties’ last protective order was dated March 15,
2024, and that it would only consider matters after that date. Concerning the exhibit
list, West explained he had about twenty-five exhibits. West testified that Paul was
in violation of the Texas statutes of stalking, threatening, and harassing. West stated
that during the last hearing, Paul claimed she had been served but had not received
any of the evidence. The trial court noted it was only concerned with Paul’s actions
that constitute stalking. West testified that after he filed for a restraining order, he
received a series of death threats from a fictitious number connected to a motorcycle
gang, and West claimed that the police were investigating the matter. Paul denied
sending the text messages, and the trial court did not admit them into evidence
because West had not shown Paul sent them.
West then sought to admit a police report showing West requested that Paul
receive a mental health evaluation after Paul sent West graphic texts and pictures
threatening to kill herself, and West also included the text messages and pictures
Paul sent him. The trial court admitted the text messages and pictures after Paul did
not object to their admission. When West asked the trial court to admit the police
report, Paul told the trial court to “submit” all the exhibits to save some time. The
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trial court admitted all of West’s exhibits after Paul repeated that she wanted them
all submitted.
West testified that since their last hearing, Paul continued a trend of behavior
that rose to stalking, including sending him dozens of text messages after “a night of
what was likely drug and alcohol fueled[.]” West stated that Paul retaliated by
making a false allegation against him for calling the mental health authorities and
attempted to blackmail him for filing charges against her for stealing his Rolex
watch. West testified that the police were investigating the text message he received
from an alleged motorcycle gang member that West perceived as a threat to his life,
and West explained that one of the phrases in the text message was a “catchphrase”
Paul used when they argued.
West’s evidence also included text messages between Paul and her exhusband in which Paul claims she could have West back at any time. West stated
that Paul’s making the statements after he filed for a restraining order is evidence of
stalking because it shows Paul won’t take “no” for an answer. West submitted audio
and visual recordings of Paul’s interactions with emergency personnel and others.
West stated those recordings show Paul’s “likely significant mental health, drug
abuse, and alcohol dependency issues, all things that contribute to her . . . refusal to
accept the fact that this relationship is over and then result of blackmail and threats
on top of that.” When Paul complained that she did not agree to admit the recordings,
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the trial court stated it admitted the exhibits after she agreed to admit them but
allowed her to withdraw that agreement. The trial court sustained Paul’s relevance
objections to the recordings. West testified that he was concerned that Paul would
continue to use character assassination and other things to injure his professional and
personal reputation.
Paul denied sending the text message concerning the biker gang. Paul stated
that West was “causing this himself[]” and that she wanted West to leave her alone.
Concerning her communicating with West in a harassing or unwanted manner, Paul
explained that they were two people who love each other that were arguing and
trying again. Paul admitted she made a rape and abuse allegation against West but
did not remember when it happened. Paul also did not recall previously testifying
that there was no history of domestic violence. Paul denied stating she could have
West back at any time.
After considering the application, evidence, and arguments, the trial court
granted West’s Application and found there were reasonable grounds to believe that
Paul committed the offense of stalking against West, a current or former dating
partner. The trial court found that, for a period of one-year, certain conditions and
terms were necessary or appropriate to prevent or reduce the likelihood of family
violence or future harm to West.
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ANALYSIS
Paul complains that the evidence was insufficient to support the protective
order. First, we note that we must review issues affecting our appellate jurisdiction,
even if sua sponte. M.O. Dental Lab v. Rape, 139 S.W.3d 671, 673 (Tex. 2004); Ross
v. Linebarger, Goggan, Blair & Sampson, L.L.P., 333 S.W.3d 736, 741 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no pet.). Here, the August 11, 2024 protective order
at issue has expired. Generally, expired orders are considered moot on appellate
review. James v. Hubbard, 21 S.W.3d 558, 560 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2000, no
pet.). Appellate courts lack jurisdiction to decide moot controversies. See Nat’l
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Jones, 1 S.W.3d 83, 86 (Tex. 1999). However, several
intermediate courts of appeals have reviewed challenges to expired protective orders
under the collateral consequences exception to the mootness doctrine on the ground
that the “effects of a protective order carry significant collateral legal repercussions
and a social stigma even though the protective order has expired.” State for Prot. of
Cockerham v. Cockerham, 218 S.W.3d 298, 303 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2007, no
pet.); see Amir–Sharif v. Hawkins, 246 S.W.3d 267, 270 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007,
pet. dism’d w.o.j.); Ex parte Flores, 130 S.W.3d 100, 105 (Tex. App.—El Paso
2003, pet. ref’d); James, 21 S.W.3d at 560-61. Because the protective order here is
based on allegations of abuse directed towards a person with whom Paul had a dating
relationship—allegations that carry significant legal repercussions and social
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stigma—Paul is entitled to appellate review. See Martin v. Martin, 545 S.W.3d 162,
167 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2017, no pet.). Accordingly, we address the merits of
Paul’s appeal under the collateral consequences exception to the mootness doctrine.
The trial court issued the protective order against Paul in accordance with
Chapter 7B of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Code of Criminal Procedure
grants a trial court authority to issue a protective order if it finds there are reasonable
grounds to believe that the applicant is a victim of stalking. Tex. Code Crim. Proc.
Ann. art. 7B.003(a), (b); see id. art. 7B.001(a)(1); see also Tex. Penal Code Ann. §
42.072. A person commits the offense of stalking if
(a) . . . on more than one occasion and pursuant to the same scheme or
course of conduct that is directed at a specific other person, knowingly
engages in conduct that:
(1) constitutes an offense under 42.07, or that the actor knows
or reasonably should know the other person will regard as
threatening:
(A) bodily injury or death for the other person; or
(B) that an offense will be committed against:
(ii) an individual with whom the other person has a
dating relationship; or
(iii) the other person’s property;
(2) causes the other person, . . . , or an individual with whom the
other person has a dating relationship:
(A) to be placed in fear of bodily injury or death or in fear
that an offense will be committed against the other person,
. . . , or an individual with whom the other person has a
dating relationship, or the other person’s property; or
(B) to feel harassed, terrified, intimidated, annoyed,
alarmed, abused, tormented, embarrassed, or offended;
and
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(3) would cause a reasonable person under circumstances similar
to the circumstances of the other person to:
(A) fear bodily injury or death for the person;
(B) fear that an offense will be committed against . . . an
individual with whom the person has a dating relationship;
(C) fear that an offense will be committed against the
person’s property; or
(D) feel harassed, terrified, intimidated, annoyed, alarmed,
abused, tormented, embarrassed, or offended.
(c) For purposes of this section, a trier of fact may find that different
types of conduct described by Subsection (a), if engaged in on more
than one occasion, constitute conduct that is engaged in pursuant to the
same scheme or course of conduct.
Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 42.072(a)(1), (2), (3), (c). An individual “‘harasses another
if, with ‘intent to harass, annoy, alarm, abuse, torment, or embarrass another,’” she
“‘sends repeated electronic communications in a manner reasonably likely to harass,
annoy, alarm, abuse, torment, embarrass, or offend another.’” Shoemaker v. State
for Protect. of C.L., 493 S.W.3d 710, 717 (Tex. App—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no
pet.) (quoting Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 42.07(a)(7)).
Thus, the Code of Criminal Procedure authorizes the trial court to issue a
protective order when the court finds reasonable grounds to believe that the
respondent engaged in conduct that would qualify as stalking under the Penal Code.
Garza v. Renteria, 726 S.W.3d 894, 897 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2025, no
pet.). On appeal, a trial court’s findings of fact have the same force and effect as a
jury’s verdict. Anderson v. City of Seven Points, 806 S.W.2d 791, 794 (Tex. 1991).
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As the fact finder, the trial court is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses
and the weight to be given their testimony. Nat’l Freight, Inc. v. Snyder, 191 S.W.3d
416, 425 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2006, no pet.). A trial court’s findings of fact are
reviewable for legal and factual sufficiency. Anderson, 806 S.W.2d at 794.
Sufficiency challenges to a trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed under the same
standards used to review a jury’s findings. Catalina v. Blasdel, 881 S.W.2d 295, 297
(Tex. 1994).
We review the trial court’s findings supporting a Chapter 7B protective order
for both legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence. See Garza, 726 S.W.3d at 898
(citing Dolgener v. Dolgener, 651 S.W.3d 242, 256 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2021, no pet.); see Shoemaker, 493 S.W.3d at 714-15, 718-19. In addressing
a legal sufficiency challenge, we consider whether the record evidence would have
enabled “a reasonable and fair-minded fact finder” to render the decision under
review. See Gunn v. McCoy, 554 S.W.3d 645, 658 (Tex. 2018) (citing City of Keller
v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005)). In making this determination, we
consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, make
every reasonable inference in that party’s favor, and disregard contrary evidence
unless a reasonable fact finder could not. See Bos v. Smith, 556 S.W.3d 293, 300
(Tex. 2018). Where there is more than a mere scintilla of evidence to support the
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trial court’s issuance of a protective order, we will find the evidence legally
sufficient to uphold the order. See Shoemaker, 493 S.W.3d at 715.
In resolving a factual sufficiency challenge, we consider the entire record and
will set aside a trial court’s finding only if it is “so against the great weight and
preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust.” Ortiz v. Jones,
917 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex. 1996). When conducting a factual sufficiency review,
we must not substitute our judgment for that of the fact finder, who “is the sole judge
of the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony.” Golden
Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson, 116 S.W.3d 757, 761 (Tex. 2003). The fact finder
may resolve inconsistencies in the testimony of any witness, draw inferences from
the evidence presented, and choose between conflicting inferences. Shoemaker, 493
S.W.3d at 715 (citing McGalliard v. Kuhlmann, 722 S.W.2d 694, 697 (Tex. 1986)).
We will not overturn a fact finder’s determination unless only one inference can be
drawn from the evidence and it opposes the fact finder’s resolution of that issue. Id.
(citing Havner v. E-Z Mart Stores, Inc., 825 S.W.2d 456, 461 (Tex. 1992)).
The trial court reviewed the text messages Paul sent to West and her exhusband as well as police reports concerning the parties. The trial court also
considered the circumstances surrounding the parties’ last protective order. West
testified that his evidence shows that Paul’s trend of stalking behavior included
sending him dozens of text messages, refusing to accept that their relationship was
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over, and blackmailing and threatening him. West perceived Paul’s text messages as
a threat to his life and was concerned about her mental health as well as her drug and
alcohol use. West was also concerned that Paul would use character assassination to
injure his reputation because Paul had made false allegations against him. Paul
denied sending some of the text messages and testified that they were just two people
who were in love and arguing.
Here, the trial court was free to believe West’s testimony and disbelieve Paul’s
testimony. See Shoemaker, 493 S.W.3d at 715. There is sufficient evidence showing
that on more than one occasion Paul knowingly engaged in conduct–by sending
repeated electronic communications–that caused West to be placed in fear of bodily
injury or in fear that Paul would commit an offense against him. See Tex. Penal Code
Ann. § 42.072(a)(2)(A). There is also sufficient evidence showing that on more than
one occasion Paul knowingly engaged in conduct–by sending repeated electronic
communications–that caused West to feel harassed. See id. §§ 42.07(a)(7);
42.072(a)(2)(B). We conclude there is legally and factually sufficient evidence to
support the trial court’s finding that Paul engaged in the offense of stalking. See
Garza, 726 S.W.3d at 898. Accordingly, the evidence is sufficient to support the trial
court’s issuance of a Chapter 7B protective order. See id.
Paul complains the trial court violated her due process rights by not allowing
her to present evidence in her defense. Based on our review of the record of the
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hearing, Paul did not ask the trial court to admit any evidence in her defense.
Concerning Paul’s complaint she had insufficient notice of West’s exhibits, the
record shows Paul told the trial court to admit West’s exhibits to save time. Since
Paul did not object to the admission of West’s exhibits, she has not preserved this
complaint for our review. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1. We also note the trial court
allowed Paul to withdraw her agreement to admit audio and visual recordings of
Paul’s interactions with emergency personnel and others and sustained Paul’s
relevance objections to those recordings. We hold that Paul has not shown any error
regarding the denial or admission of evidence.
Having determined that there is legally and factually sufficient evidence
supporting the trial court’s issuance of a Chapter 7B protective order, we affirm the
trial court’s order.
AFFIRMED.
JAY WRIGHT
Justice
Submitted on September 15, 2026
Opinion Delivered October 15, 2026
Before Golemon, C.J., Johnson and Wright, JJ.
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