NUMBER 13-26-00351-CV
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
MARCELO RAMON MORA, Appellant,
v.
JOCELYN ASHLEY MORALES,
HECTOR MORALES, RODRIGO
FERNANDEZ, YADIRA MENDOZA
A/N/F OF A.M., A MINOR, Appellees.
ON APPEAL FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 7
OF HIDALGO COUNTY, TEXAS
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Tijerina and Justices Silva and Cron
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Cron
After considering appellant Marcelo Ramon Mora’s amended motion for rehearing,
we deny the motion but withdraw our memorandum and judgment issued July 23, 2026,
and substitute the following memorandum opinion and judgment in their place.
The trial court entered a final judgment on November 20, 2025, in trial court cause
number CL-24-2411-G. On January 16, 2026, appellant filed a combined motion for new
trial, objection to appellees’ proposed judgment, and motion to modify the judgment with
five exhibits attached. Said motion was signed by one of appellant’s attorneys, Lauren
Lucio. In paragraph II, subparagraphs A and B 1 of the motion, appellant sought to invoke
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 306a by explaining, among other things, that “counsel did
not receive notice of the signed final judgment from the clerk’s office electronically nor by
first class mail[,]” and “counsel acquired actual knowledge of the signed final
judgment . . . on January 12, 2026.” See TEX. R. CIV. P. 306a(4)-(5). The Rule 306a
motion was supported by a verification, signed and sworn, by Frank Sabo, Jr., another
one of appellant’s attorneys, which stated that “every statement contained in paragraph
II, subparagraphs A and B are within his personal knowledge and are true and correct.” 2
Appellees responded in opposition. The trial court entered an amended final judgment on
March 25, 2026, and on April 2, 2026, the trial court denied appellant’s “[m]otion for [n]ew
[t]rial and [m]otion to [m]odify the [j]udgment.”
On May 1, 2026, appellant filed a notice of appeal attempting to appeal the March
25, 2026 amended final judgment and asserting the appeal was timely because it was
filed within “ninety (90) days of the date the Court’s judgment became final.” On May 4,
2026, the Clerk of the Court notified appellant that it appeared the notice of appeal had
1 Following appellant’s attorney’s lead, we refer to the language in the motion this way. Additionally,
we observe that “subparagraph” C mentioned Rule 306a, but this portion was not verified.
2 We observe that as far as we can tell, Sabo appeared in the case on August 19, 2024, and Lucio
appeared on April 7, 2025. We do not see any motions to withdraw or orders granting such a motion filed by either attorney.
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not been timely perfected. Appellant was further notified that if the defect remained
uncured after ten days, the appeal would be dismissed. On July 10, 2026, appellant filed
a response to the Clerk’s May 4, 2026 notice.
After we issued our memorandum opinion and judgment, appellant filed a motion
for rehearing in which he argued, in relevant part, that “the trial court ruled, without
objection, that appellant acquired actual knowledge of the signed final judgment on
January 12, 2026.” In support of this argument, appellant included with his motion a
transcript from a February 25, 2026 hearing that is not part of the appellate record. See
Robb v. Horizon Cmtys. Improvement Ass’n, Inc., 417 S.W.3d 585, 589 (Tex. App.—El
Paso 2013, no pet.) (“It is well established that documents attached to an appellate brief
which are not part of the record may generally not be considered by the appellate court.”).
As discussed below, even if we considered that hearing, the March 25, 2026 amended
judgment is still void. See TEX. R. APP. P. 34.6 (“If anything relevant is omitted from the
reporter’s record . . . the appellate court . . . may by letter direct the official court reporter
to prepare, certify, and file in the appellate court a supplemental reporter’s record
containing the omitted items. Any supplemental reporter’s record is part of the appellate
record.”).
Generally, a post-judgment motion or notice of appeal is due thirty days after the
judgment is signed. TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b; TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1. Rule 306a(3), in relevant
part, provides that when “the final judgment or other appealable order is signed, the clerk
of the court must immediately send the judgment or order to the parties as provided in
Rule 21(f)(10).” TEX. R. CIV. P. 306a(3); see TEX. R. CIV. P. 21(f)(10) (providing for orders,
notices, and other documents to be sent electronically through an electronic filing system
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with few exceptions). However, if a party does not receive the required notice or acquire
actual knowledge of the judgment until more than twenty days after the judgment is
signed, Rule 306a allows the time periods to run from the date the party received notice
or acquired actual knowledge of the judgment. TEX. R. CIV. P. 306a(4).
Rule 306a(5) provides the procedure to modify post-judgment timetables so that
they can begin on the date that the party or the party’s counsel first either received a
notice of the judgment or acquired actual knowledge of the signing of the judgment. See
TEX. R. CIV. P. 306a(5) (stating that the adversely affected party must “prove in the trial
court, on sworn motion and notice, the date on which the party or his attorney first either
received a notice of the judgment or acquired actual knowledge of the signing and that
this date was more than twenty days after the judgment was signed”). “Compliance with
the time periods prescribed by [Rule 306a] is a jurisdictional prerequisite.” Mem’l Hosp.
of Galveston Cnty. v. Gillis, 741 S.W.2d 364, 365 (Tex. 1987). A sworn motion establishes
a prima facie case that the party lacked timely notice and invokes the trial court’s
otherwise-expired jurisdiction for the limited purpose of conducting an evidentiary hearing
to determine the date on which the party or his counsel first received notice of the
judgment or acquired knowledge of its signing. Korczynski v. Cowboy Up Ranch
Furniture, LLC, 651 S.W.3d 602, 605 (Tex. App.—Waco 2022, no pet.).
Here, appellant failed to reinvoke the trial court’s plenary power because his Rule
306a motion failed to address whether and when appellant, himself, acquired actual
knowledge of the trial court’s November 20, 2025 final judgment. See Martinez v. Olmos,
No. 13-18-00650-CV, 2020 WL 5054794, at *5 n.9 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg
July 9, 2020, pet. struck) (mem. op.) (noting, in relevant part, Rule 306a “provides a
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procedure for extending the trial court’s plenary power, and it applies when the movant
and the movant’s attorney did not receive notice of the signing of the judgment nor acquire
actual knowledge of the judgment within twenty days after the signing of the judgment but
did receive notice or acquire knowledge of the judgment within ninety days of the
judgment”) (emphasis added)); see generally Red Bluff, LLC v. Tarpley, 713 S.W.3d 412,
415–16 (Tex. 2025) (per curiam) (defining “actual knowledge”). In other words, the Rule
306a motion failed to negate the possibility that appellant, himself, acquired knowledge
of the November 20, 2025 final judgment within twenty days of its signing. See Leal v.
Besfki, No. 05-23-00177-CV, 2024 WL 4834398, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 20, 2024,
no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding that appellant failed to make a prima facie showing to
invoke the protections of Rule 306a and extend the trial court’s jurisdiction after
reasoning, among other things, that “the motion and affidavit do not address whether and
when [appellant] himself had notice or actual knowledge of the signed judgment, nor do
they disavow that [appellant] had such notice or knowledge”); Jarell v. Bergdorf, 580
S.W.3d 463, 468 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, no pet.) (concluding that
appellants did not reinvoke the trial court’s jurisdiction after it expired given they
addressed “only notice and actual knowledge as to their counsel; they do not negate the
possibility that they received notice or acquired actual knowledge within twenty days after
the trial court signed the dismissal order”); In re J.S., 392 S.W.3d 334, 338 (Tex. App.—
El Paso 2013, no pet.) (“[C]ontrary to the State’s assertions, notice and actual knowledge
must be negated by both the party and the party’s counsel in order to make a prima facie
showing of lack of timely notice.”). Additionally, the Rule 306a motion failed to address
whether Lucio acquired actual knowledge within twenty days from the trial court’s signing
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of the November 20, 2025 judgment. See Korczynski, 651 S.W.3d at 606–07 (dismissing
appeal for want of jurisdiction after reasoning that Rule 306a motion failed to contain a
factual assertion that all of the plaintiff’s attorneys did not have actual knowledge of the
signing of the order).
And even if we considered the February 25, 2026 hearing, see TEX. R. APP. P.
34.6, as appellant urges us to do on rehearing, it would not change our decision that the
amended final judgment is void because “actual knowledge” was not demonstrated at
that hearing. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 306a(4), (5). Instead, as shown below, the trial court’s
finding of a “controlling date” surrounded when “notice” of the judgment was received:
THE COURT: This is Cl-24-2411-G. It’s a Motion for New Trial
and a Motion to Modify Judgment.
As it relates to the Court’s plenary power, the
rule says that you received notice of the
judgment after 20 days but before 90 days, your
30 days to file a Motion for New Trial or any post
judgment relief begin to run from the day you
actually received notice. So what would that
date be that you actually received notice post 20
but before 90 day days.
[Appellant’s Counsel]: January 12, 2026.
THE COURT: Any objection that he . . . that the Defendants in
fact for the first time received notice of the
judgment on January 12th?
[Appellee’s Counsel]: No objection, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Do the parties stipulate that would have been
after 20 days but before 90 days?
[Appellee’s Counsel]: Yes, sir.
[Appellant’s Counsel]: Yes.
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COURT’S FINDINGS
THE COURT: All right. The Court finds that January 12th is the
controlling date and that from that date the
defendant would have had 30 days to file any
post-judgment Motion for New Trial and that the
75 days but before 105 days run from that day,
wherever that puts us. January, February,
March, that puts it at the end of March more or
less for the 75 days. So I’m going to reset
everything to[—]
Put it in the middle of March.
(Emphasis added).
Assuming without deciding that Rule 306a(4)’s first prong was satisfied at this
hearing, appellant nevertheless failed to satisfy the second prong because, as shown
above, the February 25, 2026 hearing was silent as to when appellant acquired actual
knowledge of the judgment. Cf. Red Bluff, 713 S.W.3d at 415 (“Because the court clerk
did not send notice of the judgment ‘by first-class mail,’ Red Bluff satisfied Rule 306a(4)’s
first prong by demonstrating it did not receive notice of the judgment as the thenapplicable version of Rule 306a(3) required. The question, then, is whether Red Bluff also
satisfied Rule 306a(4)’s second prong by demonstrating it did not acquire ‘actual
knowledge’ of the judgment when it received the email. We conclude Red Bluff satisfied
the second prong”); see In re J.S., 392 S.W.3d at 338 (“[T]he evidence presented to the
trial court at the hearing on the State's motion to modify only addressed notice and was
silent as to when the State or its representative first acquired knowledge of the order of
expunction.”).
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In sum, because the requisite jurisdictional facts were not alleged in the Rule 306a
motion, the trial court’s plenary power expired thirty days after the November 20, 2025
final judgment, i.e., December 22, 2025. As such, the trial court’s March 25, 2026
amended final judgment—the judgment appellant attempts to appeal from—was void.
See Coronado, 372 S.W.3d at 623 (explaining “[a]ppellate courts do not have jurisdiction
to address the merits of appeals from void orders or judgments”); Buffa v. Buffa, No. 13-21-00171-CV, 2023 WL 3881118, at *3 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg June 8,
2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“When a party appeals a void order, we must declare the order
void and dismiss the appeal.” (citing State ex rel. Latty v. Owens, 907 S.W.2d 484, 486
(Tex. 1995) (per curiam))). Thus, we declare the trial court’s March 25, 2026 amended
final judgment void, vacate it, which thereby leaves intact the November 20, 2025 final
judgment, and dismiss this appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(e).
JENNY CRON
Justice
Delivered and filed on the
15th day of October 2026.
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