People v. Lackey-Garcia

majority opinion

Filed 10/16/26

CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION*

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Sacramento)

THE PEOPLE, C102003

Plaintiff and Respondent,

(Super. Ct. No. 20FE004111)

MARTIN LACKEY-GARCIA,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Sacramento County, Winn, John P., Awoniyi, Bunmi O., and Sawtelle, Ernest W., Judges. Affirmed.

Michael C. Sampson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey M. Laurence and Ismah Ahmad, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiffs and Respondents.

Defendant Martin Lackey-Garcia was charged with murder and attempted murder after stabbing multiple people at a mental health facility. Before trial, Lackey-Garcia’s competence to stand trial was called into doubt, and psychologists were appointed to evaluate him. (Pen. Code, §§ 1368, 1369.) 1 During the competency hearing, LackeyGarcia asked to testify on his own behalf, but the trial court deferred to defense counsel’s

* Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1105 and 8.1110, this opinion is certified for publication with the exception of part II of the Discussion.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

decision that Lackey-Garcia should not testify. Lackey-Garcia was found competent, and after representing himself at trial, was convicted on all counts. He was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole plus 30 years to life.

On appeal, Lackey-Garcia contends that he was unconstitutionally denied the right to testify at his competency hearing; that there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s competency determination; and that the court erred in instructing the jury that the doctrine of unreasonable self-defense was not available when a defendant’s belief in the need for self-defense is entirely delusional. We are unpersuaded by these contentions and affirm.

BACKGROUND

In 2020, Lackey-Garcia sought treatment at a wellness center in Sacramento County that provided outpatient mental health care (the Center). During one of his initial visits, he stabbed four people with a kitchen knife. Two of the victims, Eileen Stanwick, who was a case worker, and Paul McIntyre, a volunteer, died from their wounds.

An amended information charged Lackey-Garcia with two counts of murder (§ 187, subd. (a); counts one and two) and two counts of attempted murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664; counts three and four). It alleged as a special circumstance for counts one and two that Lackey-Garcia committed multiple murders. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3).) The information further alleged as to all counts that Lackey-Garcia personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)) and that he had suffered a prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subd. (b)) that also qualified as a prior serious felony (§ 667, subd. (a)).

Before trial began, defense counsel expressed a doubt as to whether LackeyGarcia was competent to stand trial. After a hearing, the trial court ruled that he was competent. The court also permitted Lackey-Garcia to represent himself at trial. We

discuss these proceedings in more detail below in connection with Lackey-Garcia’s challenge to the competency determination.

II.

The trial began in June 2024 and took place over the course of 10 trial days. Dozens of witnesses testified for the People, and more than 30 testified for the defense.

Lackey-Garcia was among the witnesses who testified, and he admitted that he stabbed each of the victims. He also claimed to have stabbed and killed a fifth victim, whose body he believed police had removed as part of a cover-up. He asserted that he had acted in self-defense because he believed the Center staff were part of a law enforcement conspiracy to harm or kill him.

Lackey-Garcia and certain defense witnesses testified that he had been in and out of the criminal justice system and had received sporadic care for mental health issues since at least 2015. At some point when in prison, he was diagnosed with bipolar disorder. A state corrections psychiatrist who treated Lackey-Garcia from 2015 to 2018 diagnosed him with schizoaffective disorder, which the psychiatrist described as a “nonspecific working diagnosis,” different from schizophrenia.

While housed in a mental health program during a period on parole, LackeyGarcia began to feel like people were following him and hacking his phone. He began always carrying a knife and was eventually returned to jail in 2018 for possessing the knife while in the program.

After being released for the knife possession, Lackey-Garcia was arrested and jailed for a separate incident in 2019 or 2020. While in custody, he believed that a series of confidential informants was placed in his cell and that they were warning him about danger he would face when he was released. He also believed law enforcement was “sending [him] messages.” He represented himself in defending those charges, and they were eventually dismissed. He described how, after being released, he continued having strange encounters that reinforced his belief that people were trying to set him up for

crimes and that he was being followed by law enforcement. The encounters were “terrifying [him] to death.”

Lackey-Garcia described becoming increasingly fearful as various perceived connections from his time in jail kept reappearing as he went about his daily life through January 2020. For instance, while staying at a homeless shelter, he became convinced that the district attorney was there. After about 16 months, he called a resource navigation service and asked for help because he was “ ‘being followed.’ ” The service directed him to the Center.

Lackey-Garcia attended an orientation at the Center in late February 2020. When he arrived, he perceived everyone to be “speaking in code.” He spoke with Stanwick, a case worker for the Center, and said he needed to talk to someone because he was being followed by the district attorney, the police, or “the cartel[].” She told him to sign in. After the orientation, he told staff he needed medication and to see a doctor because he was afraid he was “going to get killed.” A rehabilitation mentor at the Center advised Lackey-Garcia that she needed to go help a client with an oxygen tank. Lackey-Garcia understood this as a threat or a “subliminal[]” message that “something’s going to happen to [him], like [he’s] getting close to being killed.”

A few days later, Lackey-Garcia returned to the Center. He met with the same rehabilitation mentor he had previously spoken with, in her office. The mentor became uncomfortable and concerned when Lackey-Garcia began raising his voice and not making sense. According to Lackey-Garcia, he was “freaking out” because he felt the mentor was antagonizing him and not listening to his fears that the DEA and CIA were trying to kill him. The mentor surreptitiously emailed several coworkers to come help. Upon seeing Stanwick walk by the office, the mentor stopped her and asked her to come speak with Lackey-Garcia. Stanwick agreed, and the mentor left and walked to the break room.

According to Lackey-Garcia, he asked Stanwick for medicine and explained that “people [kept] following [him] around everywhere.” She told him he would have to wait two months to get medicine. Lackey-Garcia responded, “ ‘Okay. You’re a cop.’ ” “ ‘Now you’re sending me a message about what’s been going on.’ ” “ ‘Now I’m considering this as a threat. You’re making a threat.’ ” “ ‘I need you to tell me what’s going on. Are these people going to try and kill me?’ ” As he kept questioning Stanwick, she “just sat there and stared at [him].”

Lackey-Garcia then drew a 12-inch kitchen knife. He again demanded that Stanwick tell him what was going on because, he testified, “ ‘I’m in fear of my life.’ ” “ ‘I’m afraid to be in this room with you right now.’ ” “ ‘I’m even more afraid to walk outside because I don’t know what’s going to happen to me.’ ” As he continued along these lines, Stanwick “just looked at [him] and she didn’t say anything.” At that point, he knew he was “either going to end up dead, in jail, or something, something was going to happen” while at the Center. Lackey-Garcia felt that Stanwick had “attacked [him] mentally” and was “threatening [his] life” based on “law enforcement’s … recommendations.” He stabbed Stanwick repeatedly.

According to Lackey-Garcia, victim Paul McIntyre then came into the office and “grabbed [him] from behind.” McIntyre was a volunteer peer guide at the Center, and he was blind. Feeling McIntyre on his back, Lackey-Garcia swung the knife behind him and then, while McIntyre was standing and grabbing him, pushed the knife in further. McIntyre fell to the ground and did not respond when Lackey-Garcia asked him, “ ‘Why did you come in here?’ ” Lackey-Garcia concluded that McIntyre had been the one to call him to come in for orientation, and as he looked down at McIntyre, Lackey-Garcia berated him, repeating, “ ‘You set me up.’ ” McIntyre said he was sorry, and LackeyGarcia then asked him, “ ‘Where are the people who asked you to do this? Where are the people who asked you to set me up?’ ”

Another victim, an administrative assistant at the Center, testified to a different version of events following Stanwick’s stabbing. Upon hearing a woman scream, the assistant ran from her desk to the office. She saw Lackey-Garcia standing over Stanwick, pinning her against a wall as he struck her. The assistant “grabbed” or “pulled” him off Stanwick, who fell to the ground, having been killed by the stab wounds. Lackey-Garcia then “threw [the assistant] in the corner on the ground” and started striking her. She did not realize she was being stabbed until she started seeing blood on her face. She remained on the ground and screamed for help. Lackey-Garcia stopped attacking her and ran from the office. After Lackey-Garcia was gone, the assistant saw McIntyre come to the doorway of the office. Just as he reached the door frame, Lackey-Garcia came back, “ran straight towards [McIntyre,] and stabbed him” twice. Lackey-Garcia then ran out again. McIntyre grabbed his neck area and asked whether he had been stabbed, before falling over. McIntyre died from his wounds.

Lackey-Garcia, for his part, testified that the assistant entered the office after he had already stabbed McIntyre. He said that she could see he had a knife in his hand but still “blitzed” him and started hitting him from behind. Lackey-Garcia turned and started swinging his knife at her as she fought back. Eventually she turned around and ran.

Lackey-Garcia left the office and then encountered four staff members, whom he accused of wanting to “ ‘jump’ ” him and enjoying torturing people. The staff did not move, and he decided not to give in when “something in [his] head” told him to “kill everybody.” Instead, he moved toward a nearby exit door, convinced that the staff members were “working with the cops” and “were trying to kill [him].”

Lackey-Garcia further testified that he walked through the door, which led to a courtyard, where he saw a man start to orchestrate an attack behind him. He rushed the man and stabbed him in the chest. This man never appears on the courtyard video surveillance footage, and there was no evidence that this victim existed. Lackey-Garcia,

however, claimed throughout the proceedings that he stabbed this purported attacker and that the surveillance video had been altered to erase him.

According to Lackey-Garcia, as he was stabbing the man, the director of the Center came and “grabbed [Lackey-Garcia] from behind.” “As soon as he attacked … from behind, [Lackey-Garcia] swung” the knife at him, slicing him on the wrist. When the director started to run, Lackey-Garcia followed him and stabbed him in the back.

The courtyard surveillance video played at trial depicted a different version of events. The Center director, who was summoned to respond to the disturbance, is shown walking across the courtyard and looking inside a door to the office area. He quickly stepped back from the door and stumbled to the ground as Lackey-Garcia went through the same door holding a knife in his fist. As the director started to push himself back up, Lackey-Garcia took a large windup, plunged the knife into the director’s back, and then sliced the director’s wrist as the director fled. Lackey-Garcia then ran around the courtyard for a few seconds as everyone present dispersed. Both the director and the administrative assistant suffered extensive injuries but survived after being hospitalized.

Lackey-Garcia was eventually arrested and when asked why he did what he did, he told the police that he acted in self-defense, stating: “ ‘Because you guys came after me. You set me up. They were cops. They were law enforcement.’ ”

After one day of deliberating, the jury found Lackey-Garcia guilty on all counts and found the weapon enhancements and special circumstance true. In a bifurcated trial, the trial court found the prior conviction true. The court later sentenced Lackey-Garcia to life in prison without the possibility of parole for the murder convictions, consecutive to two years for the weapon enhancements, plus 28 years to life for the attempted murder convictions.

Lackey-Garcia timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

We first consider Lackey-Garcia’s challenges to the trial court’s competency determination.

“ ‘ “Both the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and state law prohibit the state from trying or convicting a criminal defendant while he or she is mentally incompetent.” ’ ” (People v. Sattiewhite (2014) 59 Cal.4th 446, 464; see § 1367, subd. (a).) Section 1367 provides that a “defendant is mentally incompetent … if, as a result of a mental health disorder or developmental disability, the defendant is unable to understand the nature of the criminal proceedings or to assist counsel in the conduct of a defense in a rational manner.” (§ 1367, subd. (a).) That provision “is consistent with the federal standard” (People v. Bertsch and Hronis (2026) 19 Cal.5th 183, 228 (Bertsch)), which asks whether the defendant “ ‘has sufficient present ability to consult with his [or her] lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding—and whether he [or she] has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him [or her]’ ” (id. at pp. 226-227, quoting Dusky v. United States (1960) 362 U.S. 402, 402).

“Penal Code section 1368 requires that criminal proceedings be suspended and competency proceedings be commenced if ‘a doubt arises in the mind of the judge’ regarding the defendant’s competence (id., subd. (a)) and defense counsel concurs (id., subd. (b)).” (People v. Rodas (2018) 6 Cal.5th 219, 231.) “When a doubt exists as to the defendant’s mental competence, the court must appoint an expert or experts to examine the defendant.” (Ibid.) At the time of Lackey-Garcia’s competency proceeding, as now, a defendant’s incompetence to stand trial must be established by a preponderance of the

evidence. (Former § 1369, subd. (f); § 1369, subd. (c)(3); Bertsch, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 229.) 2

If the defendant is found competent, criminal proceedings resume. (§ 1370, subd. (a)(1)(A).) If he or she is found incompetent, proceedings remain suspended, and the defendant is committed for treatment designed to restore competence. (Former § 1370, subd. (a)(1)(B); § 1370, subd. (a)(1)(C); see People v. Waterman (1986) 42 Cal.3d 565, 568.) That commitment may be to a Department of State Hospitals facility, to another treatment facility, or placement on outpatient status. (Former § 1370, subd. (a)(1)(B)(i); § 1370, subd. (a)(1)(C)(i); see Welf. & Inst. Code, § 1600.) Those charged with a violent felony, including homicide, must go to a facility with a secured perimeter or a locked and controlled treatment facility, unless the court finds placement on outpatient status would not pose a danger to public health or safety. (Former § 1370, subd. (a)(1)(D)-(F); § 1370, subd. (a)(1)(F)-(H); see § 667.5, subd. (c) [defining “ ‘violent felony’ ”].) The statute requires periodic progress reports, starting within 90 days of commitment. (§ 1370, subd. (b)(1).) Whenever competence is restored, the defendant is returned to court and criminal proceedings resume. (§ 1372; Waterman, at p. 568.)

2 After Lackey-Garcia’s competency hearing, section 1369 was amended to provide that, “[i]f neither party objects” to the expert’s competency report, “the court may determine the competency of the defendant based on” the report. (§ 1369, subd. (c)(1); see Stats. 2024, ch. 646, § 3.) The amendments further state that, “[i]f either party objects to any competency report and requests a hearing, the court shall hold a hearing to determine competence … .” (§ 1369, subd. (c)(2).) And “[i]f counsel for the defendant waives the right to a jury trial and the prosecution consents, … the hearing shall be heard by the court. Otherwise, a determination of the defendant’s competency to stand trial shall be decided by a jury.” (§ 1369, subd. (c)(4).)

In late 2020, about seven months after the initial charges were filed, Dr. Robin Hemenway Baker, a psychologist, was appointed to evaluate Lackey-Garcia’s mental competence to stand trial, apparently after defense counsel declared a doubt as to his competence. Dr. Hemenway Baker interviewed Lackey-Garcia in February 2021 and submitted a report of her examination and findings. Dr. Hemenway Baker found that Lackey-Garcia had “a mental disorder, most likely a Bipolar mood disorder” but opined he was competent to stand trial. She observed that, “[a]lthough Mr. Lackey-Garcia reported paranoid and possibly delusional ideas, he did not maintain any systematic, fixed beliefs.” She stated that, during their interview, Lackey-Garcia was initially “uninterruptable as he ranted” about what he perceived as a rigged judicial system, but his complaints “impressed as a dramatic and intentional attempt to present as psychiatrically disturbed.” As the interview progressed, his speech relaxed, and his thought process became “clear and linear.” On a test of legal knowledge, LackeyGarcia’s score raised concerns that he was making little effort to demonstrate his actual legal knowledge and may have been intentionally answering questions incorrectly. On another assessment, his score was “strongly suggestive of feigned symptoms.”

Dr. Hemenway Baker said Lackey-Garcia correctly identified the criminal charges and their meaning and maximum penalty; he also had a realistic appraisal of the strength of the evidence against him. When asked if he would be able to communicate with counsel, he said, “ ‘I guess I could.’ ” In his “uncooperative moments,” Lackey-Garcia expressed anger with his previous and current attorneys and about delays in receiving discovery. Dr. Hemenway Baker concluded that “[h]is behavior in [the] interview demonstrated that he does have the capacity to calmly discuss his case and to take in and consider an alternate viewpoint, although he may at times choose not to.”

In November 2021, the trial court granted Lackey-Garcia’s motion to represent himself. In doing so, the court found that he “does understand the nature and objects of

the proceedings clearly.” Thereafter, Lackey-Garcia filed various motions, primarily regarding discovery issues.

At a trial readiness conference in February 2022, the trial court questioned Lackey-Garcia’s competence to represent himself at trial and appointed another psychologist, Dr. Janice Nakagawa, to evaluate him. Dr. Nakagawa tried to meet with Lackey-Garcia on five occasions, but he consistently refused.

Lackey-Garcia also refused to appear for a hearing in June 2022, where it was reported that he had recently had an “outburst” with his investigator, causing deputies to respond. The trial court issued an extraction order to secure Lackey-Garcia’s presence. After discussing various discovery-related issues with him, the court decided it was necessary to revoke Lackey-Garcia’s self-represented status. The court explained that, based on Dr. Hemenway Baker’s report, there were “clearly some significant mental health issues” present and that Lackey-Garcia’s “comments today play into that, talking about conspiracies, people altering reports.” The court stated that it would be a “total travesty of justice” for Lackey-Garcia to represent himself at trial.

In December 2022, Lackey-Garcia became “[b]elligerent” during a hearing in which he accused court staff of “malicious[ly]” deleting portions of a motion he had filed. He was excused from the courtroom, and the hearing continued in his absence.

Defense counsel lodged a “challenge” under section 1368, citing Lackey-Garcia’s “inability to work with counsel,” and the trial court, based on its observations at the hearing, agreed that a doctor should be appointed to assess Lackey-Garcia’s competence. Defense counsel requested the appointment of a psychiatrist qualified to diagnose individuals like Lackey-Garcia, who, in counsel’s words, could appear competent and “say the right words, but in fact not fall within the purview of being able to assist in a defense.” The court suspended the criminal proceedings and appointed a psychiatrist, explaining that it was “obvious that the same type of delusions [the court had] witnessed for the past year [we]re still present with Mr. Lackey-Garcia.”

Lackey-Garcia refused to meet with the psychiatrist, and at a February 2023 hearing, the trial court reappointed one of the original psychologists, Dr. Nakagawa, to assess his competence. In urging a reappointment for the purpose of an actual evaluation, rather than just a review of mental health records, defense counsel reiterated that he had “no doubt” that Lackey-Garcia knew what was going on and how the court process worked. But according to counsel, “the issue” was that Lackey-Garcia “doesn’t comprehend the defense and how to assist in his defense.”

In May 2023, Dr. Nakagawa returned a report declining to opine on LackeyGarcia’s competency because he was still refusing to be interviewed. The trial court requested that she make a further attempt and then provide an opinion based on past records. Lackey-Garcia continued to refuse to meet with her.

In August 2023, Dr. Nakagawa submitted a report providing what she described as a “compromised” opinion regarding Lackey-Garcia’s competence, given her inability to interview him. She based her report on existing records and input from defense counsel on Lackey-Garcia’s behavior. Defense counsel told her that the investigator had reported concerns with Lackey-Garcia’s mental health, calling him “ ‘very volatile’ ”; that Lackey-Garcia had repeatedly admitted the crimes; and that he exhibited “possible delusional thinking” in his insistence that he had killed a third person (a fifth victim) who had never been found and that defense counsel was providing ineffective representation by not having found that supposed victim.

Dr. Nakagawa opined that, despite “a paucity of current mental health documents,” there were data supporting that Lackey-Garcia was suffering from “Serious Mental Illness (SMI).” In her opinion, the available data further supported that LackeyGarcia’s “refusal to cooperate stems not from simple recalcitrance or obstreperousness, but is rather due to mental health issues that negatively impact his ability to cooperate, with underlying paranoia as a possible symptom.” Dr. Nakagawa found it of “critical note” that the present doubt concerning Lackey-Garcia’s competency was “raised not by

the defense attorney, but by the judge.” Based on the available information, she concluded, “it appears Mr. Lackey-Garcia evidences a compromised ability to understand criminal proceedings, as they pertain to him, and he is unable to assist counsel in a rational manner.” Dr. Nakagawa thus found him incompetent.

With a different judge presiding, the trial court held a competency hearing in October 2023. Three witnesses testified for the defense, beginning with Dr. Nakagawa, who testified consistently with her recent report. Dr. Nakagawa stated that she was confident in her opinion that Lackey-Garcia was incompetent but acknowledged that it was “compromised” by the lack of a direct interview with him. She said that in reaching her opinion she paid particular attention to the fact, as relayed by defense counsel, that a judge had personally declared a doubt as to Lackey-Garcia’s competence—something she described as “extremely rare.”

Lackey-Garcia’s mother testified that her son’s mental health had recently worsened, stating that he “thinks people are following him,” “gets paranoid,” and “[v]erbally gets upset with the littl[est] things.” She also testified that her jailhouse conversations with him were rarely calm unless they were discussing her granddaughter.

A sheriff’s deputy who had been present for some of Lackey-Garcia’s previous court appearances described his behavior as “explosive” and “argumentative” toward his attorney; the deputy said that there seemed to be an “issue of conflict” every time Lackey-Garcia came to court. She also testified that Lackey-Garcia appeared “very intelligent” and meticulous and sounded “like he knows what he’s talking about” in his arguments. When asked whether he appeared able to work with his attorney, the deputy answered that it appeared “he refuses to work with his attorney, which means it’s a choice.”

After defense counsel rested, Lackey-Garcia asked: “Am I going to get a chance to testify? This is my trial, right?” His counsel responded, “No,” and the trial court thanked counsel. Lackey-Garcia then said: “I should have a right to testify in my own

defense. This is my trial.” Defense counsel maintained that, in the competency proceeding, “the decision whether or not Mr. Lackey-Garcia testifies rests solely with counsel” and that he did not intend to call Lackey-Garcia as a witness. The court noted counsel’s position and admonished Lackey-Garcia not to interrupt.

The People then called their sole witness, Dr. Hemenway Baker, who testified about her February 2021 evaluation in which she found Lackey-Garcia competent to stand trial. Dr. Hemenway Baker acknowledged that other practitioners had previously diagnosed Lackey-Garcia with mental health issues but stated that, during her interview, she did not see symptoms on which she would base such a diagnosis. She also testified that she “absolutely would not” express an opinion on Lackey-Garcia’s present competency, given the significant passage of time since she evaluated him.

The People also played audio recordings of two jail visits between Lackey-Garcia and his mother the week before the competency hearing. During the first visit, LackeyGarcia told his mother about his plans for the upcoming hearing, including “trying to get my attorney fired and … held in contempt … and get my pro per status back.” He explained to her the importance of lodging objections “for appeal purposes,” because “if you don’t object or you don’t invoke the law or you don’t write a writ of mandate[, t]hey say you waived your rights.” He also discussed his expectation that he would be found “competent to stand trial” and his belief that he could not be sent to an “insane asylum” “because they don’t have a psychologist or psychiatrist … report.” During the 45-minute conversation mostly discussing personal matters, Lackey-Garcia spoke calmly and coherently; he raised his voice for a little over one minute in unexplained frustration with his mother’s continued mentioning of certain numbers. The second visit, which lasted about six minutes, largely consisted of Lackey-Garcia and his mother both yelling and arguing about his approach to the competency proceedings.

At the People’s request, the trial court took judicial notice of two motions LackeyGarcia had filed in February 2022 when he was representing himself: a motion to

dismiss based on alleged Brady violations and a motion to continue due to discovery delays. Both motions were handwritten and supported by a notice of motion, declaration, and points and authorities with full case citations.

After a brief recess, the trial court ruled that Lackey-Garcia was competent to stand trial. The court found that he likely had “a bipolar disorder” but found him capable of understanding the nature of the proceedings and able to rationally assist defense counsel. The court found that the contents of his self-filed motions showed that LackeyGarcia understood the relevant substantive and procedural issues in his case and that his recorded conversations with his mother contradicted the assertion that he could not have calm conversations. From his tone of voice and manner of deliberating with his mother about whether he should prefer to be deemed incompetent or go to trial, the court found Lackey-Garcia to be “particularly sophisticated” and “able to understand, able to strategize, and able to execute on that strategy.” The court stated: “I believe the issue is whether or not he has the capacity to cooperate, but not whether or not he’s willing to cooperate in fact.” Based on its finding that Lackey-Garcia was competent, the court reinstated criminal proceedings.

At a hearing shortly thereafter, the trial court granted Lackey-Garcia’s request to resume representing himself.

Lackey-Garcia contends that his federal and state constitutional rights were violated when the trial court permitted his counsel to overrule his request to testify at the competency hearing.

“ ‘[I]n both civil and criminal matters, a party’s attorney has general authority to control the procedural aspects of the litigation and, indeed, to bind the client in these matters.’ ” (People v. Masterson (1994) 8 Cal.4th 965, 969 (Masterson).) “The attorney may not, however, bind the party as to certain fundamental matters.” (Ibid.) In a criminal case, a defendant “has a right to testify over the objection of his or her counsel.”

(People v. Allen (2008) 44 Cal.4th 843, 860 (Allen).) But “what applies to a criminal case does not necessarily apply to a competency proceeding.” (Masterson, at p. 969.) That is because a “competency proceeding, although certainly related to the underlying criminal case, is not itself a criminal action.” (Ibid.) “ ‘[R]ather, it is a special proceeding.’ ” (Ibid.) Unlike a criminal trial, the purpose of which is to adjudicate a defendant’s guilt, the “sole purpose of a competency proceeding is to determine the defendant’s present mental competence, i.e., whether the defendant is able to understand the nature of the criminal proceedings and to assist counsel in a rational manner.” (Id. at p. 971; see also People v. Lightsey (2012) 54 Cal.4th 668, 698.) In view of this limited and particular scope, “the defendant necessarily plays a lesser personal role in the proceeding than in a trial of guilt.” (Masterson, at p. 971; see also Medina v. California (1992) 505 U.S. 437, 452 [discussing California’s competency scheme and explaining that, after a doubt is declared, “the defendant may be prevented from making decisions that are normally left to the discretion of a competent defendant”].)

Consistent with this principle, our state high court has repeatedly upheld limitations on defendants’ decision-making authority in competency proceedings. For example, a defendant is not entitled to make the “fundamental decision” whether a competency proceeding should be held. (Masterson, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 971 [noting contradiction in arguing that “ ‘a defendant may be incompetent, and yet knowingly or intelligently “waive” his [or her] right to have the court determine his [or her] capacity to stand trial’ ”].) At such a hearing, moreover, the defendant’s attorney retains the authority to make decisions concerning numerous aspects of the proceedings. For example, in People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, the state Supreme Court determined that a defendant’s attorney could validly waive the trial authorized by section 1369 and submit the competency determination on the expert reports. (Id. at pp. 904-905.) The court explained that nothing in its precedents “preclude[d] a defense attorney from waiving a jury, forgoing the right to present live witnesses, and submitting the

competency determination on the psychiatric reports filed with the court.” (Id. at p. 904; see also People v. McPeters (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1148, 1169 [similar]; Bertsch, supra, 19 Cal.5th at pp. 229-230; cf. People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 804-805 [when doubt about defendant’s competence is declared, “defendant is not deprived of effective assistance if defense counsel overrides defendant’s desire to present only evidence and argument of competence”].)

In People v. Samuel (1981) 29 Cal.3d 489, the California Supreme Court indicated in dicta (id. at p. 494) that an attorney could waive a defendant’s privilege against selfincrimination, explaining that while the privilege is under the defendant’s personal control in certain circumstances, it is not in the context of a competency proceeding (id. at pp. 495-496). The court saw as “obvious” that “if counsel represents a defendant as to whose competence the judge has declared a doubt sufficient to require a section 1368 hearing, [counsel] should not be compelled to entrust key decisions about fundamental matters” to his or her client. (Id. at p. 495; see also Masterson, supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 971-972, 974 [discussing Samuel]; cf. People v. Lightsey, supra, 54 Cal.4th at pp. 694-699 [no federal constitutional barrier to state requiring defendant to be represented by counsel at competency hearing notwithstanding defendant’s desire for self-representation].)

And in Masterson, the California Supreme Court held that “counsel has authority to waive entirely a jury trial [regarding competency] over [a] defendant’s objection,” and that “includes within it lesser authority” to agree to a jury of only 11 people. (Masterson, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 967; see id. at pp. 969, 974.) The court reasoned that, in a trial of guilt, a defendant’s express objection to an 11-member jury could very well override counsel’s contrary view. (Id. at p. 972.) But it did not in the context of a competency proceeding. (Id. at pp. 972-973.) “The same considerations” that led the court “to conclude that counsel need not entrust key decisions to the client also compel the conclusion that the client may not veto those same decisions. Whether or not the client

objects, counsel must be allowed to do what counsel believes is best in determining the client’s competence.” (Ibid.; see also People v. Lightsey, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 697 [“ ‘[w]hen the evidence indicates that the defendant may be insane it should be assumed that he [or she] is unable to act in his [or her] own best interests’ ”].)

Applying Masterson, the Court of Appeal for the Fourth District, Division Two held in People v. Bell (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1071 (Bell) that these principles of attorney control extend to giving counsel authority to override a defendant’s desire to testify at a competency hearing. (Id. at pp. 1074-1075, 1086.) In that case, the trial court permitted the defendant to testify at a competency hearing, over his counsel’s objection, and the jury found the defendant competent to stand trial. (Id. at p. 1075.) On appeal following his conviction, the defendant argued that the trial court had erred in allowing him to testify. (Id. at p. 1074.) The court of appeal agreed, reasoning that a defendant “has a due process right not to be tried while he [or she] is incompetent,” and as in Masterson, “counsel is in the best position to determine” whether a defendant whose competence has been called into question “should testify in order to protect this right.” (Id. at p. 1085.)

Although Bell involved a different factual scenario—unlike here, defendant Bell was permitted to testify over the objection of his lawyer—we find its analysis applicable to the question before us. As explained above, our state high court has consistently distinguished competency proceedings from criminal trials, emphasizing that, when a doubt about a defendant’s competence has been declared, as here, it is unclear whether a defendant is able to make knowing and voluntary decisions to protect his or her rights. Given that circumstance, the court has permitted counsel to make decisions essential to the conduct of the proceedings—including whether to even have an adversarial hearing or to put on any oral testimony at all. Lackey-Garcia provides no persuasive reason why counsel with authority to waive altogether an adversarial hearing may not also make the determination whether a defendant, whose competency is in doubt, will testify. We thus

agree with Bell that counsel retains the authority to override a defendant’s expressed desire to testify at a competency proceeding.

Lackey-Garcia urges us not to follow Bell but to instead adopt the view of the concurring and dissenting opinion in that case, which would have held that a defendant has a state and federal due process right to testify over the objection of counsel. (Bell, supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at p. 1087 (conc. & dis. opn. of King, J.).) That opinion relied principally on our state high court’s decision in Allen, supra, 44 Cal.4th 843, which considered whether defendants facing the prospect of civil commitment under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600 et seq.) have a due process right, under both the federal and state constitutions, to testify at their commitment proceedings over counsel’s objection. (Bell, at pp. 1087, 1089-1092 (conc. & dis. opn. of King, J.).) In Allen, the court applied the multi-part balancing test developed to evaluate constitutional due process claims, as set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge (1976) 424 U.S. 319 and related decisions interpreting the state constitution. (Allen, at pp. 862-868 & 863, fn. 14; see Medina v. California, supra, 505 U.S. at pp. 442-443 [describing Mathews test].) Under that framework, the Allen court concluded that prospective committees possessed a due process right to decide whether to testify. (Allen, at pp. 869-870.) The concurring and dissenting opinion in Bell likewise applied the multi-part test in Mathews, reasoning that defendants in competency proceedings have significant liberty interests at stake, including the possibility of involuntary commitment, stigmatization associated with confinement in a state hospital, and the administration of unwanted psychotropic medication; that allowing a defendant to testify mitigates risks of erroneous outcomes; and that both the state’s interests and the defendant’s dignitary interests are furthered by allowing the defendant to decide whether to testify. (Bell, at pp. 1090-1093 (conc. & dis. opn. of King, J.).) Balancing these considerations, the concurring and dissenting opinion concluded that defendants have a due process right to

make the decision whether they will take the stand on their own behalf. (Ibid. (conc. & dis. opn. of King, J.).)

We appreciate these concerns about a defendant’s liberty and dignitary interests, but we are ultimately unpersuaded by the Bell concurring and dissenting opinion’s analysis. As an initial matter, with respect to Lackey-Garcia’s claim under the federal constitution, we note that the U.S. Supreme Court has expressly rejected reliance on the Mathews v. Eldridge framework when considering a federal due process challenge to procedures in state competency proceedings. (Medina v. California, supra, 505 U.S. at pp. 442-443; see also People v. Ary (2011) 51 Cal.4th 510, 520-521 [applying Medina to claim that allocating burden of proof to defendant in retrospective competency hearing violated federal due process clause].) Moreover, even though a defendant deemed to be incompetent for trial faces the possibility of an involuntary commitment, much like a person committed as a sexually violent predator (see former § 1370, subd. (a)(1)(B)(i); § 1370, subd. (a)(1)(C); Allen, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 858), there remain important differences between the two types of proceedings. (Bell, supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1084-1085; cf. Cooper v. Oklahoma (1996) 517 U.S. 348, 368 [rejecting analogy between civil commitment and competency proceedings because, inter alia, they “address entirely different substantive issues”].) Importantly, in the context of a competency proceeding, a doubt has been declared about the defendant’s ability to make decisions concerning the protection of his or her rights and the conduct of trial. In that setting, our Supreme Court has made clear that greater decision-making authority resides with the defendant’s attorney, as we have explained above. (See People v. Blackburn (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1113, 1121 [“[c]rucial to … reasoning” in Masterson was fact that competency hearing occurs only after a prima facie showing of incompetence is made, and in that context, “it is sensible that counsel’s decisions may trump the defendant’s”]; Moore v. Superior Court (2010) 50 Cal.4th 802, 807 [noting “no competence issue was raised” in regard to defendant in Allen].) It is also significant that a defendant in a

competency proceeding has an important interest not only in avoiding involuntary commitment but also in not being tried while incompetent. (People v. Stanley, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 806 [terming “false” the belief that defendant has only one interest in a competency proceeding and noting defendant’s interest both in not being tried while incompetent and “equally important interest in not being sent to a mental institution with his criminal case unresolved, if he is competent”].) This countervailing due process concern also distinguishes the present circumstance from Allen and persuades us that the Bell majority correctly held that defendants in competency proceedings lack a right to testify in the face of an objection by counsel.

Our state Supreme Court’s decision in Guardianship of Waite (1939) 14 Cal.2d 727, on which Lackey-Garcia also relies, does not lead us to a different result. In that case, the court deemed it prejudicial error for the trial court to have refused to allow a prospective conservatee in a guardianship proceeding to testify, explaining that “[i]t is difficult to conceive of a situation in which a party has a greater right to, or need for, his [or her] own testimony than in the type of proceeding considered [t]here.” (Id. at p. 730.) That case did not involve a competency proceeding, where the limited question to be addressed is whether a defendant is able to proceed to trial; rather, the proceeding in Waite addressed the ultimate question at issue of whether the subject’s “right to control her own person and affairs” could be removed. (Ibid.) Further, in Waite, counsel for the prospective conservatee affirmatively requested that she be allowed to testify, and “the only reason assigned by the court for refusing to permit her” to do so “was that it did not want to hear any evidence except medical testimony.” (Id. at p. 729.) Given the very different circumstances in Waite, we conclude that the state high court’s precedents on competency proceedings are more on point.

We are also unpersuaded by Lackey-Garcia’s reliance on United States v. Gillenwater (9th Cir. 2013) 717 F.3d 1070. In that case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a defendant has a right to testify in a competency

proceeding that only the defendant can personally waive. (Id. at pp. 1077-1081.) The court’s reasoning rested substantially on a defendant’s right to testify at a criminal trial. (Id. at pp. 1077-1081 & fn. 6; see also id. at p. 1077, fn. 5 [although competency proceedings may have “the veneer of being protective in nature, they are nonetheless a step along the path to a criminal trial”].) As we have explained, however, our state Supreme Court has consistently drawn a distinction between criminal trials and competency proceedings, and it has determined that the respective allocations of decision-making authority in the two proceedings are different. (See People v. Blackburn, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1127 [“defendants whose competence has been called into doubt necessarily exercise a lesser degree of control over proceedings than defendants whose competence has not been called into doubt”].)

Finally, Lackey-Garcia’s citation to People v. Harris (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 984 does not assist his arguments. In Harris, the First District Court of Appeal addressed, among other things, a claim that defendants have a due process right to be present at their competency hearings. (Id. at p. 993.) The court held that, even assuming such a right existed, the defendant there had not demonstrated prejudice from his absence. (Ibid.) The court then observed that it seemed the defendant’s real complaint was that his attorney had proceeded to prove his incompetence without giving him the opportunity to testify in support of his competence. (Ibid.) It stated: “We would agree with appellant that, at a minimum, when defense counsel seeks to prove defendant’s incompetence over his or her objection, and the defendant expresses the desire to testify that he or she is competent, counsel should permit defendant to so testify, unless the court separately determines that the defendant is incompetent to do so.” (Id. at pp. 993-994.) This statement was dictum, because the defendant in Harris never asserted a desire or intent to testify at his competency hearing. (Id. at p. 994, fn. 4.)

For all these reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not err in allowing counsel to decide whether Lackey-Garcia would testify at the competency proceeding.

We also conclude that substantial evidence supports the trial court’s determination that Lackey-Garcia was competent to stand trial.

As explained above, a defendant is incompetent for trial if “as a result of a mental health disorder or developmental disability, the defendant is unable to understand the nature of the criminal proceedings or to assist counsel in the conduct of a defense in a rational manner.” (§ 1367, subd. (a); People v. Sattiewhite, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 464.) “When the defendant puts his or her competence to stand trial in issue, the defendant bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she lacks competence.” (People v. Mendoza (2016) 62 Cal.4th 856, 871 (Mendoza), citing former § 1369, subd. (f).) We review a trial court’s competency determination for substantial evidence. (Mendoza, at p. 871.)

Lackey-Garcia challenges only the sufficiency of the evidence regarding the second prong of the competency standard: that he was able to rationally assist counsel in presenting a defense. He principally contends that the trial court lacked a reasonable basis for rejecting Dr. Nakagawa’s opinion that he was incompetent at the time of the competency hearing.

We are not persuaded. While it is true that Dr. Nakagawa was the only expert to opine on Lackey-Garcia’s competency at the time of the hearing, the trial court was not required to accept her conclusion. Courts “have long recognized the propriety of rejecting even unanimous expert opinion” of incompetency. (In re R.V. (2015) 61 Cal.4th 181, 215-216.) And here, there were ample reasons for the trial court to deem Lackey-Garcia competent to stand trial notwithstanding Dr. Nakagawa’s opinion to the contrary.

To begin with, Dr. Nakagawa herself acknowledged that her opinion was “compromised” by the fact she was unable to interview Lackey-Garcia. It is well established that “[t]he value of an expert’s opinion depends upon the quality of the

material on which the opinion is based and the reasoning used to arrive at the conclusion.” (People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 31-32.) For instance, our state Supreme Court upheld a verdict of competence, notwithstanding two expert opinions to the contrary, where those opinions were “tenuous” and were based, respectively, on a 15-minute interview of the defendant and no interview. (Id. at pp. 29-32.) Here, too, a fact finder could reasonably give less weight to Dr. Nakagawa’s opinion based on her inability to interview Lackey-Garcia.

While Dr. Nakagawa testified that she was nonetheless “confident” that LackeyGarcia was not competent to proceed to trial, she did not elaborate on the basis for such confidence either in her testimony or in her report. The report briefly summarized what she described as a “paucity” of mental health records, which noted signs of paranoia, hallucinations, and depression and which recited previous diagnoses of schizoaffective disorder, bipolar disorder, and antisocial personality disorder. But the report contained no analysis of how these symptoms or diagnoses “negatively impact[ed] [LackeyGarcia’s] ability to cooperate,” as she ultimately concluded. Dr. Nakagawa herself acknowledged on cross-examination that the inability to interview a defendant makes it difficult to evaluate his or her understanding of the court process. And as further brought out on cross-examination, Dr. Nakagawa was initially so disinclined to render an opinion without being able to interview Lackey-Garcia that she informed the trial court that she could not offer an opinion on his competency.

The other cited basis for Dr. Nakagawa’s eventual incompetency opinion was her understanding that a judge, rather than defense counsel, had been the one to raise a doubt about Lackey-Garcia’s competence to stand trial. The record, however, does not support this understanding. A judge did raise the question of whether Lackey-Garcia was competent to continue representing himself—and initially appointed Dr. Nakagawa to evaluate him for that purpose. But in doing so, the judge noted, “The issue isn’t your general competency. The issue is your competence to represent yourself in a serious jury

trial.” Nearly one year later, after reappointing counsel for Lackey-Garcia, the same judge agreed with defense counsel that an expert needed to be appointed to assess Lackey-Garcia’s competence to stand trial, but that was in response to defense counsel raising a section 1368 challenge. In any event, we do not see why the identity of the person raising a doubt would necessarily bear on an expert’s evaluation, as that evaluation would seem to depend on facts concerning the defendant’s behavior and history and the expert’s specialized training.

Further reason to discount Dr. Nakagawa’s opinion lies in the fact that the only psychologist to actually interview Lackey-Garcia, Dr. Hemenway Baker, concluded that Lackey-Garcia was competent to stand trial, albeit two years earlier. Our high court has said that, while a significant lapse of time “does diminish the probative value of the expert’s opinion and testimony to some extent,” a reasonable fact finder can still “draw inferences concerning [the] defendant’s competency at the time of the competency trial” from that opinion and from the defendant’s statements to the expert. (Mendoza, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 880, italics omitted.) That is to say, “evidence that predates [the] hearing may legitimately provide substantial evidence on the competency issue before the fact finder[].” (Id. at p. 881.) Even without Dr. Hemenway Baker being able to opine on Lackey-Garcia’s present mental competence, the trial court could reasonably consider her prior evaluation—complete with a personal interview and the administration of psychological assessments—in weighing the strength of Dr. Nakagawa’s opinion.

We also disagree with Lackey-Garcia’s assertion that Dr. Nakagawa’s opinion was “the only probative evidence” of his present mental state offered at the competency hearing. To the contrary, the recordings of Lackey-Garcia’s jailhouse conversations with his mother supported the conclusion that he “retained the ability, when he wished, to engage in rational discussions regarding daily life and various personal matters” and regarding the crimes and his defense strategies. (Mendoza, supra, 62 Cal.4th at pp. 881-882.) This evidence—which Lackey-Garcia’s appellate briefs do not mention—also

tended to support Dr. Hemenway Baker’s view that his reluctance to calmly discuss his case and consider an alternate viewpoint “were matters of choice, not an incapacity caused by mental illness.” (Id. at p. 882; see People v. Parker (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1, 29 [“An uncooperative defendant is not tantamount to an incompetent one”].)

Lackey-Garcia also emphasizes trial counsel’s statements that his client was not capable of assisting in his defense and the prior judge’s concerns about Lackey-Garcia’s ability to continue to represent himself. While “defense counsel will often have the bestinformed view of the defendant’s ability to participate in his defense” (Medina v. California, supra, 505 U.S. at p. 450), Lackey-Garcia directs us to no factual descriptions of his conduct offered by his counsel—only general ascriptions of an inability to assist in the defense, which the trial court was free to weigh alongside the other evidence. Moreover, the prior judge’s comments that it would be a “total travesty” for LackeyGarcia to represent himself at trial were, as discussed above, not expressions of doubt about Lackey-Garcia’s competence to stand trial. And while Lackey-Garcia notes that the trial judge who made the competency determination had not presided over prior proceedings in the case, that is not a basis to question the court’s ruling. “Competency proceedings commonly are assigned for hearing to a judge different from the one who initiated them by declaring a doubt [citation],” and trial judges are fully equipped “to preside over such hearings whether or not they have some prior personal experience of a defendant’s in-court behavior.” (People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 133-134.)

Based on the record before us, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the trial court’s determination that Lackey-Garcia was competent to stand trial. (Mendoza, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 871.)

II.

Next, we turn to Lackey-Garcia’s challenge to the jury instruction on unreasonable self-defense.

At trial, the court instructed the jury on self-defense, including on imperfect selfdefense, with respect to both the murder and attempted murder charges.

At the People’s request, and over Lackey-Garcia’s objection, the trial court added the following pinpoint instruction: “Purely delusional acts are excluded from the scope of unreasonable self-defense. Unreasonable self-defense, as a form of mistake of fact, has no application when the defendant’s actions are entirely delusional.”

Lackey-Garcia contends that it was prejudicial error for the trial court to give this pinpoint instruction because, he maintains, there was no substantial evidence that his belief in the need to use deadly force was entirely based on a psychotic delusion.

“Murder is defined as ‘the unlawful killing of a human being … with malice aforethought,’ [citation] while manslaughter is defined as ‘the unlawful killing of a human being without malice’ [citation].” (People v. Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237, 252.) A “ ‘finding of malice may be precluded, and the offense limited to manslaughter, even when an unlawful homicide was committed with intent to kill’ [citation] ‘ “ ‘ … when a person kills in “unreasonable self-defense”—the unreasonable but good faith belief in having to act in self-defense [citations].’ ” ’ ” (Ibid., italics omitted.) “[I]mperfect self-defense ‘obviates malice because that most culpable of mental states “cannot coexist” with an actual belief that the lethal act was necessary to avoid one’s own death or serious injury at the victim’s hand.’ ” (Ibid.) “A defendant charged with murder is entitled to an instruction on imperfect self-defense if there is substantial evidence to support the theory.” (Ibid.)

Likewise, “[a]n attempted killing based upon an unreasonable belief in the need for self-defense obviates malice, which requires an actual belief that the lethal act was necessary to avoid death or serious bodily injury. [Citation.] Thus, an attempted killing committed because of an unreasonable belief in the need for self-defense is attempted voluntary manslaughter, not attempted murder.” (People v. Ibarra (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1070, 1081.)

In People v. Elmore (2014) 59 Cal.4th 121, 130, our state Supreme Court considered “whether the doctrine of unreasonable self-defense is available when belief in the need to defend oneself is entirely delusional.” The court held it was not, explaining that unreasonable self-defense is “a form of mistake of fact” and “has no application when the defendant’s actions are entirely delusional.” (Id. at pp. 136-137, approving analysis in People v. Mejia-Lenares (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1437.) It reasoned that a “defendant who makes a factual mistake misperceives the objective circumstances. A delusional defendant holds a belief that is divorced from the circumstances. The line between mere misperception and delusion is drawn at the absence of an objective correlate.” (Elmore, at p. 137.) This rule “does not prevent the defense from presenting evidence of mental disease, defect, or disorder to support a claim of unreasonable selfdefense based on a mistake of fact. A defendant who misjudges the external circumstances may show that mental disturbance contributed to the mistaken perception of a threat, without presenting the jury with the same question it would confront at a sanity trial.” (Id. at p. 146.) That is to say, “defendants who mistakenly believed that actual circumstances required their defensive act may argue they are guilty only of voluntary manslaughter, even if their reaction was distorted by mental illness. But defendants who contend they killed in self-defense because of a purely delusional perception of threat must make that claim at a sanity trial.” (Ibid.)

Recently, in People v. Chang (2026) 119 Cal.App.5th 532, 537, the Fifth District Court of Appeal concluded that “[t]he objective correlate” referenced in Elmore “must at least conceivably relate to a reasonable need for self-defense.” In Chang, the defendant “suffered from delusions that he was being pursued by CIA agents who intended to harm or kill him.” (Ibid.; see id. at p. 540.) When law enforcement officers attempted to pull him over during a chase, he immediately began firing at them. (Id. at pp. 537-538.) On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred by refusing to give an imperfect self-defense instruction based on his claim that he “honestly, if unreasonably, believed he

needed to use force to protect himself from the police, because they were affiliated with the CIA and were seeking to kill him.” (Id. at pp. 542-543.) Specifically, the defendant argued that “merely the pursuit by and presence of” the officers who pulled him over qualified as a sufficient objective correlate to require giving the instruction, noting that the officers “ ‘were real’ ” and “ ‘were really pursuing’ ” him. (Id. at p. 546.) The appellate court rejected this argument because, prior to his firing on the officers, “there simply was no objective correlate to suggest [the] defendant’s life was being threatened by the police.” (Ibid.) The court observed that, “[i]n virtually any case, there will be something objective that exists in the world with which a defendant is interacting.” (Ibid.) For instance, in Elmore, “there actually was a woman sitting at the bus stop, and she actually stood up, raised her hands, and attempted to walk away.” (Ibid.) But “[i]t is not sufficient to point merely to any objects or actions that exist in the real world. The objective correlate—whether an object or an action or some combination thereof—must directly correlate to a threat in such a way that it could plausibly translate into the need for self-defense, even if, in that particular case, a jury might judge that self-defense was not reasonably necessary.” (Id. at p. 547.) The court concluded that the officers “had not acted in any way to suggest to an objective observer that they might harm [the] defendant before he began shooting at them,” and the defendant had not identified any “fact that would objectively correlate to a plausible need for self-defense.” (Id. at pp. 547-548.) Because the defendant’s belief in the need for self-defense “was solely a delusion within [his] mind based on his subjective belief that the officers were CIA agents who wanted to kill him,” no imperfect self-defense instruction was warranted. (Id. at p. 548.)

This case does not involve the failure to instruct the jury on imperfect self-defense but rather the trial court’s decision to add a pinpoint instruction consistent with the rule in Elmore. “Pinpoint instructions relate particular facts to a legal issue or pinpoint the crux of a defendant’s case.” (People v. Zemek (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 313, 346.) “They are required to be given upon request when there is evidence supportive of the theory … .”

(People v. Gutierrez (2009) 45 Cal.4th 789, 824; see Zemek, at p. 346 [“ ‘Parties are entitled to legally correct and factually warranted pinpoint instructions, should they request such additional instruction’ ”].) “A party is entitled to a requested instruction if it is supported by substantial evidence. [Citation.] Evidence is ‘[s]ubstantial’ for this purpose if it is ‘sufficient to “deserve consideration by the jury,” that is, evidence that a reasonable jury could find persuasive.’ [Citation.] At the same time, instructions not supported by substantial evidence should not be given. [Citation.] ‘It is error to give an instruction which, while correctly stating a principle of law, has no application to the facts of the case. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Ross (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1049-1050.) Claims of instructional error are reviewed de novo. (Zemek, at p. 346.)

Here, we conclude there was sufficient evidence that Lackey-Garcia’s belief in the need for self-defense was founded solely on delusion. As explained above, there was significant evidence that Lackey-Garcia’s attacks were based on his belief that people at the Center were in a conspiracy with law enforcement and, for that reason, he needed to kill them to protect himself. For example, Lackey-Garcia testified about his belief that Stanwick was an agent of law enforcement and that her silence when interacting with him amounted to a threat or warning that caused him to stab her to death. Lackey-Garcia felt that Stanwick had “attacked [him] mentally” and was “threatening [his] life” based on “law enforcement’s … recommendations.” Likewise, he was persuaded that McIntyre approached him as part of a set up. And when he was arrested, he told law enforcement that he acted to defend himself “ ‘[b]ecause you guys came after me. You set me up. They were cops. They were law enforcement.’ ” This and other evidence adduced at trial provided an adequate basis for a reasonable jury to find that Lackey-Garcia’s actions lacked any objective correlate. (See People v. Chang, supra, 119 Cal.App.5th at p. 537 [“Defendant’s belief that all peace officers were working on behalf of the CIA to kill him is clearly a delusion, not just a mistake of fact”].) Accordingly, the evidence in the record was sufficient to put the question to the jury whether Lackey-Garcia’s belief in the

need for self-defense was based purely on delusion. And because the trial court did not err in giving the pinpoint instruction, we need not address Lackey-Garcia’s argument that the instructional error, considered in combination with the prosecutor’s closing arguments, was prejudicial.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

/s/

FEINBERG, J.

We concur:

/s/

ROBIE, Acting P. J.

/s/

WISEMAN, J. *

* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

People v. Lackey-Garcia

Authorities cited

Opinion · public domain