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Frog Bridge Development Co., LLC v. Osborne
FROG BRIDGE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, LLC
v. JOSEPH OSBORNE ET AL.
(AC 48294)
Alvord, Moll and Clark, Js.*
Syllabus
The named defendant, O, appealed from the trial court’s judgment of possession for the plaintiff in this summary process action, which was based on O’s alleged refusal to accept the rent increase proposed by the plaintiff and his alleged nonpayment of rent. O raised various special defenses, including that he was protected under the statute (§ 47a-23c) that prohibits the eviction of certain tenants, including those with physical or mental disabilities, except for specified good cause, and that requires rent increases for such tenants to be “fair and equitable.” On appeal, O claimed, inter alia, that the trial court improperly found that the plaintiff’s proposed rent increase was fair and equitable. Held:
The trial court did not err, as a matter of law, in determining that the plaintiff’s proposed rent increase was “fair and equitable” under § 47a-23c (c) (1); although those terms were not defined in § 47a-23c, they were plain and unambiguous insofar as § 47a-23c (c) (1) expressly requires that the trial court base its determination of whether a rent increase is “fair and equitable” on certain statutory (§ 7-148c) criteria.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the plaintiff’s proposed rent increase was “fair and equitable” under § 47a-23c (c) (1), as the court’s factual findings with respect to the criteria enumerated in § 7-148c were not clearly erroneous; moreover, this court rejected O’s argument that certain of the trial court’s remarks at trial were based on the court’s own personal experiences and attitudes rather than the evidence presented.
The parties conceded, and this court agreed, that the trial court’s factual finding that the defendant had failed to pay rent for a certain month was clearly erroneous, and, accordingly, this court reversed in part the trial court’s judgment and directed that court to render judgment for O on the count of the complaint that alleged nonpayment of rent.
Argued June 3—officially released October 20, 2026
Procedural History
Summary process action, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of Windham, Housing Session at Putnam, where the complaint was withdrawn
in part; thereafter, the case was tried to the court,
*
The listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as of the date of oral argument.
Frog Bridge Development Co., LLC v. Osborne
Altermatt, J.; judgment for the plaintiff, from which the
named defendant appealed to this court; subsequently,
the court, Altermatt, J., issued an articulation of its
decision. Reversed in part; judgment directed.
Sean Patrick Eaton-Robb, with whom were Jane Kelleher and, on the brief, Madeleine Anderson and Denise
Chancey, for the appellant (named defendant).
Kenneth R. Slater, Jr., with whom was Thomas A.
Plotkin, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion
ALVORD, J. The defendant in this summary process
action, Joseph Osborne,1 appeals from the judgment
rendered, following a trial to the court, in favor of the
plaintiff, Frog Bridge Development Company, LLC. On
appeal, the defendant claims that the court erred (1) as a matter of law in concluding that the plaintiff’s proposed
rent increase was fair and equitable pursuant to General
Statutes § 47a-23c, (2) by making clearly erroneous factual findings, and (3) in rendering judgment on count
two of the plaintiff’s complaint.2 We agree with the
defendant’s third claim and, accordingly, reverse the
judgment in part.
The following facts, as found by the trial court or as
undisputed in the record, and procedural history are
relevant to our resolution of this appeal. The plaintiff
and the defendant entered into a written lease for the
use and occupancy of 560 Main Street, apartment 207,
in Willimantic (premises) with a term of July 1, 2020,
through June 30, 2021, at a monthly rent of $900. After
the initial lease term expired, the defendant continued
residing at the premises. On or about December 27, 2023,
the plaintiff notified the defendant of a proposed one
1
Although John Doe and Jane Doe, unidentified individuals who were alleged to occupy the premises with the defendant, were also named as defendants in this action, the plaintiff withdrew the action as to them in May 2024.
2
For clarity and ease of discussion, we have reordered the claims from how they are set forth in the defendant’s brief.
Frog Bridge Development Co., LLC v. Osborne
year lease renewal and that it was increasing the rent on
the premises from $900 per month to $1400 per month,
effective February 1, 2024. The notice provided that, if
the defendant did not either affirmatively renew the lease or vacate the premises, a new month-to-month tenancy
would automatically be created, with a monthly rent of
$1550.3 The defendant did not respond to the proposal,
nor did he pay the increased monthly rent. He continued
to occupy the premises.
On March 19, 2024, the plaintiff served the defendant
with a notice to quit possession of the premises, listing
therein as reasons the defendant’s nonpayment of rent
and his refusal to accept a rent increase. Although the
notice to quit instructed the defendant to vacate the
property by March 28, 2024, he remained in possession
of the premises. On April 11, 2024, the plaintiff filed
a two count complaint, alleging that it was entitled to
possession of the premises. In count one, the plaintiff
alleged that the defendant had refused to accept the rent
increase in that he failed or refused to execute the lease renewal but remained in possession of the premises. In
count two, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had
“failed to pay the rent due under the terms of the lease
renewal letter for March 1, 2024.”
In May 2024, the defendant filed an answer and special
defenses. Specifically, the defendant alleged, inter alia, payment and protection under § 47a-23c,4 in that he lived
in a building with five or more units and that he had a
3
The lease renewal notice provided that the renewal of the lease on a month-to-month basis would result in the imposition of an additional monthly fee of $150, for a total amount of $1550.
4
Section 47a-23c (a) sets forth to whom the section applies and includes any tenant who resides in a building consisting of five or more units and who has a physical or mental disability. Subsection (b) (1) of § 47a-23c provides in relevant part: “No landlord may bring an action of summary process or other action to dispossess a tenant described in subsection (a) of this section except for one or more of the following reasons: (A) Nonpayment of rent; [or] (B) refusal to agree to a fair and equitable rent increase, as defined in subsection (c) of this section . . . .” Subsection (c) (1) of § 47a-23c provides that “[t]he rent of a tenant protected
Frog Bridge Development Co., LLC v. Osborne
physical or mental disability. The plaintiff filed a reply in which it left the defendant to his proof.
The court, Altermatt, J., held trial over three dates
between September and November 2024, at which
the defendant represented himself. The plaintiff presented the testimony of its property manager, Barbara
Cuadrado, and offered several exhibits into evidence.
The defendant testified but did not offer any exhibits
into evidence.
On November 26, 2024, the court rendered judgment
of possession in favor of the plaintiff, concluding in its order that the plaintiff had sustained its burden of proof with respect to both counts of its complaint, namely,
the defendant’s refusal to accept a rent increase and his
nonpayment of rent. The court stated that it “did not find any of the defendant’s claims or defenses to be supported
by the evidence.” The court addressed the defendant’s
claim that he was entitled to protection under § 47a-23c
by this section may be increased only to the extent that such increase is fair and equitable, based on the criteria set forth in section 7-148c.”
General Statutes § 7-148c provides: “In determining whether a rental charge or a proposed increase in a rental charge is so excessive, with due regard to all the circumstances, as to be harsh and unconscionable, a fair rent commission shall consider such of the following circumstances as are applicable to the type of accommodation: (1) The rents charged for the same number of rooms in other housing accommodations in the same and in other areas of the municipality; (2) the sanitary conditions existing in the housing accommodations in question; (3) the number of bathtubs or showers, flush water closets, kitchen sinks and lavatory basins available to the occupants thereof; (4) services, furniture, furnishings and equipment supplied therein; (5) the size and number of bedrooms contained therein; (6) repairs necessary to make such accommodations reasonably livable for the occupants accommodated therein; (7) the amount of taxes and overhead expenses, including debt service, thereof; (8) whether the accommodations are in compliance with the ordinances of the municipality and the general statutes relating to health and safety; (9) the income of the petitioner and the availability of accommodations; (10) the availability of utilities; (11) damages done to the premises by the tenant, caused by other than ordinary wear and tear; (12) the amount and frequency of increases in rental charges; (13) whether, and the extent to which, the income from an increase in rental charges has been or will be reinvested in improvements to the accommodations.”
Frog Bridge Development Co., LLC v. Osborne
as follows: “Based on the disability claimed in his special defenses, the defendant was ordered on September 18,
2024, to provide the plaintiff’s counsel within thirty
days . . . ‘the supporting documentation required by . . . § 47a-23c (d), to support his claim that he has a physical or mental disability pursuant to . . . § 47a-23c (a) (1) (B).’ The defendant failed to comply with this order, although
he did submit a document that showed he was receiving
Social Security disability benefits. Although the court
cannot conclude, based on this showing, that the defendant has a mental or physical disability, the court nonetheless proceeded with the analysis as to whether there
was ‘good cause’ to evict the defendant even if he did have such a disability. The relevant portion of § 47a-23c (b) (1) precludes a landlord from bringing a summary process
action against a tenant in the protected class ‘except for the following reasons: (A) Nonpayment of rent; [and] (B)
refusal to agree to a fair and equitable rent increase, as defined in subsection (c) of this section . . . .’ ”
The court found that the defendant did not pay the rent
increase that became effective on February 1, 2024, and
that the proposed rent increase was “fair and equitable
based on the criteria as set forth in [General Statutes]
§ 7-148c.” The court concluded: “Based on the foregoing findings . . . the [defendant] is not entitled to added protection from eviction even if he does have a physical
or mental disability as addressed in . . . § 47a-23c (a) (1) [B].”5 This appeal followed.
The defendant then filed a motion requesting that the
trial court articulate the factual and legal basis for its determination that the rent increase was fair and equitable on the basis of the criteria set forth in § 7-148c. The defendant also requested that the court articulate the
month or months for which he did not pay rent due under
a lease agreement between the parties and whether he had
paid rent for the months of February and March 2024.
The court denied the motion for articulation. Thereafter,
the defendant filed a motion for review with this court,
5
The defendant filed a motion for reargument, which was denied.
Frog Bridge Development Co., LLC v. Osborne
which granted review and granted, in part, the relief
requested. This court ordered the trial court to articulate “the factual and legal basis for its determinations that
(1) the rent increase was fair and equitable pursuant to
the enumerated considerations in . . . § 7-148c; and (2)
there was a binding month-to-month lease agreement
between the parties for a specific amount of rent, from
February 1, 2024, until the date judgment was rendered,
November 26, 2024.”
On June 4, 2025, the trial court issued its articulation. With respect to the first issue, the court stated
that “many of the criteria identified in § 7-148c were not addressed by either party during the trial” but that “the
court did consider what evidence was introduced in reaching its ultimate decision that the proposed rent increase
was, in fact, fair and equitable.” As to the specific evidence presented, the court noted that the plaintiff had
elicited “testimony from the plaintiff’s building manager
that the defendant’s rent had not been increased between
20[20] and 2024, that there had been inflation and that
operating costs had increased, and that similar rents
were being paid by other tenants in both the defendant’s
building and in other similar buildings within the community.” The court noted that the defendant had testified
in response “as to his belief that the level of services and the overall upkeep of the apartment complex had deteriorated during his four years of tenancy. He also challenged the qualifications of the individuals hired by the plaintiff to perform electrical work and other services. Finally, he challenged whether the ‘comparables’ relied upon by the
plaintiff’s building manager were, in fact, sufficiently
similar to the building in which he resides.” The court
articulated that it had found, on the basis of the totality of the evidence, that “the plaintiff established by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the proposed rental
increase was fair and equitable and was not ‘so excessive, with due regard to all of the circumstances as to be harsh and unconscionable.’ ” The court further articulated that
“the defendant failed to sustain his burden of proof as
to any of his alleged special defenses, other than that
Frog Bridge Development Co., LLC v. Osborne
he has a physical disability that entitles him to added
protections in summary process actions.”6
As to the second issue, the court articulated that it
had found that “the parties had an ongoing series of onemonth leases for $900 per month between [February 1,
2024] . . . and the date on which judgment entered.” The
court reasoned that “[t]he defendant’s continued useand-occupancy of the subject premises after [the expiration of the written lease], combined with the plaintiff’s
acceptance of monthly payments during that period,
constituted a month-to-month tenancy” pursuant to
General Statutes §§ 47a-3b and 47a-3d.
The court further articulated that its judgment with
respect to count two of the complaint was “based on the
defendant’s failure to pay the $900 owed for use-andoccupancy for March of 2024” and not the failure to pay
the $1400 monthly rent proposed in the lease renewal
notice. The court also articulated that its finding that
the defendant had failed to make this payment was based
on the testimony of the plaintiff’s building manager to
6
Although the judgment of possession is not a model of clarity, we note that, in the absence of the articulation, it would appear that the court concluded that the defendant had failed to prove that he had a mental or physical disability, and that the court’s conclusion that the rent increase was fair and equitable was an alternative basis for its decision. In the articulation, however, the court stated that the defendant had failed to prove his special defenses “other than that he has a physical disability that entitles him to [statutory] protections in summary process actions.” Moreover, on appeal, the plaintiff has not disputed that the defendant was disabled within the meaning of § 47a-23c (a) (1) (B) and does not claim that the court improperly altered its decision by way of the articulation. See, e.g., Sabrina C. v. Fortin, 176 Conn. App. 730, 750, 170 A.3d 100 (2017) (“The purpose of an articulation is to dispel any . . . ambiguity by clarifying the factual and legal basis upon which the trial court rendered its decision, thereby sharpening the issues on appeal. . . . An articulation is not an opportunity for a trial court to substitute a new decision nor to change the reasoning or basis of a prior decision.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)). Accordingly, we construe the judgment of possession, in light of the articulation and the parties’ respective positions on appeal, to mean that the court assumed that the defendant had a disability within the meaning of the statute but concluded that he could not prevail on his claim under § 47a-23c because the rent increase was fair and equitable.
Frog Bridge Development Co., LLC v. Osborne
that effect, which the court had credited, and that the
court had not credited the defendant’s denial of being
in arrears and his testimony that his payment may have
been directed to the plaintiff’s out-of-state offices instead of its “on-site landlord . . . .”
Before we turn to the defendant’s claims on appeal, it
is helpful to review in relevant part the statutory scheme under which this case arises. Section 47a-23c affords
protection from eviction for certain classes of tenants,
except for good cause. Subsection (a) of § 47a-23c specifies to whom the statutory protections apply and includes
those who reside in a building consisting of five or more
units and who have a physical or mental disability.7
Subsection (b) (1) of § 47a-23c provides in relevant part: “No landlord may bring an action of summary process
or other action to dispossess a tenant described in subsection (a) of this section except for one or more of the
following reasons: (A) Nonpayment of rent; (B) refusal
to agree to a fair and equitable rent increase, as defined in subsection (c) of this section . . . .” Subsection (c) (1) of 7
Specifically, § 47a-23c (a) (1) provides that, “[e]xcept as provided in subdivision (2) of this subsection, this section applies to any tenant who resides in a building or complex consisting of five or more separate dwelling units or who resides in a mobile manufactured home park and who is either: (A) Sixty-two years of age or older, or whose spouse, sibling, parent or grandparent is sixty-two years of age or older and permanently resides with that tenant, or (B) a person with a physical or mental disability, as defined in subdivision (12) of section 46a-64b, or whose spouse, sibling, child, parent or grandparent is a person with a physical or mental disability who permanently resides with that tenant, but only if such disability can be expected to result in death or to last for a continuous period of at least twelve months.”
General Statutes § 46a-64b (8) provides that “ ‘[p]hysical or mental disability’ includes, but is not limited to, intellectual disability, as defined in section 1-1g, and physical disability, as defined in subdivision (15) of section 46a-51, and also includes, but is not limited to, persons who have a handicap as that term is defined in the Fair Housing Act.”
General Statutes § 46a-51 (15) provides that “ ‘[p]hysically disabled’ refers to any individual who has any chronic physical handicap, infirmity or impairment, whether congenital or resulting from bodily injury, organic processes or changes or from illness, including, but not limited to, epilepsy, deafness or being hard of hearing or reliance on a wheelchair or other remedial appliance or device . . . .”
Frog Bridge Development Co., LLC v. Osborne
§ 47a-23c provides that “[t]he rent of a tenant protected
by this section may be increased only to the extent that
such increase is fair and equitable, based on the criteria set forth in section 7-148c.”
Section 7-148c provides: “In determining whether a
rental charge or a proposed increase in a rental charge is so excessive, with due regard to all the circumstances, as to be harsh and unconscionable, a fair rent commission
shall consider such of the following circumstances as are
applicable to the type of accommodation: (1) The rents
charged for the same number of rooms in other housing
accommodations in the same and in other areas of the
municipality; (2) the sanitary conditions existing in the
housing accommodations in question; (3) the number of
bathtubs or showers, flush water closets, kitchen sinks
and lavatory basins available to the occupants thereof; (4) services, furniture, furnishings and equipment supplied
therein; (5) the size and number of bedrooms contained
therein; (6) repairs necessary to make such accommodations reasonably livable for the occupants accommodated
therein; (7) the amount of taxes and overhead expenses,
including debt service, thereof; (8) whether the accommodations are in compliance with the ordinances of the
municipality and the general statutes relating to health
and safety; (9) the income of the petitioner and the availability of accommodations; (10) the availability of utilities; (11) damages done to the premises by the tenant,
caused by other than ordinary wear and tear; (12) the
amount and frequency of increases in rental charges; (13)
whether, and the extent to which, the income from an
increase in rental charges has been or will be reinvested
in improvements to the accommodations.”
I
We first address the defendant’s claim that the court
erred, as a matter of law, in determining that the plaintiff’s proposed rent increase was fair and equitable.8
8
Within this claim, the defendant argues that the court erred in that it “did not consider [the defendant’s] limited Social Security disability income—one of the factors it was permitted to consider under . . .
Frog Bridge Development Co., LLC v. Osborne
Within this claim, the defendant argues that, “[b]ecause
the plain text of the statute does not provide a clear definition of the phrase ‘fair and equitable’—for example,
by limiting a rent increase to a certain percentage—the
statute does not answer the question presented by this
appeal,” and “the court may look to the legislature’s
intent in enacting the statute,” among other considerations. We are not persuaded.
Because our resolution of the defendant’s claim
requires us to construe §§ 47a-23c and 7-148, we begin
with the general principles of statutory construction
that guide our analysis. “When construing a statute,
[o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give
effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. . . . In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to
the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply. . . . In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z directs us
first to consider the text of the statute itself and its
relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such
text and considering such relationship, the meaning of
such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield
absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of
§ 7-148c—in determining that the plaintiff’s proposed rent increase was fair and equitable.”
The only evidence in the record to which the defendant directs this court’s attention is his testimony that he receives Social Security disability benefits. As the plaintiff emphasizes in its appellate brief, the defendant did not testify as to the amount of his income. Although the defendant e-filed a document, which the court characterized as “a benefit verification letter which tells . . . the dollar amount that you’re going to receive per month,” the document was never offered, and thus not admitted, as a full exhibit and is not part of the record on appeal. “This court’s role is not to divine the possibilities, but to review the claims and exhibits presented to the trial court.” Daigle v. Metropolitan Property & Casualty Ins. Co., 257 Conn. 359, 364, 777 A.2d 681 (2001). Accordingly, we conclude that the record is inadequate to consider any argument relating to the amount of the defendant’s income. See id., 365 (record was inadequate to review claim when plaintiff failed to make income tax returns part of record and, thus, court was left to speculate as to factual predicates for argument).
Frog Bridge Development Co., LLC v. Osborne
the meaning of the statute shall not be considered. . . .
Issues of statutory construction . . . are also matters of law subject to our plenary review. . . .
“In the construction of statutes, words and phrases
shall be construed according to the commonly approved
usage of the language; and technical words and phrases,
and such as have acquired a peculiar and appropriate
meaning in the law, shall be construed and understood
accordingly. . . . [W]hen construing a statute, we do not
interpret some clauses in a manner that nullifies others,
but rather read the statute as a whole and so as to reconcile all parts as far as possible. . . . Consequently, we look to the language of the statute in its entirety.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Graham v.
Graham, 222 Conn. App. 560, 582, 306 A.3d 499 (2023).
The defendant’s specific claim on appeal is that the
terms “fair and equitable” are ambiguous. After considering the text of § 47a-23c and its relationship to § 7-148c, we conclude that the terms are plain and unambiguous.
Although the terms “fair and equitable” are not specifically defined in § 47a-23c, the statute expressly requires that the determination of whether a rent increase is fair
and equitable be made “based on the criteria set forth in
[§] 7-148c.” General Statutes § 47a-23c (c) (1). Thus, the terms “fair and equitable,” although not defined, are
explained by way of reference to the thirteen criteria in
§ 7-148c. Thus, we do not view the terms “fair and equitable” as the type of undefined terms that are inherently
ambiguous. See Mayfield v. Goshen Volunteer Fire Co.,
301 Conn. 739, 745, 22 A.3d 1251 (2011) (when statute
does not define term, “[s]uch silence does not . . . necessarily equate to ambiguity” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
The defendant relies on two decisions in support of his
contention that the plain language of § 47a-23c “does
not answer the question before this court,” which, he
contends, require this court to “look to the legislature’s intent in enacting the statute in its entirety, as well as the statute’s relationship to existing common-law principles,
Frog Bridge Development Co., LLC v. Osborne
for guidance in interpreting how § 47a-23c applies to the
facts of [his] case.” We are not persuaded.
Both decisions on which the defendant relies address
the scope of § 47a-23c, but neither addresses the phrase
“fair and equitable.” See First Federal Bank, FSB v.
Whitney Development Corp., 237 Conn. 679, 692, 677
A.2d 1363 (1996) (concluding that Ҥ 47a-23c shields
tenants who qualify for its protections from executions
of judgments of ejectment pursuant to [General Statutes]
§ 49-22”); O’Brien Properties, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 215
Conn. 367, 373, 576 A.2d 469 (1990) (concluding that
“a tenant at sufferance is a ‘tenant’ for the purposes of
§ 47a-23c (a) (1)”). In both decisions, our Supreme Court
reinforced that § 47a-23c, as a remedial statute intended
to benefit elderly, blind, and physically disabled tenants, should be construed liberally in favor of those whom the
legislature intended to benefit. See First Federal Bank,
FSB v. Whitney Development Corp., supra, 684–85;
O’Brien Properties, Inc. v. Rodriguez, supra, 373.
Neither decision compels us to conclude that the phrase
“fair and equitable,” applied only after the tenant has
been determined to be afforded the protection of § 47a23c, requires us to look beyond the thirteen enumerated
criteria in § 7-148c for extratextual evidence as to the
meaning of that phrase. To the contrary, we conclude that
the robust statutory criteria provided ample guidance to
the trial court in making its determination as to whether
the rent increase was fair and equitable. Accordingly, we
reject the defendant’s claim.
II
The defendant’s next claim on appeal is that the court
improperly determined, as a matter of fact, that the
rent increase was fair and equitable. Specifically, he
argues that the court made clearly erroneous findings
in support of its determination. We conclude that the
court’s findings are not clearly erroneous, and, thus, its ultimate determination that the rent increase was fair
and equitable does not reflect an abuse of its discretion.
Frog Bridge Development Co., LLC v. Osborne
As a threshold matter, we must determine the appropriate standard of review. Our appellate courts have not
had occasion to consider the standard of review applicable to a trial court’s determination of whether a rent increase is fair and equitable pursuant to § 47a-23c. “Generally,
when a finding requires the balancing of several factors,
many of which require factual determinations . . . this
court has held that such conclusions are reversed only for an abuse of discretion.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hobby v. Commissioner of Correction, 238 Conn.
App. 644, 648, 357 A.3d 295, cert. denied, 354 Conn.
943, 356 A.3d 345 (2026); see id. (whether petitioner
has demonstrated good cause to excuse delayed filing of
habeas petition, which requires evaluation of relevant
factors in light of totality of facts and circumstances
presented, is reviewed for abuse of discretion). In Benjamin v. Island Management, LLC, 341 Conn. 189, 223,
267 A.3d 19 (2021), our Supreme Court considered the
standard of review applicable to the ultimate determination regarding whether statutory conditions for the
inspection of records, as set forth in General Statutes
§ 34-255i (b), had been met. The court explained that the
statutory conditions “require the balancing of many factors,” and, thus, “the ultimate determination involves
the exercise of discretion.” Id.
Moreover, equitable determinations in particular are
committed to the discretion of the court. See, e.g., Geriatrics, Inc. v. McGee, 332 Conn. 1, 25, 208 A.3d 1197
(2019) (“[b]ecause the trial court’s equitable determinations ‘depend on the balancing of many factors,’ we
review its ultimate decision as to whether the defendant
was unjustly enriched for abuse of discretion”); Trevorrow v. Marcuccio, 125 Conn. App. 141, 146, 10 A.3d
1058 (2010) (“A court’s determination of whether to
impose a constructive trust must stand unless it is clearly erroneous or involves an abuse of discretion. . . . This
limited scope of review is consistent with the general
proposition that equitable determinations that depend
on the balancing of many factors are committed to the
sound discretion of the trial court.” (Internal quotation
Frog Bridge Development Co., LLC v. Osborne
marks omitted.)); Krasowski v. Fantarella, 51 Conn.
App. 186, 199–200, 720 A.2d 1123 (1998) (“[E]quitable
determinations that depend on the balancing of many
factors are committed to the sound discretion of the
trial court. . . . Sound discretion, by definition, means
a discretion that is not exercised arbitrarily or wilfully, but with regard to what is right and equitable under
the circumstances and the law . . . .” (Citation omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.)), cert. denied, 247
Conn. 961, 723 A.3d 815 (1999).
Accordingly, we conclude that a court’s determination as to whether a rent increase is fair and equitable
pursuant to § 47a-23c is reviewed on appeal for abuse of
discretion. “Thus, [w]e will make every reasonable presumption in favor of upholding the trial court’s ruling[s] . . . . In determining whether there has been an abuse of
discretion, the ultimate issue is whether the court . . .
reasonably [could have] conclude[d] as it did.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Kelsey v. Commissioner of
Correction, 343 Conn. 424, 440, 274 A.3d 85 (2022).
Any subordinate factual determinations made in connection with the statutory criteria are subject to review
for clear error. See Benjamin v. Island Management,
LLC, supra, 341 Conn. 223 (when statutory conditions
for inspection required balancing of many factors, subordinate factual findings were subject to clearly erroneous
standard, but ultimate determination involved exercise
of discretion). “[I]t is axiomatic that [t]he trial court’s [factual] findings are binding upon this court unless they are clearly erroneous in light of the evidence and the
pleadings in the record as a whole. . . . We cannot retry
the facts or pass on the credibility of the witnesses. . . . A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no
evidence in the record to support it . . . or when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on
the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) McKay v. Longman, 332
Conn. 394, 417, 211 A.3d 20 (2019).
Frog Bridge Development Co., LLC v. Osborne
Having articulated the proper standard of review, we
now turn to the defendant’s claim that the court made
several clearly erroneous findings. First, the defendant
challenges the court’s reliance on Cuadrado’s testimony
that “similar rents were being paid by other tenants in
both the defendant’s building and in other similar buildings within the community.” The defendant maintains
that “there was no evidence presented as to whether [he]
rents a one bedroom, two bedroom, or studio apartment.”
Cuadrado testified that “all the same type of units of
[the defendant rent for] close to, if not, 1400 or 1425
[dollars per month].” She additionally responded affirmatively when asked by the court whether “the majority of
the units of the same size and nature of the defendant’s
are being charged approximately $1400 a month . . . .”
Cuadrado additionally testified: “I did a market study for Willimantic and noticed that there’s actually [some] units with less features, more features, that are more—they’re
more expensive actually than what we’re requesting.
And we have different type of studios, two bedrooms,
different floor plans, so doing this market study, I was
able to keep our prices still affordable but still putting it compared to what . . . the Willimantic area is charging.
Like, right now I get tenants, applicants that come to
me, come see a unit, and they are, like, oh, I went to this property, that property, the prices are outrageous for
the same unit, less amenities, less utilities included. . . . [The plaintiff] has very affordable prices compared to
the properties . . . in Willimantic.” Cuadrado further
testified, with respect to the market study, that “I have
to do it every year if I’m asking for a rent increase for
either of my properties because the Connecticut [Housing] Finance Authority manages the low-income housing
tax credit program. So every time that I submit my rent
increases, they want me to do a market study to make
sure that we’re offering fair rent prices.”
We are not persuaded that the court’s implicit crediting of Cuadrado’s testimony, in referencing the statutory
factor addressing whether similar rents were being paid
Frog Bridge Development Co., LLC v. Osborne
by other tenants in the defendant’s building and other
buildings, is clearly erroneous because there is some
evidence in the record to support it, and we are not left
with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been committed.9 See DeRose v. Jason Robert’s, Inc., 191
Conn. App. 781, 796, 216 A.3d 699, cert. denied, 333
Conn. 934, 218 A.3d 593 (2019); see also Lynch v. Lynch,
135 Conn. App. 40, 47, 43 A.3d 667 (2012) (“[b]ecause the
defendant’s financial affidavits provide some evidence
of a decrease in her income, we cannot conclude that the
court’s finding in this regard was clearly erroneous”).
The defendant next challenges the court’s treatment of
his testimony regarding the services, furniture, furnishings, and equipment supplied. He argues that he testified
to a loss of maintenance and managerial staff, removal
of free Wi-Fi, restrictions on access to a community
room, a decline in cleanliness, and deterioration of the
property’s gym. Although the court acknowledged the
testimony of the defendant as to a decrease in services and equipment, the court expressed during that testimony,
and the defendant agreed, that it was speculative to
suggest that the plaintiff had incurred savings directly
from the diminished services, rather than the alternative possibility that the perceived changes resulted from
meeting the higher cost of operation.
Next, the defendant challenges the court’s crediting
of Cuadrado’s testimony to find that “there had been
9
Throughout his principal appellate brief, the defendant cites various decisions of the Superior Court that he contends involve a lessor presenting more evidence regarding the statutory criteria than was introduced in this case. First, we note that Superior Court decisions are not binding on this court. See, e.g., Rider v. Rider, 210 Conn. App. 278, 287 n.13, 270 A.3d 206 (2022). Additionally, that those decisions arguably involve the presentation of “more specific” evidence than the present case does not compel the conclusion, applying the clearly erroneous standard of review, that “there is no evidence in the record to support” the trial court’s findings or “that a mistake has been committed.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Disciplinary Counsel v. Parnoff, 158 Conn. App. 454, 474, 119 A.3d 621 (2015), aff’d, 324 Conn. 505, 152 A.3d 1222 (2016); see id. (“[i]t is axiomatic that factual findings . . . are subject only to a limited scope of review on appeal” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Frog Bridge Development Co., LLC v. Osborne
inflation and that operating costs had increased . . . .”
Cuadrado testified that, “as you are aware, a lot of things changed [since 2020], inflation and all that, so we started doing a hundred-dollar increase. So that’s what we’ve
been doing with all the tenants, and since 2020 up until
now, we pretty much have everybody to where, you know,
the prices that we are—that are out there—actually,
because I did a market study—and if you go out in Willimantic, actually, we have the best affordable prices out there.” She additionally testified that “[e]verything has
increased, even with the . . . vendors and contractors that we deal with . . . .” She further testified that, “[s]ince 2020, especially since the pandemic, everything is now
double. Even when we try to do flooring in an apartment,
we even, depending on the size of the apartment, it is not less than three grand.” As the trier of fact, the court was entitled to credit Cuadrado’s testimony to that effect.
Finally, we address the defendant’s contention that
certain remarks made by the trial court during the trial
“suggest that the court’s decision was based, in part,
on its own attitudes about the expenses of operating
a rental property in 2024 garnered from personal life
experience.” Specifically, the defendant emphasizes
the following remarks made by the court: “I could have
asked them the number of bathtubs and showers, flush
water closets, kitchen sinks, and laboratory basins. You
know, I could have gone through all that if I wished to. I didn’t feel necessary. I heard enough from them to decide
that they made a showing that they felt it was appropriate for a rent increase. I now turn to you in asking you
to demonstrate, or to at least counter that showing,
and demonstrate to me otherwise.” Additionally, the
defendant references the trial court’s remark that “I’ve
heard testimony, expenses have gone up. That’s not a real
shocker. I think everyone knows that. I heard testimony
that rentals everywhere have gone up. Again, not very
surprising, that’s generally common knowledge.”
As this court has stated, “[triers of fact] are not
required to leave common sense at the courtroom door . . .
Frog Bridge Development Co., LLC v. Osborne
nor are they expected to lay aside matters of common
knowledge or their own observations and experience of
the affairs of life . . . [n]evertheless, attitudes garnered from personal life experience cannot serve as a substitute for properly admitted evidence at a hearing where the
court’s mandate is to ascertain the intent of the parties. Judicial impartiality is the hallmark of the American
system of justice. . . . The background and experience of
a trial judge are disqualifying only if they prevent that
judge from assessing the evidence fairly and impartially.
It is assumed that judges, regardless of their personal
backgrounds and experiences in life, will be able to set
aside any biases or predispositions they might have and
consider each case in light of the evidence presented.”
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Dessa, LLC v. Riddle, 223 Conn. App. 457, 470, 308
A.3d 1051 (2024).
We are not convinced that the trial court’s remarks,
made on the record over the course of the three day trial, demonstrate that the court’s decision was based on its
“life experience” rather than the evidence. First, the
remarks themselves, considered in their full context,
also refer to the evidence. Immediately following the
court’s remarks regarding increased expenses and rents
being common knowledge, the court added: “But I did
hear testimony in that regard. You, however, seem to
think that you’re entitled to not have a rent increase
from 20[20] to 2024. So I’m really looking for you to
tell me why that is.” Second, the court did not repeat
the remarks in its decision or articulation. Rather, the
articulation referenced the testimony on which the court
relied in rendering its decision. Cf. Dessa, LLC v. Riddle, supra, 223 Conn. App. 470 (trial court improperly relied
on personal beliefs, rather than evidence, when it explicitly interjected personal observations into its decision). Accordingly, we reject the defendant’s argument.
III
The defendant’s final claim on appeal is that the court
improperly determined that he had failed to pay rent in
Frog Bridge Development Co., LLC v. Osborne
March 2024. During oral argument before this court, the
plaintiff’s counsel conceded that there was no evidence
in the record that the defendant had not made use and
occupancy payments for March 2024, and, thus, the court
erred in rendering judgment of possession with respect
to count two. We agree with the parties.
In its articulation, the court stated that its judgment on count two of the complaint was “based on the defendant’s
failure to pay the $900 owed for use-and-occupancy for
March of 2024.” Our review of the record reveals that
Cuadrado testified that the defendant had made payments of $900 in full between the months of February
and May 2024, and that the defendant has not paid rent
since May 2024. As the parties represent, there was no
evidence in the record that the defendant had not paid
the $900 owed for March 2024. Accordingly, the court’s
finding was clearly erroneous.
The judgment is reversed only as to the second count
of the complaint and the case is remanded with direction
to render judgment for the defendant on that count; the
judgment is affirmed in all other respects.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.