Opinion issued October 13, 2026
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
NO. 01-25-00349-CV
RUDTUCK OPERATING, LLC, Appellant
v.
KAYSHA STROEBEL, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS REPRESENTATIVE OF
THE ESTATE OF BRANDON STROEBEL, DECEASED, AND AS NEXT
FRIEND OF JOHN DOE AND JANE DOE, AND JO STROEBEL, Appellees
On Appeal from the 295th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 2023-81052
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This appeal arises from a judgment confirming an arbitration order in a
wrongful death and survival case. Brandon Stroebel was fatally injured while
working for the appellee, Rudtuck Operating, LLC (“Rudtuck”). The appellants, his widow, Kaysha Stroebel, individually and as representative of Brandon’s estate and
as next friend of their minor children, and Brandon’s mother, Jo Stroebel
(collectively, the “Stroebels”), sued Rudtuck. After the trial court sent the case to
arbitration, the arbitrator determined the case was not arbitrable because Rudtuck
did not timely initiate arbitration in compliance with the arbitration agreement.
Rudtuck contends the trial court erred in confirming the arbitration order
because the arbitration agreement’s one-year limitation should not be applied to
Rudtuck, as the non-claimant, and contradicts Texas law.
We affirm.
Background
As part of his employment with Rudtuck, Brandon signed a mutual arbitration
agreement. One year later, Brandon was fatally injured while working for Rudtuck
at an oil and gas wellsite owned by Maverick Natural Resources, LLC (“Maverick”).
The Stroebels sued Rudtuck for gross negligence under the Workers’ Compensation
Act and Maverick for wrongful death and survival.
Five months after suit was filed, Rudtuck and Maverick moved to compel
arbitration. The trial court granted the motions and stayed the litigation pending
arbitration.
After the Stroebels filed a demand for arbitration with the American
Arbitration Association, the arbitrator determined the Stroebels’ challenge to
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arbitrability. The arbitrator explained that because neither party claimed the
arbitration agreement’s language was ambiguous, he was bound by the agreement’s
plain language. The pertinent language of the arbitration agreement states that “any
claim for arbitration must be brought within one year from the date the claim
accrues . . . .” Rudtuck argued that (1) the provision it drafted can’t be literally
enforced because it would permit a claimant to nullify the employer’s right to
arbitration by waiting a year before asserting an otherwise arbitrable claim; and
(2) the term “claim” should include Rudtuck’s right to arbitrate, which accrued only
upon the assertion of claims against it.
The arbitrator ruled that while the arbitration agreement encompassed the
Stroebels’ claims, Rudtuck failed to commence arbitration “within one year from the
date the claim accrues” as required by the agreement’s plain language, and thus,
Rudtuck missed its opportunity to compel the arbitration of the claims at issue. He
also ruled that Maverick, as a non-signatory, lacked standing to compel arbitration
because it was not an intended third-party beneficiary.
Having found that neither Rudtuck nor Maverick could compel arbitration,
the arbitrator terminated the arbitration of the Stroebels’ claims “without prejudice
to adjudication in a court of law.”
Shortly after the arbitrator issued his order, the Stroebels moved the trial court
to lift the stay and confirm the arbitration order. Rudtuk responded, requesting
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dismissal of the case because the arbitrator found the claims within the agreement’s
scope and the Stroebels failed to initiate arbitration within the agreement’s one-year
limit.
At the hearing on the Stroebels’ motion, Rudtuck agreed that the trial court
should lift the stay and did not oppose the trial court issuing a docket control order.
The trial court lifted the stay and entered judgment confirming the arbitration order.
Jurisdiction
We first address whether we have jurisdiction over the appeal. M.O. Dental
Lab v. Rape, 139 S.W.3d 671, 673 (Tex. 2004) (“[W]e are obligated to review sua
sponte issues affecting jurisdiction.”).
“Unless specifically authorized by statute, Texas appellate courts have
jurisdiction only to review final judgments.” McFadin v. Broadway Coffeehouse,
LLC, 539 S.W.3d 278, 283 (Tex. 2018). For cases governed by the Federal
Arbitration Act (“FAA”), such as this one, Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code
section 51.016 provides that a party may appeal from a judgment or interlocutory
order “under the same circumstances that an appeal from a federal district court’s
order or decision would be allowed by 9 U.S.C. Section 16.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
REM. CODE § 51.016. Under section 16, an appeal may be taken from an order
confirming or denying confirmation of an award. 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(D).
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The parties disagree whether the arbitrator’s order terminating the arbitration
constitutes an “award.” Both Texas and federal courts have held that the arbitrator’s
order must be final and definitive to constitute a confirmable “award.” See InTown
Homes Ltd. v. Knoche, No. 14-20-00275-CV, 2022 WL 1671136, at *2 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] May 26, 2022, no pet.) (applying Black’s Law Dictionary to
define “award” as “a final judgment or decision”); SM Architects, PLLC v. AMX
Veteran Specialty Servs., LLC, 564 S.W.3d 902, 906 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2018, pet.
denied) (explaining “common and technical meanings of ‘award’ contemplate
finality”); Publicis Commc’n v. True N. Commc’ns, Inc., 206 F.3d 725, 728–29 (7th
Cir. 2000) (noting FAA uses “award” in conjunction with finality). An arbitrator’s
termination of proceedings for failure to comply with the terms of the arbitration
agreement can constitute a final disposition that satisfies the “award” requirement.
See In Town Homes, Ltd., 2022 WL 1671136, at *3. Once the arbitration is complete
based on the arbitrator’s final decision on the matter before it, the order disposes of
all claims pending in the arbitration proceeding, leaving no remaining substantive
tasks for the arbitrator to perform in that proceeding. See id. (holding that even
though appellee may assert her claims in second arbitration, her claims were
complete as far as initial arbitration that resulted in dismissal without prejudice).
Here, the arbitration order was a final decision, dismissing the entire arbitration.
Thus, it constitutes an “award.”
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The trial court’s order also lifts the previously imposed stay of the court
proceedings. An order lifting a previously imposed stay under the FAA is considered
an order “refusing a stay,” which is independently appealable as an interlocutory
order. Vets Securing Am., Inc. v. Smith, 632 S.W.3d 272, 278 (Tex. App.—Corpus
Christi-Edinburg 2021, pet. denied) (citing federal cases holding same).
We conclude, therefore, that we have jurisdiction over this appeal. TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.016; 9 U.S.C. § 16(a).
Standard of Review and Applicable Law
We review a trial court’s order confirming an arbitration award de novo. Port
Arthur Steam Energy LP v. Oxbow Calcining LLC, 416 S.W.3d 708, 713 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. denied). “Because Texas law favors
arbitration, judicial review of an arbitration award is extraordinarily narrow.” E. Tex.
Salt Water Disposal Co., Inc. v. Werline, 307 S.W.3d 267, 271 (Tex. 2010). “An
arbitration decision has the same effect as a judgment of a court of last resort;
accordingly, all reasonable presumptions are indulged in its favor.” Port Arthur
Steam Energy LP, 416 S.W.3d at 713.
A trial court must confirm an arbitration award governed by the FAA unless
the opposing party timely establishes one of the enumerated statutory grounds for
denying confirmation. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 9, 10, 12; Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel,
Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 584 (2008) (holding court must confirm arbitration award unless
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exclusive statutory ground for vacatur is established). Such grounds are as follows:
(1) award procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; (2) arbitrators’ partiality
or corruption; (3) arbitrators’ misconduct by refusing to postpone the hearing, upon
sufficient cause shown; by refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the
controversy; or by any other misbehavior prejudicing any party’s rights; or (4)
arbitrators exceeded their powers or so imperfectly exercised them resulting in the
lack of a mutual, final, and definite award on the subject matter. 9 U.S.C. § 10.
A party must serve its notice of a motion to vacate an award within three
months after the award is filed or delivered. 9 U.S.C. § 12. “A party seeking to vacate
an award bears the burden of presenting a complete record that establishes grounds
for vacatur.” Denbury Onshore, LLC v. Texcal Energy S. Tex., L.P., 513 S.W.3d
511, 515 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.).
Error Preservation
Rudtuck contends the trial court erred by confirming the arbitration order that,
in turn, terminated arbitration based on Rudtuck’s failure to initiate arbitration within
one year of the date the Stroebels’ claims accrued. But Rudtuck did not preserve its
contention for our review.
Error preservation rules apply to appeals from arbitration awards. Nafta
Traders, Inc. v. Quinn, 339 S.W.3d 84, 101 n.80 (Tex. 2011). “A party seeking to
vacate an arbitration award must present any grounds for doing so to the trial court;
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otherwise, those complaints are waived on appeal.” Human Biostar, Inc. v. Celltex
Therapeutics Corp., 514 S.W.3d 844, 850 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017,
pet. denied); see TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a).
Here, Rudtuck did not seek vacatur, modification, or correction of the
arbitration award in the trial court. Although Rudtuck responded to the Stroebels’
motion to lift the stay and confirm the arbitration order, Rudtuck relied on the
arbitration award when requesting the trial court dismiss the case. At the hearing,
Rudtuck made no argument or request to the trial court regarding vacatur,
modification, or correction of the award.
Because Rudtuck did not move the trial court to vacate, modify, or correct the
arbitration award or raise any statutory ground for doing so, it did not preserve its
complaint for appellate review.
Conclusion
We affirm the trial court’s judgment. All pending motions are dismissed as
moot.
Clint Morgan
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Caughey, Morgan, and Dokupil.
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