Opinion issued October 16, 2026.
In the
Court of Appeals
for the
First District of Texas
NO. 01-26-00479-CV
IN THE INTEREST OF W.S., A CHILD
On Appeal from the 313th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 2025-00549J
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This accelerated appeal arises from a suit for the termination of the parentchild relationship brought by the Department of Family and Protective Services (the Department). Appellant S.T. (Mother) challenges the trial court’s final decree
terminating her parental rights to her child, “William.”1
To terminate a parent’s relationship with her child under the Texas Family
Code, the Department must establish—and the trial court must find—by clear and
convincing evidence that (1) the parent committed one or more acts or omissions
prescribed by the legislature and (2) termination is in the best interest of the child.
TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b). Mother contends that legally and factually
insufficient evidence supports (1) the trial court’s termination of her parental rights
under subsections 161.001(b)(1)(D) (endangering conditions), (E) (endangering
conduct), and (P) (inability to care for child due to incarceration)2 of the Texas
Family Code and (2) the trial court’s finding that termination is in the child’s best
interest. Because we conclude that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to
support the trial court’s findings that Mother endangered the child under subsections
1
To protect the identity of the parties, we refer to them by fictitious names, initials,
or aliases. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 109.002(d); TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b)(2). 2
Under subsection 161.001(b)(1)(D) of the Texas Family Code, the parent-child
relationship may be terminated if the parent has “knowingly placed or knowingly
allowed the child to remain in” endangering conditions. TEX. FAM. CODE
§ 161.001(b)(1)(D). Relatedly, under subsection (E), the parent-child relationship
may be terminated if the parent has engaged in endangering conduct. Id.
§ 161.001(b)(1)(E). Under subsection (P), formerly subsection (Q), the parent-child
relationship may be terminated if the parent is convicted of a criminal offense, is
sentenced to serve at least two years’ confinement, and will not be able to provide
for the child during that time. Id. § 161.001(b)(1)(P).
2
161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) and that termination is in the child’s best interest, we
affirm the trial court’s termination decree.3
Background
This appeal concerns the termination of Mother’s parental rights to William,
who was four years old at the start of the trial.
A. Child’s Removal
On December 9, 2024, the Department received a referral for Mother’s
neglectful supervision of William. According to a Department investigator’s
affidavit, filed in a support of an application for William’s emergency removal and
admitted as an exhibit at the trial, Mother allegedly had been leaving William home
alone “while she [was] out using and dealing ‘crystal meth.’” On December 10,
2024, the Department investigator visited Mother, who denied leaving William
home alone and refused to take a drug test. The following day, and unrelated to the
investigator’s visit, Aransas Pass Police arrested Mother, leaving no one to care for
3
Because only one predicate ground is necessary to support a judgment of
termination, we do not address Mother’s third issue, in which she challenges the
trial court’s finding under subsection (P). In re A.M., 495 S.W.3d 573, 580 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. denied) (not addressing challenge to additional
predicate ground after affirming termination on one predicate ground); see also In
re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2003) (holding that only one predicate ground
is sufficient to affirm termination). However, the Department concedes that it never
pleaded, or sought, termination under subsection (P).
3
William. On December 13, 2024, the trial court4 signed an emergency order
appointing the Department as William’s temporary managing conservator.
On December 17, 2024, William was placed in the home of “Sarah,” who at
the time was believed to be William’s paternal grandmother. DNA testing later
excluded Sarah’s son as William’s father. However, Sarah continued to care for
William through the trial, and later expressed an intention to adopt William.
B. Service Plan
On January 31, 2025, Mother signed a service plan, which the Department
subsequently filed and served on all parties. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.101
(requiring Department to file service plan); id. § 263.102 (prescribing content of
service plan). Mother’s service plan identified the following “NEEDS AND
ACTIONS TO ADDRESS”: (1) Mother’s leaving William unsupervised and using
illegal substances and (2) Mother’s incarceration and inability to provide William
with his basic needs. The service plan also stated that Mother should, among other
things, obtain safe housing, maintain contact with her Department caseworker,
secure employment, participate in supervised visits with William, complete
parenting courses, and submit to random drug tests. Under the service plan, “a no
show for a drug test [is] considered as a positive [result] by the Department.”
4
At the time of William’s removal from Mother’s care, the suit was pending in San
Patricio County. On February 20, 2025, the suit was transferred to Harris County,
where all subsequent proceedings, including the trial, took place.
4
C. Trial
Over three, non-consecutive days in December 2025 and January and
February 2026, the trial court received evidence and heard testimony from Yesenia
Robles, a Department caseworker; William’s caregiver, Sarah; and Mother. Mother
appeared on the first and second days of trial but failed to appear for the third day.
1. Mother’s background and post-removal conduct
Criminal history. According to Mother, she has been arrested almost 10 times
since she was 17 years old. The details of each of Mother’s arrests—including the
nature of the offense, whether the arrest led to a conviction, or the duration of her
incarceration—are not in the record. However, Mother testified to, and the
Department introduced evidence of, several offenses committed by Mother.
In 2014, Mother was charged with possession of a controlled substance.
According to Mother, the charge resulted from “one ecstasy pill that [she] didn’t
know was in the vehicle” she had been driving. The trial court overseeing her
criminal proceedings initially deferred adjudication of Mother’s guilt and placed her
on community supervision. However, while on community supervision, the State
filed a motion to adjudicate Mother’s guilt. According to Mother, she violated the
conditions of her community supervision by failing to complete her GED courses.
According to the judgment adjudicating guilt, Mother pled true to the allegations in
the State’s motion to adjudicate guilt and, as part of a plea bargain, she was sentenced
5
to seven months’ imprisonment. The State’s motion to adjudicate guilt is not in the
appellate record.
At some point, the date of which is unclear, Mother was charged with theft.
However, according to Mother, the charge was dropped. The record does not include
any document that evidences the theft charge or whether Mother was jailed as a
result. Mother testified that she picked up the charge because she “was driving a
vehicle with someone who stole something from Wal-Mart,” but she denied stealing
anything.
At another point in time, Mother was arrested on a charge of, according to
Mother, “misdemeanor failure to ID.” Mother testified that the charges were later
dropped but, during the period in which she was incarcerated, her children were
placed with Sarah. Mother has four children, and it is unclear whether all or only
some of her children were placed with Sarah and whether at that point in time
William had been born.
In December 2024, one or two days after a Department investigator visited
Mother concerning allegations of neglectful supervision, Mother was arrested for
burglary, to which Mother pled guilty. On June 25, 2025, Mother was paroled.
Because neither the judgment of conviction nor Mother’s conditions of release on
parole are part of the appellate record, the length of Mother’s sentence for the
burglary conviction and the amount of time that Mother must serve on parole are
6
unknown to the Court. According to Mother, the December 2024 arrest is her most
recent.
History of drug use and drug testing. Mother admitted that she has used
“[d]rugs in general” for approximately the last decade. She stated that her use of
methamphetamine has been “[o]ff and on for . . . like six years.” She testified that
she completed one inpatient program for substance abuse “[s]ometime within the
last ten years.” She testified that she “stayed drug free for two and a half years”
following that program.
In 2018, Mother gave birth to her second child, who tested positive for
amphetamine at birth and was adopted shortly after. A few years later, around the
time Mother became pregnant with William, Mother began a romantic relationship
with Sarah’s son, although the relationship has since ended.5 According to Sarah,
her son suffers from a meth addiction.
In 2023, the Department alleged—but was unable to confirm—that Mother
was “living in a recreational vehicle and selling food stamps for drugs.” Mother
denied the allegations.
In December 2024, when a Department investigator visited Mother, Mother
refused to take a drug test but admitted to using a THC vape pen. After Mother was
5
Due to the timing of this relationship, Sarah’s son was William’s presumed father.
However, as mentioned, DNA testing later excluded Sarah’s son as William’s
father.
7
jailed later that month, she admitted to the Department investigator that she had
purchased “mushroom edibles,” which is why she had previously declined to take a
drug test.
Following Mother’s release from jail in June 2025, the Department requested
that Mother submit to drug tests in August, September, and October 2025. Mother
did not show up to any of the requested drug tests.6
On November 5, 2025, Mother appeared for a drug test and submitted urine
and hair follicle samples. Mother’s urine tested negative for ethyl glucuronide, a
metabolite of alcohol, and tested “INVALID” for purposes of the “Substance Abuse
Panel” due to “ABNORMAL PH.” In response to questioning, Robles, the
Department caseworker, agreed that an abnormal pH level is “normally indicative
of some type of adulteration.” Mother’s hair sample tested positive for amphetamine
and methamphetamine. Mother never submitted to any other drug testing during the
termination proceedings. Mother testified that she missed her appointments for drug
testing due to transportation issues and her work schedule.
In December 2025, Mother admitted to Robles that Mother had relapsed.
According to Robles, Mother “mentioned how hard it’s been not having her child
with her” and “she had a slip up.” When questioned about her relapse, Mother agreed
6
As mentioned, under Mother’s service plan, “a no show for a drug test will be
considered as a positive [result] by the Department.”
8
that her response to disappointment has been to “move on to drugs.” At the time of
the second day of trial on January 29, 2026, Mother estimated that she had been
sober for two and a half months. However, she agreed that her “addiction issues
[were] not under control.”
At the end of the second day of trial, the trial court ordered Mother to submit
to a drug test in the courthouse. The trial resumed three weeks later on February 19,
2026. Mother did not appear on that date, and Robles testified that Mother did not
submit to the drug test that the trial court ordered at the previous day of trial. The
attorney ad litem for William represented to the trial court that she was present while
Mother waited for drug-testing personnel to arrive and that Mother waited “[n]o
longer than 15 minutes.” Drug-testing personnel arrived a few minutes after Mother
had left.
Robles testified that, between the second and third days of trial, she met with
Mother while Mother visited William and, on February 10, 2026, asked that Mother
take a drug test. Mother did not. Robles asked Mother why she did not submit to the
court-ordered drug test at the previous day of trial and, according to Robles, Mother
said that “she was waiting [outside the courtroom] for a while, and that the people
were not here . . . . The drug testing people were not here.” Mother did not take a
drug test at any point between January 29 and February 19, 2026, the second and
9
third days of the trial, respectively. The only drug test to which Mother submitted
after William’s removal is the November 5, 2025 test.
Mother’s home. Following Mother’s release from jail in June 2025, Mother
began living with “Mary,” her godmother, and “Rachel,” her minor daughter.
Mother admitted that, although Mary’s home was “safe and stable,” she did not have
a home of her own for William. Robles testified that Mary did not want William to
move into Mary’s home because Mary has a “heart problem.”
Robles testified that Mary is aware that Mother is an “active drug user.”
However, Mary reported to Robles that Mother “is much more active with her child,
[Rachel], than she has [been] in the past.” Mary also informed Robles of Mother’s
“improvement.” Sarah, who has known Mother for four and a half years due to
Mother’s prior romantic relationship with Sarah’s son, testified that she did not
believe that Mother had a good support system. Mother admitted that she did not
have “the most desirable people” in her life.
Mother’s employment. Mother’s service plan requires that she remain
employed and provide Robles with “verification of employment through pay stubs
or a letter from her employer.” Verification must occur monthly. Although Mother
never sent Robles any verification of her employment in 2025, Robles did not
dispute that Mother began working at a gas station after Mother was released from
jail in June 2025. However, Robles testified that, at some point between August and
10
December 2025, Mother was unemployed again. In January 2026, Mother began
working at a mechanic’s shop. On the morning of the second day of trial, Mother
purportedly sent Robles verification of her employment with the mechanic’s shop;
however, Robles did not have time to review the document, and it was never
introduced or admitted as an exhibit.
2. Mother’s relationship with William
Mother’s supervised visits with William occurred monthly, and Mother never
missed a visit. According to Robles, Mother’s visits with William “go well” without
“any issues” and Mother “is also attached to the child.” Robles had no concerns with
Mother’s behavior during the visits. According to Robles, William refers to Sarah
as “mom” and does not refer to Mother by any name. When William wants Mother’s
attention, he says, “Hey.”
3. William’s placement and relationship with Sarah
William has lived with Sarah since December 2024 and, prior to that, Sarah
had occasionally watched William and cared for him. Robles testified that William
was “doing well” with Sarah and “is attached” to her.
Sarah testified that her relationship with William is “[v]ery close.” She loves
him “like he’s [her] own.” William has started to call Sarah “[M]ommy.” Sarah
testified that William becomes upset when he is told that Sarah is not his mother, so
she does not “push that issue.” She testified that she told William that he “can call
11
[her] anything [he] want[s] to call [her],” but she has asked him to call her “Minnie”
and call her husband, “Papa,” because she is “like a grandmother figure for him.”
She testified that she is willing to care for William permanently.
4. Parties’ positions on termination of Mother’s parental rights
On the first day of trial, the Department did not seek to terminate Mother’s
parental rights to William. Rather, the Department sought to make Sarah the
permanent managing conservator of William without terminating Mother’s parental
rights. The Department requested that the trial commence but be continued so that
Mother could have “more time to work more services.” More than two months later,
following Mother’s failure to submit to the court-ordered drug test, Robles testified
that the Department sought to terminate Mother’s parental rights.
Mother contested termination of her parental rights, but she testified that she
wanted William to remain with Sarah.
As for Sarah, she did not appear to understand the different forms of relief that
the trial court could grant or how those different forms of relief would impact the
permanency of William’s placement with her. On the second day of trial, she
testified that she wanted William to be with Mother, but “[i]f [Mother] can’t get
herself together, [William] needs to stay with” Sarah. However, moments later in
the trial, Sarah testified that she believed that the termination of Mother’s parental
rights is in William’s best interest.
12
Sarah testified again on the last day of trial—after Mother had missed her
drug-test appointments, including the court-ordered drug test—and stated that she
intended to adopt William. Although she did not explicitly request that Mother’s
parental rights be terminated, she testified that it is in William’s best interest that she
“have custody of him to say nobody can take him.” Sarah understood that, if
Mother’s parental rights were terminated, Mother would have “no legal right at all”
to William. Sarah testified that, if Mother’s parental rights were not terminated, she
would not agree to Mother’s having visitation rights.
D. Termination Decree
Following the trial, on April 21, 2026, the trial court rendered a final decree
that terminated Mother’s parental rights to William and appointed the Department
as William’s sole managing conservator.7 The trial court found by clear and
convincing evidence that Mother had (1) “knowingly placed or knowingly allowed
the child to remain in conditions or surroundings which endanger the physical or
emotional well-being of the child,” (2) “engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the
child with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or
emotional well-being of the child,” and (3) “knowingly engaged in criminal conduct
that has resulted in the mother’s conviction of an offense and confinement or
7
The trial court also terminated the parental rights of William’s father. The father did
not file a notice of appeal and is not a party to this appeal.
13
imprisonment and inability to care for the child for not less than two years from the
date of filing the petition.” See TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (P). The
trial court also found that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child’s
best interest.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
In a case to terminate parental rights under section 161.001(b) of the Texas
Family Code, the Department must establish that (1) the parent committed one or
more of the enumerated acts or omissions justifying termination and (2) termination
is in the best interest of the child. TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b). Only one predicate
finding under section 161.001(b)(1) is necessary to support a judgment of
termination when there is also a finding that termination is in the child’s best interest.
In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2003). The Department must prove both
elements—i.e., both the statutorily prescribed predicate finding(s) and that
termination is in the child’s best interest—by clear and convincing evidence. In re
E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d 796, 803 (Tex. 2012). The Family Code defines “clear and
convincing evidence” as “the measure or degree of proof that will produce in the
mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations
sought to be established.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 101.007.
When assessing the legal sufficiency of the evidence in a termination
proceeding, we consider all evidence in the record in the light most favorable to the
14
trial court’s finding and decide “whether a reasonable trier of fact could have formed
a firm belief or conviction that its finding was true.” In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256,
266 (Tex. 2002); see City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 817 (Tex. 2005)
(discussing elevated standard of review in parental termination cases). We assume
that any disputed facts were resolved in favor of the finding if a reasonable factfinder
could have done so. J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. When “no reasonable factfinder could
form a firm belief or conviction” that the matter on which the Department bears the
burden of proof is true, we “must conclude that the evidence is legally insufficient.”
Id. In reviewing the evidence’s factual sufficiency, we consider the entire record,
including disputed evidence. Id. The evidence is factually insufficient if, considering
the entire record, the disputed evidence that a reasonable factfinder could not have
resolved in favor of the finding is so significant that the factfinder could not
reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction. Id.
We give due deference to the factfinder’s findings, and we cannot substitute
our own judgment for that of the factfinder. In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex.
2006) (per curiam). The factfinder is the sole arbiter when assessing the credibility
and demeanor of witnesses. Id. at 109.
A. Predicate Findings Under Subsections (D) and (E)
In Mother’s first and second issues, she challenges the factual and legal
sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s findings that she (1)
15
“knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child to remain in conditions or
surroundings which endanger the physical or emotional well-being of the child” and
(2) “engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in
conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the child.” TEX.
FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E). She contends that there is no evidence of
William’s pre-removal environment or that her actions or omissions endangered
William. In response, the Department argues that the evidence “reflects a sustained
pattern of criminal conduct” and “an extensive, unresolved pattern of substance
abuse.” The Department contends that this pattern of behavior is legally and
factually sufficient to support the trial court’s findings under subsections (D) and
(E).
1. Applicable law
Protection of the best interest of the child is the primary focus of a termination
proceeding. See A.V., 113 S.W.3d at 361. However, a parent’s rights to the
“companionship, care, custody, and management” of a child is a constitutional
interest “far more precious than any property right.” Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S.
745, 758-59 (1982) (citation modified); accord In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d 534, 547
(Tex. 2003). Accordingly, we strictly scrutinize termination proceedings and strictly
construe the involuntary termination statutes in favor of the parent. Holick v. Smith,
685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985).
16
Because subsection (M) provides a basis for terminating parental rights due
to a prior subsection (D) or (E) finding, due process concerns coupled with the
requirement for a meaningful appeal require that, if an appellate court affirms a
termination order based on a (D) or (E) finding, the appellate court must provide the
details of its analysis. In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 237 (Tex. 2019) (per curiam).
Further, because termination under subsection (D) or (E) may justify termination of
parental rights to other children in future cases, we must review both grounds, even
though only one ground is sufficient to support termination. In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d
269, 279 (Tex. 2024) (citing N.G., 577 S.W.3d at 235-37; TEX. FAM. CODE
§ 161.001(b)(1)(M)); see TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(M) (providing as ground
of termination that parent “had his or her parent-child relationship terminated with
respect to another child based on a finding that the parent’s conduct was in violation
of Paragraph (D) or (E)”).
Subsection 161.001(b)(1)(D) of the Family Code provides that the trial court
may order termination of the parent-child relationship if it finds by clear and
convincing evidence that the parent has “knowingly placed or knowingly allowed
the child to remain in conditions or surroundings which endanger the physical or
emotional well-being of the child.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(D). Subsection
161.001(b)(1)(E) provides that the trial court may terminate a parent’s rights if the
trial court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parent “engaged in conduct
17
or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct which
endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the child.” Id. § 161.001(b)(1)(E).
Because evidence concerning termination under subsections (D) and (E) is
interrelated, we may consolidate our examination of the evidence for both grounds.
In re A.J.H., No. 01-18-00245-CV, 2019 WL 190050, at *8 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] Jan. 15, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing In re M.T.W., No. 01-11-00162-CV, 2011 WL 6938542, at *13 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 29, 2011, no
pet.) (mem. op.); In re J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d 117, 126 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003,
no pet.)). “Endanger” is a term used in both subsections (D) and (E). To “endanger”
a child means to jeopardize the child or expose him or her to loss or injury. In re
M.C., 917 S.W.2d 268, 269 (Tex. 1996) (citing Tex. Dep’t of Hum. Servs. v. Boyd,
727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987)). While endangerment often involves physical
jeopardy, the statute does not require that endangering conduct be directed at a child
or that the child actually suffer any injury; rather, the specific danger to the child’s
well-being may be inferred from the parent’s misconduct alone. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d
at 533; In re N.J.H., 575 S.W.3d 822, 831 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018,
pet. denied) (mem. op.). A parent’s conduct that subjects a child to a life of
uncertainty and instability endangers the child’s physical and emotional well-being.
In re J.S., 584 S.W.3d 622, 635 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, no pet.). The
Department does not need to establish that a parent intended to endanger a child to
18
support termination based on endangerment. In re M.A.J., 612 S.W.3d 398, 407
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, pet. denied).
Although subsections (D) and (E) both focus on endangerment, “they differ
with regard to the source and proof of endangerment.” In re A.S., 261 S.W.3d 76, 83
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. denied) (citing In re S.M.L., 171
S.W.3d 472, 477 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.), overruled on
other grounds by In re L.C.L., 599 S.W.3d 79 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2020, pet. denied) (en banc)). Subsection (D) concerns the children’s living
environment, rather than the parent’s conduct, although the parent’s conduct can
affect the children’s environment. Id. Under subsection (D), “knowingly” does not
require that a parent have “certain knowledge that an actual injury is occurring.” In
re L.M.M., 522 S.W.3d 34, 44 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. denied)
(citing A.S., 261 S.W.3d at 83). Rather, a parent acts “knowingly” when he or she is
aware of the potential danger but disregards that risk. Id. Under subsection (E), the
evidence must show that the endangerment was the result of the parent’s conduct,
including acts, omissions, or a failure to act. In re K.P., 498 S.W.3d 157, 171 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. denied). Under that subsection, courts may
consider conduct both before and after the child’s birth and before and after the
Department removed the child from the home. In re J.A.R., 696 S.W.3d 245, 254
19
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2024, pet. denied); In re J.D.G., 570 S.W.3d 839,
851 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. denied).
Incarceration alone does not constitute “engaging in conduct” that “endangers
the emotional or physical well-being of a child.” In re J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d 304,
312-13 (Tex. 2021) (quoting Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533-34). However, a parent’s
failure to “stop engaging in criminal activity” after the child’s birth—which risks
separating the parent from the child—is endangering conduct. Id. at 315. And
evidence of “an offense occurring before a person’s children are born can be a
relevant factor in establishing an endangering course of conduct.” In re E.N.C., 384
S.W.3d 796, 804-05 (Tex. 2012). Further, “endangerment does not require a parent’s
drug use to directly harm the child.” R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at 278. Instead, “a pattern
of drug use accompanied by circumstances that indicate related dangers to the child
can establish a substantial risk of harm.” Id.; see id. at 271-72 (noting that
“endanger” under subsections (D) and (E) includes “a substantial risk of harm to the
child”). A factfinder may “reasonably credit” drug-use evidence coupled with
evidence of other endangering circumstances to find that “illegal drug use presents
a risk to the parent’s ‘ability to parent.’” Id. (quoting In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336,
345 (Tex. 2009)).
20
2. Analysis
The Department opened its investigation into Mother based on allegations that
Mother had repeatedly left William home alone while Mother was “out using and
dealing ‘crystal meth.’” One to two days after a Department investigator visited
Mother, Mother was arrested on burglary charges, for which she was incarcerated
for seven months and to which she pled guilty. Her arrest left William home alone
without a suitable caregiver. Mother’s then-romantic partner, the only adult
apparently remaining in the household, told the Department investigator that he
could not care for William. After William was removed, Mother submitted to only
one drug test, and she tested positive for amphetamine and methamphetamine. She
failed to report to multiple requested drug tests, including one court-ordered drug
test on the second day of trial. Prior to William’s removal, Mother had been arrested
multiple times, including on drug-related offenses, at least some of which led to
sentences of incarceration. She has a decade-long history of drug abuse—including
ecstasy, “mushroom edibles,” THC, amphetamine, and methamphetamine—and
agreed at trial that her “addiction issues [were] not under control.” Furthermore, at
the time of trial, Mother conceded that she did not have a home for William and
requested that he remain with Sarah.
From Mother’s positive drug-test result and repeated failure to appear for
requested drug screenings, the trial court could have inferred that Mother was using
21
illegal drugs. See In re J.C., No. 01-25-00136-CV, 2025 WL 2109931, at *10 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 29, 2025, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (noting that trial
court may consider failure to submit to drug test as equivalent to positive test result);
In re K.J.B., No. 01-23-00031-CV, 2023 WL 4188065, at *10 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] June 27, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (noting that trial court may infer from
parent’s failure to appear for drug tests that parent continued to use illegal drugs).
Additionally, the trial court could have reasonably concluded that Mother’s
pattern of incarceration and her inability to secure housing for William are related
to her drug use. See R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at 279 (noting that factfinder could
reasonably infer that parent’s difficulty in providing shelter and support “were
related to his drug use” and concluding sufficient evidence supported termination on
grounds (D) and (E)); In re C.K.J.-S., No. 01-26-00128-CV, 2026 WL 2089398, at
*8-9 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 21, 2026, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (noting
relationship between parent’s drug use and criminal history and affirming
termination on grounds (D) and (E)); J.S., 584 S.W.3d at 636-38 (noting that parent’s
drug use, before and after child’s removal, and criminal history supported trial
court’s endangerment findings). Mother has been convicted of at least one drugrelated offense, and she has served prison time for other offenses, including a
burglary charge, for which she was incarcerated after William’s birth. See J.C., 2025
22
WL 2109931, at *9 (noting parent’s continued criminal activity after child’s birth
supported endangerment findings).
Mother’s circumstances are unlike the facts in a case on which Mother relies:
In re D.T., 34 S.W.3d 625 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2000, pet. denied). In D.T., there
was no evidence of drug use, and the Department relied solely on a single instance
of incarceration: “It is undisputed that this is [the parent’s] first jail sentence, and it
is for a relatively short time . . . . The evidence amounts only to ‘possibilities’ as to
[the parent’s] future incarceration on other unspecified charges in other states.” Id.
at 639. Unlike the parent in D.T., Mother has been incarcerated multiple times, and
her continued drug use carries a substantial risk of harm to William in that she
exposes herself to future arrest and incarceration, leaving William without a
caregiver.
Mother also argues that, because the Department failed to present evidence
regarding the state of Mother’s home, there is no evidence that supports the trial
court’s findings under subsection (D). However, as mentioned, although subsection
(D) concerns the child’s living environment, rather than the parent’s conduct, the
parent’s conduct can affect the children’s environment. A.S., 261 S.W.3d at 83. A
parent “creates an endangering environment that may support termination of parental
rights when she leaves a young child alone in potentially dangerous settings, such as
leaving the child home alone or with other young children without competent adult
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supervision.” In re E.J., No. 14-23-00387-CV, 2023 WL 8043686, at *9 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Nov. 21, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (collecting cases).
Mother’s pattern of arrests and incarcerations creates an endangering environment
by leaving William alone without supervision. Each time Mother is jailed, she is
absent from William’s life and unable to provide for him. See In re T.G.R.-M., 404
S.W.3d 7, 15 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (noting that repeated
arrests and incarceration negatively impact child’s emotional and physical wellbeing). Moreover, given Mother’s drug-use history before and after William’s
removal, “the trial court could infer a course [of] conduct by which the mother
continued to place herself in situations that risked her imprisonment even though she
knew her parental rights were in jeopardy.” Id. Mother’s prior conduct permits an
inference that her endangering conduct will continue in the future. In re N.J.H., 575
S.W.3d 822, 832-33 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.)
(citing Jordan v. Dossey, 325 S.W.3d 700, 724 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.]
2010, pet. denied); Walker v. Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 312 S.W.3d
608, 617 (Tex. App—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied)).
A reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that
the trial court’s findings under subsections (D) and (E) were true, and the disputed
evidence is not so significant that a factfinder could not reasonably have formed a
firm belief or conviction that the findings were true. Accordingly, we hold that
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legally and factually sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s findings under
subsections (D) and (E).
We overrule Mother’s first and second issues. Because only one predicate
ground is necessary to support a judgment of termination and we have already
addressed subsections (D) and (E), as due process requires, we do not address
Mother’s third issue, in which she challenges the trial court’s finding under
subsection (P). See In re A.M., 495 S.W.3d 573, 580 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2016, pet. denied) (not addressing challenge to additional predicate ground after
affirming termination on one predicate ground); see also A.V., 113 S.W.3d at 362
(holding that only one predicate ground is sufficient to affirm termination).
B. Best Interest of Child
In Mother’s fourth issue, she contends that the evidence is legally and
factually insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that termination of her
parental rights is in William’s best interest. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(2).
There is a strong presumption that the best interest of a child is served by keeping
the child with the child’s natural parent. In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. 2006)
(per curiam) (citing TEX. FAM. CODE § 153.131(b)); In re D.R.A., 374 S.W.3d 528,
533 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.). However, prompt and
permanent placement of the child in a safe environment is also presumed to be in the
child’s best interest. TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.307(a).
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Courts may consider the following non-exclusive factors in reviewing the
sufficiency of the evidence to support the best-interest finding: (1) the desires of the
child; (2) the present and future physical and emotional needs of the child; (3) the
present and future emotional and physical danger to the child; (4) the parental
abilities of the persons seeking custody; (5) the programs available to assist those
persons seeking custody in promoting the best interest of the child; (6) the plans for
the child by the individuals or agency seeking custody; (7) the stability of the home
or proposed placement; (8) the acts or omissions of the parent which may indicate
the existing parent-child relationship is not appropriate; and (9) any excuse for the
parent’s acts or omissions. Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371-72 (Tex. 1976).
These factors are not exhaustive, and evidence is not required on each factor to
support a finding that terminating a parent’s rights is in the child’s best interest. Id.
at 372; D.R.A., 374 S.W.3d at 533. Moreover, evidence supporting termination under
one of the grounds listed in section 161.001(b)(1) can also be considered in support
of a finding that termination is in the best interest of the child. See In re C.H., 89
S.W.3d 17, 28 (Tex. 2002) (holding same evidence may be probative of both section
161.001(b)(1) grounds and best interest).
1. Child’s desires, environment, and needs
The same evidence that supports the trial court’s endangerment findings also
supports the trial court’s best-interest finding: Mother’s multiple incarcerations
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leave William without a stable environment and “put a child in [Mother’s] custody
in emotional and physical danger now or in the future.” In re V.V., 349 S.W.3d 548,
558 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. denied) (en banc) (relying on
evidence of endangerment to support best-interest finding). Mother’s most recent
incarceration left William without anyone to care for him. Mother’s criminal history
and drug use have subjected—and may continue to subject—William to a life of
uncertainty and instability. See Jordan, 325 S.W.3d at 723 (“Conduct that subjects
a child to life of uncertainty and instability endangers the child’s physical and
emotional well-being.”).
Furthermore, although William was four years old at the time of trial and did
not testify, the factfinder may consider with whom the child has bonded as evidence
of the child’s desires. In re B.M.R., 84 S.W.3d 814, 820 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2002, no pet.); In re R.R.A., No. 14-22-00217-CV, 2025 WL 1375185, at *3
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] May 13, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.) (reviewing
sufficiency of best-interest finding on remand). William’s visits with Mother went
well; however, William has bonded with Sarah, has referred to Sarah as
“[M]ommy,” and, according to Sarah, becomes upset when he is told that Sarah is
not his mother. Additionally, the caseworker, Robles, testified that William does not
refer to Mother as “mom” or any similar name and instead says “hey” to get Mother’s
attention during visits.
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2. Proposed placement
Sarah testified that she and her husband intend to adopt William. Robles
testified that the Department has no concerns with Sarah as a placement. A home
study was conducted, during which William was observed hugging Sarah and asking
her for help with a puzzle, and the Department approved Sarah’s home as a
placement. Sarah’s husband has been employed by the same company since 2015,
and his income is sufficient to support Sarah and William.
3. Mother’s parenting abilities and acts or omissions
William is Mother’s fourth child and, although Mother lives in a home with
her third child, Mother does not have primary custody of any of her children.
Mother’s eldest child has lived with Mother’s former sister-in-law since 2017.
Mother’s next child tested positive for amphetamine at birth and was adopted shortly
after. And Mother’s third child lives with Mother’s godmother, Mary, with whom
Mother also resides. From Mother’s relationships with her other children, coupled
with the circumstances of William’s removal, the trial court could have reasonably
inferred that Mother lacked parenting abilities. See In re A.C., 559 S.W.3d 176, 182
(Tex. App.—Dallas 2017) (noting that parent’s agreement to termination in
mediation, among other things, supported inference that parenting abilities were
lacking and support best-interest finding), aff’d, 560 S.W.3d 624 (Tex. 2018); In re
M.C.H., No. 14-12-00103-CV, 2012 WL 1795123, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
28
Dist.] May 17, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.) (noting that parent’s “lack of parenting
ability with her other three children” supported termination).
Additionally, Mother failed to appear on the third and final day of the trial.
On the final day of trial, Mother’s attorney represented that she had not heard from
Mother since the previous day of trial, three weeks earlier. Mother’s failure to attend
trial is “one more circumstance from which the factfinder could have inferred that
she was indifferent to her parental rights and responsibilities.” In re A.J.D.-J., 667
S.W.3d 813, 826 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2023, no pet.) (relying on parent’s
failure to attend trial to support best-interest finding and affirm termination).
4. Summary
Considering all evidence in the record in the light most favorable to the trial
court’s finding, and deferring to the trial court as the sole arbiter when assessing the
credibility and demeanor of witnesses, we conclude that a reasonable trier of fact
could have formed a firm belief or conviction that the trial court’s best-interest
finding was true. See H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d at 108; J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. We have
not found disputed evidence that a reasonable factfinder could not have resolved in
favor of the trial court’s best-interest finding that is so significant that the trial court
could not have reasonably formed a firm belief or conviction in its best-interest
finding. J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. Accordingly, we hold that legally and factually
sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s best-interest finding.
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We overrule Mother’s fourth issue.
Conclusion
We affirm the trial court’s decree of termination.
Amparo “Amy” Guerra
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Rivas-Molloy, Guerra, and Gunn.
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