In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
No. 02-26-00253-CV
TIFFANI BOWDEN, Appellant
V.
LORI ROCCO, Appellee
On Appeal from the 325th District Court
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 325-777694-26
Before Sudderth, C.J.; Bassel and Walker, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Bassel
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Tiffani Bowden, acting pro se, challenges a protective order entered against her
under Title 4 of the Texas Family Code. Raising three issues, Bowden argues (1) that
her due-process rights were violated because she was not present at the final hearing
on the protective-order application; (2) that the trial court erred by granting the
protective-order application because the applicant, Appellee Lori Rocco, had acted
with unclean hands and had committed extrinsic fraud; and (3) that the evidence is
legally insufficient to support the trial court’s family-violence finding. We will affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
In January 2026, Rocco filed an application for a protective order against
Bowden—her daughter.1 In the application, she asserted that Bowden had
committed family violence.2 Specifically, she alleged that Bowden, among other
things, had pushed her, had threatened to kill her by scraping “I will kill you hoe” into
the side of her vehicle, had threatened to kill her husband (i.e., Bowden’s stepfather),
had sent threatening text messages, and had previously been arrested after repeatedly
throwing a “sharp tool” at a closed bedroom door in the family home.
1
The application was originally filed in the 322nd District Court but was later transferred to the 325th District Court. We do not distinguish between these courts herein and refer to both courts as the “trial court.”
She also asserted that Bowden had violated a previous protective order that
2
had since expired or would expire within thirty days.
2
The trial court signed a temporary ex parte protective order and set the
application for hearing.
In February 2026, Bowden entered an appearance in the case and indicated that
she had chosen to represent herself. She later filed a motion seeking a continuance of,
or permission to appear remotely at, the hearing then scheduled for March 3, 2026,
because she had tested positive for the flu and for COVID-19.
After Bowden filed her motion for continuance, the hearing on Rocco’s
protective-order application was rescheduled multiple times and was eventually set for
March 26, 2026. Bowden claims that she was arrested on March 10, 2026, and
remained incarcerated “through April 2026.” Nevertheless, despite receiving notice
of the March 26, 2026 hearing, she never filed a motion for continuance, requested a
bench warrant, or asked to appear remotely at the hearing.
Bowden did not appear at the March 2026 hearing, but Rocco appeared and
testified concerning numerous incidents in which Bowden had threatened or assaulted
her and her husband. Following the hearing, the trial court found that family violence
had occurred and signed a two-year final protective order prohibiting Bowden from,
among other things, committing further acts of family violence; communicating with
Rocco, her husband, or her grandson in a threatening or harassing manner; or going
within 500 yards of their persons, their residence, or their respective places of
employment. See Tex. Fam. Code §§ 85.001(a), (b)(1), 85.022. This appeal followed.
3
II. DISCUSSION
A. Due Process
In her first issue, Bowden contends that her due-process rights were violated
because her incarceration prevented her from attending the March 26, 2026 hearing.3
We disagree.
An inmate does not have an absolute right to appear in person at every court
proceeding. In re Z.L.T., 124 S.W.3d 163, 165 (Tex. 2003). Rather, if an inmate
wishes to appear at a hearing in a civil proceeding, she must file a request for a bench
warrant providing sufficient information to allow the trial court to balance the
inmate’s need to appear at the hearing against the need to protect the correctional
system’s integrity. See id. (setting forth factors courts should consider in deciding
whether to grant a bench warrant). Thus, the burden is on the inmate to establish her
right to relief, and if she fails to present sufficient information to the trial court, the
trial court does not abuse its discretion by denying the request. Ringer v. Kimball, 274
S.W.3d 865, 868 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, no pet.) (citing Z.L.T., 124 S.W.3d at
166).
Citing Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., 133 S.W.2d 124, 126 (Tex. [Comm’n
3
Op.] 1939), Bowden also argues under her first issue that the protective order—which the trial court styled as a “default” protective order, see Tex. Fam. Code § 85.006— should be set aside because her failure to appear was not intentional or the result of conscious indifference. But because Bowden did not file a motion for new trial, she is not entitled to have the order set aside under Craddock. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 324(b)(1); Young v. Marquardt, No. 03-24-00288-CV, 2025 WL 643994, at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin Feb. 28, 2025, no pet.).
4
Here, the record contains no evidence demonstrating that Bowden requested a
bench warrant or that she otherwise sought and was denied access to the trial court by
motion, objection, or other complaint. Because Bowden failed to request a bench
warrant or to otherwise seek access to the court at the trial level, she has not
preserved her due-process complaint for our review. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a);
Morales v. A.D.W., No. 02-23-00073-CV, 2024 WL 482862, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth Feb. 8, 2024, pet. denied) (holding that incarcerated appellant had not
preserved his due-process complaint based on his inability to attend the final hearing
on the appellee’s protective-order application because he had “failed to request a
bench warrant or to otherwise seek access to the court at the trial level”); Smith v. Tex.
Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, No. 02-02-00035-CV, 2003 WL 22724996, at *1 (Tex. App.—
Fort Worth Nov. 20, 2003, no pet.) (holding that appellant had waived his complaint
concerning his right of access to court when he did not request a bench warrant or
otherwise seek access to the court at the trial level).
We overrule Bowden’s first issue.
B. Unclean Hands
In her second issue, Bowden contends that that the trial court erred by granting
the protective-order application because Rocco had acted with unclean hands and had
committed extrinsic fraud. But Bowden has forfeited this complaint.
The unclean-hands doctrine and fraud are affirmative defenses that must be
specifically pleaded. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 94; Hamaker v. Newman, No. 02-19-00405-CV,
5
2022 WL 714554, at *17 n.23 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 10, 2022, no pet.); Tex.
Tax Sols., LLC v. City of El Paso, 593 S.W.3d 903, 909 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2019, no
pet.). Bowden did not plead these affirmative defenses, nor did she otherwise present
them to the trial court. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a).
Further, she has cited to nothing in the record that would support either
theory. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i). Instead, she exclusively relies on documents
attached to her brief to support her unclean-hands and extrinsic-fraud arguments.
But such documents are not part of the appellate record, and we cannot consider
them. See In re G.K., No. 02-25-00420-CV, 2025 WL 3558969, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth Dec. 11, 2025, no pet.); see also Leal v. Lopez, No. 11-24-00015-CV, 2025 WL
1335315, at *5 (Tex. App.—Eastland May 8, 2025, pet. denied) (“[B]ecause the
appendix and its inclusions attached to [appellant’s] appellate brief are not part of the
appellate record, we cannot and do not consider them.”); Bell v. State for S.E.G., 659
S.W.3d 21, 24 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2021, pet. denied) (stating that because the
attachment of documents as exhibits or appendices to briefs is not a formal inclusion
in the record on appeal, the documents attached to appellant’s brief could not be
considered).
Because Bowden failed to present her unclean-hands and extrinsic-fraud
theories to the trial court or relies on documents not a part of the appellate record,
she has forfeited her complaint. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a), 38.1(i).
We overrule Bowden’s second issue.
6
C. Sufficiency of the Evidence to Support Family-Violence Finding
In her third issue, Bowden contends that the evidence is legally insufficient to
support the trial court’s family-violence finding. 4 We disagree.
1. Standard of Review
When, as here, the trial court acts as factfinder, we review its findings under the
familiar legal-sufficiency standard. In re Doe, 19 S.W.3d 249, 253 (Tex. 2000); see also
Watts v. Adviento, No. 02-17-00424-CV, 2019 WL 1388534, at *3 n.3 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth Mar. 28, 2019, no pet.). Under this standard, we may sustain a legal-sufficiency
challenge—that is, a no-evidence challenge—only when (1) the record bears no
evidence of a vital fact, (2) the rules of law or of evidence bar the court from giving
weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact, (3) the evidence offered to
prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla, or (4) the evidence establishes
conclusively the opposite of a vital fact. Gunn v. McCoy, 554 S.W.3d 645, 658 (Tex.
2018); Huskins v. Garcia, No. 02-21-00328-CV, 2022 WL 3905083, at *2 (Tex. App.—
Fort Worth Aug. 31, 2022, no pet.). In determining whether legally sufficient
evidence supports the challenged finding, we must consider evidence favorable to the
finding if a reasonable factfinder could, and we must disregard contrary evidence
4
In her briefing, Bowden incorrectly states that the trial court was required to “find that family violence ha[d] occurred and [was] likely to occur in the future” before issuing the protective order. However, as amended effective September 1, 2023, Family Code Sections 81.001 and 85.001 no longer require courts to find that family violence is likely to occur in the future before issuing a protective order. See Z.S. v. L.S., 676 S.W.3d 845, 849 n.3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2023, no pet.).
7
unless a reasonable factfinder could not. Cent. Ready Mix Concrete Co. v. Islas, 228
S.W.3d 649, 651 (Tex. 2007); City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005).
We indulge “every reasonable inference deducible from the evidence” in support of
the challenged finding. Gunn, 554 S.W.3d at 658 (quoting Bustamante v. Ponte, 529
S.W.3d 447, 456 (Tex. 2017)).
2. Analysis
As with her second issue, Bowden cites to nothing in the record to support her
evidentiary-sufficiency complaint and instead relies exclusively on certain “text
communications” attached as an exhibit to her brief to support her argument. See
Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i); see also G.K., 2025 WL 3558969, at *4. Her brief does not
reference any of the evidence presented at the March 26, 2026 hearing, nor does it
include any authority to support her argument that the evidence is insufficient.
Accordingly, she has forfeited her evidentiary-sufficiency complaint due to inadequate
briefing. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i); Mata v. Argos USA LLC, No. 06-21-00089-CV,
2022 WL 1193671, at *4 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Apr. 22, 2022, no pet.) (holding that
evidentiary-sufficiency argument had been waived due to inadequate briefing).
Further, even assuming that (1) Bowden had not forfeited her third issue and
(2) we could consider the text communications attached to her brief, we would
nevertheless overrule her evidentiary-sufficiency complaint on the merits. Bowden
argues that because Rocco purportedly admitted in a text message that her husband
had “acknowledged [that Bowden] ‘did not touch him,’” the evidence “affirmatively
8
demonstrates an absence of physical assault” and is therefore insufficient to support
the trial court’s family-violence finding. But family violence is not limited to physical
assaults; rather, it includes “threat[s]” that reasonably place a family or household
member “in fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury, assault, or sexual assault.”
Tex. Fam. Code § 71.004(1). Thus, even if the record showed an “absence of physical
assault” as Bowden contends, this would not preclude the trial court’s family-violence
finding.
And Rocco testified concerning numerous incidents in which Bowden had
threatened to kill her and her husband, including one in which Bowden had pulled a
knife on Rocco’s husband and had “threatened him that way.” This testimony,
standing alone, is sufficient to support the trial court’s family-violence finding. See
Anjum v. Shams-Ul-Qamar, No. 04-21-00586-CV, 2023 WL 6285331, at *4 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio Sep. 27, 2023, no pet.) (pointing out that “an applicant’s
testimony alone is sufficient to support findings in a protective order” (citing Lummus
v. Lummus, No. 04-22-00350-CV, 2023 WL 242730, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
Jan. 18, 2023, no pet.))).
We overrule Bowden’s third issue.
9
III. CONCLUSION
Having overruled all of Bowden’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s protective
order.
/s/ Dabney Bassel
Dabney Bassel
Justice
Delivered: October 15, 2026
10