[Cite as State v. Crace, 2026-Ohio-4116.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
ADAMS COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, :
: Case No. 25CA1228
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
:
v. : DECISION AND JUDGMENT
: ENTRY
RODNEY CRACE, :
:
Defendant-Appellant. : RELEASED: 10/13/2026
APPEARANCES:
Brian T. Goldberg, Cincinnati, Ohio, for appellant.
Ariana Bowels Norris, Adams County Prosecuting Attorney, and Sean M.
Donovan, Adams County Assistant Prosecutor, for appellee.
Wilkin, J.
{¶1} This is an appeal from a judgment entry of the Adams County Court
of Common Pleas sentencing Rodney Crace (“Crace”) to an aggregate 34-month
prison term, imposing a one-year driver’s license suspension, and ordering
forfeiture of a firearm after he pleaded guilty to having a weapon while under a
disability, aggravated possession of drugs, operating a vehicle under the
influence, and driving with a suspended license. On appeal, Crace argues that
the trial court’s imposition of consecutive prison terms was not supported by the
record and that the suspension of his license was invalid because it was not read
in open court. After reviewing the parties’ arguments, the record, and the
applicable law, we find both his assignments of error lack merit and therefore
affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Adams App. No. 25CA1228 2
BACKGROUND
{¶2} On October 21, 2024, Crace was indicted on nine criminal counts,
including one count of having weapons while under disability in violation of R.C.
2923.13(A)(4), a third-degree felony; three counts of improper-handling of a
firearm in a motor vehicle in violation of R.C. 2923.16(B) and (D)(1) and (2),
fourth- and fifth-degree felonies; one count of aggravated possession of drugs in
violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), a fifth-degree felony; three counts of operating a
vehicle under the influence of drugs (OVI) in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a),
(A)(1)(j)(i) and (A)(1)(j)(viii)(ix), first-degree misdemeanors; and driving with a
suspended license in violation of R.C. 4511.11(A), a first degree misdemeanor.
On May 7, 2025, he pleaded guilty to having weapons while under disability
(Count 1), aggravated possession of drugs (Count 5), OVI (Count 6), and driving
with a suspended license (Count 9), and the remaining counts were dismissed
per a plea agreement.
{¶3} The court held a sentencing hearing on July 23, 2025, which it
continued to September 3, 2025. During the hearing, the court stated that it
considered the principles and purposes of felony sentencing under R.C.
2929.11(A) and balanced the seriousness and recidivism factors under R.C.
2929.12. The court then discussed the circumstances of the offenses, including
the involvement of two other individuals, methamphetamine use, and Crace’s
“bizarre” behavior. Crace also acknowledged that, after these offenses, he was
again convicted of driving without a valid license. The court further referenced
additional violations, including driving under suspension, driving 80 m.p.h. in a Adams App. No. 25CA1228 3
55-m.p.h. zone, and causing an accident by failing to maintain an assured clear
distance ahead. The court also noted that Crace violated bond by failing to
report and by failing a drug screen.
{¶4} The court concluded:
After due consideration, the court finds the defendant is no
longer amenable to available community control sanctions. It's
therefore ordered that the defendant shall serve a stated prison
term in count one of 24 months and a stated prison term in count
five of 10 months, which will served . . . consecutive to the term
imposed in count one and the term of local incarceration in count
six of the 180 days which shall be served concurrent to the terms
imposed in count one and five and a term of local incarceration
and count nine of 180 days which also be served concurrent to
the terms of incarceration and counts one and five. For a total term
of incarceration of 34 months.
Because multiple prison terms are imposed on the offender
for convictions of multiple offenses, the court may require the
offender to serve these terms consecutively and two of them are
because the court finds that consecutive services is necessary to
protect the public from future crime and or to punish the offender
and that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the
seriousness of the offender's conduct and to the danger that he
poses to the public. And the court finds further that at least two of
the multiple offenses were committed as part of one or more
courses of conduct and the harm caused or the potential harm
caused by two or more of the multiple offenses so committed is so
great or unusual that no single prison term for any of the offenses
committed as part of the courses of conduct would adequately
reflect the seriousness of the offender's conduct.
{¶5} The entry further imposed a $375 OVI fine, a one-year driver’s
license suspension, and forfeiture of his firearm. It is this judgment that Crace
appeals.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES
WHEN THE RECORD DID NOT SUPPORT THE FINDINGS MADE BY
THE TRIAL COURT TO IMPOSE CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES.
Adams App. No. 25CA1228 4
II. MR. CRACE’S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED WHEN THE
TRIAL COURT IMPOSED A SENTENCE THAT WAS NOT ANNOUNCED
IN OPEN COURT
First Assignment of Error
{¶6} In his first assignment of error, Crace asserts that the trial court erred
by imposing consecutive sentences because the record does not support the
court’s consecutive sentence findings made pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(C)(4).
Crace claims that consecutive sentences are unnecessary to protect the public
from future crime or to punish him. In support, Crace acknowledged his
admission to the court that he was addicted to drugs at the time of this offense
but notes he reported to the court that he had attended addiction meetings and
treatment, had been sober for over 200 days, and was in treatment for his
addiction. He also cites testimony from his pastor, which indicated that he
believed “[Crace’s] heart has really been changed, and he really does want to
live a better life.”
{¶7} He also argues his lack of significant criminal history, which is limited
to prior traffic offenses, weighs against consecutive terms. He contends a
24-month term suffices to reflect seriousness without the additional consecutive
10 months.
{¶8} Finally, he claims that for the same reasons he cited previously,
consecutive sentences “were not necessary to reflect the seriousness of [his]
conduct.”
Adams App. No. 25CA1228 5
{¶9} Therefore, Crace moves this Court to modify his sentence by
ordering his 24-month and 10-month prison terms be served concurrently rather
than consecutively.
{¶10} In response, the State contends that the record supports the trial
court’s decision to impose consecutive sentences. The State notes that the trial
court described the conduct underlying Crace’s convictions as “a day-long event
of driving around, partying with guns and methamphetamine . . . in a highly
congested area as far as businesses and persons.” The State also emphasizes
the trial court’s concern that, shortly after his arrest in this case, Crace incurred
another charge for driving without a license. In addition, the court referenced
Crace’s prior traffic-related violations, including fictitious registration (2023),
driving under suspension (2023), speeding (80 m.p.h. in a 55-m.p.h. zone),
causing an accident by failing to maintain an assured clear distance, and bond
violations for failing to report and failing to submit to drug testing.
{¶11} The State argues that these facts support the trial court’s
consecutive-sentence findings. Accordingly, the State asks this court to overrule
Crace’s first assignment of error.
A. Law
{¶12} We review the appeal of a felony sentence under R.C. 2953.08(G).
R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a)
authorizes appellate courts to increase, reduce, or otherwise
modify a sentence “if it clearly and convincingly finds either of the
following”:
(a) That the record does not support the sentencing court's
findings under division (B) or (D) of section 2929.13, division
(B)(2)(e) or Treatments(C)(4) of section 2929.14, or division (I) of
Adams App. No. 25CA1228 6
section 2929.20 of the Revised Code, whichever, if any, is
relevant;
(b) That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.
State v. Rogers, 2026-Ohio-2277, ¶ 17 (4th Dist.)
{¶13} “Generally, a trial court is required to make certain findings pursuant
to R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) before ordering a defendant to serve multiple prison terms
consecutively.” State v. Durst, 2026-Ohio-2600, ¶11 (4th Dist.). “The trial court
is required to make the consecutive-sentence findings at the disposition hearing
and incorporate the findings in the sentencing entry.” Id., citing State v. Bonnell,
2014-Ohio-3177, ¶ 23. R.C.2929.14(C)(4) provides that:
[i]f multiple prison terms are imposed on an offender for
convictions of multiple offenses, the court may require the
offender to serve the prison terms consecutively if the court finds
that the consecutive service is necessary to protect the public from
future crime or to punish the offender and that consecutive
sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the
offender's conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the
public, and if the court also finds any of the following:
(a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses
while the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a
sanction imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or
2929.18 of the Revised Code, or was under post-release control
for a prior offense.
(b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of
one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or
more of the multiple offenses so committed was so great or
unusual that no single prison term for any of the offenses
committed as part of any of the courses of conduct adequately
reflects the seriousness of the offender's conduct.
(c) The offender's history of criminal conduct demonstrates that
consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from
future crime by the offender.
Adams App. No. 25CA1228 7
{¶14} “The record must support any findings that the applicable statutory
sentencing provisions require and that are made by the sentencing court,
including those contained in R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a)-(c).” State v. McFarland,
2025-Ohio, ¶ 17 (4th Dist.), citing State v. Gray, 2019-Ohio-5317, ¶ 21 (4th Dist.);
State v. Drummond, 2024-Ohio-81, ¶ 11 (4th Dist.). A “trial judge may consider
the credibility of the witnesses' testimony in contemplating the statutory factors
for sentencing purposes.” State v. Lytle, 1998 WL 429845, *3 (2d Dist. July 31,
1998).
{¶15} Finally, we observed “that the plain language of R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)
requires an appellate court to defer to a trial court's consecutive-sentence
findings, and to uphold the trial court's findings unless those findings are clearly
and convincingly not supported by the record.” State v. Collins, 2024-Ohio-2891,
¶25 (4th Dist.), citing Drummond at ¶ 12. “[P]ractically speaking, R.C.
2953.08(G)(2) means that appellate courts ordinarily ‘ “defer to trial courts’ broad
discretion in making sentencing decisions,” ’ ” State v. Rogers, 2026-Ohio-2277,
¶ 17, quoting State v. Gwynne, 2023-Ohio-3851, ¶ 11 (lead opinion), quoting
State v. Rahab, 2017-Ohio-1401, ¶ 10 (lead opinion).
Analysis
{¶16} Crace does not dispute that the trial court made the appropriate
findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(b) necessary to impose consecutive prison
terms. Instead, he argues the record does not support the trial court’s findings
that consecutive sentences are (1) “necessary in this case to protect the public
from future crime or punish [him,]” and (2) “necessary to reflect the seriousness Adams App. No. 25CA1228 8
of [his] conduct.” However, he does not meaningfully challenge the remaining
findings made by the trial court, i.e., that consecutive sentences are not
disproportionate or that the offenses were committed as part of a course of
conduct causing harm so great or unusual that no single term would adequately
reflect the seriousness of his conduct.
{¶17} We find that the sentencing record supports the trial court’s
conclusion that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from
future crime and punish Crace. Crace was convicted of driving a vehicle that
contained a firearm while under a license suspension with multiple persons who
were under the influence of methamphetamine. The trial court described Crace’s
offenses as “a day-long event of driving around, partying with guns and
methamphetamine and it and as the state of Ohio pointed out in a highly
congested area as far as businesses and persons.” Even Crace admits “nobody
will dispute that operating a motor vehicle with a suspended license while in
possession of a firearm and methamphetamine is a serious and dangerous
offense.” These facts reasonably support a finding that Crace’s conduct posed a
serious public-safety risk.
{¶18} The record also reflects continued unlawful driving behavior after
Crace’s arrest. Shortly after he was arrested on the charges herein, Crace again
operated a vehicle while his license was suspended. That post-arrest conduct
supports the trial court’s conclusion that Crace posed an ongoing risk and that
consecutive sentences were necessary to protect the public.
Adams App. No. 25CA1228 9
{¶19} Further, Crace admitted at sentencing that he is a drug addict and
failed a drug test. Given that the underlying conduct involved methamphetamine
and dangerous driving circumstances, the trial court could reasonably conclude
that Crace’s substance-abuse issues increased the likelihood of recidivism and
future danger.
{¶20} Finally, the record indicates Crace caused an auto accident by
failing to maintain an assured clear distance and was cited for driving 80 mph in
a 55-mph zone, which also supports the trial court’s finding that Crace is a
danger to the public.
{¶21} Nevertheless, Crace relies on his own testimony (e.g., sobriety for
200 days) and his pastor’s testimony that his “heart has really been changed.”
But the trial court was tasked with assessing credibility and weighing mitigation.
The court determined the testimony was insufficient to mitigate the need to
protect the public or to impose consecutive sentences, and the record does not
warrant disturbing that credibility determination.
{¶22} Crace also argues that his lack of criminal history shows
consecutive sentences are unsupported by the record, but that contention does
not address the basis on which the trial court imposed consecutive terms. The
court imposed consecutive sentences pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(b)
(authorizes consecutive sentences if offenses were committed as “one or more
courses of conduct[,]” and the “harm caused” was “great or unusual”), not R.C.
2929.14(C)(4)(c) (authorizes consecutive sentence based on offender’s “criminal
history”). Thus, Crace’s criminal history argument is misplaced.
Adams App. No. 25CA1228 10
{¶23} Because the record reflects sustained and dangerous conduct
involving firearms, methamphetamine, unlawful driving in a congested area,
continued suspended driving after arrest, admitted addiction and failed drug
testing, and additional unsafe driving behavior, the trial court’s findings that
consecutive sentences were necessary to protect the public and to reflect the
seriousness of Crace’s conduct. Accordingly, the consecutive sentences are not
clearly and convincingly unsupported by the record.
Second Assignment of Error
{¶24} In his second assignment of error, Crace claims that his due
process was violated because the sentencing entry imposed a one-year driver’s
license suspension not announced in open court
{¶25} Therefore, Crace maintains that his sentence should be reversed
and his case remanded for resentencing.
{¶26} In response, the State claims that the court did announce the
suspension of Crace’s driver’s license in open court during the sentencing
hearing. Therefore, the State asks this court to overrule Crace’s second
assignment of error.
Law and Analysis
{¶27} Subject to exceptions not alleged in this case, Ohio Crim.R. 43
provides that “the defendant must be physically present at every stage of the
criminal proceeding and trial, including the . . . imposition of sentence[.]”
Interpreting Ohio Crim.R. 43, the Sixth District Court of Appeals has reasoned
that:
Adams App. No. 25CA1228 11
[b]ecause a defendant is required to be present when sentence is
imposed, it constitutes reversible error for the trial court to impose
a different sentence in its judgment entry than was announced at
the sentencing hearing in defendant's presence. Thus, “ ‘if there
exists a variance between the sentence pronounced in open court
and the sentence imposed by a court's judgment entry, a remand
for resentencing is required.’ ”
In re A.T., 2014-Ohio-1761, ¶ 63 (6th Dist.), quoting State v. Hardison, 2011-Ohio-4859, ¶ 9 (6th Dist.), quoting State v. Pfeifer, 2011-Ohio-289, ¶ 8 (6th Dist.).
{¶28} Contrary to Crace’s assertion, the trial court did state in open court
that part of his sentence would be the suspension of his driver’s license.
Therefore, because the suspension of Crace’s driver’s license was stated in open
court and on the court’s sentencing entry, his argument lacks merit. Accordingly,
we overrule Crace’s second assignment of error.
CONCLUSION
{¶29} Having overruled both of Crace’s assignments of error, we affirm the
trial court judgment entry.
JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED.
Adams App. No. 25CA1228 12
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED and that appellant shall
pay the costs.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Adams County Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Smith, P.J.: Concurs in Judgment and Opinion.
Judge Peter B. Abele concurred in this Judgment and Opinion prior to his death on September 25, 2026.1
For the Court,
BY: ____________________________
Kristy S. Wilkin, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 22, this document constitutes a final
judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.
1
The Ohio Constitution requires the concurrence of at least two judges when rendering a decision of a court of appeals. Therefore, this announcement of decision is in compliance with constitutional requirements. See State v. Pembaur (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 110.