TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
NO. 03-25-00824-CR
NO. 03-25-00826-CR
Richard Vincent Ramos, Appellant
v.
The State of Texas, Appellee
FROM THE 26TH DISTRICT COURT OF WILLIAMSON COUNTY
NOS. 24-1671-K26 & 24-1672-K26, THE HONORABLE DONNA GAYLE KING, JUDGE
PRESIDING
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Richard Vincent Ramos was convicted of two counts of aggravated sexual assault
of a child and sentenced to 90 years’ imprisonment on each count. See Tex. Penal Code
§§ 12.32, 22.021. The victim in both counts was his niece N.M., who was twelve when she
made an outcry about the abuse. 1 On appeal, Ramos contends that the trial court erred by
allowing the outcry witness, N.M.’s mother, to testify about extraneous offenses allegedly
committed against N.M.’s sisters and that two fines were improperly included in the bill of costs
for each case. We will modify the trial court’s judgments of conviction and bills of costs to
delete one fine and affirm the judgments as modified.
1 Because N.M. and her sisters were minors during the time that the abuse occurred, we will refer to them by aliases and to their family members by their relationships to them. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.10(a)(3) (defining sensitive information).
BACKGROUND
Mother met Father in middle school while living in California, but they did not
start dating until they reconnected in their twenties. Ultimately, they got married and had four
daughters: N.M. (oldest), C.M. (second child), A.M. (third child), and P.M. (youngest).
Mother’s parents lived nearby, and Mother and her children would regularly visit her parents’
home. Ramos is Mother’s brother, and he lived with their parents.
In 2019, Mother and Father decided to move to Texas with their children. Shortly
thereafter, Mother’s parents moved to Texas to be near Mother and her family. Ramos also left
California and moved to Texas. Ramos and his parents temporarily moved into an apartment
before moving into their new house. As it had been in California, Mother regularly brought her
children to her parents’ apartment and home and let Ramos babysit her children.
In 2022, Mother and Father went to California because Father was scheduled to
have surgery there. Shortly after they returned to Texas, N.M. told Mother that Ramos had been
sexually abusing her. Mother told Father, who called the police. The police arranged for N.M.
to have a forensic interview and a forensic exam. The police arrested Ramos a few days later,
and the police seized and later searched his phone. An extraction report created as part of the
search showed that Ramos owned the phone and that he had installed a search engine designed to
hide the identity of the person using it and to search the dark web. The report also showed that
the phone’s user dictionary 2 had saved the following words for quick autofill purposes: “[n]ude,
model, teen, girls, teens, models, young, preteen, girls, and girl.” The search history for the
phone showed that the following searches had been performed on the phone: “[m]odels nude;
2 According to the testimony presented at trial, each cell phone has a user dictionary file that contains search terms that the user uses regularly that can then be used to auto-populate or autocomplete future searches.
2
photos leaks; nonnude preteen models; use net models; index young; images and videos;
cherished model; cute, little models”; and “7, 8, 9, YO cuties.” The report listed other search
terms that were used and that are terms used by individuals specifically seeking child
pornography. Additionally, the report documented that the search engine browser had photos of
child pornography in the cache folder and links to child pornography.
After the police investigated the allegations, Ramos was charged with two counts
of aggravated sexual assault of a child. Ramos elected to represent himself at trial. Before any
witnesses were called, the trial court held a hearing outside the presence of the jury in which the
State explained that it intended to call Mother as an outcry witness under article 38.072 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure. During the hearing, Mother testified that in February 2022 she
went out of state with Father and their two oldest daughters because Father was having surgery.
Further, Mother explained that her two youngest children stayed with her parents while she was
out of town. Shortly after returning home, Mother started preparing a meal for her family in the
kitchen. While Mother was cooking, P.M. and A.M. were in the kitchen with her, and P.M. told
Mother that Ramos hurt and kicked her while Mother was away on the trip. P.M. also told
Mother that Ramos hurts her a lot. Mother exclaimed, “[W]hat!” C.M. overheard Mother and
went into the kitchen to see what was happening. After being told what P.M. had said, C.M. told
Mother that Ramos “touches us in places he shouldn’t” and explained that the touching was like
what was described in a safety video shown at her school in which a child was sexually abused
by a family member. P.M. and A.M. both agreed with that description and said, “Yeah, Mom, he
does, he does that to us.” The children also explained that Ramos would touch them on their
breasts, try to put his hand down their pants, make them look at things on his phone, and ask
them to run around naked.
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Mother testified that after talking with C.M., P.M., and A.M., she went to N.M.’s
room, woke her up, and asked her if Ramos had touched her too. N.M. started crying and told
Mother that Ramos would pull her pants down and lick her in inappropriate places. Further,
N.M. discussed how Ramos would threaten her if she did not comply with what he wanted her to
do and threatened to hurt her if she told anyone about the abuse.
Following Mother’s testimony at the hearing, Ramos generally objected to
Mother’s testifying about the three sisters “since I have pending charges on those accusations. I
believe if I’m being tried on the -- [N.M.]’s statements, the scope of the trial should be to
[N.M.]’s statements.” After the State argued that Mother could testify as an outcry witness and
could testify about the other children under article 38.37 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
which allows the admission of evidence concerning offenses involving other victims, Ramos
objected that article 38.37 did not apply because the offenses involving the other sisters “are
actually not alleged now” because “they’re charged and indicted offenses. So I now have the
presumption of innocence where my inference of guilt cannot be brought against me now since I
have that presumption of innocence on these extraneous offenses.”
The trial court overruled the objections and determined that Mother could testify
as an outcry witness under article 38.072 and that article 38.37 also applied and authorized
Mother to testify about the offenses involving her other daughters.
After the hearing concluded, the trial on the merits commenced. In its case-inchief, the State called as witnesses Mother, Maternal Grandmother, a counselor who treated
N.M. and C.M., a sexual assault nurse examiner (“SANE”) who reviewed forensic reports
prepared by another examiner, C.M., N.M., and police officers involved in the investigation. In
his case-in-chief, Ramos called a forensic consultant to testify about the search of his phone
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before electing to testify. The witnesses described the events summarized above and provided
additional testimony as set out below.
In her testimony, Mother explained that sometime after her parents moved to
Texas, N.M. and C.M. both stopped wanting to spend the night at their grandparents’ home.
Next, Mother testified similarly to what she said during the 38.072 hearing concerning how her
children made outcries about Ramos after she returned from a trip to California. Further, Mother
explained that C.M. said that Ramos would put his hands inside the girls’ pants to touch their
genitals and would put his hand in their shirts to touch their breasts. Regarding N.M., Mother
testified that N.M. started shaking and told Mother that Ramos would pull her pants down, “lick
her in her pookie,” and threaten to hurt her if she told anyone.
Next, Maternal Grandmother testified that N.M. and C.M. stopped wanting to
spend the night at her house and that N.M. asked to sleep in Maternal Grandmother’s room rather
than the guest room next to Ramos’s room that the girls usually slept in. Further, Maternal
Grandmother recalled that in February 2022 Mother called her and said that Ramos “molested
my daughters.” In addition, Maternal Grandmother stated that the children would not make up
those allegations.
C.M. testified that in February 2022 when she was eleven, she told Mother that
Ramos “was touching us inappropriately.” Further, she discussed how prior to making that
disclosure guest lecturers at her school had discussed sexual abuse and shown a video regarding
abuse. She did not realize what Ramos had been doing to her and her sisters was wrong until
attending that lecture. Moreover, she said that the abuse started when she was six or seven.
When discussing the abuse, she described how Ramos would put his hands into her and her
sisters’ pants, show her his penis, and bite her butt. Additionally, she testified that he told her
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that he would lick her while she slept. Concerning Ramos’s phone, she explained that he used it
to show her photos of a girl spreading her legs while not wearing underwear and of a naked man
holding a naked child.
Next, N.M. testified that Ramos started sexually abusing her when they all lived
in California. Regarding the first incident, she related that he pulled his penis out and told her to
touch it. When testifying about another incident in California, she explained that it happened
when she was seven and that Ramos locked his bedroom door, took off her clothes, put a pillow
over her face, and inserted his penis into her vagina. She also explained that the assault was
painful and that he threatened to hurt her if she told anyone. She recalled similar incidents
happening a lot and remembered that he would also tell her to put his penis in her mouth and
would punch and kick her if she did not comply.
Concerning incidents occurring in Texas, she testified that he inserted his penis
into her mouth and vagina multiple times when she was ten. Regarding one of the incidents, she
remembered that she refused his directive to put his penis in her mouth, that he hit her in
response, that he threatened to hurt her again if she continued to refuse, and that he then forced
his penis into her mouth. Additionally, she testified about an incident that occurred while she
was lying down to go to sleep in which Ramos masturbated over her and ejaculated on her
stomach. She remembered that Ramos would stick his hands in her pants and touch her vagina
and asked her to take a shower with him. She related that when she fell asleep one day, she
woke up feeling pain and realized that Ramos had inserted his finger into her vagina. Regarding
another incident, she testified that Ramos held her head down on his bed, hit her when she
moved, and tried to insert his penis into her vagina, but she stated that she was able to get away
that time. She also described Ramos’s biting her butt but related that it stopped when she got
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older. She discussed how Ramos told her and C.M. that he would lick them while they slept.
N.M. testified that she did not feel safe staying in the guest room at her grandparents’ house and
asked to sleep on the floor of their room when she spent the night. Further, she recalled seeing
pictures of naked children on Ramos’s phone and computer.
Regarding the outcry, N.M. testified that she and her sisters told their parents
about the abuse in February 2022 when she was twelve. She related feeling sad when she
learned that Ramos abused all her sisters too and felt like she should have protected
them somehow.
The counselor who treated N.M. and C.M. following their outcries testified that
N.M. and C.M. both discussed Ramos’s sexually abusing them and that there was no indication
that they had been coached. The SANE testified that she did not evaluate any of Mother’s
children but did review the reports prepared by a prior nurse. The SANE explained that N.M.,
C.M., A.M., and P.M. all made outcries of sexual abuse during their exams.
One of the officers involved in the case testified that he talked with Father about a
sex offense involving children, that Father reported what had happened to his children, and that
there were four children involved in the report. Another officer testified that he seized Ramos’s
cell phone when Ramos was arrested and took the phone to a forensic lab. One of the detectives
involved in the case explained that one of the children said during a forensic interview that
Ramos showed her pornography on his cell phone. An investigator who worked for the Attorney
General’s Office testified about the extraction report that was made in the case concerning the
contents of Ramos’s phone. He also testified that the presence of an image in the cache file
indicates that the phone was used to view the image. Based on his training and experience, he
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believed that the contents of Ramos’s phone showed his intent to look for and view
child pornography.
In his case-in-chief, Ramos called a forensic consultant who reviewed the
extraction report. In his testimony, the consultant explained that images in a cache file could not
be viewed without special software and that he did not see any programs like that on Ramos’s
phone. Although the consultant initially testified that his review of the report did not lead him to
conclude that Ramos was searching for child pornography, he later agreed in his
cross-examination that two of the search terms found on Ramos’s phone are specifically used to
search for child pornography and that Ramos’s use of those terms indicated that he was looking
for child pornography. Further, the consultant testified that the search engine found on Ramos’s
phone could be used to search for child pornography by bypassing normal security features and
that images found in cache memory typically indicate that the person looked at the image or
downloaded it. However, he agreed that images can be stored in cache if they were in a pop-up
ad or an email attack and that images of child pornography can show up in pop-up ads in
countries where child pornography is not illegal.
Finally, Ramos testified and attempted to undermine the testimony of N.M. and
C.M. by stating that there was a significant deformity on his penis that neither child mentioned.
Further, he claimed that he never babysat the children alone. Although he did admit to biting the
children’s butts over their clothing, he denied sexually abusing his nieces. Even though he
agreed that the search terms set out above were extracted from his phone, he asserted that he did
not perform those searches. Further, he urged that Mother forced her children to lie about
the abuse.
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After considering the evidence, the jury found Ramos guilty of both counts of
aggravated sexual abuse against N.M. During the punishment phase, neither side called any
witnesses nor introduced any evidence. Ramos elected not to present any closing argument, and
the State urged the jury to assess the maximum punishment. After deliberating, the jury
recommended that Ramos be sentenced to ninety years’ imprisonment on each count, and the
trial court rendered its judgment of conviction consistent with the jury’s verdict.
Ramos appeals his convictions.
DISCUSSION
In his first issue on appeal, Ramos contends that the trial court erred by allowing
Mother to testify about the extraneous offenses involving C.M., A.M., and P.M. In his second
issue, he argues that the trial court erred by including two fines in the bill of costs in each case.
Mother’s Testimony
When challenging the trial court’s overruling his objection to Mother’s testimony,
Ramos acknowledges that Mother was the outcry witness and that Mother could testify regarding
the outcry N.M. made; however, he argues that the outcry statute only allows the outcry witness
to testify about “statements that describe the alleged offense.” See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art.
38.072, § 2(a)(1)(A). In light of this statutory language, he urges that the trial court’s ruling
allowing Mother to testify about the extraneous offenses constituted error. Further, he suggests
that the erroneous ruling resulted in reversible harm because the State emphasized Mother’s
testimony about the extraneous offenses, because the jury was able to hear evidence pertaining to
his allegedly sexually assaulting three other children, and because the jury was allowed to
consider the extraneous offenses for purposes of character conformity.
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As an initial matter, we note that it appears that Ramos did not preserve his first
appellate issue. Generally, to preserve error for appeal, a defendant must make a timely, specific
objection, request, or motion to the trial court stating the specific grounds for the ruling sought
by the complaining party, unless the specific grounds were apparent from the context. Tex. R.
App. P. 33.1(a). Preservation of error is a “systemic requirement” on appeal. Darcy v. State,
488 S.W.3d 325, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). “An appellant fails to preserve error by failing to
object when he had the opportunity.” Burt v. State, 396 S.W.3d 574, 577-78 (Tex. Crim. App.
2013). “To avoid forfeiting a complaint on appeal, the party must ‘let the trial judge know what
he wants, why he thinks he is entitled to it, and . . . do so clearly enough for the judge to
understand him at a time when the judge is in the proper position to do something about it.’”
Pena v. State, 285 S.W.3d 459, 464 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (quoting Lankston v. State,
827 S.W.2d 907, 909 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)). “[T]he point of error on appeal must comport
with the objection made at trial.” Yazdchi v. State, 428 S.W.3d 831, 844 (Tex. Crim. App.
2014). An objection stating one legal theory may not be used to support a different legal theory
on appeal. Broxton v. State, 909 S.W.2d 912, 918 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). The preservation
rule “ensures that trial courts are provided an opportunity to correct their own mistakes at the
most convenient and appropriate time—when the mistakes are alleged to have been made.” Hull
v. State, 67 S.W.3d 215, 217 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Appellate courts should not address the
merits of an issue that has not been preserved for appellate consideration. See Blackshear
v. State, 385 S.W.3d 589, 591 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
During the article 38.072 hearing, Ramos generally objected that “the scope of the
trial should be to [N.M.]’s statements” because there were charges against him based on the
other offenses and that the State should not be allowed to introduce evidence regarding the
10
extraneous offenses because the presumption of innocence applied to them and prohibited them
from being discussed during this case. He did not argue, as he does on appeal, that the language
of the outcry witness statute prohibits an outcry witness from testifying about extraneous
offenses involving other children. Accordingly, his arguments on appeal do not comport with
the objections made below, and he has not preserved his first issue for appellate consideration.
See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1; see Taylor v. State, 509 S.W.3d 468, 474 (Tex. App.—Austin 2015,
pet. ref’d) (determining that defendant failed to preserve complaint that outcry witness should
not have been allowed to testify regarding extraneous offense); see also Brown v. State,
632 S.W.3d 75, 78 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2020, no pet.) (“If pro se litigants were not required to
comply with applicable rules of procedure, they would be given an unfair advantage over parties
represented by counsel.”). 3
Even if this issue were preserved, we could not sustain Ramos’s first issue on
appeal. To be entitled to reversal, Ramos would have to show that the trial court erred, and the
record would have to show that the error harmed him. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b). Because
“[t]he admission of inadmissible hearsay testimony under article 38.072 is nonconstitutional
3 We note that in both Ramos’s and the State’s briefs, the parties observe that Ramos did not object to Mother’s testimony during trial and that there is contradictory case law concerning whether a party must re-urge an objection made at a 38.072 hearing when the outcry witness testifies at trial. Compare Galvan v. State, No. 08-23-00162-CR, 2024 WL 1599208, at *2 (Tex. App.—El Paso Apr. 12, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (determining that defendant preserved complaint by objecting before trial and obtaining ruling concerning outcry witness), with State v. Kaiser, 822 S.W.2d 697, 702 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1991, pet. ref’d) (“Likewise, a preliminary ruling on the admissibility of evidence pursuant to article 38.072 will not preserve error for appeal—there must be a timely, specific objection proffered at trial.”); see also Tex. R. Evid. 103(b) (“When the court hears a party’s objections outside the presence of the jury and rules that evidence is admissible, a party need not renew an objection to preserve a claim of error for appeal.”). Having determined that Ramos did not preserve his complaint for a separate reason, we need not also decide whether he failed to preserve the claim by failing to object when Mother was called as a witness at trial. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.
11
error,” Shaw v. State, 329 S.W.3d 645, 653 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. ref’d),
any error “must be disregarded” if it did “not affect substantial rights,” Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b).
“It is well settled that the erroneous admission of [evidence] is not cause for reversal ‘if the same
fact is proven by other [evidence] not objected to.’” Smith v. State, 499 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2016) (plurality op.) (quoting Leday v. State, 983 S.W.2d 713, 718 (Tex. Crim. App.
1998)). In other words, error in the improper admission of evidence is harmless if the same or
similar evidence is admitted at another point in the trial. Estrada v. State, 313 S.W.3d 274, 302
n.29 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). This is true regardless of whether the other evidence “was
received . . . before or after the complained-of ruling.” Coble v. State, 330 S.W.3d 253, 282
(Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (quoting Leday, 983 S.W.2d at 718).
During the trial, Mother testified regarding how C.M., A.M., and P.M. made
outcries concerning Ramos that prompted Mother to ask N.M. if she had also been sexually
abused. After Mother finished testifying, other witnesses discussed the offenses involving C.M.,
A.M., and P.M., and Ramos did not object to any of their testimonies. For example, Maternal
Grandmother testified that Mother told her in February 2022 that Ramos sexually abused her
daughters, and Maternal Grandmother explained that her granddaughters would not make up
claims regarding sexual abuse. Similarly, C.M. testified that she told Mother in February 2022
that Ramos was inappropriately touching her and her sisters by putting his hands inside their
pants, that he showed her his penis, and that he said that he would lick her body when she slept.
Like C.M., N.M. testified that Ramos told her and C.M. that he would lick them while they slept,
and N.M. explained that in February 2022 she and her sisters all told their parents that Ramos
had been sexually abusing them. The counselor who treated N.M. and C.M. explained that both
sisters discussed how Ramos had sexually abused them. The SANE testified that the reports
12
made after all four sisters were forensically examined documented that all four sisters reported
being sexually abused. Finally, one of the police officers involved in the case related that Father
reported his children being sexually abused and specified that four children were mentioned in
the report.
Because the unobjected-to testimony from these witnesses was similar to
Mother’s testimony concerning the offenses involving C.M., A.M., and P.M., we conclude that
any error stemming from the admission of Mother’s testimony did not affect Ramos’s substantial
rights and was, therefore, harmless. See Valle v. State, 109 S.W.3d 500, 509 (Tex. Crim. App.
2003) (“An error in the admission of evidence is cured where the same evidence comes in
elsewhere without objection.”); Lamerand v. State, 540 S.W.3d 252, 257 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 2018, pet. ref’d) (determining that any error from admission of hearsay in medical
report was harmless because other evidence established same facts); see also Anderson v. State,
717 S.W.2d 622, 627 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (“Whether or not the testimony complained of was
admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule is irrelevant” “[i]f the fact to which the hearsay
relates is sufficiently proved by other competent and unobjected to evidence . . . .”).
For these reasons, we overrule Ramos’s first issue on appeal.
Fines
In his second issue, Ramos contends that the trial court erred by including in its
bills of costs $100 fines for intoxication convictions and $50 fines for juvenile delinquency
prevention. When presenting this issue, Ramos contends that the inclusion of these fines was
erroneous because neither applied to the offenses at issue in this case and because the fines were
not orally pronounced when he was sentenced. Accordingly, Ramos requests that the fines be
13
deleted and that the judgments of conviction be reformed to reflect that he is only required to pay
$325 in court costs. In response, the State asserts that nothing in the record indicates that the
fines identified by Ramos were imposed in these cases. However, the State identifies another
fine—the Child Abuse Prevention Fine—imposed in both bills of costs and included in the court
costs portions of the judgments of conviction that it asserts should be stricken because the fines
were not imposed by the jury in its sentences nor orally pronounced by the trial court. See Van
Flowers v. State, 629 S.W.3d 707, 710 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2021, no pet.) (noting
that appellate courts give due consideration to State’s concession).
The bills of costs prepared in both cases specify that Ramos must pay $290 for
mandatory state consolidated court costs and local consolidated court costs, a $100 Child Abuse
Prevention Fine, and $85 in peace officer service fees. Although the bills of costs both list fines
for intoxication convictions and for juvenile delinquency prevention, neither fine was checked,
nor were the fines included in the “TOTAL OF ALL COSTS DUE $475.” Accordingly, we
agree with the State that the bills of costs and judgments of conviction do not need to be
reformed to delete the imposition of fines for intoxication convictions and juvenile
delinquency prevention.
Turning to the Child Abuse Prevention Fine, that fine was imposed under
subarticle 102.0186(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which provides that “[a] person
convicted of an offense” under certain provisions of the Penal Code, including the one governing
aggravated sexual assault of a child, “shall pay a fine of $100 on conviction of the offense.”
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 102.0186(a); see Tex. Penal Code § 22.021(a)(1)(B). “The ‘Cost
Act,’ which became effective on January 1, 2020, amended this article to, among other things,
reclassify this $100 fee as a fine, rather than a court cost.” McCarter v. State, 722 S.W.3d 138,
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144 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2025, no pet.); see Act of May 23, 2019, 86th Leg., R.S.,
ch. 1352, §§ 2.40, 5.04, 2019 Tex. Gen. Laws 3981, 4006, 4035. This reclassification applies to
offenses committed after the effective date of the Act, which was January 1, 2020. See Act of
May 23, 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., ch. 1352, §§ 5.01, .04, 2019 Tex. Gen. Laws 3981, 4035.
Because the financial obligation imposed under subarticle 102.0186 is imposed as
a fine, it is “punitive in nature and is part of a defendant’s sentence.” See Anastassov v. State,
664 S.W.3d 815, 820 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022). Since fines are punitive and intended to be part of
a defendant’s sentence, they “generally must be orally pronounced in the defendant’s presence.”
Armstrong v. State, 340 S.W.3d 759, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); see Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art.
42.03, § 1(a) (providing, with certain exceptions, that sentence be pronounced in defendant’s
presence); Weir v. State, 278 S.W.3d 364, 366 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (explaining differential
treatment for fines and court costs). Alternatively, if a jury imposes a fine and if the jury’s
verdict is read out loud, it may be included in the judgment even if the trial court does not
specifically pronounce the fine when pronouncing sentence. Ette v. State, 559 S.W.3d 511,
515-17 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). “When there is a conflict between the oral pronouncement of
sentence and the sentence in the written judgment, the oral pronouncement controls.” Taylor
v. State, 131 S.W.3d 497, 500 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
The indictments in these cases alleged that the offenses occurred in December
2020 and February 2021, and there was no assertion below that the offenses occurred before the
effective date of the Cost Act. Accordingly, the imposed Child Abuse Prevention fees were fines
and had to be orally pronounced at sentencing or be part of the jury’s verdict that was read out
loud. See Ette, 559 S.W.3d at 515-17; McCarter, 722 S.W.3d at 144. Because neither of those
occurred and because the oral pronouncement controls over the judgment, the $100 Child Abuse
15
Prevention Fines should not have been included in the bills of costs or in the court costs sections
of the judgments of conviction as our sister courts of appeals have similarly concluded. See
Bonilla v. State, 739 S.W.3d 878, 882 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2026, pet. ref’d); Abad
v. State, 729 S.W.3d 108, 116-17 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2025, no pet.); McCarter,
722 S.W.3d at 144; Fugett v. State, 721 S.W.3d 120, 122 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2025, no pet.);
Rhodes v. State, 712 S.W.3d 226, 235 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2025, no pet.). 4
Appellate courts have the authority to modify a trial court’s judgment when we
have the necessary information to do so and affirm it as modified. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(b);
Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27-28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). Although we agree with the State
that the modifications requested by Ramos are not warranted and, therefore, overrule his second
issue, we also agree with the State that the Child Abuse Prevention Fines should not have been
imposed because they were not orally pronounced at sentencing and were not part of the jury’s
verdict that was read out loud. Accordingly, we modify the bills of costs to delete the $100
4 Although the State suggests that the modification is necessary, it warns of the possibility that the deletion might render the sentence illegal because the fine is mandatory in nature. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 102.0186 (using word shall); Tex. Gov’t Code § 311.016 (explaining that legislature’s use of word “‘[s]hall’ imposes a duty”). Although cases have explained that the absence of a fine when a fine is required by the statute governing the offense renders the sentence illegal and void, see Bradshaw v. State, 331 S.W.2d 52, 52 (Tex. Crim. App. 1959) (reversing conviction for driving while intoxicated where no fine was imposed because statute at time required minimum fine of $50); Saldivar v. State, 542 S.W.3d 43, 48 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, pet. ref’d) (explaining that statute governing manufacturing and distributing controlled substance requires that defendant be sentenced to prison term and fined, that fine was mandatory, and that trial court’s failure to assess fine rendered judgment void), we have been unable to find case law supporting a conclusion that the absence of a fine like the Child Abuse Prevention Fine that is mandatory in nature but not part of the punishment provided for by the statute governing the offense renders the judgment illegal and void, cf. Columbus v. State, -- S.W.3d --, No. PD-0538-25, 2026 WL 1852097, at *5 (Tex. Crim. App. June 25, 2026) (distinguishing between fines imposed under Chapter 12 of Penal Code as part of punishment and mandatory ones imposed through other means). Moreover, as set out above, several of our sister courts have determined that striking the Child Abuse Prevention Fine is correct under the circumstances present here.
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Child Abuse Prevention Fine and to reflect that the “TOTAL OF ALL COSTS DUE” is “$375.”
See Abad, 729 S.W.3d at 123-24 (explaining that appellate courts may modify bill of costs by
deleting fine and fees). In turn, we reform the trial court’s judgments to reflect that the amount
due as “Court Costs” is $375.00. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(b); Bigley, 865 S.W.2d at 27-28.
CONCLUSION
Having modified the trial court’s judgments and bills of costs to remove the Child
Abuse Prevention Fine and having overruled Ramos’s two issues on appeal, we affirm the trial
court’s judgments of conviction as modified.
Karin Crump, Justice
Before Justices Triana, Crump, and Ellis
Modified and, As Modified, Affirmed
Filed: October 14, 2026
Do Not Publish
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