J-S13031-25
2026 PA Super 233
CYNTHIA L. POLLICK : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
ANTHONY P. TROZZOLILLO : No. 616 MDA 2024
Appeal from the Order Entered April 2, 2024
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County Civil Division at
No(s): 2020-40119
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., KUNSELMAN, J., and NICHOLS, J.
OPINION BY NICHOLS, J: FILED: OCTOBER 21, 2026
Appellant Cynthia L. Pollick appeals pro se1 from the February 7, 20232
and April 2, 2024 orders that found her in contempt for noncompliance with
various provisions of court orders resolving the equitable distribution of her
marital estate with Appellee Anthony P. Trozzolillo and imposing sanctions
against her. Appellant argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter
the April 2, 2024 contempt order, failed to appoint counsel for her, erred by
denying her permission to withdraw funds from her retirement account, failed
to consider her ability to pay the contempt sanction, and failed to impose a
purge condition on the contempt sanction. After careful review, we vacate
1Appellant is appearing pro se in the instant appeal. Both Appellant and Appellee are licensed attorneys in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
2 As explained further below, Hon. Richard A. Lewis’s April 2, 2024 contempt
order made the interlocutory February 7, 2023 order final and appealable. J-S13031-25
and remand the trial court’s April 2, 2024 contempt order for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion. Judge Lewis3 summarized the facts
and procedural history of this matter as follows:
The facts and procedural history of this case are quite extensive
and unavailingly litigious. As such, this court will briefly
summarize the relevant history.[fn1] The parties were married on
January 7, 2017. Three (3) years later, on January 20, 2020,
[Appellant] commenced an action in divorce against her exhusband, [] Anthony P. Trozzolillo (“Appellee”). Subsequently,
Appellant filed an amended complaint in divorce on January 27,
2020. The Honorable Emanuel A. Bertin, Senior Judge, presided
over the divorce action after a full-bench recusal in Lackawanna
County.
Pollick v. Trozzolillo, 991 MDA 2021[, 2022 WL
[fn1]
16736956] (Pa. Super. November 7, 2022) [(Pollick III)].
On July 2[3], 2021, Judge Bertin issued “Order Re: Husband’s
Omnibus Petition for Sanctions,” together with a fifteen (15) page
“Memorandum Opinion And Order Re: Husband’s Omnibus Petition
for Sanctions Pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 2503(7) and (9)[”] wherein
this court entered sanctions against [] Appellant in the amount of
$26,950.00 (the Sanctions Opinion). Judge Bertin also issued a
thirty-three (33) page “Memorandum Opinion Re: Equitable
Distribution And Alimony, Issued Simultaneously With Divorce
Decree,” (the Substantive Opinion).
Trial Ct. Op., 12/19/24, at 3 (some formatting altered).
In the Substantive Opinion, Judge Bertin explained:
When the [trial] court entered a temporary, interlocutory order on
December 2, 2020, the [trial c]ourt put right in the order that it
was not appealable, because the [trial] court sensed [Appellant]
would appeal to delay the case and harass [Appellee] and run up ____________________________________________
3 Judge Lewis presided at the March 22, 2024 contempt hearing and found
Appellant in contempt in an order entered on April 2, 2024. As explained below, Hon. Emanuel A. Bertin presided over the divorce and equitable distribution proceedings.
-2-J-S13031-25
his fees. [Appellant] appealed anyway. [Appellee] appropriately
filed a motion to quash with the Superior Court and the [trial]
court went to the trouble of writing a [Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion
in support of quashal]. Before [the trial court could transmit the
record to the Superior Court, the Superior Court] quashed
[Appellant’s] appeal, based on [Appellee’s] motion. In its January
7, 2021 quashal order the Superior Court instructed [Appellant]
that:
Generally, only final orders are appealable. See Pa.R.A.P.
341(b)(1) (a final order is any order that disposes of all
claims and of all parties), see also Fried v. Fried, 501 A.2d
211 (Pa. 1985) (piecemeal determinations and consequent
protracted litigation are abhorred in matrimonial actions).
[Pollick v. Trozzolillo, 1537 MDA 2020, Order, 1/7/21. (Pollick
I)]
* * *
[Appellant] went on an ill-conceived campaign, and she still
persists in this, that because she filed a petition for allocator . . .
to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court from the Superior Court’s
quashal order of January 7, 2021, . . . th[e trial] court is without
jurisdiction to do anything in this case.[4]
* * *
Even though the [trial court had already rejected Appellant’s
jurisdictional argument], she argued to th[e trial] court at the
June 3, 2021 equitable distribution hearing and in her posthearing brief that the [trial] court does not have jurisdiction.
* * *
First of all, [Appellant’s] claim that the record never came down
[from the appellate courts] was untrue and reckless. The [trial]
court arranged, at the equitable distribution hearing on June 3,
2021, for the individual in the Prothonotary’s Office in Lackawanna
County to testify on this issue. She arrived with her boss, the ____________________________________________
4 In addition to the appeal at 1537 MDA 2020, Appellant subsequently appealed from four of the trial court’s February 11, 2021 orders, which this Court docketed at 239 MDA 2021. This Court quashed that appeal on March 22, 2021. See Pollick v. Trozzolillo, 239 MDA 2021, Order, 3/22/21 (Pollick II).
-3-J-S13031-25
Prothonotary, and the solicitor for the Prothonotary’s Office. The
employee testified credibly about the many years she has been
processing the appeals from the Lackawanna County Court of
Common Pleas to the Pennsylvania appellate courts. She testified
clearly, and with certainty, with respect to [Appellant’s] two
improvident appeals to the Superior Court, which were quashed
promptly by the Superior Court. She testified that she never had
a chance to send the record up to the Superior Court from her
office, and the record never left [the Lackawanna County
Prothonotary’s] office to the Superior Court prior to the deadline
or at any time, because the Superior Court quashed both appeals
before she could bundle everything up and send the record up to
the Superior Court.
Instead of being embarrassed, and apologizing for her mistake
and false accusation that the record was still up with the Superior
Court, [Appellant] proceeded to delay, drag on, and somewhat
badgered the witness and would not relent with an embarrassing
performance for a lawyer acting in a pro se capacity, before the
witness, her superior, and counsel for the Prothonotary’s Office.
This one issue consumed much of the time at the June 3, 2021
hearing.
Substantive Op., 7/23/21, at 23-27 (some formatting altered).
Based on the foregoing and other behavior of Appellant during the
pendency of this litigation, Judge Bertin found that Appellant had engaged in
“dilatory, obdurate, vexatious, arbitrary, and bad faith conduct” and imposed
sanctions against Appellant in the amount of $26,950 in attorney’s fees to
Appellee pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 2503(7) and (9). See Sanctions Op.,
7/23/21, at 2, 14.
Appellant appealed from “the July 23, 2021 orders resolving the
equitable distribution of the parties’ marital estate, denying her claim for an
award of alimony, and imposing sanctions against her.” Pollick III, 2022 WL
16736956, at *1. This Court concluded that Appellant’s previous interlocutory
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appeals did not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to proceed and affirmed
the trial court’s orders based on the reasoning set forth in the trial court’s
Substantive Opinion and Sanctions Opinion. See id. at *2-4.
Judge Lewis explained the subsequent procedural history as follows:
Notwithstanding, during the pendency of the divorce appeal,
Appellee filed his initial contempt petition on December 8, 2021.
Appellee alleged that Appellant had not yet paid the $26,950.00
in sanctions. A hearing on the aforementioned “petition for
contempt” was held on April 12, 2022. Following the hearing,
Judge Bertin issued three (3) separate memorand[a] and orders
holding Appellant in contempt [of the July 23, 2021 sanctions
order, directing Appellant to pay the previous sanctions within ten
days, restricting Appellant from making any withdrawals from her
[simplified employee pension (SEP)] account until she paid the
total sanctions amount to Appellee, and directing the sheriff to
serve a bench warrant for Appellant’s arrest if she failed to
comply. Additionally, Judge Bertin imposed additional sanctions
totaling $3,300 in attorney’s fees to Appellee,] and afforded
[Appellant] several weeks to satisfy her payment obligations. On
April 20, 2022, the Lackawanna County Clerk of Courts entered
judgment against M&T Bank, as garnishee, in the amount of
$20,529.99.
Trial Ct. Op., 12/19/24, at 3-4 (some formatting altered). Appellant failed to
comply with the April 12, 2022 contempt order; therefore, on April 25, 2022,
the sheriff arrested Appellant pursuant to the bench warrant. See Trial Ct.
Order, 4/27/22, at 1 (unpaginated).
On April 26, 2022, Appellant filed a notice of appeal challenging
Judge Bertin’s finding of contempt, docketed at 62[0] MDA 2022,
however [] Appellant failed to file a brief. The appeal was
dismissed on October 19, 2022.
Subsequently, in May 2022, Appellee [] filed a motion to amend
the July 23, 2021 sanctions award and consolidate with the April
12, 2022 contempt judgment such that the total judgment
entered against Appellant reflected $11,271.71. [] Appellant filed
-5-J-S13031-25
a response on June 6, 2022, and upon review, on July 12, 2022,
Judge Bertin granted Appellee’s motion and entered judgment
against the Appellant in the amount of $11,271.71.
Thereafter, on September 15, 2022, Judge Bertin held a status
conference regarding enforcement of the contempt judgment.
Upon conclusion of the status conference, Judge Bertin directed []
Appellant to access her SEP account and pay Appellee [] the
remaining sanctions sum of $11,271.71 within thirty (30) days.
Trial Ct. Op., 12/19/24, at 4 (some formatting altered). Judge Bertin also
ordered Appellant’s immediate release from Lackawanna County Prison on
September 15, 2022. See Trial Ct. Order, 9/15/22.
Appellant failed to comply with Judge Bertin’s directive[,] thereby
forcing Appellee to file his second contempt petition on October
18, 2022. Appellant filed a response on November 14, 2022[,]
requesting this court deny Appellee’s contempt petition [and]
citing her inability to pay the remaining sanctions sum.
By this time, Judge Bertin reached the age limit for senior judges
in Pennsylvania, thereafter; the [Judge Lewis] was assigned to
preside over the underlying matter. Accordingly, [Judge Lewis]
held the hearing on Appellee’s second contempt petition on
January 20, 2023, wherein after consideration, this court granted
Appellee’s petition and found Appellant in contempt of the [April
12, 2022] order[, in an order entered on] February 7, 2023.
Further [Judge Lewis] directed Appellant to access her SEP
account, remove $11,950.00, and place it in escrow within twenty
days, pending decision on Appellant’s petition for allowance of
appeal. On February 27, 2023, [] Appellant filed a notice of appeal
[from, among others, the February 7, 2023 contempt order]
docketed to 329 MDA 2023.
Notwithstanding, on February 28, 2023, Appellee [] filed his third
contempt petition. After review, [Judge Lewis] issued an order
dated March 17, 2023, and relied on its prior February 7, 2023
order, by deferring disposition until decision on [] Appellant’s
petition for allowance of appeal.
On April 24, 2023, the [] Superior Court quashed the appeal
docketed at 329 MDA 2023 [as interlocutory].
-6-J-S13031-25
Approximately two months later, [] Appellant’s petition[s] for
allowance of appeal [to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court]
docketed to 514 MAL 2022, and 573 MAL 2022, respectively were
denied via order[s] on May 23, 2023.[5] Likewise, on October 17,
2023, [] Appellant’s third petition for allowance of appeal docketed
to 278 MAL 2023 was denied.
At this time, with all petitions for allowance of appeal denied,
Appellee[’s] third contempt petition remained ripe for decision.
This court held a contempt hearing on March 22, 2024[.]
Trial Ct. Op., 12/19/24, at 4-5 (some formatting altered).
At the March 22, 2024 contempt hearing, Appellant testified that she
had no savings and did not have any taxable income in 2022. See N.T. Hr’g,
3/22/24, at 2. Appellant confirmed that she had not complied with the
February 7, 2023 order directing her to place $11,950.00 into the Lackawanna
County Clerk of Court’s escrow fund. See id. at 3-4. Appellant also explained
that she had withdrawn all the money in her SEP account to cover her living
expenses. See id. at 4.
On April 2, 2024, Judge Lewis entered an order finding Appellant in
contempt of the trial court’s February 7, 2023 order. See Trial Ct. Order,
4/2/24. As a sanction, the trial court ordered Appellant to pay a $100.00 fine
and complete 75 hours of community service within 180 days of the date of
that order. See id. Finally, the trial court ordered Appellant to comply with
5 Additionally, Appellant filed petitions for a writ of certiorari with the Supreme
Court of the United States in both of these matters, which were both denied on October 10, 2023. See Pollick v. Trozzolillo, --- U.S. ---, 144 S.Ct. 286 (2023) and Pollick v. Trozzolillo, --- U.S. ---, 144 S.Ct. 287 (2023), respectively.
-7-J-S13031-25
the terms of its February 7, 2023 order including the requirement to place
$11,950.00 into escrow. See id.
Appellant filed a notice of appeal on April 26, 2024 purporting to appeal
from the trial court’s February 7, 2023 and April 2, 2024 contempt orders.
Both Appellant and the trial court complied with the requirements of Pa.R.A.P.
1925.6
On appeal, Appellant raises the following issues, which we reorder as
follows:
1. Did the trial court err by entertaining contempt petitions when
this Court had jurisdiction and was reviewing the 7/26/21
$26,950.00 sanction judgment in question in 991 MDA 2021;
and therefore, all orders issued after 7/26/21 are null and void
due to the trial court’s lack of jurisdiction?
2. Did the trial court err when it considered the 7/26/21
$26,950.00 sanction judgment an order when it was judgment
that Appellee issued a writ of execution on 3/22/22?
3. Did the trial court err when it held against Appellant . . . the
fact that she appealed the 7/26/21 $26,950.00 sanction
judgment, which payment would have mooted the pending
appeal?
4. Did the trial court err when it refused to evaluate Appellant[’s]
present financial state on 1/20/23 and 3/22/24 after being
released from divorce imprisonment on 9/15/22 without any
credit or car because DeNaples [Auto Parts] sought title to the
same while Appellant . . . was serving the divorce
imprisonment for an accurate ability to pay defense to the
second and third contempt petitions filed by Appellee?
6 Specifically, Appellant filed an initial Rule 1925(b) statement on May 17, 2024. Appellant filed an amended Rule 1925(b) statement on May 23, 2024. Lastly, Appellant filed an addendum to her amended Rule 1925(b) on June 13, 2024.
-8-J-S13031-25
5. Did the trial court err when it fined Appellant [ ]$100 and
ordered 75 hours of unpaid community service when Appellant
[ ] had the right to appeal the 7/26/21 $26,950.00 sanction
judgment through all possible appellate avenues and the illegal
divorce imprisonment from 4/25/22-9/15/22 took every form
of credit away from a 52-year-old woman, including her 2020
Audi Q5, and she had to live in a woman’s shelter and use
public transportation because she could no longer afford to live
as she did on 4/24/22?
6. Did the trial court err when it failed to provide legal counsel to
Appellant, who never practiced divorce law, was a solo
practitioner without any employees and appeared pro se,
before imprisoning Appellant [ ]from 4/25/22 – 9/15/22 and
entertaining post-7/26/21 judgment contempt petitions on
4/12/22, 1/20/23[,] and 3/22/24 because Appellant did not
have the ability to pay because her debt exceeded her income
and [counsel for Appellant] would have provided the credibility
to avoid Appellant [ ]from being incarcerated in a divorce as
well as educated the trial court that it was divested of
jurisdiction because this Court was vested with it until the
7/26/21 $26,950.00 sanction judgment was final when
Appellant[’s] writ of certiorari was denied by the Supreme
Court of the United States and record remitted?
7. Did the trial court err when it failed to provide legal counsel to
Appellant, who was pro se, when imprisonment was a
possibility on 1/20/23 and 3/22/24[,] because Appellant had
been imprisoned before in this divorce, and the trial court had
an independent obligation to assess Appellant’s ability to pay
because she had debt of approximately $134,394.68 with no
stream of income as a W2 lawyer?
8. Did the trial court err when it refused to allow Appellant access
to monies in her SEP account, which contrary to the trial court
contained only $54,834.44 in December 2022, for ordinary
living expenses, such as shelter, housing, food, bills and other
normal living expenses because the trial court wrongful
imprisoned her on a divorce from 4/25/22-9/15/22 and her law
practice account of $20,318.94 was given to Appellee through
a 3/22/22 writ of execution[?]
-9-J-S13031-25
Appellant’s Brief at 5-7.7
Procedural History Summary
Judge Bertin and Judge Lewis thoroughly summarized the facts and
procedural history underlying this matter in their respective opinions. See
Substantive Op., 7/23/21, at 23-27; Sanctions Op., 7/23/21, at 1-15; Trial
Ct. Op., 12/19/24, at 3-5. Briefly, Appellant has been proceeding pro se
throughout the history of this divorce matter. The litigation between Appellant
and Appellee has been intensely acrimonious.
On July 23, 2021, Judge Bertin entered an opinion and order disposing
of the economic claims in the parties’ divorce matter. In a separate opinion
and order, Judge Bertin imposed $26,950.00 in sanctions against Appellant
pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 2503 (7) and (9) and directed her to pay that sum
to Appellee within twenty days of the entry of that order. See Sanctions Op.
at 14; see also Sanctions Order, 7/23/21, at 1. Judgment was entered
against Appellant in the amount of $26,950.00 on July 26, 2021.
7 We note that the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure require that the
argument section of the brief be divided into as many parts as there are questions to be argued. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). Failure to do so may result in waiver. See Ramalingam v. Keller Williams Realty Grp., Inc., 121 A.3d 1034, 1042 (Pa. Super. 2015). We admonish Appellant, who, we reiterate, while appearing pro se in the instant appeal is a licensed attorney in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, for failing to comply with the Rules of Appellate Procedure. We find, however, that these particular defects in Appellant’s brief do not impede our ability to render meaningful appellate review; therefore, we decline to find waiver on this basis. See id.
- 10 -J-S13031-25
Appellant previously filed a timely notice of appeal from the equitable
distribution and sanctions orders. This Court affirmed both the equitable
distribution order and the sanctions order. See Pollick III, 2022 WL
16736956 at *4. Further, this Court granted Appellee’s application for costs
and directed the trial court “to determine the reasonableness of costs to be
paid to” Appellee. See Pollick III, 991 MDA 2021, Order, 2/28/22.
While the aforementioned appeal was pending, Appellee filed his first
petition for contempt on December 8, 2021. On March 22, 2022, while
Appellee’s contempt petition was pending, Appellee obtained a writ of
execution for the judgment. Judge Bertin held a contempt hearing on April
12, 2022 and issued three separate memorandum orders holding Appellant in
contempt. Appellant failed to pay the outstanding balance of the sanctions
judgment as required by the April 12, 2022 contempt orders. On April 25,
2022, the sheriff arrested Appellant pursuant to a bench warrant for failing to
comply with the trial court’s orders. Judge Bertin set the payment of the
outstanding balance of the previous sanctions judgments plus the additional
sanctions that the trial court imposed on April 12, 2022 as the purge condition.
Appellant refused to satisfy the purge condition and filed an appeal from the
April 12, 2022 contempt orders docketed at 620 MDA 2022, that was
dismissed by this Court on October 19, 2022 for failure to file a brief.
Meanwhile, Appellee filed a motion to amend the July 23, 2021 sanctions
award to consolidate it with the April 12, 2022 award for counsel fees and to
reflect the execution on Appellant’s business account. Judge Bertin’s order of
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July 12, 2022, granted Appellee’s motion and amended the amount of the
judgment to the outstanding sanctions award balance of $11,271.71.
On September 15, 2022, Judge Bertin ordered the immediate release of
Appellant from incarceration and required her to access her SEP account to
withdraw the funds to pay Appellee the outstanding judgment amount of
$11,271.71 within thirty days. Appellee filed his second contempt petition on
October 18, 2022. Appellant responded citing her inability to pay. After Judge
Bertin’s retirement, Judge Lewis held a contempt hearing on January 20,
2023, after which Judge Lewis found Appellant in contempt of court and issued
its February 7, 2023 order. Further, Judge Lewis ordered that Appellant
access her SEP account, remove $11,950.00 and place it in escrow within
twenty (20) days. Appellant then filed her appeal to this Court docketed at
329 MDA 2023. Subsequently, this Court quashed Appellant’s appeal on April
24, 2023. Appellee filed his third contempt petition on February 28, 2023, for
which Judge Lewis held a contempt hearing on March 22, 2024 and found
Appellant in contempt of its February 7, 2023 order. Judge Lewis’s April 2,
2024 order required Appellant to pay a fine of $100 and to complete seventyfive hours of community service in addition to the transfer of $11,950.00 from
her SEP account into an escrow account within one-hundred and eighty (180)
days. Appellant filed the instant notice of appeal to this Court on May 31,
2024, and a second amended concise statement on June 13, 2024. Trial Ct.
Op., 12/19/2024, at 3-6.
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Trial Court’s Jurisdiction
In her first issue, Appellant argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction
to impose the February 7, 2023 and April 2, 2024 contempt orders because
her appeal from the July 23, 2021 sanctions order was still pending until the
trial court was revested with jurisdiction after this Court resolved the pending
appeal. Id. at 27-31 (citing, inter alia, Pa.R.A.P. 1701(a)). Appellant
contends that because the trial court lacked jurisdiction, the trial court’s April
12, 2022, February 7, 2023, and April 2, 2024 contempt orders are null and
void. Id. at 28-29. Appellant concludes that because the February 7, 2023
order was a legal nullity, the trial court erred by holding her in contempt of
that order in its April 2, 2024 order. Id. at 28-29; see also Appellant’s Reply
Brief at 5 n.2. Appellant has challenged the jurisdiction of the trial court
previously. In her appeal to this Court docked at 991 MDA 2021, she claimed
that Judge Bertin’s July 23, 2021 orders concerning substantive issues and
contempt sanctions were invalid because her appeal at 239 MDA 2021 was
pending before this Court. The 239 MDA 2021 appeal arose after Judge Bertin
entered four interlocutory orders on February 17, 2021, to which this Court
granted Appellee’s application to quash by its order of March 22, 2021. This
Court in its memorandum dated November 7, 2022, docketed at 991 MDA
2021, determined that the trial court had jurisdiction to decide substantive
issues and enforce contempt sanctions during the pendency of Appellant’s
appeal. Further, this Court adopted the reasoning of Judge Bertin’s
substantive opinion and sanctions opinion in its conclusion that Appellant’s
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claims lacked merit. Substantive Op., 07/20/21, at 23-28; Sanctions Op.,
07/20/21, at 11–15; see also Pollick III, 2022 WL 16736956 at *3-4.
Instantly, Appellant is challenging the trial court’s jurisdiction to issue
its contempt orders of February 7, 2023 and April 2, 2024, on the same
grounds as her prior appeal, that the trial court is divested of jurisdiction
pending her prior appeal to this Court. Jurisdiction presents a pure question
of law, and this Court’s standard of review is de novo and the scope of review
is plenary. See Kapcsos v. Benshoff, 194 A.3d 139, 141 (Pa. Super. 2018).
“A court lacks authority to find an individual in contempt of an order it did not
have jurisdiction to issue.” V.C. v. L.P., 179 A.3d 95, 99 (Pa. Super. 2018)
(citation omitted).
Rule of Appellate Procedure 1701 provides, in relevant part:
(a) General rule.—Except as otherwise prescribed by these
rules, after an appeal is taken . . . the trial court . . . may no
longer proceed further in the matter.
(b) Authority of a trial court or other government unit after
appeal.—After an appeal is taken . . . the trial court . . . may:
(1) Take such action as may be necessary to preserve the
status quo, correct formal errors in papers relating to the
matter, cause the record to be transcribed, approved, filed, and
transmitted, grant leave to appeal in forma pauperis, grant
supersedeas, and take other action permitted or required by
these rules or otherwise ancillary to the appeal or petition for
review proceeding.
(2) Enforce any order entered in the matter, unless the effect
of the order has been superseded as prescribed in this chapter.
Pa.R.A.P. 1701(a), (b)(1), (b)(2).
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This Court has explained that, “pursuant to the Rules of Appellate
Procedure, the filing of an appeal does not preclude the trial court from
enforcing its own orders unless it has granted a supersedeas.” Glynn v.
Glynn, 789 A.2d 242, 248 n.7 (Pa. Super. 2001) (citing Pa.R.A.P.
1701(b)(2)); see also Pa.R.A.P. 1731(a) (providing that, in order to obtain a
supersedeas for an order involving solely the payment of money, an appellant
must deposit 120% of the amount due under the order with the trial court
clerk as security); Pa.R.A.P. 1732 (governing an application of stay of an order
of a trial court pending appeal); Pa.R.A.P. 1735(a) (explaining that the filing
of appropriate security within thirty days of the entry of the order being
appealed will stay any execution pursuant to that order). Where a party has
not obtained a supersedeas or a stay of the trial court’s order, a pending
appeal does not affect the trial court’s jurisdiction to hear a petition for
contempt and to impose sanctions on a party for noncompliance with that
order. See, e.g., Tanglwood Lakes Cmty. Ass’n v. Laskowski, 616 A.2d
37, 38-39 (Pa. Super. 1992).
Judge Lewis addressed Appellant’s appeal from the April 12, 2022
contempt order as follows:
Appellant previously appealed this court’s April 12, 2022 order
holding her in contempt. Although Appellant insists that this court
cannot have held her in contempt for non-payment because of the
existing appeal, this court has the authority to enforce its orders
while an appeal is under review. The Superior Court dismissed
said appeal based upon Appellant’s failure to file a brief. Appellant
is under the belief that as long as she pursues an appeal that [this]
will defer her payment. This court believes that Appellant’s
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current appeal is frivolous, and an attempt to prolong her payment
of sanctions.
Trial Ct. Op., 12/19/24, at 24-25 (some formatting altered).
Based on our review of the record, we discern no error of law in the trial
court’s conclusion that it had jurisdiction to hold Appellant in contempt while
appeals from its prior orders were pending. See Kapcsos, 194 A.3d at 141.
Specifically, under Pa.R.A.P. 1701, the trial court retains jurisdiction to enforce
its orders notwithstanding the filing of an appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 1701(b)(2).
Further, Appellant never sought a supersedeas or a stay of the trial court’s
orders pursuant to the Rules of Appellate Procedure during the pendency of
any of her prior appeals. Therefore, the trial court retained the authority to
enforce its orders through its contempt power. See Tanglwood Lakes Cmty.
Ass’n, 616 A.2d at 38-39. Accordingly, Appellant is not entitled to relief on
this claim because the trial court retained jurisdiction to enter its contempt
orders of April 12, 2022, April 25, 2022, February 7, 2023, and April 2, 2024.8
Additionally, Pa.R.A.P. 1701 states, in relevant part: “Except as
otherwise prescribed by these rules, after an appeal is taken . . . the trial court
. . . may no longer proceed further in the matter.” Pa.R.A.P. 1701(a).
8 Generally, any order entered by a court divested of subject matter jurisdiction is null and void. See, e.g., Turner v. Estate of Baird, 270 A.3d 556, 560 (Pa. Super. 2022). However, for reasons stated herein, the trial court had jurisdiction to enforce its orders notwithstanding the entry of judgment and the filing of an appeal.
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However, Rule 1701(b) establishes six exceptions to Rule 1701(a).
Specifically, Rule 1701(b) provides, in relevant part:
After an appeal is taken . . . , the trial court . . . may:
(2) Enforce any order entered in the matter, unless the
effect of the order has been superseded as prescribed in
this chapter.
* * *
(5) Take any action directed or authorized by an
appellate court.
Pa.R.A.P. 1701(b), (2), (5) (emphasis added).
Instantly, even after Appellant filed her notice of appeal from Judge
Bertin’s July 23, 2021 order, the trial court retained jurisdiction to enforce its
sanctions orders and the ensuing judgment because a supersedeas had not
been granted. See Pa.R.A.P. 1701(b)(2); see also Tanglwood Lakes Cmty.
Ass’n, 616 A.2d at 39 (stating that a “trial court possess[es] inherent power
to enforce their orders and decrees by imposing sanctions for failure to comply
with their orders. This power is retained even after an appeal is filed, absent
supersedeas” (citations omitted and formatting altered)). Further, Judge
Lewis had jurisdiction to enter the April 12, 2022, order directing Appellant to
pay Appellee $2,080 in legal fees in accordance with this Court’s February 28,
2022 order. See Pollick III, 991 MDA 2021, Order, 2/28/22 (directing trial
court “to determine the reasonableness of costs to be paid to Appellee”); see
also Pa.R.A.P. 1701(b)(5) (stating that a trial court may “[t]ake any action
directed or authorized by an appellate court”).
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Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court was not divested of its
jurisdiction to impose its contempt orders of April 12, 2022; April 25, 2022;
February 7, 2023; and April 2, 2024, for Appellant’s non-compliance with its
court orders. Therefore, no relief is due.
Civil Contempt Orders
Similar to her lack of jurisdiction claim, in her second issue, Appellant is
again challenging the enforcement of Judge Bertin’s July 21, 2021 sanctions
order in the amount of $26,950.00, imposed pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 2503(7)
and (9), that was affirmed by this Court in its memorandum dated November
7, 2022. Appellant’s Brief at 32-35; see also Pollick III, 2022 WL 16736956
at *1. Appellant contends that “the trial court erred by turning a judgment
into an order.” Appellant’s Brief at 35. Presently, the remaining sanctions
sum is $11,271.71. Trial Ct. Op., 12/19/24, at 4.
Before addressing the merits of Appellant’s claim, we must consider the
procedural posture of this appeal. We have previously held, “it is a general
rule of law that issues decided by an appellate court on a prior appeal between
the same parties will not be reconsidered on a second appeal.” Albright v.
Wella Corp., 359 A.2d 460, 463 (Pa. Super. 1976) (citations omitted); see
generally Pa.R.A.P. 2188 (“If an appellant fails to file . . . [a] brief or any
required reproduced record within the time prescribed by these rules, or within
the time as extended, an appellee may move for dismissal of the matter.”).
Furthermore, “under any other rule, litigation would never cease, and finality
and respect for orderly processes of law would be overcome by chaos and
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contempt.” Daniels v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 451 A.2d 684, 686
(Pa. Super. 1982).
The trial court stated:
Appellant’s argument here has been waived. As stated above,
Appellant sought to challenge this court’s findings holding her in
contempt on April 12, 2022, by timely filing her notice of appeal
on April 26, 2022. However, said appeal, docketed at 62[0] MDA
2022, was dismissed by the Superior Court in October 2022 based
upon her failure to file a brief. By including the above issue in her
amended concise statement, Appellant is attempting another bite
at the apple, in violation of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Appellant cannot cite to any relevant caselaw supporting her
claim, therefore it is without merit, and must fail.
Trial Ct. Op., 12/19/22 at 16 (some formatting altered).
Following a review of the record, we agree with the trial court’s
determination that the claim has been waived. On April 22, 2022, Appellant
filed a notice of appeal discussing the writ of execution and the July 20, 2021
Order stating she owed $26,950.00. See Pollick. v. Trozzolillo, 620 MDA
2022, Not. of Appeal, 4/22/2022. (Pollick IV) Appellant argued that the writ
of execution “wiped out Appellant’s entire law practice account.” See Pollick
VI, 620 MDA 2022, Appellant’s Mot. for Release, 7/18/22. On August 3, 2022,
this Court denied Appellant’s motion without prejudice and instructed
Appellant to file the appropriate briefs. See Pollick VI, 620 MDA 2022, Order,
8/3/22. On September 15, 2022, Appellee filed an application to dismiss
Appellant’s appeal. See Pollick VI, 620 MDA 2022, Appl. to Dismiss Appeal,
9/15/22. Appellee claimed that Appellant violated Pennsylvania Rules of
Appellant Procedure 2185 and 2188. Id. On October 19, 2022, this Court
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granted Appellee’s application and explained that Appellant failed to file a brief
by August 30, 2022. See Pollick VI, 620 MDA 2022, Order, 10/19/22. We
find that Appellant previously raised the same issues before this Court that
she currently raises on appeal and therefore, we find the issue waived.
Albright, 359 A.2d at 463; see generally Pa.R.A.P. 2188.
Even if Appellant’s claim was not waived, we would find that Judge Lewis
acted within his discretion and statutory authority to impose the contempt
orders of April 12, 2022; April 25, 2022; February 7, 2023; and April 2, 2024.
42 Pa.C.S. §2503 provides:
§2503. Right of Participants to Receive Counsel Fees
The following participants shall be entitled to a reasonable
counsel fee as part of the taxable costs of the matter:
* * *
(7) Any participant who is awarded counsel fees as a
sanction against another participant for dilatory, obdurate
or vexatious conduct during the pendency of a matter.
* * *
(9) Any participant who is awarded counsel fees because the
conduct of another party in commencing the matter or
otherwise was arbitrary was arbitrary, vexatious or in bad
faith.
42 Pa.C.S. § 2503(7), (9).
This Court concluded that the trial court acted within its discretion and
adopted the reasoning of both Judge Bertin’s Substantive and Sanctions
Opinions. Pollick III, 2022 WL 16736956 at *2. This Court determined that
the record amply demonstrated that the conduct of Appellant was obdurate
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and vexatious, therefore the appellate court would not disturb the trial court’s
award. Id. at 2. For this reason, we would find that Judge Lewis acted within
his discretion and statutory authority to impose the contempt orders of April
12, 2022; April 25, 2022; February 7, 2023; and April 2, 2024, even if this
claim were not waived.
Payment of Sanctions Mooting Appellant’s Appeals
Appellant, in her third issue, essentially argues that the trial court erred
by holding her in contempt for refusing to pay any balance of the $26,950
sanctions award because payment of the sanctions would have mooted her
appeal from the July 23, 2021 sanctions order. Appellant’s Brief at 36-39.
Specifically, Appellant contends that if she paid the contempt sanction, it
would have precluded her from subsequently appealing the judgment of
contempt. Id. at 37 (citing Phoenix Glass Co. v. Local Union No. 8381,
United Steel Workers of America, Dist. 20, 366 A.2d 293 (Pa. Super.
1976)).
Our standard of review over findings of contempt in the trial court
is extremely narrow. This Court will reverse only upon a showing
of an abuse of discretion. A trial court abuses its discretion in this
context if it misapplies the law or exercises its discretion in a
manner lacking reason.
Fetzer v. Fetzer, 336 A.3d 1058, 1064 (Pa. Super. 2025) (citations omitted
and some formatting altered); see also Thomas v. Thomas, 194 A.3d 220,
225 (Pa. Super. 2018) (stating that “[a]bsent an error of law or an abuse of
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discretion, we will not disrupt a finding of civil contempt if the record supports
the court’s findings” (citation omitted)).
Our Supreme Court has explained:
In civil contempt proceedings the burden is on the complaining
party to prove noncompliance by a preponderance of the
evidence. The corollary of this proposition is that the order which
is said to have been violated must be specific and definite.
Mere noncompliance with a court order is not by itself sufficient to
prove contempt; rather, the complaining party must prove:
(1) That the contemnor had notice of the specific order or
decree which he is alleged to have disobeyed;
(2) That the act constituting the contemnor’s violation was
volitional; and
(3) That the contemnor acted with wrongful intent.
County of Fulton v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 292 A.3d 974, 1004
(Pa. 2023) (footnotes omitted and some formatting altered), cert. denied, ---U.S. ---, 144 S.Ct. 283 (2023).
It is well-established that the payment of a monetary sanction renders
moot any appeal from an order imposing sanctions and/or a related judgment.
See, e.g., Logan v. Lillie, 753 A.2d 322, 324 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000) (quashing
an appeal from the order directing the appellants to pay the appellees’
attorney fees as moot where the appellants had paid the sanctions amount
and the judgments had been satisfied);9 Phoenix Glass Co., 366 A.2d at 294
9While the decisions of the Commonwealth Court are not binding on this Court, “such decisions [may] provide persuasive authority[.]”. Maryland (Footnote Continued Next Page)
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(quashing an appeal from a contempt judgment where the contemnor had
paid the fine imposed).
As stated above, the Rules of Appellate Procedure provide that an
appellant may obtain a supersedeas of an order solely involving the payment
of money being appealed by depositing appropriate security equal to 120% of
the amount set forth in the order with the clerk of the trial court within thirty
days of the entry of the order being appealed. See Pa.R.A.P. 1731(a),
1735(a). If the order is affirmed in whole or in part on appeal, upon remand
of the record, the clerk of the trial court shall enter an order against the
appellant for the amount due under the order as affirmed. See Pa.R.A.P.
1735(b). Alternatively, a party may file a motion with the trial court, or in
some instances the appellate court, requesting that it stay its order pending
appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 1732(a), (b).
This Court has explained:
A supersedeas order is an auxiliary process designed to supersede
or hold in abeyance the enforcement of the judgment of an inferior
tribunal. A supersedeas order is not an appellate ruling on the
merits of the judgment below; it does not open, strike off or
vacate the judgment or otherwise remove the judgment from the
record or render it invalid.
Goodstein v. Goodstein, 619 A.2d 703, 706 (Pa. Super. 1992) (citations
and quotations omitted, emphasis in original); see also In re Passarelli
Cas. Co. v. Odyssey Contracting Corp., 894 A.2d 750, 756 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2006).
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Family Trust, 231 A.3d 969, 973 (Pa. Super. 2020) (explaining that “[a]
stay, like a supersedeas, is an auxiliary process designed to supersede or hold
in abeyance the enforcement of the judgment of an inferior tribunal” (citation
omitted)).
Here, Judge Lewis explained:
This court believes that Appellant acted in bad faith by withholding
payment simply because she disagreed with the result and sought
to extend the lifespan of this case much further than an ordinary
divorce matter should reach. She had [sic] refused to provide any
explanation or relevant evidence that she cannot pay. Appellant,
as she has repeatedly stated throughout these proceedings, was
a licensed lawyer in Pennsylvania for over twenty (20) years. . . .
Appellant has not logically or factually explained why she has been
unable to pay since this court first imposed sanctions against her
in July 2021. Appellant has simply refused to comply. Appellant
has not shown that this court acted manifestly unreasonable, [sic]
with prejudice towards her, or with any ill-will against her. This
court acted properly in holding her in contempt and imposed fair
sanctions upon her in relation to her own misconduct. No abuse
of discretion has occurred, nor does an error of law exist.
Trial Ct. Op., 12/19/24, at 14-15 (some formatting altered).
Based on our review of the record, we discern no abuse of discretion in
Judge Lewis’ decision to hold Appellant in civil contempt. See Fetzer, 336
A.3d at 1064. Appellant admitted at the March 23, 2024 contempt hearings
that she had not complied with the July 23, 2021 and April 12, 2022 sanctions
orders. See N.T. Hr’g, 3/22/24, at 3; N.T. Hr’g, 1/20/23, at 48, 56. Appellant
is not entitled to relief on her claim that payment of the sanctions orders would
moot her appeals. Appellant failed to seek supersedeas or stay of the trial
court’s July 23, 2021 sanctions order for any of the contempt orders during
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the pendency of any of her prior appeals, therefore the enforcement of these
sanctions orders was not stayed. See Pa.R.A.P. 1731(a), 1732(a), 1735(a);
Passarelli Family Trust, 231 A.3d at 973; Goodstein, 619 A.2d at 706.
Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding Appellant in
contempt of the July 23, 2021 sanctions order and April 12, 2022 contempt
orders.10 See County of Fulton, 292 A.3d at 1004. Further, this Court
affirmed the enforcement of the July 23, 2021 sanctions orders in its
memorandum dated November 7, 2022, and adopted the reasoning of Judge
Bertin’s Sanctions Opinion. Pollick III, 2022 WL 16736956 at *5-7; Sanction
Op., 07/20/21, at 11-15; see also Trial Ct. Op., 12/19/24, at 3-4. Here, as
in the prior appeal, on this record, Appellant’s claim is meritless and no relief
is due.
10 We note that in her reply brief, Appellant claims that the trial court erred
by concluding she acted in bad faith because she had appealed from the prior orders and the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear the contempt petitions while the appeal was pending. Appellant’s Reply Brief at 21-22. It is wellestablished that “[t]he opportunity for, and the extent of, a reply brief is limited. . . . [A]n appellant is prohibited from raising new issues in a reply brief.” Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214, 219 n.8 (Pa. 1999) (citations omitted); see also Reginelli v. Boggs, 181 A.3d 293, 307 n.15 (Pa. 2018) (explaining that “an appellant is prohibited from raising new issues in a reply brief” (citation omitted)). “When an appellant uses a reply brief to raise new issues or remedy deficient discussions in an initial brief, the appellate court may suppress the non-complying portions.” Fahy, 737 A.2d at 219 n.8 (citations omitted). Appellant did not include any argument in her initial appellate brief that she did not act in bad faith or with wrongful intent. Therefore, this claim is waived. See id.; see also Reginelli, 181 A.3d at 307 n.15.
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Appellant’s Ability to Pay Sanctions
In her fourth to eighth issues, Appellant argues that the trial court erred
by imposing a monetary sanction for contempt without first determining if she
had the ability to pay that sanction. Appellant’s Brief at 46-51; see also
Appellant’s Reply Brief at 13-16. Appellant contends that the trial court was
required to assess her “present ability to pay” at the contempt hearing and
could not rely on the Judge Bertin’s determinations regarding her ability to
pay. Appellant’s Brief at 46-47 (citing Muraco v. Pitulski, 368 A.2d 624, 626
(Pa. 1977)).
Appellee responds that as of the January 20, 2023 hearing, Appellant
had the funds in her SEP account to pay the outstanding sanctions, which
totaled $11,271.71. Appellee’s Brief at 12-13. Appellee asserts that after
Appellant depleted her SEP account, she still had the present ability to comply
with the trial court’s order. Id. at 16. Appellee supported his contention by
referring to evidence from the equitable distribution hearing showing that
Appellant owns real property that is not encumbered by a mortgage.11 Id.
This Court has explained:
11 To the extent Appellee relies on evidence not in the certified record regarding Appellant’s real property, we cannot consider it. See MacPherson v. Magee Mem’l Hosp. for Convalescence, 128 A.3d 1209, 1224 (Pa. Super. 2015) (en banc) (stating that “matters which are not of record cannot be considered on appeal. An appellate court is limited to considering only the materials in the certified record when resolving an issue. . . . [A]ny document which is not part of the officially certified record is deemed non-existent” (citation omitted and some formatting altered)).
- 26 -J-S13031-25
If the alleged contemnor is unable to perform and has in good
faith attempted to comply with the court order, contempt is not
proven. The alleged contemnor has the burden of proving the
affirmative defense that he [or she] has the present inability to
comply with the court order. A court cannot impose a coercive
sentence conditioned on the contemnor’s performance of an act
which is incapable of performance. To impose civil contempt the
trial court must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt from the
totality of evidence presented that the contemnor has the present
ability to comply with the order.
Sinaiko v. Sinaiko, 664 A.2d 1005, 1009-10 (citations omitted and
formatting altered); see also Muraco, 368 A.2d at 625-26 (holding that the
trial court erred by disregarding evidence of the contemnor’s present inability
to comply with the trial court’s prior order).
Here, Judge Lewis explained the record evidence regarding Appellant’s
ability to pay as follows:
This court has been well aware of Appellant’s financial information
since the equitable distribution phase of this divorce proceeding,
specifically Appellant’s six figure income and her SEP account.
Appellant had approximately $88,375.20 in her SEP account.
[N.T., 4/12/22, at 19]; see also [Substantive Op., 7/23/21].
Appellant testified on April 12, 2022, that she withdrew
approximately $30,000 out of her SEP account at some point
during 2021. [N.T., 4/12/22, at 30]. Notwithstanding any growth
to Appellant’s SEP account, this would leave the balance of the
account at approximately $58,000.00 when Appellant was initially
found to be in contempt on April 12, 2022. Appellant presented
no relevant evidence that bolstered her claim that she was unable
to pay. Appellant merely stated on the record that she needed
her SEP account “to survive,” providing no proof of indigency or
list of expenses. The evidence of this case points to the contrary.
As this court stated in its July 2[3], 2021 memorandum opinion:
[Appellant] has always supported herself as a practicing
attorney before and after this marriage, and throughout this
short-term marriage, [Appellant] purposely kept secret
from [Appellee] her finances and earnings and insisted, in
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that regard, the parties file separate tax returns. Indeed,
[Appellant] did not even present at the equitable distribution
hearing, the requested expense list outlining her personal
expenses and needs in support of an alimony claim.
See [Substantive Op., 7/23/21,] at p.2.
. . . [Appellant] had refused to provide any explanation or relevant
evidence that she cannot pay. Appellant, as she has repeatedly
stated throughout these proceedings, was a licensed lawyer in
Pennsylvania for over twenty (20) years. By virtue of her
occupation as a solo practitioner, Appellant had a greater future
earning power than [Appellee], also a licensed attorney.
Appellee’s earning power is capped lower than Appellant’s because
of his employment at a private law firm in Scranton, PA. Appellant
has not logically or factually explained why she has been unable
to pay since this court first imposed sanctions against her in July
2021. Appellant has simply refused to comply.
Trial Ct. Op., 12/19/24, at 13-14 (some formatting altered).
Judge Lewis further explained that he was not permitted to re-evaluate
Appellant’s financial status under the coordinate jurisdiction rule:12
This court did not err in declining to independently assess
Appellant’s ability to pay as there was no intervening change of
law, no substantial change in the facts or evidence, nor was Judge
Bertin’s prior holding clearly erroneous that would create a
manifest injustice if the undersigned did not uphold it. Judge
Bertin wrote multiple, lengthy decisions regarding Appellant’s
financial records and status. First, he wrote a thirty-three page
(33) opinion and memorandum in regard to equitable distribution
in this matter. Furthermore, he presided over a prolonged and
12 Under the coordinate jurisdiction rule, “[j]udges of coordinate jurisdiction
sitting in the same case should not overrule each others’ decisions.” Ryan v. Berman, 813 A.2d 792, 795 (Pa. 2002) (citation omitted). Departure from the coordinate jurisdiction rule “is allowed only in exceptional circumstances” which include “an intervening change in the controlling law, a substantial change in the facts or evidence giving rise to the dispute in the matter or where the prior holding was clearly erroneous and would create a manifest injustice if followed.” Id. (citation omitted). “[A] judge may not lightly overrule the prior decision of another judge of the same court.” Id.
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drawn-out hearing on April 12, 2022, wherein he heard testimony
from Appellant concerning her ability to pay. Lastly, Judge Bertin
presided over one final hearing before his exit from this matter on
September 15, 2022. At the conclusion of the above proceedings,
Judge Bertin found Appellant had the ability to pay in each
instance. The undersigned is well aware of the factual and
procedural history of this matter. Finally, and most importantly,
the undersigned has discovered no change of law or substantial
fact that would permit him to disturb Judge Bertin’s findings. Nor
has Appellant supported her claim with any such evidence.
Therefore, Appellant’s claim lacks merit and must fail.
Id. at 18.
Here, Appellee sought contempt sanctions against Appellant for
repeated non-compliance with the trial court’s orders throughout the intensely
acrimonious divorce litigation. Based on our review of the record, we are
constrained to conclude that the trial court committed an error of law. See
Fetzer, 336 A.3d at 1064; Thomas, 194 A.3d at 225. The record reveals
that at the January 20, 2023 contempt hearing, Appellant testified that she
has approximately $130,000 in outstanding debt and she had lost possession
of her car. See N.T. Hr’g, 1/20/23, at 23-27. Appellant further testified that
Appellee’s execution against Appellant’s business line of credit account and
her incarceration for contempt affected her law practice. See id. at 56-57.
Appellant admitted that the balance of her SEP account as of December 2022
was $54,834.44. See id. at 54-55. Subsequently, at the March 22, 2024
contempt hearing, Appellant testified that she had no savings and did not have
any taxable income in 2022. See N.T. Hr’g, 3/22/24, at 2. Appellant also
explained that she had withdrawn all of the money in her SEP account to cover
her living expenses. See id. at 4.
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Because Appellant presented evidence that she was unable to comply
with the sanctions orders at the January 20, 2023 and March 22, 2024
hearings, the trial court was required to determine if Appellant had the
present ability to comply with the trial court’s orders. See Muraco, 368
A.2d at 625-26; Sinaiko, 664 A.2d at 1009-10. Further, Appellant’s evidence
regarding her ability to pay constitutes a substantial change in the facts which
permits the trial court to depart from the coordinate jurisdiction rule. See
Ryan, 813 A.2d at 795. For these reasons, we are constrained to conclude
that the trial court erred by failing to independently determine whether
Appellant lacked the present ability to comply with the trial court’s sanctions
orders. See Sinaiko, 664 A.2d at 1010. Understanding the extreme volatility
and acrimony evident in these proceedings, nonetheless, we are constrained
to vacate the trial court’s April 2, 2024 contempt order and remand for
furthering factual findings by the trial court.13
Lack of Purge Condition
Having vacated the trial court’s April 2, 2024 contempt order, we need
not address Appellant’s remaining issues. However, we deem it appropriate
to address Appellant’s claim in her eighth and ninth issues that the contempt
order lacks a purge condition because it is likely to arise on remand. See,
13 Additionally, Appellant asserts in her reply brief that she has been granted
in forma pauperis status in litigation she has pursued in federal court. See Appellant’s Reply Brief at 19. However, Appellant raised this in her reply brief for the first time; therefore, we will not consider this claim. See Reginelli, 181 A.3d at 307 n.15; Fahy, 737 A.2d at 219 n.8.
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e.g., Freed v. Geisinger Med. Ctr., 910 A.2d 68, 75 (Pa. Super. 2006)
(stating that “[d]espite our holding of trial court error and the decision to
remand for trial, we will address the other two issues raised by [the a]ppellant
precisely because they are likely to arise on remand”).
Appellant argues that the trial court erred by ordering her to pay a $100
fine and perform 75 hours of community service without including a purge
condition in the April 2, 2024 contempt order. Appellant’s Brief at 54-56.
Appellee responds that the lack of a purge condition is irrelevant because
Appellant has willfully violated “court orders over and over and over again.”
Appellee’s Brief at 20-21. Appellee suggests that even if a purge condition
was included in the April 2, 2024 contempt order, Appellant would not comply
with that order because Appellant has not satisfied the purge conditions set
forth in the trial court’s previous contempt orders. Id. at 21.
This Court has reiterated that
the characteristic that distinguishes civil from criminal contempt
is the ability of the contemnor to purge himself [or herself] of
contempt by complying with the court’s directive. To that end,
every order which imposes punishment for civil contempt should
state the condition upon which fulfillment will result in the release
of the defendant or the remission of the fine. With specific
reference to imprisonment based upon a finding of civil contempt,
our Supreme Court has explained:
Before a defendant may be committed for civil contempt, it
is essential that it be clear what is required of him [or her]
in order to purge himself [or herself] of the contempt, and
the commitment order should state the condition which
when complied with will release him [or her]. In the
absence thereof, a commitment for civil contempt is
improper.
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[Knaus v. Knaus, 127 A.2d 669, 674 (Pa. 1956)]. Indeed, it is
axiomatic that a litigant adjudged to be in civil contempt holds the
keys to the jailhouse door.
Fetzer, 336 A.3d at 1066 (some citations omitted and some formatting
altered).
Here, Judge Lewis explained:
In Rhoades [v. Pryce, 874 A.2d 148 (Pa. Super. 2005) (en
banc)], an Allegheny County judge held [the] ex-wife in contempt
and imposed sanctions for attorney’s fees for her refusal to sign
an authorization form to reduce insurance policy coverage.
Further the Superior Court agreed with the trial court that “her
conduct was willful and served no legitimate purpose.” Rhoades,
874 A.2d at [154]. This court has imposed, as a sanction,
attorney’s fees on Appellant on three (3) prior occasions as well
as a $100 fine. Appellant has refused to pay Appellee’s legal
counsel for her vexatious, obdurate, and disrespectful behavior
both inside and outside of the courtroom. Further, in its decision
to impose a fine and community service, this court attempted to
try a different route to ascertain if she would comply with a nonmonetary sanction. Gross v. Schultz, No. 51 WDA 2024, 2024
WL 4792917, at *1 (Pa. Super. Ct. Oct. 22, 2024) [(unpublished
mem.)]. Appellant has not provided proof of compliance of any
sanction that she was ordered to pay. Therefore, Appellant’s claim
is without merit and must fail.
Trial Ct. Op., 12/19/24, at 21 (some formatting altered).
Based on our review of the record, we are constrained to conclude that
the trial court erred by not setting a purge condition in its April 2, 2024
contempt order. See Fetzer, 336 A.3d at 1064; see also Thomas, 194 A.3d
at 225. The record confirms that the April 2, 2024 contempt order does not
contain any purge condition. See Trial Ct. Order, 4/2/24. Judge Lewis
explained that the purpose in imposing sanctions was to encourage Appellant’s
compliance with the prior monetary sanctions. See Trial Ct. Op., 12/19/24,
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at 21. However, as a matter of civil contempt, the trial court was required to
include a purge condition in its contempt order, the fulfillment of which would
have released Appellant from the $100 fine and requirement to perform 75
hours of community service. See Fetzer, 336 A.3d at 1066. Accordingly, the
trial court must include a purge condition in any civil contempt order that it
enters on remand. See id.
Conclusion
In sum, we conclude that the trial court had jurisdiction to enter its
orders of April 12, 2022; April 25, 2022; February 7, 2023; and April 2, 2024.
However, we vacate the April 2, 2024, order and remand this matter for
further proceedings to determine Appellant’s current ability to pay Appellee
the outstanding balance of the sanctions judgment orders and any other
related matters deemed appropriate by the trial court. We further direct the
trial court to include a purge condition in any civil contempt orders that it
enters on remand. In light of our disposition, we need not address the
remainder of Appellant’s arguments.14
14 For the same reasons, we decline to address Appellee’s request for reasonable attorney fees pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2744. See Appellee’s Brief at 21-25.
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Order vacated. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.
President Judge Emeritus Panella joins the opinion.
Judge Kunselman files a concurring opinion.
Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/21/2026
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