IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 25-1830
Filed October 21, 2026
In re the Marriage of William L. Godden and Sheryl L. Godden
Upon the Petition of
William L. Godden,
Petitioner–Appellant,
And Concerning
Sheryl L. Godden,
Respondent–Appellee.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Clarke County,
The Honorable Stacy Ritchie, Judge.
AFFIRMED
Mason T. McCoy (argued) of Reynoldson, Van Werden & McCoy, L.L.P.,
Osceola, attorney for appellant.
Andrew B. Howie (argued) of Shindler, Anderson, Goplerud & Weese,
P.C., West Des Moines, attorney for appellee.
Heard at oral argument
by Tabor, C.J., and Greer and Ahlers, JJ.
Opinion by Ahlers, J.
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AHLERS, Judge.
William Godden appeals from the property-division provisions of the decree dissolving his marriage to Sheryl Shupe (formerly known as Sheryl Godden). Sheryl requests an award of appellate attorney fees. Following our review, we affirm and deny Sheryl’s request for appellate attorney fees.
I. Background Facts & Proceedings
In 2012, William purchased a farm residence that sits on thirty acres. William met Sheryl through an online dating site in late 2020. At that time, Sheryl lived and worked in Illinois.
In June 2021, William sold farm ground in an adjoining county and
used the proceeds to execute a 1031 exchange1 by buying land (the southern
1
Section 1031 of the United States Internal Revenue Code provides that
capital gains tax may be deferred in certain circumstances where property
is exchanged for property “of like kind.” The policy behind this deferral is
the taxpayer has not received anything that can be used to pay taxes
because the property was simply exchanged for property of like kind. The
basis of the old property becomes the basis of the new property, with
adjustments. Therefore, the gain is still locked up in property—just a
different property—and the taxpayer has not realized a gain for tax
purposes.
The IRS issued a fact sheet regarding 1031 exchanges. FS—
2008—18, issued in February 2008, explains that a section 1031 exchange
“allows you to postpone paying tax on the gain” and that “[g]ain is
deferred, but not forgiven, in a like-kind exchange.” As the fact sheet
explains, “When the replacement property is ultimately sold (not as part
of another exchange), the original deferred gain, plus any additional gain
realized since the purchase of the replacement property, is subject to tax.”
Daniels v. Holtz, 794 N.W.2d 813, 819 (Iowa 2010) (internal citations omitted).
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property) abutting the south side of the acreage where he lived. He paid $475,000 for the land.
The next month Sheryl sold her home, quit her job, moved to Iowa,
and began living with William. The couple’s house was unfinished. The bedroom walls were drywalled, but the rest of the house only had stud walls. The kitchen consisted of “a mop sink with a set of shelves and a piece of plywood on it and stove and refrigerator sitting there in the room.” William, some of his employees, and Sheryl worked hard to finish the interior of the house.
Once Sheryl moved in, she did not work independently elsewhere.
Instead, she worked for William’s business,2 though she was never paid for that work. Sheryl explained that she worked without pay because William represented that “everything was [theirs].” She also used money she brought into their relationship to pay various bills, taxes, and farm payments.
The couple married in June of 2022. In March 2024, William sold a
significant portion of the southern property for $925,000. He used $443,063 of the proceeds to purchase land in Illinois through another 1031 exchange. The remaining proceeds were used to pay down William’s debt.
By the time the southern property sold, the marriage had soured to the point that William filed a petition to dissolve the marriage in July 2024. The dissolution trial focused on how to equitably divide the property. Only William and Sheryl testified. Following trial, the district court issued a decree dividing the parties’ assets and liabilities. The court found “that for their short marriage, Sheryl gave up a lot to commit to William. Further, she
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William testified that he is self-employed doing “mostly dirt work for farmers, . . . ponds, terraces.” And he previously farmed and raised cattle.
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worked with him toward his business, farming, and renovation enterprises without receiving a wage for her efforts.” Although the court awarded all real property to William, it found it equitable to award Sheryl one-half of twothirds of the $443,063 paid to purchase the Illinois property from the proceeds from the sale of the southern property. The court arrived at this figure—$147,687.67—because the parties were married for two of the three years William owned the southern property. The court also found it
equitable to award Sheryl half of the appreciation of the value of the Illinois property that was purchased shortly before they separated. Sheryl’s half of the appreciation totaled $28,468.50. In total, the court ordered William to pay Sheryl a property equalization payment of $176,156.17.
William filed a motion for reconsideration, which the court denied. He now appeals.
II. Discussion
As dissolution-of-marriage proceedings are in equity, we review them de novo. In re Marriage of Mills, 983 N.W.2d 61, 67 (Iowa 2022); Iowa R. App. P. 6.907. As such, we give weight to the district court’s fact findings, especially as to credibility determinations, but we are not bound by them. In re Marriage of McDermott, 827 N.W.2d 671, 676 (Iowa 2013). And “[w]e will disturb the district court’s ruling only when there has been a failure to do equity.” Id. (cleaned up).
As part of entering a decree in any dissolution-of-marriage case, the district court must equitably divide the parties’ property. 3 Iowa Code
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The exception being that gifted and inherited property is not subject to division unless “refusal to divide the property is inequitable to the other party or to the children of the marriage.” Iowa Code § 598.21(6). This exception is not applicable to the instant case.
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§ 598.21(1) (2024). Iowa Code section 598.21(5) identifies the factors a court should consider when equitably dividing the property. Those factors are:
a. The length of the marriage.
b. The property brought to the marriage by each party.
c. The contribution of each party to the marriage, giving
appropriate economic value to each party’s contribution in homemaking
and child care services.
d. The age and physical and emotional health of the parties.
e. The contribution by one party to the education, training, or
increased earning power of the other.
f. The earning capacity of each party, including educational
background, training, employment skills, work experience, length of
absence from the job market, custodial responsibilities for children, and
the time and expense necessary to acquire sufficient education or training
to enable the party to become self-supporting at a standard of living
reasonably comparable to that enjoyed during the marriage.
g. The desirability of awarding the family home or the right to live
in the family home for a reasonable period to the party having custody of
the children, or if the parties have joint legal custody, to the party having
physical care of the children.
h. The amount and duration of an order granting support payments
to either party pursuant to section 598.21A and whether the property
division should be in lieu of such payments.
i. Other economic circumstances of each party, including pension
benefits, vested or unvested. Future interests may be considered, but
expectancies or interests arising from inherited or gifted property created
under a will or other instrument under which the trustee, trustor, trust
protector, or owner has the power to remove the party in question as a
beneficiary, shall not be considered.
j. The tax consequences to each party.
k. Any written agreement made by the parties concerning property
distribution.
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l. The provisions of an antenuptial agreement.
m. Other factors the court may determine to be relevant in an
individual case.
Id. § 598.21(5). We use these factors as our guideposts when reviewing the district court’s division of property.
William contends the property division was not equitable in a number of respects. Most of his arguments center on his contention that Sheryl should not benefit from the growth or investment of assets he held prior to their marriage, though he does acknowledge that premarital property is still subject to division in dissolution proceedings. As to that, he is correct. Premarital property is divisible in a dissolution. See id. (“The court shall divide all property, except inherited property or gifts received or expected by one party, equitably . . . .” (emphasis added)); In re Marriage of Schriner, 695 N.W.2d 493, 496 (Iowa 2005) (recognizing that the statutory requirement “means the property included in the divisible estate includes not only property acquired during the marriage by one or both of the parties, but property owned prior to the marriage by a party”). And “[t]he district court may not separate a premarital asset from the divisible estate and
automatically award it to the spouse that owned the property prior to the marriage.” In re Marriage of Fennelly, 737 N.W.2d 97, 102 (Iowa 2007) (cleaned up).
The above said, the property brought into the marriage is a factor to consider in determining an equitable property division. See Iowa Code § 598.21(5)(b) (listing “[t]he property brought to the marriage by each party” as a factor to consider in determining property division). This factor can be used to essentially set aside the premarital value of property to the spouse bringing the property into the marriage when it is equitable to do so. See, e.g.,
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In re Marriage of Wendell, 581 N.W.2d 197, 199 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998) (noting that consideration of the value of premarital property “may justify a full credit, but it is not required”).
Here, the district court clearly considered the short duration of the marriage and what assets the parties had when they entered the marriage because the property division heavily favored William, and understandably so. William received all the real property he brought into the marriage and the Illinois property. But the court ordered William to make a property equalization payment to Sheryl. The payment amount was based on the appreciation of two assets.
The first asset is the southern property, which increased in value by $450,000 while William owned it. After it was sold, $443,063 of that gain was used to purchase the Illinois land. As the parties were married for approximately two-thirds of the time William owned the southern property, the court considered two-thirds 4 of the $443,063 appreciation to have
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William takes issue with the court’s conclusion that the parties were married for two-thirds of the time William owned the southern property, claiming that the court improperly used years to calculate the fraction instead of months. He contends that, if we accept the district court’s theory that we should determine the marital portion of the appreciation in value by prorating the appreciation by the period of the marriage, we should make that calculation based on him purchasing the southern property in early June 2021, the parties marrying in early June 2022, and him selling the property in late March 2024. Using those dates, William contends he owned the property for thirty-four months, of which he was married to Sheryl for twenty-two. Thus, he contends, the marriage only constituted 64.7% (twenty-two divided by thirty-four) of the time he owned the southern property rather than the 66.667% (two divided by three) figure the court used. While William may have a point, he conceded at oral argument that the difference in the calculation is negligible. By our calculation the difference is only about $4357.52 (($443,063 x .66667 x .5) – ($443,063 x .647 x .5)). In relation to the property distribution as a whole, this discrepancy is comparatively minor. As such, we decline to adjust for it.
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occurred during the marriage and awarded Sheryl one-half of the value of that marital appreciation—or $147,687.67.5
The second asset is the Illinois property. It was purchased for
$443,063 during the marriage, and the parties agreed it was worth $500,000 at the time of trial, so it had appreciated by $56,937. The court awarded Sheryl one-half of the value of the appreciation—or $28,468.50.
Combining Sheryl’s share of the appreciation of these two assets, the court ordered William to pay a property settlement payment to Sheryl of $176,156.17. William challenges this award. He contends it is inequitable for Sheryl to receive any share of assets he traces back to his premarital assets.
William focuses on the fact that the record does not contain evidence of Sheryl working to improve either the southern property or the Illinois property. He reasons that Sheryl should not reap any benefit from the increased value of them. But looking at the property division and marriage holistically, it is apparent that Sheryl made notable, substantial sacrifices and contributions that benefitted William significantly. She sold her home and quit her job to integrate herself into William’s life. She also worked for William’s business without receiving a wage because William represented that what was his was also hers.6 She also put sweat equity into his residence,
See In re Marriage of Towne, 966 N.W.2d 668, 677 (Iowa Ct. App. 2021) (noting that an equitable division of property “need not be done with mathematical exactness” (cleaned up)).
5
$443,063 x (2/3) x (1/2) = $147,687.67.
6
William makes a passing argument that the district court failed to consider that Sheryl received indirect benefits from her contributions to the business because the business paid their living expenses and was used to purchase some assets that were divided between them. We are unconvinced by this argument because we see no persuasive
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providing labor to help finish the interior of his home. And she used $31,808.45 she brought into the marriage to pay bills for William.
Even though this was a short marriage, Sheryl made the notable
sacrifices and contributions just described. We agree with the district court that it was equitable to compensate Sheryl in some manner for those sacrifices and contributions. And we find the district court’s method of compensation by awarding her a portion of the appreciation in value of the southern property during the marriage and half the appreciation of the Illinois property to be fair. So, we affirm the district court’s order requiring William to pay Sheryl a property settlement payment of $176,156.17. See McDermott, 827 N.W.2d at 676 (noting that we do not disturb the district court’s property-division ruling unless “there has been a failure to do equity”).
As to other property, William contends that he did not receive a
$15,000 credit for a baler he owned prior to the marriage and sold to buy a new baler. In the dissolution decree, the court noted that the parties agreed that the new baler “was purchased in part with some of William’s premarital funds.” So, William argues that he should get credit for it in the equalization payment to reduce the valuation of the equipment awarded to him in the decree. But as previously discussed, premarital assets are not automatically set aside. Fennelly, 737 N.W.2d at 102. And, during oral argument, William largely conceded that no inequity occurred by the court’s failure to give William credit for the premarital equity in the baler that was sold to buy the new one. Accounting for the sacrifices and contributions Sheryl made to the marriage, we find nothing inequitable about the district court’s decision not
evidence that those things would not have happened had Sheryl worked outside the home for a wage.
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to set aside $15,000 of the equity in the new baler as William’s separate property, so we decline to disturb the district court’s property-division ruling. See McDermott, 827 N.W.2d at 676.
Finally, we address Sheryl’s request for appellate attorney fees.
“Appellate attorney fees are not a matter of right, but rather rest in this court’s discretion.” Id. at 687 (citation omitted). When considering an appellate-attorney-fee request, we consider the needs of the requesting party, the other’s ability to pay, and the merits of the claims. Id. William was unsuccessful in his appeal and has the ability to pay. On the other hand, Sheryl now has means of her own, as she works full-time as an office manager making $21 per hour and will receive a significant property-equalization payment from William. Balancing these considerations, we decline to order William to pay any of Sheryl’s appellate attorney fees.
III. Conclusion
Finding the district court’s property-division determination to be
equitable, we affirm. And we deny Sheryl’s claim for appellate attorney fees.
AFFIRMED.
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