In the
Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
No. 06-26-00083-CV
ADEPT MACHINE TOOLS, INC., Appellant
V.
LINDSEY UNDERWOOD, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS INDEPENDENT ADMINISTRATOR
OF THE ESTATE OF CHARLES TRENT UNDERWOOD, ET AL., Appellees
On Appeal from the 102nd District Court
Red River County, Texas
Trial Court No. CV05658
Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice van Cleef
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Charles Trent Underwood was working for Martin Sprocket and Gear, Inc. as a HyundaiWIA Corp. LV 800R computer numerical control (CNC) vertical lathe-machine (Machine)
operator when the Machine ejected a spinning object that beat its metal door open “with such
force that [Charles] was thrown back . . . several feet,” causing his death. Charles’s wife,
Lindsey Underwood, sued Adept Machine Tools, Inc., among other parties, individually and as
Independent Administrator of the Estate of Charles Trent Underwood, along with Jerry
Underwood, and Marcia Lewis (collectively referred to as Underwood).1 Adept, a foreign
corporation with its principal place of business in North Carolina, filed a special appearance,
which the trial court denied. In this accelerated appeal, Adept argues that the trial court erred by
finding that it had personal jurisdiction over Adept. Finding no error in the trial court’s exercise
of specific jurisdiction over Adept, we affirm the denial of Adept’s special appearance.
I. Standard of Review
“On appeal, we review de novo the trial court’s determination to grant or deny a special
appearance.” Chongqing Huansong Indus. Grp. Imp. & Exp. Trade Co. v. Swanson, No. 06-20-00045-CV, 2021 WL 1031542, at *5 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Mar. 18, 2021, pet. denied) (mem.
op.) (quoting Hitachi Shin Din Cable, Ltd. v. Cain, 106 S.W.3d 776, 781 (Tex. App.—Texarkana
2003, no pet.)). Thus, “[w]hether a trial court has personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant is a question of law that we review de novo.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting
Schexnider v. E-Cig Cent., LLC, No. 06-20-00003-CV, 2020 WL 6929872, at *3 (Tex. App.—
1
Jerry and Marcia are Charles’s surviving parents.
2
Texarkana Nov. 25, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (quoting Wilco Farmers v. Carter, 558 S.W.3d
197, 201 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2018, no pet.) (quoting Old Republic Nat’l Title Ins. Co. v.
Bell, 549 S.W.3d 550, 558 (Tex. 2018) (citing Moncrief Oil Int’l Inc. v. OAO Gazprom, 414
S.W.3d 142, 150 (Tex. 2013))))).
Where, as here, “no findings of fact and conclusions of law are made by the trial court,
‘we infer “all facts necessary to support the judgment and supported by the evidence.”’” Id.
(quoting Schexnider, 2020 WL 6929872, at *3 (quoting Wilco Farmers, 558 S.W.3d at 201–02
(quoting Moki Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg, 221 S.W.3d 569, 574 (Tex. 2007) (quoting BMC
Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 795 (Tex. 2002))))). “However, ‘[w]hen
the appellate record includes the reporter’s and clerk’s records, these implied findings are not
conclusive and may be challenged for legal and factual sufficiency in the appropriate appellate
court.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Schexnider, 2020 WL 6929872, at *3 (quoting BMC
Software, 83 S.W.3d at 795 (citing Roberson v. Robinson, 768 S.W.2d 280, 281 (Tex. 1989)
(per curiam); Zac Smith & Co. v. Otis Elevator Co., 734 S.W.2d 662, 666 (Tex. 1987)))). “In
considering whether the evidence supports the trial court’s ruling, ‘[w]e consider all of the
jurisdictional evidence before the trial court.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Schexnider,
2020 WL 6929872, at *3 (quoting Cagle v. Clark, 401 S.W.3d 379, 387 (Tex. App.—Texarkana
2013, no pet.) (citing Townsend v. Univ. Hosp.-Univ. of Colo., 83 S.W.3d 913, 919 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana 2002, pet. denied)))).
When a defendant challenges whether the trial court has personal jurisdiction over it, “the
plaintiff and the defendant have shifting burdens of proof.” Id. at *6 (quoting Schexnider, 2020
3
WL 6929872, at *3 (citing Wilco Farmers, 558 S.W.3d at 202 (citing Kelly v. Gen. Interior
Const., Inc., 301 S.W.3d 653, 658 (Tex. 2010)))). “First, ‘[i]t is the plaintiff’s initial burden to
plead sufficient allegations to invoke jurisdiction under the Texas long-arm statute.’” Id.
(alteration in original) (quoting Schexnider, 2020 WL 6929872, at *3 (quoting Wilco Farmers,
558 S.W.3d at 202 (citing Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 574))). “The nonresident defendant must
then negate all bases of jurisdiction in the plaintiff’s allegations.” Id. (quoting Schexnider, 2020
WL 6929872, at *3 (quoting Wilco Farmers, 558 S.W.3d at 202)). “Jurisdiction can be negated
on either a factual or legal basis.” Id. (quoting Schexnider, 2020 WL 6929872, at *3 (quoting
Wilco Farmers, 558 S.W.3d at 202 (citing Kelly, 301 S.W.3d at 659))). “The defendant can
factually negate the plaintiff’s allegations by presenting evidence that it has no contacts with
Texas.” Id. (quoting Schexnider, 2020 WL 6929872, at *3 (quoting Wilco Farmers, 558 S.W.3d
at 202)). “The plaintiff must then respond with evidence affirming its jurisdictional allegations,
or risk dismissal of its lawsuit by failing to do so.” Id. (quoting Schexnider, 2020 WL 6929872,
at *3 (quoting Wilco Farmers, 558 S.W.3d at 202)). To negate personal jurisdiction allegations
in a plaintiff’s petition, the defendant must show:
that even if the allegations are true, either (1) the evidence is legally insufficient
to establish jurisdiction; (2) the defendant’s contacts with Texas do not amount to
purposeful availment; (3) for specific jurisdiction, that the plaintiff’s claims do
not arise from the defendant’s contacts; or (4) that the exercise of jurisdiction
would offend the traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
Id. (quoting Schexnider, 2020 WL 6929872, at *3 (quoting Wilco Farmers, 558 S.W.3d at 202)).
4
II. Factual and Procedural Background
In their live petition, Underwood explained how the accident occurred. Their petition
states that Charles “clamped” a metal sprocket into the Machine’s chuck, which was meant to
keep the sprocket in place during operation. Then, Charles “closed the Machine’s door, and
started the program.” Their petition states that, “[a]t some point during the machining process,
and while the heavy steel sprocket was spinning at a very high rate of speed, or many rotations
per minute, the steel sprocket was released from the [c]huck, sending it flying about within the
enclosed operating area of the Machine.” As a result, their petition states that when “the steel
sprocket made its way around the Machine, it finally struck the Machine’s metal door with such
force that it caused the door to be forced outward.”
Underwood asserted claims for negligence, gross negligence, and breach of the warranty
of merchantability against Adept and others. They alleged in their petition that “[o]nce the
Machine was delivered to and assembled in the United States, Hyundai America notified its
licensed distributors,” including Hillary Machinery, Inc., that the Machine was available for sale.
According to their petition, Hillary notified Martin Sprocket of the Machine, and Martin
Sprocket purchased it after Hillary communicated with Adept about modifying the Machine
according to Martin Sprocket’s specifications. Specifically, their petition states that Adept
modified the Machine by installing a “[twenty-four inch] HC Series Sealed Power Chuck – 3 –
Jaw, High-Speed, Closed – Center Power Chuck” and shipped the Machine to Texas.
Underwood alleged in their petition that it was the modified chuck that released the steel
sprocket and that, as a result, “the parts manufactured for and installed on the Machine were
5
defective and not fit for the ordinary purpose for which such goods are used” since “the
Machine’s guard door and its frame were not designed to withstand the impact from large,
ejected objects that would foreseeably be crafted by the Machine.” Underwood also complained
of “the absence of warnings, instructions, or labels on the Machine itself or in the Machine’s
manuals as to the dangers associated with large steel parts being ejected while the operator
stands in front of the Machine’s door during the machining process.”
Their petition states the following jurisdictional facts:
• “Hyundai Korea sells its products to Hyundai America, which then distributes
them through Texas sales agents like Hillary and/or Adept, demonstrates a
purposeful targeting of the Texas market through an established distribution
network.”
• “Hillary is a machine tool dealer, sales, and service organization headquartered in
Plano, Texas[,] with additional offices in Oklahoma and Texas. Hillary markets,
sells, and supports computer numerical control (“CNC”) machine tools,
accessories, and automation solutions to major manufacturers, contract
manufactures, and job shops throughout the Texas, Arkansas, Oklahoma,
Louisiana area and even into Mexico. Martin Sprocket is one of the major
manufactures with whom Hillary deals.”
• “Adept is also a machine tool dealer with its principal place of business in North
Carolina. Adept has purposely availed itself of the jurisdiction of Texas by
placing its products in the stream of commerce and marketing its products through
distributors who have agreed to serve as the sales agents in Texas, namely, Hillary.
Together and/or in concert with Hillary, Adept and Hillary sold the Machine at
issue to Martin Sprocket.”
Adept filed a special appearance, arguing that it had no physical presence in Texas, did
not have enough contacts with Texas to support general jurisdiction, and did not have the
purposeful contacts with Texas required for specific jurisdiction because “it merely facilitated
6
the shipment of goods that other [corporate defendant] entities had placed in the steam of
commerce.” Adept’s special appearance was supported by an affidavit of its president, Kelly
Schiefen, who stated that Adept did not manufacture or sell the Machine, but merely “packaged
the product and arranged for it to be shipped to Martin Sprocket.” Schiefen also averred that
Adept had no property, office, employee, or bank account in Texas. Schiefen said that Adept
does not market to Texas and that its website states that Adept’s “Mission is to provide Solution
based selling of Machine Tools to manufacturers in North Carolina, South Carolina, and
Virginia.”
Adept also included its invoice to Hillary showing that it billed Hillary $1,898.45 for
“Non-Warranty Services” and delivery of the Machine to Martin Sprocket. Under a description
of the services Adept was billing Hillary for, the invoice states, “Preparation of HW LV800 for
shipment, including modification of draw tube [sic], and chuck mounting. [Eighteen] Hours at a
special rate of $85[.00]/[Hour].”
The trial court permitted jurisdictional discovery, and its results were presented to the
trial court in Underwood’s response to the special appearance. In its responses to requests for
admissions, Adept admitted that it (1) received certain parts that it used to modify the Machine,
(2) billed Hillary for eighteen hours of work that included modification of the Machine’s
drawtube and chuck, and (3) knew that the Machine would be shipped to a Texas company at the
time it made the modifications to the Machine.
Emails between Chuck Schiefen, an Adept employee, and Hillary’s president, Troy
Owen, show that, on March 31, 2016, Owen asked Schiefen what type of adapter needed to be
7
on the Machine. On April 1, Owen responded that Hillary had “ordered the chuck adapter and
drawtube adapter to be shipped directly to Adept” and asked that Hillary be updated when it/they
arrived. On the same day, Schiefen responded by stating that Adept “will put it all together
when it arrives and finish prepping for shipment.” Schiefen said that Adept had cleaned the
Machine up and added, “[w]e did some sample parts on the [M]achine for a[n] OEM truck[-]hub
manufacturer and the chips were large and chipped away the inside of the [M]achine. Other than
that[,] the [M]achine is in new condition with very low power on hours.” On April 25, Schiefen
informed Owen that the “[d]raw bar [sic] and adapter [wa]s too long” and that Adept could get
the Machine “modified” on April 26 and still make a timely delivery. Adept admitted that the
Machine was shipped directly to Martin Sprocket. The Machine’s bill of lading identified Adept
as the shipper of the Machine.
After being presented with this evidence, the trial court denied Adept’s special
appearance.
III. Law Applicable to the Trial Court’s Finding of Personal Jurisdiction
Adept argues that the trial court erred by denying its special appearance because it did not
have personal jurisdiction over Adept. “Texas courts may assert in personam jurisdiction over a
nonresident if (1) the Texas long-arm statute authorizes the exercise of jurisdiction, and (2) the
exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with federal and state constitutional due-process
guarantees.” Id. at *4 (quoting Schexnider, 2020 WL 6929872, at *4 (quoting Moki Mac, 221
S.W.3d at 574 (citing Schlobohm v. Schapiro, 784 S.W.2d 355, 356 (Tex. 1990)))).
The Texas long-arm statute reads,
8
In addition to other acts that may constitute doing business, a
nonresident does business in this state if the nonresident:
(1) contracts by mail or otherwise with a Texas resident
and either party is to perform the contract in whole or in
part in this state; [or]
(2) commits a tort in whole or in part in this state.
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 17.042). “[T]he longarm statute’s broad doing-business language allows the statute to ‘reach as far as the federal
constitutional requirements of due process will allow.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting
Schexnider, 2020 WL 6929872, at *4 (quoting Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 575 (quoting Guardian
Royal Exch. Assurance, Ltd. v. English China Clays, P.L.C., 815 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Tex.
1991)))).
“Federal due-process requirements limit a state’s power to assert personal jurisdiction
over a nonresident defendant.” Id. (quoting Schexnider, 2020 WL 6929872, at *4 (quoting Moki
Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 575 (citing Guardian Royal, 815 S.W.2d at 226))). “Personal jurisdiction is
proper when the nonresident defendant has established minimum contacts with the forum state,
and the exercise of jurisdiction comports with ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.’” Id. (quoting Schexnider, 2020 WL 6929872, at *4 (quoting Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at
575 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer,
311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940))))). “The purpose of the minimum contacts analysis is to prevent a
foreign corporation from being haled into Texas courts when its relationship to Texas is so
remote that it could not reasonably anticipate having to defend itself in a Texas court.” Id.
(quoting Hitachi Shin Din Cable, Ltd., 106 S.W.3d at 782 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.
9
v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980))). “Minimum contacts are sufficient for personal
jurisdiction when the nonresident defendant ‘purposefully avails itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its
laws.’” Id. (quoting Schexnider, 2020 WL 6929872, at *4 (quoting Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at
575 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (citing Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at
319)))).
“A nonresident defendant’s forum-state contacts may give rise to two types of personal
jurisdiction”—general2 or specific. Id. (quoting Schexnider, 2020 WL 6929872, at *4 (quoting
Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 575 (citing BMC Software, 83 S.W.3d at 795–96))). Here, it is
specific jurisdiction that is at issue.
“[S]pecific jurisdiction ‘may be asserted when the defendant’s forum contacts are
isolated or sporadic, but the plaintiff’s cause of action arises out of those contacts with the
state.’” Id. at *5 (quoting Schexnider, 2020 WL 6929872, at *4 (quoting Spir Star AG v. Kimich,
310 S.W.3d 868, 873 (Tex. 2010) (quoting 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1067.5 (3d ed. 2002)))). “In specific jurisdiction cases,
the analysis focuses on the ‘relationship among the defendant, the forum[,] and the litigation.’”
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Schexnider, 2020 WL 6929872, at *4 (quoting Spir Star, 310
S.W.3d at 873 (quoting Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 575–76 (quoting Guardian Royal, 815 S.W.2d
at 228)))).
2
“A court has general jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant whose ‘affiliations with the State are so “continuous and systematic” as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum State.’” Swanson, 2021 WL 1031542, at *4 (alteration in original) (quoting Schexnider, 2020 WL 6929872, at *4 (quoting TV Azteca v. Ruiz, 490 S.W.3d 29, 37 (Tex. 2016) (quoting Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 127 (2014) (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011))))).
10
“Specific jurisdiction is appropriate when (1) the defendant’s contacts with the forum
state are purposeful, and (2) the cause of action arises from or relates to the defendant’s
contacts.” Id. (quoting Schexnider, 2020 WL 6929872, at *4 (quoting Spir Star, 310 S.W.3d at
873 (citing Retamco Operating, Inc. v. Republic Drilling Co., 278 S.W.3d 333, 337 (Tex.
2009)))).
“The purposeful-availment requirement has three components.” Id. (quoting Schexnider,
2020 WL 6929872, at *6 (citing Michiana Easy Livin’ Country, Inc. v. Holten, 168 S.W.3d 777,
785 (Tex. 2005))). “First, only the defendant’s contacts with the forum are relevant, not the
unilateral activity of another party or a third person.” Id. (quoting Schexnider, 2020 WL
6929872, at *6 (quoting Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 575 (citing Michiana, 168 S.W.3d at 785))).
“Second, the contacts relied on must be purposeful rather than random, fortuitous, or attenuated.”
Id. (quoting Schexnider, 2020 WL 6929872, at *6 (quoting Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 575 (citing
Michiana, 168 S.W.3d at 785))). “Thus, ‘[s]ellers who “reach out . . . and create continuing
relationships and obligations with citizens of another state” are subject to the jurisdiction of the
latter in suits based on their activities.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Schexnider, 2020
WL 6929872, at *6 (quoting Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 575 (quoting Michiana, 168 S.W.3d at
785 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473 (1985))))). “Finally, the
‘defendant must seek some benefit, advantage or profit by “availing” itself of the jurisdiction.’”
Id. (quoting Schexnider, 2020 WL 6929872, at *6 (quoting Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 575
(quoting Michiana, 168 S.W.3d at 785))).
11
“The second requirement of specific jurisdiction, that the cause of action arises from or
relates to the defendant’s forum contacts, ‘lies at the heart of specific jurisdiction by defining the
required nexus between the nonresident defendant, the litigation, and the forum.’” Id. (quoting
Schexnider, 2020 WL 6929872, at *9 (quoting Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 579)). “In Texas, to
satisfy this requirement ‘there must be a “substantial connection” between the defendant’s
contacts and the operative facts of the litigation.’” Id. (quoting Schexnider, 2020 WL 6929872,
at *9 (quoting Spir Star, 310 S.W.3d at 874 (citing Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 585))). “[W]hen a
nonresident’s only contacts with Texas involve indirect sales through a distributor or subsidiary,
specific jurisdiction is limited to claims arising out of those sales.” Id. (quoting Schexnider,
2020 WL 6929872, at *9 (quoting Spir Star, 310 S.W.3d at 874 (citing Alpine View Co. v. Atlas
Copco AB, 205 F.3d 208, 216 (5th Cir. 2000)))).
IV. Factually Sufficient Evidence Supported the Trial Court’s Finding of Specific
Jurisdiction
First, we address whether Underwood met their burden to plead sufficient facts to bring
Adept within the reach of the Texas long-arm statute. Underwood alleged in their petition that
Adept contracted with Hillary, a Texas company, to modify the Machine for its Texas customer
in exchange for a profit. They also alleged in their petition that Adept knew the modifications
were for a Texas customer and that it shipped the product to Texas. They further alleged that the
modified chuck installed by Adept was defective and contributed to the accident occurring in
Texas. We find that the petition’s allegations were sufficient to meet the initial burden to plead
that Adept did business in Texas as required by the Texas long-arm statute. See TEX. CIV. PRAC.
12
& REM. CODE ANN. § 17.042. Accordingly, the burden shifted to Adept to negate all bases of
jurisdiction alleged in Underwood’s petition. See Swanson, 2021 WL 1031542, at *6.
The first requirement of specific jurisdiction is purposeful availment. Adept showed that
it had no employees, offices, or other physical presence in Texas. However, specific jurisdiction
“may not be avoided merely because the defendant did not physically enter the forum State.”
Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476. “So long as a commercial actor’s efforts are ‘purposefully
directed’ toward residents of another State, we have consistently rejected the notion that an
absence of physical contacts can defeat personal jurisdiction there.” Id. (quoting Keeton v.
Hustler Mag., Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984)). “This analysis assesses the quality and nature of
the contacts, not the quantity.” Moncrief Oil, 414 S.W.3d at 151 (citing Retamco, 278 S.W.3d at
339). For this reason, “[a] substantial connection can result from even a single act.” Id.
“Purposeful availment includes deliberately engaging in significant activities within a
state or creating continuing obligations with residents of the forum.” Glob. Energy Sols., LLC v.
Kermit Pipeline, LLC, 657 S.W.3d 165, 173 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2022, no pet.) (citing Burger
King, 471 U.S. at 475–76). This “includes seeking profit, benefits, or advantage from the forum.
Id. (citing Michiana, 168 S.W.3d at 785). “It excludes, however, ‘random,’ ‘fortuitous,’ or
‘attenuated’ contacts or the ‘unilateral activity of another party or a third person.’” Id. (quoting
Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475; Michiana, 168 S.W.3d at 790 (quoting Keeton, 465 U.S. at 774)).
While Adept acknowledges that a single act can support specific jurisdiction, it argues
that its acceptance of Hillary’s contract does not do so because “[p]urposeful availment turns on
the defendant’s choices” and it was Hillary’s decision to reach out to Adept that established
13
Adept’s connection to Texas. Yet, the fact that Hillary contacted Adept does not negate the trial
court’s implied finding that Adept nonetheless purposefully availed itself of doing business in
Texas by accepting a contract that specifically included modifying a product for a Texas
customer. See id. at 178.
“The ‘substantial connection,’ between the defendant and the forum State necessary for a
finding of minimum contacts must come about by an action of the defendant purposefully
directed toward the forum State.” Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., Solano Cnty.,
480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987) (citations omitted) (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475).
“[C]onduct of the defendant [that] indicate[s] an intent or purpose to serve the market in the
forum State, for example, designing the product for the market in the forum State” shows
purposeful availment. Id.; Spir Star, 310 S.W.3d at 873 (quoting Asahi Metal Indus., 480 U.S. at
112); Glob. Energy Sols., 657 S.W.3d at 170 (quoting Spir Star, 310 S.W.3d at 873 (quoting
Asahi Metal Indus., 480 U.S. at 112)).3
Here, the evidence shows that Hillary and Adept discussed modifications to the Machine
that were required for a specific Texas consumer, Martin Sprocket. Adept knew that the
Machine would be used in Texas and agreed to make the modifications. It contracted with
Hillary, a Texas company, and charged them for the modifications, preparation of the Machine
for shipment, and shipment of the Machine to Texas. Adept does not negate that it made a profit
in doing so. “At its core, the purposeful availment analysis seeks to determine whether a
nonresident’s conduct and connection to a forum are such that it could reasonably anticipate
3
We note that nothing in the record alleges that Adept was a manufacturer or designer of the Machine.
14
being haled into court there.” Moncrief Oil, 414 S.W.3d at 152 (citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at
474). Here, it was foreseeable that Adept could anticipate being haled into court in Texas for
alleged damages arising out of the modifications it completed to the Machine. See Otis Elevator
Co., 734 S.W.2d at 666; Glob. Energy Sols., 657 S.W.3d at 176. As a result, the evidence
supported the trial court’s finding that Adept sought “some benefit, advantage or profit by
availing itself of” doing business in Texas. See Moncreif Oil, 414 S.W.3d at 151 (quoting
Retamco, 278 S.W.3d at 339 (quoting Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 575)); Spir Star, 310 S.W.3d at
873 (quoting Michiana, 168 S.W.3d at 784).
As for the second requirement of specific jurisdiction—that the cause of action arises
from or relates to the defendant’s forum contacts—Underwood alleged in their petition that the
modifications to the Machine completed by Adept were a contributing cause to the incident
resulting in Charles’s death. That established the “substantial connection” required between
Adept’s contacts and the operative facts of the litigation. See Glob. Energy Sols., 657 S.W.3d at
178.
Because the evidence supports the trial court’s finding of specific jurisdiction, we find
that Adept failed to negate all bases for personal jurisdiction. Even so, we must decide whether
the exercise of specific jurisdiction would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.
“Only in rare cases, however, will the exercise of jurisdiction not comport with fair play
and substantial justice when the nonresident defendant has purposefully established minimum
contacts with the forum state.” Spir Star, 310 S.W.3d at 878 (quoting Guardian Royal, 815
15
S.W.2d at 231 (citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477–78)); see Galaxy Powersports, LLC v.
Benzou Vehicle Indus., Grp. Co., No. 3:10-CV-0360-P, 2011 WL 13232161, at *3 (N.D. Tex.
Mar. 28, 2011) (order) (“If a defendant benefits from the availability of a particular state’s
market for its products, it is only fitting that the defendant be amenable to suit in that state.”).
“To defeat jurisdiction, [the defendant] must present ‘“a compelling case that the presence of
some consideration would render jurisdiction unreasonable”’ . . . .” Spir Star, 310 S.W.3d at
878–79 (quoting Guardian Royal, 815 S.W.2d at 231 (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477)).
In determining whether assumption of jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant will
offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice,
due consideration should be given to (1) the burden on the defendant, (2) the
interests of the forum state in adjudicating the dispute, (3) the plaintiff’s interest
in obtaining convenient and effective relief, (4) the interstate judicial system’s
interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies, and (5) the
shared interest of the several states in furthering fundamental substantive social
policies.
LeBlanc v. Kyle, 28 S.W.3d 99, 102–03 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2000, pet. denied) (citing
World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292; Guardian Royal, 815 S.W.2d at 228).
In its briefing, Adept does not explain why litigation in Texas would be burdensome to it.
It also failed to offer any such explanation below in its special appearance. “The fact that [Adept
is] not headquartered in Texas ‘cannot, by itself, defeat jurisdiction.”’ Swanson, 2021 WL
1031542, at *12 (quoting Spir Star, 310 S.W.3d at 879 (citing Guardian Royal, 815 S.W.2d at
231) (“Nor is distance alone ordinarily sufficient to defeat jurisdiction: ‘modern transportation
and communication have made it much less burdensome for a party sued to defend himself in a
16
State where he engages in economic activity.’” (citation omitted))). Thus, the trial court could
find that requiring Adept to defend claims in Texas would not pose an undue burden for it.
As for the remaining factors, “Texas has a significant interest in exercising jurisdiction
over controversies arising from injuries a Texas resident sustains” where the purposeful
availment requirement is met. Amneal Pharms., Inc. v. Cnty. of Dallas, 694 S.W.3d 875, 887
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2024, no pet.) (quoting Spir Star, 310 S.W.3d at 879).
Underwood’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief also favors litigation in Texas
since the accident occurred here, the witnesses regarding causation and damages are here, and
there are other Texas defendants involved. No party has addressed the fourth or fifth factors, but
(1) the interstate-judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution would be
better served if the entire litigation were in Texas instead of Underwood having to separately
litigate their claims against Adept in North Carolina, and (2) we are unaware of a difference in
the “fundamental substantive social policies” of Texas and any other state concerning the matters
at issue in this case. See Spir Star, 310 S.W.3d at 878 n.3 (quoting Guardian Royal, 815 S.W.2d
at 232 n.17); Moncrief Oil, 414 S.W.3d at 155 (citing Spir Star, 310 S.W.3d at 878; Asahi Metal
Indus., 480 U.S. at 113).
After reviewing the relevant factors, we find that asserting personal jurisdiction over
Adept comports with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Therefore, we find
that the trial court did not err by denying Adept’s special appearance.
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V. Conclusion
We affirm the trial court’s denial of Adept’s special appearance.
Charles van Cleef
Justice
Date Submitted: October 5, 2026
Date Decided: October 21, 2026
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