Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 490
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION II
No. CR-24-816
Opinion Delivered October 21, 2026
CARLOS ANTONIO RUIZ
APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE BENTON
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. 04CR-23-102]
V.
HONORABLE BRAD KARREN, JUDGE
STATE OF ARKANSAS
APPELLEE AFFIRMED
CASEY R. TUCKER, Judge
Carlos Ruiz was convicted in the Benton County Circuit Court of one count of rape
and one count of second-degree sexual assault. On appeal, he argues that the circuit court
erred when it (1) failed to exclude witnesses from the courtroom during opening statements;
(2) denied his motions for directed verdict on both counts because there was insufficient
evidence of sexual gratification and the victim’s credibility was questionable due to the
passage of time; and (3) admitted improper Rule 404(b) evidence during the sentencing
phase of trial. We affirm.
I. Relevant Facts
The State charged Ruiz with second-degree sexual assault and rape, alleging that
between 2007 and 2012, he engaged in sexual contact with a person who was less than
fourteen years of age and not his spouse and that he engaged in deviate sexual activity with a minor. Ruiz was tried before a jury in February 2024. The evidence at trial was that the
minor victim (MV) was born in 2000. She experienced significant communication
difficulties in the regular classroom beginning in kindergarten. The elementary school
psychology specialist administered a psycho-educational evaluation to MV when she was six
years old. MV’s intellectual functioning was low—within the borderline range—and she
demonstrated weakness in academic areas that required a higher level of expressive and
receptive language processing. Her communication difficulties were found to interfere with
her ability to follow directions and participate in verbal-communication activities. MV was
placed in special education at that time. MV’s mother testified at trial that as an adult, MV
still struggles to express complicated ideas and sometimes gets frustrated when she is
communicating about difficult subjects.
Ruiz was married to MV’s grandmother, Maria Bautista. MV spent a lot of time at
Bautista and Ruiz’s house while her mother was at work. She also spent the night there at
times. MV testified that when she was seven years old, she went into Ruiz’s home office to
see what he was doing, and he was watching porn. Ruiz picked her up, placed her on his
lap, and put his hand inside her panties. He then used his finger to touch her vagina and
“play with it” without actually penetrating it.
A second incident occurred when MV was spending the night at Bautista and Ruiz’s
house. On that occasion, MV went to the library and found Ruiz reading his Bible. Ruiz
picked her up, put her on his lap, and put “his hand” inside her vagina. MV testified that
Ruiz continued to read his Bible while playing with her vagina. He then penetrated her
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vagina with his penis. MV testified that Ruiz also put his mouth on her vagina and “was
licking and kissing it.”
MV remembered a third occasion in which she was watching cartoons when Ruiz
came in and put his penis in her mouth. MV testified that there were other occasions when
Ruiz did “those things” to her, but these three were the ones she remembered most clearly.
According to MV, the molestation ended when she was twelve years old. MV reported the
incidents to her youth leader and her grandmother in 2020 when she was twenty years old.
At that time, she filed a civil lawsuit, which she later dismissed. MV’s civil attorney notified
law enforcement of MV’s allegations. MV was twenty-four at the time of trial.
MV’s grandmother, Maria Bautista, testified that she was married to Ruiz from 2003
to 2013. They lived across the street from MV, who was frequently at their house. On one
occasion in 2012 when MV was at their house, Ruiz called her into his home office. Bautista
went to see what they were doing. When she walked into the office, she found MV standing
between Ruiz’s legs, facing his computer, and “he had put his hands too close to her part.”
Bautista had MV stop coming to their house at that time. Ruiz filed for divorce later that
same year.
Ruiz’s biological daughter, Nelly Hernandez, who was thirty-six at the time of trial,
traveled to Arkansas from California to testify. Nelly had never met MV or others in Ruiz’s
Arkansas family. She testified that she was four or five years old when she accidentally walked
in on Ruiz while he was in the shower. He accused her of wanting to see him naked. He
then touched her both over her underwear and inside her underwear, and he touched her
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nipples. Nelly testified that Ruiz did this to her multiple times before stopping for a number
of years. Ruiz began molesting Nelly again when she was eleven or twelve years old. Ruiz
touched her breasts and rubbed his penis on the outside of her vagina. Nelly testified that
he would ejaculate on her stomach, outside of her vagina, or in her mouth. On one occasion,
Ruiz made Nelly perform oral sex on him and then he performed oral sex on her before
ejaculating into a towel. Nelly was approximately thirteen years old the last time Ruiz
molested her, which she thought was in 2001.
At the close of the State’s case, Robinson moved for a directed verdict. As to count I,
that Ruiz engaged in sexual intercourse or deviate sexual activity with MV, counsel stated, “I
would just state that I think there’s insufficient evidence. She did give her testimony. I did
not find her to be credible, but that she was less than 14 years at the time of the alleged
offense.” Defense counsel then argued that “there just - - wasn’t any evidence that there was
sexual gratification of the - - of Mr. Ruiz. [MV] did not testify that there was any ejaculation
from Mr. Ruiz.” He concluded, “I think that the evidence for that was insufficient on the
rape.” As to count II, he argued that “there just was not sufficient evidence on that.” He
again argued that there was no evidence that the sexual contact was for sexual gratification.
The court denied the motions. Ruiz rested his case without presenting evidence and renewed
his motions, which the court again denied. The jury found Robinson guilty on both counts:
second-degree sexual assault and rape.
During the sentencing phase of the trial, Jacqueline Baires, one of Ruiz’s
stepdaughters, testified that Ruiz came to her house and sent her children outside because
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he “wanted to be with [her].” She stated that Ruiz forced her to one of her children’s
bedrooms and threw her on the bed face down. Ruiz pulled down her shorts and
“bloomers,” at which time Baires’s children came back inside the house, and Ruiz stopped.
On another occasion, Ruiz forced Baires into her mother’s bedroom, pushed her onto the
bed, opened her legs, and got on top of her. Baires was able to force him off of her. These
events occurred between 2008 and 2009.
The next and last sentencing-phase witness was Marina Rivas, Bautista’s sister. She
testified that one day in 2012, Ruiz let himself into her house while she was in the shower.
When she stepped out of the shower, Ruiz grabbed her, pushed her onto the bed, and was
holding both of her hands while on top of her. She managed to get one hand free and hit
him in the head and “grabbed him by the testicles, and [she] grabbed him really hard.” Ruiz
stopped, and Rivas ran out of the house and into the street still wrapped in a towel, at which
time Ruiz left.
The jury returned a sentence of ten years’ incarceration on the second-degree sexual
assault conviction and a sentence of forty years’ incarceration on the rape conviction. The
jury recommended that the terms run consecutively. The court sentenced Ruiz accordingly,
and this appeal followed.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Although Ruiz raises sufficiency of the evidence as his second point on appeal, we
address it first due to double-jeopardy considerations. Smith v. State, 2024 Ark. 1, 680
S.W.3d 711. Ruiz argues that MV’s credibility was subject to challenge, especially
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considering that she waited fourteen years to report the allegations. He also argues that there
was no evidence that Ruiz derived any sexual gratification from the alleged conduct, stressing
that there was no evidence that Ruiz ejaculated or even had an erection when the alleged
offenses occurred. These arguments are without merit.
A. Standard of Review
In considering a sufficiency challenge, we assess the evidence in the light most
favorable to the State and consider only the evidence that supports the verdict. Smith, supra.
We affirm if the verdict is supported by substantial evidence. Herron v. State, 2026 Ark. App.
276. “Substantial evidence is evidence of sufficient force and character to compel a
conclusion without resort to speculation or conjecture.” Id. at 9. Witness credibility is a
matter for the fact-finder, who may believe all or part of any witness’s testimony. Bahena v.
State, 2023 Ark. App. 261, 667 S.W.3d 553. “A sexual-assault victim’s testimony may
constitute substantial evidence to sustain a conviction for sexual assault. Brown v. State, 374
Ark. 341, 343, 288 S.W.3d 226, 229 (2008). The victim’s testimony need not be
corroborated, and the victim’s testimony alone, describing the sexual contact, is enough for
a conviction. Halliday v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 544, at 2, 386 S.W.3d 51, 53.” Id. at 3, 667
S.W.3d at 555–56. Likewise, a rape victim’s testimony alone can constitute sufficient
evidence to support a rape conviction. Lester v. State, 2024 Ark. App. 206, 687 S.W.3d 344;
see also Bryant v. State, 2010 Ark. 7, at 8, 377 S.W.3d 152, 158 (“This court has consistently
held that the testimony of a rape victim, standing alone, is sufficient to support a conviction
if the testimony satisfies the statutory elements of rape.”).
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B. Sexual Gratification
Sexual gratification is not defined by statute, but our appellate courts have construed
the words in accordance with their reasonable and commonly accepted meanings. Martinez
v. State, 2025 Ark. App. 119, 708 S.W.3d 100. It is not necessary for the State to provide
direct proof that an act is done for sexual gratification if it can be assumed that “the desire
for sexual gratification is a plausible reason for the act. [Brehm v. State, 2020 Ark. App. 442,
608 S.W.3d 166]. Indeed, ‘case law makes clear that when sexual contact occurs, and there
is no legitimate medical reason for it, it can be assumed that such contact was for sexual
gratification.’ Ross v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 129, at 4.” Id. at 8, 708 S.W.3d at 105.
C. Rape
MV’s testimony satisfied the statutory elements of rape. The State charged Ruiz with
rape pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-103(a)(3)(A) (Supp. 2021), requiring the State to
prove that Ruiz engaged in sexual intercourse and/or deviate sexual activity with MV and
that she was under the age of fourteen at the time of the offense. Sexual intercourse is
statutorily defined as “penetration, however slight, of the labia majora by a penis.” Ark.
Code Ann. § 5-14-101(13) (Supp. 2021). Deviate sexual activity is defined as “any act of
sexual gratification involving: [t]he penetration, however slight, of the anus or mouth by the
penis of another person; or [t]he penetration, however slight, of the labia majora or anus of
a person by any body member or foreign instrument manipulated by another person.” Ark.
Code Ann § 5-14-101(1).
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MV testified that Ruiz touched her over her panties and inside her panties, touching
her vagina. He eventually penetrated MV’s vagina with “his whole hand” and with his penis.
On one occasion, Ruiz put his penis in MV’s mouth. MV testified that Ruiz committed
these offenses from the time she was approximately seven years old until she was twelve years
old.
The jury could conclude from MV’s testimony that Ruiz engaged in sexual intercourse
and deviate sexual activity with MV and that she was under the age of fourteen. MV’s
testimony satisfies the statutory elements of rape; thus, it is sufficient to support Ruiz’s
conviction. See Bryant, supra. Any credibility issues were for the jury to decide. Id.
D. Second-Degree Sexual Assault
Ruiz was charged with second-degree sexual assault pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-125(a)(3)(A), which required the State to prove that Ruiz, being over eighteen years old,
engaged in sexual contact with a person who was under the age of fourteen and was not his
wife. Sexual contact, as applies in this case, is “[a]n act of sexual gratification involving the
touching, directly or through clothing, of the sex organs, buttocks, or anus of a person or
the breast of a female.” Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-101(12)(A).
The evidence at trial was that Ruiz, while watching pornography, put MV on his lap
and touched her vagina both over her panties and inside her panties, so that he was touching
the skin of her vagina. On another occasion, he licked and kissed MV’s vagina without
actually penetrating the labia. MV was under fourteen at the time of these actions and was
not married to Ruiz.
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There was no legitimate medical reason for Ruiz to be engaging in this kind of contact
with MV, so it can be assumed the conduct was for sexual gratification. MV’s credibility was
a matter for the jury to decide, and it found her credible. Her testimony satisfies the elements
of second-degree sexual assault and supports Ruiz’s conviction.
III. Allowing Witnesses to Remain in the Courtroom for Opening Statements
Following Invocation of the Rule
Before trial, the State filed a motion in limine requesting that the court allow
witnesses to remain in the courtroom during opening statements, even if Arkansas Rule of
Evidence 615 (“the rule”) was invoked. Defense counsel objected, arguing that to do so
would be giving the State’s witnesses a roadmap, and “having every witness present for the
roadmap is going to be here’s what the State says the roadmap is and every witness needs to
follow that roadmap if we’re going to convict Mr. Ruiz.” The court granted the State’s
motion over defense counsel’s objection. Ruiz argues on appeal that allowing the witnesses
to remain in the courtroom for opening statements was an abuse of discretion that defeated
the purpose of the rule.
Rule 615 states:
At the request of a party the court shall order witnesses excluded so
that they cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses, and it may make the
order of its own motion. This rule does not authorize the exclusion of (1) a
party who is a natural person, or (2) an officer or employee of a party that is
not a natural person designated as its representative by its attorney, or (3) a
person whose presence is shown by a party to be essential to the presentation
of his cause.
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Ark. R. Evid. 615. “The purpose of Rule 615 is to expose inconsistencies in the testimony of
different witnesses and to prevent the possibility of one witness’s shaping her testimony to
match that given by other witnesses at trial.” Jones v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 286, at 4, 524
S.W.3d 1, 3 (citations omitted). As stated by the court in Adams v. State, “The ‘rule,’
embodied in Rule 615, requires the exclusion of witnesses from the courtroom to prevent
them from adjusting their testimony based upon what they have heard prior witnesses say.”
2013 Ark. 174, at 13, 427 S.W.3d 63, 72. The rule is mandatory, requiring the circuit court
to exclude witnesses from the courtroom upon the request of either party, the only
exceptions being those specified in the rule itself. Id. The rule does not exclude a party who
is a natural person or the victim of a crime in the criminal prosecution of that crime. See
Ark. R. Evid. 615(1) and 616. Prejudice is not presumed, and an appellant must demonstrate
prejudice in order to prevail on appeal. Adams, supra.
In the case before us, the circuit court granted the State’s motion in limine to allow
the witnesses to remain in the courtroom for opening statements. While the rule is
mandatory, the Arkansas Supreme Court has never addressed whether it applies to opening
statements. And we need not reach the issue today because even assuming Rule 615 applies
and bars witnesses from opening statements, Ruiz has not shown that he was prejudiced by
the court’s ruling.1 This court will not reverse the circuit court’s decision regarding the
1
Ruiz erroneously asserts that he received the maximum sentences for his convictions.
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proper exercise of the rule absent a showing of prejudice because prejudice is not presumed.
Lard v. State, 2014 Ark. 1, 431 S.W.3d 249.
In Lard, the circuit court allowed a murder victim’s family to remain in the courtroom
for the trial, even though they were going to testify in the sentencing phase. While the
supreme court recognized the circuit court’s decision as erroneous, it did not reverse the
conviction. The appellant had not demonstrated prejudice, which rendered the error
harmless. The court concluded,
Thus, the witnesses’ testimony did not contravene the purpose of the sequestration
rule, as theirs was not the kind of testimony that is susceptible to being materially
altered by any testimony presented during the guilt-phase of trail. Therefore, we hold
that the circuit court’s failure to abide by Rule 615 was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.
Id. at 25, 431 S.W.3d at 267.
The State’s opening statement in the present case briefly outlined what it expected
MV’s testimony to reveal: MV spent time at her grandparents’ house due to her mother
being a single mother who worked, MV’s grandparents had divorced, and MV did not tell
anyone her story until she was twenty years old, at which time she approached an attorney
about the possibility of a civil action. The defendant’s opening statement was similarly brief.
It focused on credibility and the fact that when MV finally told her story about Ruiz’s alleged
offenses, she contacted an attorney about filing a civil action seeking damages.
Ruiz fails to identify the witnesses who heard opening statements, describe the
information they heard, and explain how their testimony was shaped or adjusted by that
information. Additionally, we note that MV’s testimony alone was sufficient to convict Ruiz.
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And MV’s presence in the courtroom was not a violation of the rule. See Ark. R. Evid. 616.
Under these circumstances, we find no prejudice and cannot say the circuit court committed
reversible error.
IV. Rule 404(b) Evidence Admitted During Sentencing Phase
Ruiz argues that the circuit court committed reversible error when it allowed
Jacqueline Baires and Marina Rivas to testify because their experiences were too dissimilar
to MV’s. They were adults when Ruiz allegedly attacked each of them. Further, they each
managed to get away from Ruiz. Ruiz maintains that Baires’s and Rivas’s testimony was
propensity evidence barred by Arkansas Rule of Evidence 404(b), and even if the evidence
was marginally probative, any probative value was outweighed by unfair prejudice.
A circuit court’s decision to admit evidence during the sentencing phase of a criminal
trial is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Woolems v. State, 2024 Ark. App. 380, 690 S.W.3d
893. The abuse-of-discretion standard requires not only that the court made an error but
also that it acted improvidently, thoughtlessly, or without due consideration in doing so. Id.
An evidentiary error in the sentencing phase of a trial may be declared harmless, and
the appellate court may affirm when the evidence of guilt is overwhelming and the
error is slight. To determine if the error is slight, the court looks to see if the
defendant was prejudiced. To show prejudice, a defendant must demonstrate that
the sentence was either outside the statutory range or the maximum allowed.
Id. at 5–6, 690 S.W.3d at 897 (citations omitted).
In the present case, Ruiz was convicted of rape, which is a Class Y felony, and seconddegree sexual assault, which is a Class B felony. Ark. Code Ann. §§ 5-14-103(c)(1) and -125(b)(1). The sentence range for a Class Y felony is incarceration of not less than ten years’
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and not more than forty years’, or life. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-401(a)(1). The sentence range
for a Class B felony is not less than five years’ and no more than twenty years’ incarceration.
§ 5-4-401(a)(3). The jury sentenced Ruiz to forty years’ incarceration on the rape conviction.
He was sentenced to ten years on the second-degree sexual-assault conviction. Since he did
not receive the maximum sentence on either of his convictions, he cannot show prejudice.
We will not reverse a circuit court’s decision on the admission of evidence during the
sentencing phase of trial absent a showing that the defendant was prejudiced. Fowler v. State,
2024 Ark. App. 63, 684 S.W.3d 271. Since Ruiz cannot demonstrate prejudice, we affirm
without reaching the merits of his argument.
Affirmed.
WOOD and HIXSON, JJ., agree.
Knutson Law Firm, by: Gregg A. Knutson, for appellant.
Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Mallory Wood, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.
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