UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
PAMELA JOHNSON,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 22-3814 (CKK)
v.
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
(October 27, 2026)
This case arises from disputes about the circumstances under which the District of
Columbia Department of Housing and Community Development (“DHCD”) decided not to offer
Plaintiff Pamela Johnson a position after interviewing her for a role as an Economic Development
Program Specialist. Ms. Johnson alleges that DHCD’s decision not to offer her a position
constituted age discrimination, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 621, et seq., as well as retaliation for filing a previous lawsuit alleging hiring
discrimination at DHCD.
The District of Columbia (“the District”) moves for summary judgment, claiming that
DHCD did not discriminate or retaliate against Ms. Johnson, but rather followed its policy of
offering the job vacancies to the applicants with the highest combined score from (1) a
prescreening questionnaire on the online platform PeopleSoft, which generated automatic scores
for candidates; and (2) an interview with DHCD employees. The District’s [32] Motion for
Summary Judgment is ripe for decision. Upon consideration of the parties’ submissions,1 the
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The Court’s consideration has focused on the following documents, including the attachments and exhibits thereto:
• The Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (“Def.’s Mot.”), Dkt. No. 32;
• The Plaintiff’s Amended Opposition to the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (“Pl.’s Opp’n”), Dkt.
1
relevant legal authority, and the entire record, the Court concludes that the District is entitled to
summary judgment on Ms. Johnson’s claims of age discrimination and retaliation. Accordingly,
the Court shall GRANT the District’s [32] Motion for Summary Judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
The facts below are either undisputed or not genuinely disputed because Ms. Johnson, the
non-movant, has not shown the existence of such a dispute by “citing to particular parts of
materials in the record” that would be admissible in evidence. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), (e).
A. Ms. Johnson’s Prior Lawsuit
In 2016, Ms. Johnson filed an administrative complaint against the District of Columbia
(“the District”) after she applied for a position with the District of Columbia Department of
Housing and Community Development (“DHCD”) but did not receive an interview. District’s
Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (“Def.’s Stmt.”), Dkt. No. 32, ¶ 86. Ms. Johnson later
filed a lawsuit against the District for age discrimination in February 2018, and the parties settled
the case in 2020. Def.’s Stmt. ¶¶ 86–87; Complaint (“Compl.”), Dkt. No. 1, ¶¶ 43–47.
B. The Job Vacancies
In August 2020, DHCD posted two new vacancies for positions as an Economic
Development Program Specialist. Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 1. The job posting stated that the position
involved “prepar[ing] and implement[ing] plans for [the] Neighborhood Based Activities program
area, which includes the coordination of loan/grant programs, storefront improvement programs,
housing counseling, small business technical assistance and working with community-based
groups.” Ex. A, Job Description, Dkt. No. 32-1. The job posting required “at least one . . . year
No. 37-1, 40;
• The Defendant’s Reply in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment (“Def.’s Reply”), Dkt. No. 43.
In an exercise of its discretion, the Court concludes that oral argument is not necessary to the resolution of the issues pending before the Court. See LCvR 7(f).
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of specialized experience” that is “directly related to the line of work of the position.” Def.’s Stmt.
¶ 23–30. This experience could be “case management, records keeping and data tracking
principles”; “[k]nowledge of cost principles for federal grants and uniform administrative
requirements for federal grants”; “[skills] in preparing status reports, presentation documents and
the ability to convey information both orally and in writing”; and “[t]ask management and
continuous quality improvement.” Id. ¶ 23–27.
Ms. Johnson, who was fifty-eight years old at the time, applied to both vacancies. Def.’s
Stmt. ¶ 2; Compl. ¶ 26. The application process had two steps. First, applicants completed an
online questionnaire, on the website PeopleSoft, about their background and professional
experience. Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 4–6. Before the application process began, DHCD pre-loaded the
questions, possible answers, and respective point values for the possible answers into PeopleSoft.
Id. ¶ 4; see also Exhibit D, Def.’s Answers to Pl.’s First Set of Interrogs., Dkt. No. 32-4, at 4. After
applicants completed the questionnaire, PeopleSoft automatically generated a ranking of the
applicants, based on the point values that DHCD had pre-loaded in the system to correspond to
possible responses to the questions. Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 6. DHCD provided the eleven top-scoring
applications to its Human Resources Department, who then submitted the list to its hiring manager.
Id. ¶ 7. Ms. Johnson’s application was one of the top eleven applicants that were given to the
hiring manager, but, of these top eleven applications, Ms. Johnson’s application had the lowest
score from PeopleSoft’s automatic scoring system. Id. ¶ 8; see also Plaintiff’s Statement of
Material Facts in Genuine Dispute (“Pl.’s Resp.”), Dkt. 35-1, ¶ 8.
Second, DHCD employees interviewed the top eleven applicants. On September 17, 2020,
Edward Davis (“the Hiring Manager”) and Ernest Merchant (“the Economic Development
Specialist”) interviewed Ms. Johnson for the position over the telephone. Pl.’s Opp’n at 5; Compl.
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¶ 38. However, after the telephone interview, DHCD employees informed Ms. Johnson that she
would need to interview a second time because not all candidates had been interviewed by the
same panel members during the first round of interviews. Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 11–12. At least one
DHCD employee, Lesley Edmond, had participated in interviews with other candidates, but not
with Ms. Johnson. Pl.’s Opp’n at 6; Def.’s Reply at 11. Ms. Johnson alleges that Ms. Edmond
“was the management official accused of discrimination” in Ms. Johnson’s prior lawsuit, Pl.’s
Opp’n at 5, and the District does not dispute this fact.
DHCD conducted a second round of interviews with the candidates, including Ms.
Johnson. Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 11. During the second round of interviews, Mr. Davis and Mr. Merchant
were the only interviewers for each candidate; Ms. Edmond did not participate in any interviews.
Id. ¶ 13. The interviewers asked each applicant the same questions in each interview. Id. ¶ 14.
After each interview, the panel members gave the applicant a score for their response to each
question. Id. ¶ 15–16; see also Exhibit D, Dkt. No. 32-4, at 6. Then, the panel members tallied
the applicant’s scores to each question to create a total interview score. Id. Finally, the panel
members combined the applicant’s interview score to their score from the PeopleSoft
questionnaire. Id. ¶ 16. After this scoring was completed, Ms. Johnson’s total score tied with one
other candidate for the lowest score of all eleven candidates who received an interview. Id. ¶ 16.
The District offered positions to the top two scoring candidates. Def.’s Stmt. ¶¶ 17–18;
Pl.’s Resp. ¶¶ 17–18. However, both candidates declined the positions, so the District offered the
positions to the next highest scoring candidates, Remarno Chambers and Paul Stanford, who
accepted the positions. Def.’s Stmt. ¶¶ 17–21. The remaining candidates, including Ms. Johnson,
were not offered a position. Id. At the time of the interviews, Mr. Chambers and Mr. Stanford
were both less than forty-years-old. Compl. ¶ 60.
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C. Ms. Johnson’s Lawsuit
On December 23, 2022, Ms. Johnson filed this action in the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia. See generally Compl., Dkt. No. 1. Ms. Johnson alleged that the
District’s decision not to hire her constituted age discrimination, in violation of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”). Id. ¶ 54–70. In addition, Ms. Johnson alleged that
the District’s decision not to hire her constituted retaliation for her previous lawsuit against the
District, also in violation of the ADEA. Id. ¶ 64–70. After the conclusion of discovery, the District
moved for summary judgment. See Def.’s Mot., Dkt. No. 32. This motion is ripe for decision.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A court must grant a motion for summary judgment when “the movant shows that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The mere existence of some factual dispute is insufficient on its own
to bar summary judgment; the dispute must pertain to a “material” fact. Id. Accordingly, “[o]nly
disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly
preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986). Nor may summary judgment be avoided based on any disagreement as to the relevant
facts; the dispute must be “genuine,” meaning that there must be sufficient admissible evidence
for a reasonable trier of fact to find for the non-movant. Id.
In order to establish that a fact is or cannot be genuinely disputed, a party must (a) cite to
specific parts of the record—including deposition testimony, documentary evidence, affidavits or
declarations, or other competent evidence—in support of its position, or (b) demonstrate that the
materials relied upon by the opposing party “do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine
dispute.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). Where “a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or
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fails to properly address another party’s assertion of fact,” the district court may “consider the fact
undisputed for purposes of the motion.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
When faced with a motion for summary judgment, the district court may not make
credibility determinations or weigh the evidence; instead, the evidence must be analyzed in the
light most favorable to the non-movant, with all justifiable inferences drawn in her favor. Liberty
Lobby, 477 U.S. at 255. In the end, the district court’s task is to determine “whether the evidence
presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that
one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 251–252.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Ms. Johnson’s Age Discrimination Claim (Count I)
Ms. Johnson first alleges that the District did not hire her because of her age, in violation
of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621, et seq. The District
is entitled to summary judgment on this claim.
The ADEA provides, in relevant part, that “[i]t shall be unlawful for an employer . . . to
fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual’s age,” and includes persons forty years of age or older in the class protected by the
statute. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1), 631(a); see Teneyck v. Omni Shoreham Hotel, 365 F.3d 1139, 1155
(D.C. Cir. 2004) (“[T]he ADEA makes it unlawful for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual over 40 years of age.”) (citation modified). As the Supreme Court has
explained, “the ordinary meaning of the ADEA’s requirement than an employer took adverse
action ‘because of’ age is that age was the ‘reason’ that the employer decided to act.” Gross v.
FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009). Accordingly, to prevail on a claim under the
ADEA, a plaintiff “must prove by a preponderance of the evidence (which may be direct or
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circumstantial), that age was the ‘but-for’ cause of the challenged employer decision.” Id. at 177–
178.
Where, as here, the plaintiff brings claims of employment discrimination under the ADEA
that are based on circumstantial evidence, rather than direct evidence of intentional discrimination,
courts apply the burden-shifting framework set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792, 802 (1973); see Hall v. Giant Food, Inc., 175 F.3d 1074, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (applying
the McDonnell Douglas framework to ADEA claims).
Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, “the employee must first make out a prima facie
case of . . . discrimination.” Hall, 175 F.3d at 1077. The employer must then come forward with
a legitimate reason for the challenged action. Id. If the employer meets that burden, then the
question of whether the proffered non-discriminatory explanation was pretextual merges with
plaintiff’s “ultimate burden of persuading the court that she has been the victim of intentional
discrimination.” Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981).
When the employer properly presents a legitimate nondiscriminatory and nonretaliatory
reason for the challenged action at the summary judgment stage, the district court “need not—and
should not—decide whether the plaintiff actually made out a prima facie case.” Brady v. Off. of
Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490, 494 (D.C. Cir. 2008). Rather, the court can proceed to the central
inquiry of whether the plaintiff “produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the
employer’s asserted non-discriminatory reason was not the actual reason and that the employer
intentionally discriminated against the” plaintiff. Id.
1. The District’s nondiscriminatory reasons for not hiring Ms. Johnson
Here, the District has met its initial burden of producing “admissible evidence showing a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory, clear, and reasonably specific explanation for its actions.” Figueroa
v. Pompeo, 923 F.3d 1078, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 2019). According to the District, the District offered
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the positions to candidates who had the highest combined score from (1) PeopleSoft’s automatic
scoring of candidates based on their responses to the questionnaire, and (2) the interview with Mr.
Davis and Mr. Merchant. See Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 4–7. With respect to the first part of the application
process, the District explained that Ms. Johnson had the lowest score (of the eleven candidates
interviewed) on the PeopleSoft questionnaire, according to the “calculations [that were] done
automatically through the Peoplesoft administrative platform.” Def.’s Mot. at 12. Then, during
the live interviews, the panel “asked each candidate the same questions.” Id. After the District
added applicants’ scores from the PeopleSoft questionnaire to the scores from the live interviews,
Ms. Johnson was tied for the lowest score of the eleven interviewed candidates. Id. Given that it
is the District’s “policy to send out a job offer to the candidate with the highest combined score,”
the District did not offer Ms. Johnson a position. Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 18–21.
The District has proffered admissible evidence in support of this nondiscriminatory
explanation, including deposition testimony of the employees who conducted the interviews, the
applicant scores, documents relating to the applicant scoring criteria, and testimony relating to
applicant interview processes. See Job Posting, Exhibit A, Dkt. No. 32-1; Davis Dep. Tr., Dkt.
No. 32-6; Merchant Dep. Tr., Dkt. No 32-11; District’s Interrog. Resp. (Second Set), Dkt. No. 32-5. Ms. Johnson does not contest the admissibility of the District’s evidence, and she admits that
“[i]t is DCHR policy to send out a job offer to the candidate with the highest combined score” and
she was the lowest scoring candidate interviewed. Pl.’s Resp. ¶ 17–22; see Smith v. Napolitano,
626 F. Supp. 2d 81, 90 (D.D.C. 2009) (RMU) (“[T]he defendant has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory and non-retaliatory justification for the plaintiff’s non-selection—namely, that the
plaintiff was passed over because he was not the most qualified candidate for either of the two
positions.”).
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Because the District has proffered a nondiscriminatory reason for its decision, the Court
“need not . . . decide whether [Ms. Johnson] actually made out a prima facie case” of
discrimination. Brady, 520 F.3d at 494. Instead, the summary judgment analysis turns on whether
Ms. Johnson’s evidence is sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to conclude that the District’s stated
reason for not extending an offer to her—that she was tied for the lowest scoring candidate of the
eleven candidates interviewed—was a pretext for unlawful discrimination. At this stage, courts
ask “whether the jury could infer discrimination from the combination of (1) the plaintiff’s prima
facie case; (2) any evidence the plaintiff presents to attack the employer’s proffered explanation
for its actions; and (3) any further evidence of discrimination that may be available.” Aka v. Wash.
Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
2. Ms. Johnson’s arguments for pretext
Ms. Johnson raises two arguments that District’s stated reasons for not hiring her were
pretext for age discrimination: (1) she was substantially more qualified than the chosen candidates,
who were both under forty-years-old, thereby raising the inference that DHCD’s hiring decision
was based on age discrimination; and (2) other defects in the hiring process support an inference
of age discrimination. However, Ms. Johnson fails to offer sufficient evidence upon which a
reasonable jury could conclude that the District’s stated reasons for not hiring her were pretext and
“age was the ‘but-for’ cause of the challenged employer decision.” DeJesus v. WP Co. LLC, 841
F.3d 527, 532 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (citation omitted).
a. Whether Ms. Johnson was significantly more qualified than the
chosen candidates
First, Ms. Johnson argues that the District “treated other employees of a different group
more favorably.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 15. Ms. Johnson argues that she was more qualified than the two
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candidates the District hired, and the fact that both hired candidates were under forty, whereas she
was fifty-eight, could lead a jury to conclude that she was subjected to age discrimination. Id.
“Employers have discretion to select among equally qualified candidates as long as their
decisions are based on lawful criteria.” Kilby-Robb v. Duncan, 77 F. Supp. 3d 164, 171 (D.D.C.
2015) (CRC) (citing Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259 (1981)).
But a jury may infer pretext if “a reasonable employer would have found the plaintiff to be
significantly better qualified for the job.” Aka, 156 F.3d at 1296. Nevertheless, because courts do
not serve as “super-personnel departments that reexamine an entity’s business decisions, a plaintiff
asserting that an employer’s explanation is pretextual based upon comparative qualifications faces
a formidable task.” Pearsall v. Holder, 610 F. Supp. 2d 87, 100 (D.D.C. 2009) (PLF) (citations
and internal alterations omitted). “[I]n order to justify an inference of discrimination, the
qualifications gap must be great enough to be inherently indicative of discrimination.” Jackson v.
Gonzales, 496 F.3d 703, 707 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
The D.C. Circuit’s prior cases on qualification gaps provide useful context for the Court’s
analysis of this issue. In Aka, the D.C. Circuit held that a reasonable jury could infer pretext when
the successful candidate for a pharmacy technician position had only “two months of part-time
volunteer work” and no college degree, whereas the plaintiff had “nineteen years” of experience
and a “master’s degree in business and professional administration, with a concentration in health
service management.” 156 F.3d at 1296–1297. In Hamilton v. Geithner, in contrast, the person
selected had “no college degree and little formal training,” but had “approximately eight years” of
experience, “mostly from on-the-job training,” while the plaintiff had “nineteen years of
experience,” as well as a “master’s degree” in the field. 666 F.3d 1344, 1353 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
While the court in Geithner acknowledged that the plaintiff was more qualified, the court found it
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to be a “relatively close question” as to whether a reasonable jury could conclude that the plaintiff
was so “markedly” or “significantly” more qualified than the person selected as to be “inherently
indicative of discrimination.” Id. at 1352. Accordingly, the court did not “conclusively resolve”
this question and reviewed factors other than the qualification gap. Id.
Read in this context, it is clear that Ms. Johnson was not so significantly better qualified
than the hired candidates, Mr. Stanford and Mr. Chambers, as to be “inherently indicative of
discrimination.” Id. For starters, “courts must defer to the employer’s decision as to which
qualities required by the job . . . it weighs more heavily.” Barnette v. Chertoff, 453 F.3d 513, 517
(D.C. Cir. 2006). The District chose to begin its application process with the PeopleSoft
questionnaire and chose to include applicants’ automatically generated PeopleSoft scores as part
of its final applicant ranking. Ms. Johnson does not dispute that she was the lowest scoring
candidate on the PeopleSoft questionnaire. Pl.’s Resp. ¶ 16–21. Instead, Ms. Johnson’s only
criticism of the PeopleSoft questionnaire is that the questions “relied almost entirely on selfevaluation, which is . . . arbitrary and subjective,” and “her score was off because she completed
the form the evening before the deadline and marked several boxes as showing ‘intermediate’
rather than ‘expert’ experience.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 14.
Despite this criticism, however, each applicant was given the same opportunity to answer
the same questions on PeopleSoft, and the fact that Ms. Johnson did not complete the questions to
her satisfaction cannot show pretext for age discrimination. Ms. Johnson chose to complete the
form “the evening before the deadline,” and she chose how to respond to the questions, including
marking “intermediate,” rather than “expert” experience. Id. Ms. Johnson cannot fault the
PeopleSoft program for her own choices. Nor does the fact that questions were “arbitrary and
subjective” demonstrate pretext, given that each applicant was required to answer the same
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questions, and Ms. Johnson does not provide any indication that the nature of the questions
systematically favored younger candidates. See Gladden v. Bolden, 802 F. Supp. 2d 209, 214
(D.D.C. 2011) (ESH) (“[A] plaintiff cannot as a matter of law survive summary judgment given
that his employment application was rejected by an automated computer system . . . that does not
take race, gender, or age into consideration as an input variable when analyzing or scoring
resumes.”) (collecting employment discrimination cases involving automated scoring).
Accordingly, Ms. Johnson’s claim falters from the outset, given that Mr. Chambers and Mr.
Stanford scored higher than she did on the first portion of the final applicant ranking: the automated
PeopleSoft questionnaire.
Turning to the credentials of the candidates, Ms. Johnson emphasizes that she had more
years of experience working in housing than Mr. Stanford and Mr. Chambers did. See Pl.’s Opp’n
at 15 (noting that Ms. Johnson had “17 years of experience in housing”). To be sure, Ms. Johnson’s
resume showed “approximately eleven years of experience as a housing counselor for Marshall
Heights,” as well as “three years of experience as a project manager at DHCD.” Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 54–
56. Ms. Johnson also had a Bachelor of Science degree. See Exhibit J, Johnson Resume, Dkt. No.
32-10, at 3.
But Ms. Johnson’s experience in housing alone does not constitute a qualifications gap so
“wide and inexplicable” as to support an inference of discrimination. Lathram v. Snow, 336 F.3d
1085, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Here, the position in question required only one year of work
experience and drew on a range of economic skills beyond housing. See Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 24–34;
Def.’s Mot. at 14 (noting that the job description listed a variety of relevant skills, including
“monitoring community-based nonprofit organizations’ performance and compliance with various
requirements, identifying and correcting compliance deficiencies, having knowledge of data and
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finance principles, performing analyses of organizations’ finances, preparing reports and
presenting documents, and providing support to organizations”).
The record demonstrates that Mr. Stanford and Mr. Chambers had more varied work
experiences and more pertinent credentials than Ms. Johnson. First, Mr. Stanford’s background
included a Master of Science in Public Administration, as well as a bachelor’s degree and
“approximately nine years of work experience,” including “three years of experience as an
affordable and workforce housing program manager at another county’s own Department of
Housing and Community Development”; “two additional years of experience as a housing
specialist focused on a city’s affordable dwelling unit program”; and “two years of experience as
a consultant and exam writer for HUD’s housing counseling certification exam and program.” Id.
¶ 47–50, 62. Given Mr. Stanford’s advanced degree and specialized and diverse housing
experience, a reasonable jury would likely not conclude that any qualification gap between Ms.
Johnson and Mr. Stanford was “great enough to be inherently indicative of discrimination.”
Jackson, 496 F.3d at 707 (emphasis added).
Perhaps recognizing Mr. Stanford’s superior qualifications, Ms. Johnson centers her
arguments on Mr. Chambers, claiming that “[t]he difference between Ms. Johnson’s 17 years of
experience in housing, many of which dealt directly with [Community Block Development Grant
work], and [Mr. Chambers’s] complete lack of experience is stark.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 15. However,
as the District notes, Mr. Chambers’s resume reflected “a more highly credentialed educational
background” than Ms. Johnson, with a master’s degree in “Technical Management” as well as a
“bachelor’s degree, an ongoing certification program,” and nine years of diverse work experience,
which included “two years of compliance management experience in the District government”;
“two additional years in construction compliance”; and “three years of experience as an accountant
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and an additional two years as a financial analyst.” Def.’s Mot. at 15; Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 43–45, 60;
see also Exhibit H, Chambers Resume, Dkt. No. 32-8.
Ms. Johnson argues that her years of housing experience should be valued more highly
than Mr. Chambers’s financial experience. But “it is the perception of the decisionmaker which
is relevant, not the self-assessment of [Johnson].” Vatel v. All. of Auto. Mfrs., 627 F.3d 1245, 1247
(D.C. Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). The District argues that it sought someone with economic
skills and concluded that Mr. Chambers “stood out for compliance and finance experience.” Def.
Mot. at 15; see also Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 67 (listing the interviewers’ key attributes, including: “Can you
read regulations. Can you translate. Can you formulate a budget. Are you accustomed to following
federal regulations.”). Accordingly, the Court will not second guess the District’s decision to
consider Mr. Chambers’s accounting and finance experience as important for the role. See
Jackson, 496 F.3d at 708 (“We have said that courts must not second-guess an employer’s initial
choice of appropriate qualifications.”).
Moreover, the interviewers concluded that Mr. Stanford and Mr. Chambers outperformed
Ms. Johnson in the interview. See Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 69–73. As the D.C. Circuit has explained, it can
be reasonable to select candidates based on their interview performance, even assuming another
candidate was more qualified on paper. See Fischbach, 86 F.3d at 1183–1184 (“Selecting a pool
of qualified candidates based upon their written credentials and then making a final selection based
upon personal interviews is an obviously reasonable method of hiring a professional employee.”);
see also Aka, 156 F.3d at 897 (“In a close case, a reasonable juror would usually assume that the
employer is more capable of assessing the significance of small differences in the qualifications of
the candidates, or that the employer simply made a judgment call.”).
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When considering Mr. Stanford and Mr. Chambers’s higher scores on the PeopleSoft
questionnaire, as well as their more diverse professional experience, graduate degrees, and higher
interview scores, Ms. Johnson has not presented sufficient evidence upon which a jury could
reasonably conclude that she was so much more qualified for the position than Mr. Stanford and
Mr. Chambers as “to be inherently indicative of discrimination.” Jackson, 496 F.3d at 707.
b. Whether other inconsistencies in the hiring process support an
inference of age discrimination.
Second, Ms. Johnson argues that “there is ample evidence that the process was . . . unfair.”
Pl.’s Opp’n at 4–5. Ms. Johnson alleges that there were several defects in the interview process:
(1) the District conducted two rounds of interviews of the candidates, once District staff realized
that Ms. Edmond could not interview Ms. Johnson; (2) Mr. Merchant and Mr. Davis put forth
“identical notes” for candidates’ first and second rounds of interviews; and (3) Ms. Edmond and
Mr. Merchant had “conflicts of interest” because Ms. Edmond referred a friend for the position,
and Mr. Merchant “coached” one of the candidates. Pl.’s Opp’n at 12–15.
An “employer’s failure to follow established procedures or criteria” in the selection process
may demonstrate that the employer’s justification for not hiring someone was pretextual. Wang v.
Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 206 F. Supp. 3d 46, 68 (D.D.C. 2016) (RC) (quoting Brady, 520
F.3d at 495 n.3). However, “a finding of a failure on the part of the prospective employer to follow
its own regulations and procedures, alone, may not be sufficient to support a finding of age
discrimination.” Johnson v. Lehman, 679 F.2d 918, 922 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (emphasis added).
Rather, the plaintiff must go beyond merely identifying irregularities and instead must “establish
discriminatory motive.” Glenn v. Bair, 643 F. Supp. 2d 23, 38 (D.D.C. 2009) (RMU) (quoting
Johnson, 679 F.2d at 922). In other words, even if a court suspects that a job applicant “was
victimized by . . . poor selection procedures” it may not “second-guess an employer’s personnel
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decision absent demonstrably discriminatory motive.” Fischbach, 86 F.3d at 1183 (citation and
quotation marks omitted).
Here, none of Ms. Johnson’s arguments, even considered jointly, create a genuine dispute
as to whether the explanation provided by the District for Ms. Johnson’s non-selection was pretext
for discriminatory motive. As the D.C. Circuit has explained, a court reviewing summary
judgment looks to whether a reasonable jury could infer intentional discrimination from all the
evidence, including “(1) the plaintiff’s prima facie case; (2) any evidence the plaintiff presents to
attack the employer’s proffered explanation for its action; and (3) any further evidence of
discrimination.” Aka, 156 F.3d at 1289. Here, Ms. Johnson’s arguments fail to cast doubt on the
District’s nondiscriminatory reasons for not hiring her, and Ms. Johnson fails to connect any
defects in the hiring process with age discrimination.
First, Ms. Johnson argues that the District’s decision to conduct a second round of
interviews, once the District realized that it could not have the same employees interview each
candidate, illustrates a discriminatory motive. Ms. Johnson alleges that the reason for conducting
two rounds of interviews was that Ms. Edmond “was not willing to interview Ms. Johnson,” given
Ms. Johnson’s earlier lawsuit against the District. Pl.’s Opp’n at 5.
However, Ms. Johnson’s claim falters from the outset, as Ms. Johnson proposes no
connection between Ms. Edmond’s decision not to participate in the interview and Ms. Johnson’s
age. See Butler v. Ashcroft, 293 F. Supp. 2d 74, 80 (D.D.C. 2003) (RJL) (granting summary
judgment to the defendant where “allegations of irregularities, even if proven, do not indicate
discriminatory hiring practices”).
Even more directly, Ms. Johnson’s own evidence contradicts her argument that the
District’s decision to hold a second round of interviews constituted discrimination against her.
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Citing two of her exhibits, Ms. Johnson alleges that her interview score went “down” between her
first and second interviews. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 6–11 (citing “Ex. 2, Ex. 6”). However, Exhibit 2
shows that, during her first interview, Ms. Johnson received a score of 80 from Mr. Davis and a
score of 82 from Mr. Merchant, for a combined score of 162. See Exhibit 2, Dkt. No. 35-3, at 1.
Exhibit 6 shows that, during her second interview, Ms. Johnson received a score of 80 from Mr.
Davis and a score of 89 from Mr. Merchant, for a combined score of 169—seven points higher
than her first interview score. See Exhibit 6, Dkt. No. 35-7, at 1. Accordingly, Ms. Johnson’s own
cited exhibits demonstrate that the District gave her a higher score on her second interview. Nor
does any other evidence in the record support Ms. Johnson’s assertion that her scores went “down”
from the September 2020 interview to the October 2020 interview. Accordingly, the Court does
not credit Ms. Johnson’s assertion that her scores went “down,” and no reasonable jury could
conclude, from the evidence provided, that the fact that the District conducted a second round of
interviews, in which it gave her a higher score, supports a finding of age discrimination.
Second, Ms. Johnson faults Mr. Davis and Mr. Merchant for taking “identical” notes during
the first and second rounds of interviews for the candidates. After Mr. Davis and Mr. Merchant
conducted their interview with Ms. Johnson, the District determined that Mr. Davis and Mr.
Merchant needed to conduct interviews with each applicant, including Ms. Johnson, for a second
time because Ms. Edmond had participated in interviews with some candidates, but could not
participate in Ms. Johnson’s interview. Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 11–12. Here, Ms. Johnson alleges that Mr.
Davis and Mr. Merchant copied and pasted their notes from their first interview with each
candidate into their notes for their second interview with each candidate, given that “the majority
of [the] notes from the first round were identical or largely identical [to the] notes taken in the
second round,” down to the “punctuation.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 6, 10.
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Ms. Johnson argues that a jury may infer pretext from the fact that (1) the interviewers’
notes were similar across the two interviews, yet (2) “Mr. Chambers’ scores went up” from his
first interview to his second interview, and Ms. Johnson’s scores “went down.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 6,
10. Yet Ms. Johnson’s argument again fails from the outset, because, as discussed, the record does
not support her assertion that her scores went “down” between her first and second interviews.
Compare Ex. 2, “September Candidate Scoring Sheet,” Dkt. No. 35-3, at 1, with Ex. 6, October
2020 scores, Exhibit 6, Dkt. No. 35-7, at 1 (showing that Ms. Johnson’s scores were seven points
higher in the second round of interviews).2
Finally, Ms. Johnson alleges that Mr. Merchant and Ms. Edmond had “conflicts of interest”
because Mr. Merchant “coached” one of the candidates, and Ms. Edmond referred a friend for the
position. Pl.’s Opp’n at 12–15. However, the candidate that Mr. Merchant allegedly “coached”
did not receive a job offer, so Ms. Johnson cannot demonstrate that any impropriety on this basis
was the reason she did not receive the position. While the candidate that Ms. Edmond referred for
the position did receive a job offer, he turned down the job offer, and, as discussed, Ms. Edmond
did not participate in the interview process. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 13. Ms. Johnson does not allege
that the candidates who ultimately accepted the positions had any prior contact with the
interviewers. Therefore, Ms. Johnson again fails to propose any connection between these alleged
improprieties and age discrimination.
c. Conclusion
In sum, no reasonable jury would find based on the facts of this case that the District’s
clear non-discriminatory justification for not hiring Ms. Johnson—that the other candidates scored
2
Moreover, Ms. Johnson concedes that while much of the notes are “unaltered, word for word,” the interviewers also added “a couple of sentences” to some of the applicants’ interview responses. Id. at 11. Accordingly, the interviewers’ notes may be more consistent with form language, giving the same notes in response to the same answer by the candidates, rather than any indication of discrimination.
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more highly on its prescreening and interview metrics—was pretext for age discrimination. Ms.
Johnson fails to show any qualification gap between herself and the two selected candidates that a
reasonable jury would find to be inherently indicative of age discrimination. Nor does Ms. Johnson
show any evidence of irregularities in the hiring process that supports an inference of age
discrimination. Indeed, Ms. Johnson’s own cited exhibits show that she benefitted from the
District’s decision to conduct a second round of interviews. Accordingly, the Court shall GRANT
the District’s motion for summary judgment on Ms. Johnson’s age discrimination claims.
B. Ms. Johnson’s Retaliation Claim (Count II)
Ms. Johnson next alleges that the District’s decision not to offer her a position constituted
unlawful retaliation for her former lawsuit against the District. The District is entitled to summary
judgment on this claim.
Under the ADEA, it is “unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any of his
employees or applicants for employment . . . because such individual . . . has opposed any practice
made unlawful by” the ADEA or because that individual “has made a charge, testified, assisted,
or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or litigation under” the ADEA. 29
U.S.C. § 623(d). Retaliation claims based on circumstantial evidence trigger the same McDonnell
Douglas burden-shifting framework. A plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of
retaliation by showing “(1) that [she] engaged in statutorily protected activity; (2) [she] suffered a
materially adverse action by [her] employer; and (3) that a causal link connects the two.” Jones v.
Bernanke, 557 F.3d 670, 677 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (citing Wiley v. Glassman, 511 F.3d 151, 155 (D.C.
Cir. 2007)). If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to
produce a “legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for its actions. Id. (citation omitted).
Where, as here, the employer has asserted a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the
challenged action, the court considers “whether a reasonable jury could infer retaliation from all
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the evidence, which includes not only the prima facie case but also the evidence the plaintiff offers
to attack the employer’s proffered explanation for its action and other evidence of retaliation.” Id.
(citation and quotation marks omitted). In short, “[t]he crucial issue reduces to whether the
plaintiff has produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the employer’s asserted
non-retaliatory reason was not the actual reason for its adverse action and that the employer
intentionally retaliated against the plaintiff.” Cooper v. District of Columbia, 279 F. Supp. 3d 156,
164 (D.D.C. 2017) (EGS) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Retaliation “must be proved
according to traditional principles of but-for causation . . . [meaning] that the adverse action would
not have occurred absent the retaliatory motive.” Id. (citation omitted); see also Univ. of Tex. Sw.
Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 354 (2013) (“[R]etaliation claims require proof that the desire
to retaliate was the but-for cause of the challenged employment action.”).
Here, the District does not dispute that Ms. Johnson’s previous lawsuit constituted
protected activity or that the decision not to hire someone can constitute a materially adverse
action. See Def.’s Mot. at 20–21. Instead, the parties’ dispute focuses on the causal connection
between Ms. Johnson’s previous lawsuit and the District’s decision not to hire her.
The District first argues that there is no causal connection between Ms. Johnson’s prior
protected activity and the District’s decision not to hire her because there is “no evidence” that Mr.
Davis and Mr. Merchant knew about Ms. Johnson’s former lawsuit, and Ms. Johnson’s protected
activity occurred too long ago to support an inference of knowledge. Def.’s Mot. at 20 (arguing
that Ms. “Johnson’s previous administrative complaint was filed in August 2016, four years before
the non-selections at issue,” and “[h]er prior lawsuit was filed in February 2018, approximately
2.5 years earlier”). The District is correct that, for a retaliation claim to succeed, “the employer
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must have had knowledge of the protected activity prior to the challenged actions.” Townsend v.
United States, 236 F. Supp. 3d 280, 316 (D.D.C. 2017) (BAH) (citation modified).
Here, however, the Court cannot conclude that there is no dispute of material fact over
whether Mr. Davis and Mr. Merchant knew about Ms. Johnson’s prior lawsuit. Ms. Johnson’s
prior lawsuit settled only two weeks before interviews began for the positions at issue in this case.
See Pl.’s Opp’n at 18. Moreover, Ms. Edmond communicated several times with Mr. Davis and
Mr. Merchant regarding the fact that she would not participate in Ms. Johnson’s interview. For
example, when Mr. Davis invited Ms. Edmond to be part of Ms. Johnson’s interview panel, Ms.
Edmond responded that she could not do the interview and “it’s not a time issue.” Id. (quoting Ex.
13, Dkt. No. 35-11). Ms. Edmond’s recusal had substantial effects on Mr. Merchant and Mr.
Davis, given that Ms. Edmond’s recusal triggered the need for a second round of duplicative
interviews. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 18. These reasons could lead a reasonable jury to infer that Mr.
Davis and Mr. Merchant may have learned, from Ms. Edmond or otherwise, about Ms. Johnson’s
prior lawsuit. Accordingly, the Court will not grant the District summary judgment based on its
frontline position that Mr. Davis and Mr. Merchant did not know about Ms. Johnson’s prior
lawsuit.
Even if Mr. Davis and Mr. Merchant knew about Ms. Johnson’s prior lawsuit, however,
the District has presented a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision not to hire Ms.
Johnson: she was the lowest scoring candidate on the PeopleSoft questionnaire and tied for the
lowest score in live interviews. Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 17–21. Because the District has proffered a
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its decision not to hire Ms. Johnson, the Court must
evaluate whether Ms. Johnson has provided sufficient evidence to enable a reasonable jury to
conclude that the District’s stated reasons “were not the actual reasons for the adverse actions, and
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that the desire to retaliate was the but-for cause of the adverse actions.” Bean v. District of
Columbia, 264 F. Supp. 3d 242, 254 (D.D.C. 2017) (ABJ). To make this showing, Ms. Johnson
must offer “proof that the unlawful retaliation would not have occurred in the absence of the
alleged wrongful action or actions of the employer.” Nassar, 570 U.S. at 360.
The D.C. Circuit’s decision in Woodruff v. Peters, is instructive on this point. 482 F.3d
521 (D.C. Cir. 2007). There, Woodruff filed an EEOC complaint against his employer in February
1997 and, after going on leave, returned to work in February 1998. Id. at 529. After Woodruff
returned to work, his supervisor, Eoyang, declined to reinstate some of Woodruff’s previous
supervisory authority. Id. In August 1998, Woodruff deposed Eoyang, pursuant to his EEOC
complaint, and less than one month later, Eoyang revoked some of Woodruff’s workplace
accommodations. Id.
Woodruff asked the D.C Circuit to infer retaliation from the temporal proximity of the
events, but the court declined. The D.C. Circuit explained that Eoyang had given Woodruff
“legitimate reasons for each adverse action.” Id. at 529–530. As Eoyang explained and closely
documented: “(1) Woodruff was not available to his subordinates during regular work hours, and
(2) Eoyang did not consistently know in advance when Woodruff would be at work.” Id. at 530.
While the D.C. Circuit acknowledged the “proximity in time” between Woodruff’s protected
activity and the adverse employment actions, it explained that “[i]f temporal proximity sufficed to
rebut a legitimate proffer, then protected activities would effectively grant employees a period of
immunity, during which no act, however egregious, would support summary judgment for the
employer in a subsequent retaliation claim.” Id. Instead, the court concluded that “positive
evidence beyond mere proximity is required to defeat the presumption that the proffered
explanations are genuine,” and Woodruff offered “no basis for rejecting the presumptive validity
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of Eoyang’s explanation[s]” for the employment actions. Id.; see also Bean, 264 F. Supp. 3d at
254 (granting summary judgment to the employer where the “plaintiff does not point to any
evidence beyond mere temporal proximity”) (discussing Woodruff, 482 F.3d at 530).
Likewise, here, Ms. Johnson has not presented sufficient “positive evidence beyond mere
proximity” to show that her prior protected activity was the but-for cause of the District’s decision
not to hire her. Woodruff, 482 F.3d at 530. For one, Ms. Johnson has not offered any evidence to
challenge the results of the District’s PeopleSoft questionnaire, which was automated and scored
without any knowledge of the candidates’ identities. Pl.’s Resp. ¶ 16. By Ms. Johnson’s own
admissions, she was the eleventh-ranked candidate by the time the District began interviewing
applicants live. Id. Given that retaliation requires “proof that the unlawful retaliation would not
have occurred in the absence of the alleged wrongful action or actions of the employer,” Nassar,
570 U.S. at 360, Ms. Johnson must demonstrate sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to
conclude that she did not receive the job offer because of retaliation in the second step of the
application: the live interviews. Ms. Johnson must make a difficult showing here, given the fact
that she entered the live interviews with the least overall points of all eleven candidates, due to her
low PeopleSoft score.
Consideration of the candidates’ numerical scores helps to illustrate this point. Ms.
Johnson received a score of “95” on her PeopleSoft questionnaire, while Mr. Chambers received
a “110” and Mr. Stanford received a “100.” Exhibit E, Dkt. 32-5, at 5. Mr. Chambers and Mr.
Stanford both had strong interviews, scoring a “180” and “185,” respectively, making their total
scores “290” and “285.” Id. In order for Ms. Johnson to have tied with Mr. Stanford in her overall
score, she would have had to score a “190” on her interviews, given that her PeopleSoft score was
a “95.” Id. A “190” would have been a superlative interview score, putting her in third place of
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all eleven candidates’ interview scores and above the interview scores of both Mr. Chambers and
Mr. Stanford. Id. Accordingly, Ms. Johnson faces a high bar: she must demonstrate sufficient
evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that, but for any retaliation, she would have surmounted
Mr. Chambers and Mr. Stanford based on her live interview. See Bean, 264 F. Supp. 3d at 254.
She has not provided this evidence. For starters, as discussed, Ms. Johnson failed to show
any substantial qualification gap between herself and Mr. Chambers and Mr. Stanford upon which
a jury could conclude she was likely to achieve this superlative interview score absent retaliation.
See Brisbon v. Tischner, 639 F. Supp. 3d 164, 187 (D.D.C. 2022) (RBW) (concluding that “any
qualifications gap between the plaintiff and [the selected candidate] does not so greatly favor the
plaintiff sufficient for a reasonable jury to infer retaliatory motive”) (citation and quotation marks
omitted). Nor does Ms. Johnson point to any other “positive evidence” of retaliation in the record.
Woodruff, 482 F.3d at 530. Here, again, the fact that Ms. Johnson’s scores went up between her
first and second interviews, according to Ms. Johnson’s exhibits, weighs heavily against her
argument of retaliation. Pl.’s Exhibit 2, Dkt. 35-3. It is not clear when, if ever, Mr. Davis and Mr.
Merchant learned of Ms. Johnson’s prior lawsuit. However, if Ms. Johnson’s scores had gone
down in the second interview, a jury may have a stronger basis to conclude that Mr. Davis and Mr.
Merchant learned of Ms. Johnson’s prior lawsuit after the first interview and then retaliated against
her in the second interview. The fact that Ms. Johnson’s scores increased between her first
interview and her second interview, on the other hand, precludes this conclusion. Id.
In sum, Ms. Johnson offers only speculation that the District retaliated against her, and, as
the D.C. Circuit has explained, “speculations and allegations . . . are insufficient to create a
genuine issue of fact regarding an employer’s articulated reasons for its decisions and avoid
summary judgment.” Porter v. Shah, 606 F.3d 809, 816 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (citation and internal
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alterations omitted). Ms. Johnson fails to allege any sufficient gap in qualifications between
herself and Mr. Stanford and Mr. Chambers upon which a reasonable jury could infer that her prior
protected conduct was the but-for cause of the District's decision not to hire her. Nor has Mr.
Johnson pointed to any other "positive evidence" in the record to rebut the District's clear
nondiscriminatory reason for not hiring her: that she was the lowest-scoring candidate in her
PeopleSoft interview and tied for the lowest score after her live interviews. Woodruff, 482 F.3d at
530. Accordingly, because Ms. Johnson has failed to provide the Court with evidence upon which
a reasonable jury could conclude that retaliation was the but-for cause of the District's decision
not to hire her, the Court shall GRANT the District's motion as to the retaliation allegations.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court shall GRANT the District's [32] Motion for Summary
Judgment.
An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: October 27, 2026
United States District Judge
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