SECOND DIVISION
DOYLE, P. J.,
DAVIS and WHITAKER, JJ.
NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
received no later than 4:30 pm on the 10th day after
the decision was issued to be deemed timely filed.
https://www.gaappeals.gov/rules
October 27, 2026
In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
A26A1152. EVANS v. LYFT, INC.
DOYLE, Presiding Judge.
Williams Evans sued Roy Sallie and Lyft, Inc., for personal injury after Evans
was assaulted by Sallie, his Lyft driver. Lyft moved for summary judgment, and after
a hearing, the trial court granted the motion. Evans now appeals, contending that the
trial court erred by granting summary judgment to Lyft because there were genuine
issues of material fact as to whether Lyft’s failure to follow its own safety policies
proximately caused Evans’s injuries. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
“Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Sheffield v. Jekyll Island
State Park Auth., 369 Ga. App. 265, 266 (893 SE2d 158) (2023) (punctuation omitted). “We review de novo a grant ... of summary judgment, viewing the evidence and all
reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from it in the light most favorable to the
nonmovant.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
So viewed, the record reflects that Lyft is a ride share network service that
operates a technology platform, including a smart phone application and website, that
connects passengers with drivers who transport passengers for a fee. Georgia statutory
law requires ride share network services like Lyft to undertake certain steps to protect
riders. For instance, pursuant to OCGA § 40-5-39(e), Lyft requires its drivers to
submit to background checks of their criminal histories and driving records before
approval to use the Lyft platform. Pursuant to OCGA § 40-5-39(e)(4), certain criminal
convictions and traffic violations bar prospective drivers from such approval, and Lyft
continuously monitors the criminal and driving records of approved drivers such that
the existence of certain offenses automatically results in the removal of a driver from
the Lyft platform. Additionally, pursuant to OCGA § 40-1-193(c)(3), Lyft has a zerotolerance drug and alcohol policy, whereby Lyft drivers who are under the influence
of drugs or alcohol while transporting passengers are removed from the Lyft platform.
The Lyft application allows passengers to report Lyft drivers for suspected violations
of this policy at the completion of a ride.
2
On September 6, 2020, Evans engaged Sallie via the Lyft platform for a ride to
the Atlanta airport. Despite the fact that there was little to no traffic at the time, Sallie
was weaving in and out of lanes and otherwise driving erratically. Evans’s destination
was a rental car facility apart from the main airport; however, Sallie initially drove
Evans to both the north and south terminals and subsequently to a restricted-access
offsite parking area before Evans began using his own GPS to direct Sallie. Tensions
eventually escalated to the point at which Sallie stopped on the roadside and ordered
Evans out of the vehicle. Evans obliged and removed his luggage from the trunk. Sallie
then exited his vehicle, beat Evans unconscious, and fled the scene. Sallie was
removed from the Lyft platform following the incident, and he later pled guilty to
aggravated battery based on the incident.
On October 20, 2020, Evans sued Sallie and Lyft, alleging that Lyft was liable
for Sallie’s assault of Evans based on theories of vicarious liability and negligent
hiring, training, supervision, and retention. Evans also asserted claims against Lyft for
punitive damages and attorney fees under OCGA § 13-6-11. Sallie did not answer, and
Lyft’s answer denied liability on the basis that Sallie was an independent contractor
rather than an employee at the time of the assault.
Discovery revealed that Lyft had approved Sallie to use the Lyft platform on
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August 28, 2020. Prior to his approval, in April 2020, Sallie was charged with reckless
driving in Virginia based on his allegedly traveling 94 mph in a 55 mph zone. The
charge subsequently was reduced to improper driving, to which Sallie entered a plea
of nolo contendere in August 2020. Lyft’s corporate representative deposed that he
believed that a prospective or approved driver being charged with reckless driving for
traveling 94 mph in a 55 mph zone would result in the driver being barred from using
the Lyft platform.
Lyft received two reports indicating that Sallie was in violation of the zerotolerance drug and alcohol policy. One day after Sallie was approved to use the Lyft
platform, on August 29, 2020, a passenger left him a one-star review, complained of
unsafe driving, and commented, “[I] felt uneasy the whole time[; I] felt like the driver
was on something.” Lyft sent the passenger an email the next day requesting further
detail, but the passenger did not respond. Lyft took no further action in response to
the incident. On September 4, 2020, another passenger gave Sallie a one-star review
and flagged him for a suspected violation of Lyft’s zero-tolerance drug and alcohol
policy without comment. Lyft took no action in response to this incident.
Lyft eventually moved for summary judgment, arguing that each of Evans’s
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claims against Lyft were precluded by Sallie’s independent contractor status.1 Evans
then amended his complaint to add two counts against Lyft based on Lyft’s alleged
negligence in failing to disqualify Sallie from using the Lyft platform based on his
driving record and repeated violations of the zero-tolerance drug and alcohol policy.
Evans also responded in opposition to Lyft’s summary judgment motion. Lyft
subsequently amended its answer and supplemented its summary judgment motion
to address the new claims raised in Evans’s amended complaint, arguing that Sallie’s
assault of Evans was an intervening criminal act of a third party, which broke the
causal connection between Lyft’s alleged negligence and Evans’s injury, and that
Sallie’s assault of Evans was not a reasonably foreseeable consequence of Lyft’s
alleged negligence.
After a hearing, the trial court granted Lyft’s motion for summary judgment.
In its order, the trial court found that Evans’s claims against Lyft based on vicarious
liability and negligent hiring, training, supervision, and retention failed as a matter of
law based on Sallie’s undisputed status as an independent contractor. As to Evans’s
negligence claim based on Sallie’s driving record, the trial court found that Sallie’s
1
The trial court initially granted the motion without a hearing, but later set aside the order upon learning that the parties had agreed to extend Evans’s time to respond to the motion.
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conviction for improper driving was not an offense warranting removal from the Lyft
platform under Georgia law, with which Lyft had complied in performing its
background checks of Sallie’s driving record and criminal history. As to Evans’s
negligence claim based on Sallie’s reported violations of Lyft’s zero-tolerance drug
and alcohol policy, the trial court found that because neither of these reported
violations had put Lyft on notice of Sallie’s violent propensities, there was no jury
issue as to foreseeability and proximate cause. Accordingly, the trial court granted
summary judgment to Lyft.
Evans initially appealed the trial court’s order in December 2022. Lyft moved
to dismiss the appeal based on Evans’s delay in filing the required transcripts, and
Evans subsequently withdrew his notice of appeal. Thereafter, Evans moved for a
default judgment against Sallie, which motion the trial court granted. After a damages
hearing, the trial court entered a judgment against Sallie in the amount of $12,115,000,
inclusive of compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorney fees. This appeal
follows.2
Evans contends that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment to Lyft
because there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether Lyft’s failure to
2
Lyft also moved to dismiss this appeal, which motion the trial court denied.
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follow its own safety policies proximately caused Evans’s injuries. Specifically, Evans
argues that Sallie’s improper driving conviction, together with his two reported
violations of the zero-tolerance drug and alcohol policy in the week leading up the
assault made it reasonably foreseeable to Lyft that Sallie’s use of the Lyft platform
would result in physical injury to Evans. We disagree.
“[T]o recover for injuries caused by another’s negligence, a plaintiff must show
four elements: a duty, a breach of that duty, causation[,] and damages. A plaintiff must
prove that the defendant’s negligence was both the ‘cause in fact’ and the ‘proximate
cause’ of the injury.” City of Richmond Hill v. Maia, 301 Ga. 257, 258(1) (800 SE2d
573) (2017) (citation and punctuation omitted). “Cause-in-fact requires a
determination that, but for the defendant’s act, the injury to the plaintiff would not
have occurred. ... Proximate cause, on the other hand, is a separate limit on legal
liability.” Blondell v. Courtney Station 300 LLC, 362 Ga. App. 1, 4-5(1) (865 SE2d 589)
(2021) (quotation marks omitted). “The requirement of proximate cause is a policy
decision that, for a variety of reasons, ... the defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s
injury are too remote for the law to countenance recovery.” Goldstein, Garber &
Salama, LLC v. J. B., 300 Ga. 840, 842(1) (797 SE2d 87) (2017) (quotation marks
omitted). “This policy decision is largely grounded in the concept of foreseeability:
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a wrongdoer should be responsible only for consequences which, based on our
common sense and understanding, would probably or naturally flow from his
conduct.” Blondell, 362 Ga. App. at 5(1). “Reasonable foreseeability [is thus] a
hallmark of proximate cause.” Tyner v. Matta-Truncoso, 305 Ga. 480, 488(3) (826
SE2d 100) (2019).
While the question of proximate cause is usually submitted to the
jury as a question of fact, it may be decided as a matter of law where the
evidence shows clearly and palpably that the jury could reasonably draw
but one conclusion, that the defendant’s acts were not the proximate
cause of the injury.
Karekezi v. Pinnacle Systems, Inc., 367 Ga. App. 391, 396(1) (885 SE2d 235) (2023)
(quotation marks omitted).
Although it is undisputed that Sallie was an independent contractor for Lyft, if
a plaintiff claims a defendant is liable for the criminal act of third person because the
defendant negligently had an independent contractor relationship with that person,
the reasonable foreseeability standard for negligent employment actions nevertheless
applies. See Goldstein, Garber & Salama, LLC, 300 Ga. at 840, 842(1) n. 2 (applying
the standard for employer/employee to an independent contractor relationship). In
this context, reasonable foreseeability “hinge[s] on an employer’s knowledge of a
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specific employee’s propensity to cause the type of harm suffered by the plaintiff.”
Cleveland v. Tearm RTR2, LLC, 359 Ga. App. 104, 108-09(2) (854 SE2d 756) (2021)
(emphasis omitted). Although a plaintiff is “not required to prove the foreseeability
of the particular consequences of [the employee]’s behavior or the precise injuries
sustained by [the plaintiff,] ... [he must] produce ‘some evidence of incidents similar
to the behavior that was the cause of the injury at issue.’” Advanced Disposal Servs.
Atlanta v. Marczak, 359 Ga. App. 316, 319(2) (857 SE2d 494) (2021) (emphasis and
citation omitted). See also Munroe v. Universal Health Servs., Inc., 277 Ga. 861, 863(1)
(596 SE2d 604) (2004) (“[A]n employer may be held liable only where there is
sufficient evidence to establish that the employer reasonably knew or should have
known of an employee’s ‘tendencies’ to engage in certain behavior relevant to the
injuries allegedly incurred by the plaintiff.”).
Evans argues that Sallie’s conviction for improper driving created a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether Lyft’s failure to disqualify Sallie from the Lyft
platform was the proximate cause of Evans’s injuries. In support of this argument,
Evans cites the fact that Lyft’s corporate representative deposed that he believed that
a prospective or approved driver being charged with reckless driving for traveling 94
mph in a 55 mph zone would result in the driver being barred from using the Lyft
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platform. Neither reckless driving nor improper driving is considered a major traffic
violation under OCGA § 40-5-142(18.2), and because Sallie had no other traffic
violations from the preceding three-year period, see OCGA § 40-5-39(e)(4)(A), the
conviction did not bar Sallie from approval to use the Lyft platform. And even
assuming that Sallie’s traffic violation warranted his disqualification from the Lyft
platform, and further assuming that Lyft’s failure to disqualify Sallie based on this
offense constituted a breach of duty, there is no evidence of a causal connection
between Sallie’s driving record and the type of injuries Evans sustained here. See
Graham v. City of Duluth, 328 Ga. App. 496, 505(2)(b) (759 SE2d 645) (2014)
(“[E]ven if the [employer] did not adhere to proper procedures in hiring [the
employee], absent a causal connection between the employee’s particular
incompetency for the job and the injury sustained by the plaintiff, the defendant
employer is not liable to the plaintiff for hiring an employee with that particular
incompetency.”). In other words, a prior speeding ticket is not evidence of an incident
similar to the violent behavior that caused the injuries at issue. See Marczak, 359 Ga.
App. at 319.
Evans also argues that Sallie’s two reported violations of Lyft’s zero-tolerance
drug and alcohol policy created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Lyft’s
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failure to remove Sallie from the Lyft platform was the proximate cause of Evans’s
injuries. Construing Sallie’s two prior reported violations of the zero-tolerance drug
and alcohol policy as evidence that Sallie was in fact intoxicated while transporting
these passengers, there is no evidence that Lyft knew of Sallie’s propensity for
aggression and violence or that it was reasonably foreseeable that his apparent issues
with drugs and/or alcohol would result in the injuries sustained by Evans.
To hold ... that a[n employer] may be found liable for the negligent
employment of a[n employee] who subsequently commits tortious and
criminal acts solely because the employer knew or should have known
that the [employee] was having a problem with [drugs or] alcohol would
be tantamount to holding that there is no longer any proximate causation
requirement in negligent employment actions in this state.
Mountain v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 205 Ga. App. 119, 121(2) (421 SE2d 284) (1992)
(quotation marks omitted) (holding that an employee’s rape of the plaintiff and
“dangerous and violent propensities” were not reasonably foreseeable based on his
“alcoholism and/or drug addiction”). See also Worstell Parking v. Aisida, 212 Ga.
App. 605, 606(2) (442 SE2d 469) (1994) (holding that an employee’s assault of the
plaintiff was not reasonably foreseeable based on the fact that the employee had
several previous drug convictions because the record contained no evidence that the
employee had violent propensities or that the employer knew of such propensities).
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Compare Underberg v. S. Alarm, Inc., 284 Ga. App. 108, 112-15(2) (643 SE2d 374)
(2007) (holding that the employer’s failure to conduct a background check that would
have revealed that the employee previously had been convicted of burglary and
kidnapping created a genuine issue of material fact as to proximate cause after an
employee kidnapped the plaintiff); Marczak, 359 Ga. App at 320 (holding that the fact
that the employee recently had “reacted aggressively” and threatened his supervisor
after being “accused of not performing his work properly” created a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether the employee’s assault of the plaintiff was reasonably
foreseeable).
The undisputed material record contains no evidence that Sallie had aggressive
or violent tendencies or that Lyft was aware of such tendencies. Accordingly, the trial
court did not err by granting summary judgment as to Evans’s negligence claims
against Lyft based on Sallie’s driving record and violations of the zero-tolerance drug
and alcohol policy.
Judgment affirmed. Davis, J., concurs. Whitaker, J., concurs fully and specially.
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A26A1152. EVANS v. LYFT, INC.
WHITAKER, Judge, concurring fully and specially.
It is undisputed that no record evidence suggests that Sallie had displayed
aggressive or violent tendencies prior to his vicious attack on Evans, or that Lyft was
aware of any such tendencies. So under our applicable caselaw, the trial court
correctly concluded as a matter of law that Lyft’s acts were not the proximate cause
of Evans’ devastating injuries, and I concur fully in the judgment affirming the trial
court’s grant of summary judgment in this case. I write separately only to highlight
what the facts of this case make painfully clear: irrespective of legal duties, proximate
cause, or bottom lines, the safety of the riding public should be a paramount focus for
rideshare companies. Serious customer concerns and “one star” ratings reported at
the virtual outset of a driver’s tenure, even if not portending future violence or aggression towards customers, should give a rideshare company serious pause about
continuing the company’s association with that driver.
2