Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas
MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-25-00616-CV
Sandra ASHLEY,
Appellant
v.
Joy Lea WYATT,
Appellee
From the 451st Judicial District Court, Kendall County, Texas
Trial Court No. 22-494
Honorable Kirsten B. Cohoon, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: H. Todd McCray, Justice
Sitting: Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice
Adrian A. Spears II, Justice
H. Todd McCray, Justice
Delivered and Filed: October 21, 2026
REVERSED AND REMANDED
Sandra Ashley appeals the trial court’s order striking her pleadings and dismissing her
personal injury suit without prejudice as a sanction for providing a false sworn discovery response.
Because the record does not establish that Ashley’s misconduct justified a presumption that her
claims lacked merit or that lesser sanctions would have been effective, we reverse and remand.
04-25-00616-CV
BACKGROUND
Sandra Ashley sued Joy Wyatt for injuries she alleged resulted from a 2020 automobile
accident. During discovery, Wyatt asked Ashley to identify any accidents in which she had been
involved either before or after the accident underlying the present suit. In a sworn interrogatory
response, Ashley answered, “I cannot recall being involved in any other accidents.” However, she
subsequently testified in her deposition that she had, in fact, been involved in previous accidents.
The case proceeded to a jury trial. During Ashley’s cross-examination, Wyatt’s counsel
confronted her with the discrepancy between the interrogatory response and her deposition
testimony. Ashley acknowledged that her interrogatory response was false and stated that she had
lied at the direction of her attorney. The trial court immediately removed the jury and placed
Ashely’s counsel under oath. Counsel denied instructing Ashley to provide a false interrogatory
response. The trial court ultimately determined that the jury had been so prejudiced by this
exchange that it could not be rehabilitated. The trial court excused the jury and announced its
intention to strike Ashley’s pleadings.
The following day, the trial court conducted a hearing in advance of signing a written order
dismissing the case. Ashley’s counsel acknowledged that Ashley should be sanctioned but urged
the court to impose a lesser sanction rather than striking her pleadings. Specifically, counsel
suggested a monetary sanction. The trial court rejected that alternative, emphasizing the
seriousness of Ashley’s conduct. The court stated that it had “never seen such flagrant behavior in
a court of law” and could not “turn a blind eye to the mockery” made of the court in front of the
jury. The court further stated that it did not believe a monetary sanction was sufficient.
The trial court signed an order striking Ashley’s pleadings and dismissing the suit without
prejudice. In its written order, the court found Ashley’s conduct interfered with the court’s core
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functions and demonstrated “flagrant bad faith or a callous disregard for the responsibilities of
discovery.” The court further found that Ashley’s false testimony was directly related to the “heart
of [her] proof and [her] credibility.” The court characterized the misconduct as sufficiently
egregious to constitute an exceptional case warranting severe sanctions. The order stated the court
had “considered all possible lesser sanctions” but found none would “properly and fully punish
the perjury and misconduct” involved. Ashley appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a trial court’s imposition of sanctions for an abuse of discretion. Cire v.
Cummings, 134 S.W.3d 835, 838 (Tex. 2004). A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts
without reference to guiding rules or principles. Id. at 839. We independently review the entire
record to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion when imposing sanctions on a
party. In re Newkirk Logistics, Inc., 718 S.W.3d 240, 247 (Tex. 2025).
Courts possess inherent authority to impose sanctions for bad faith abuse of the judicial
process. Brewer v. Lennox Hearth Prods. LLC, 601 S.W.3d 704, 718 (Tex. 2020). However, in
doing so, the sanction must be just. Id.; see TransAmerican Nat. Gas Corp. v. Powell, 811 S.W.2d
913, 917 (Tex. 1991). A trial court’s discretion in regard to sanctions is constrained by two
principal considerations: there must be a direct relationship between the offensive conduct and the
sanction imposed, and the sanction may not be excessive. TransAmerican, 811 S.W.2d at 917.
Further, a sanction that effectively adjudicates a party’s claims is reserved for exceptional
circumstances and should be a trial court’s last resort. Id. at 918 (noting that “although punishment
and deterrence are legitimate purposes for sanctions, they do not justify trial by sanctions.”). Such
a sanction generally may not be imposed unless the trial court has first considered and tested lesser
sanctions. Newkirk, 718 S.W.3d at 249; Cire, 134 S.W.3d at 842. A merits preclusive sanction
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may be imposed as an initial means of punishment only when exceptional circumstances make the
sanction clearly justified and it is fully apparent that no lesser sanction would suffice. Id.
Additionally, sanctions may not be used to effectually adjudicate the merits of a claim
unless the sanctioned party’s conduct justifies a presumption that the claim lacks merit. Newkirk,
718 S.W.3d at 249 (citing Paradigm Oil, Inc. v. Retamco Operating, Inc., 372 S.W.3d 177, 184
(Tex. 2012)). As the Texas Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized, the punishment must be
proportionate in both nature and scope to the misconduct. See Newkirk, 718 S.W.3d at 249; Cire,
134 S.W.3d at 842; TransAmerican, 811 S.W.2d at 917.
ANALYSIS
A. Death Penalty Sanctions
Ashley first argues that, while styled a dismissal without prejudice, the actual effect of the trial
court’s order was to prevent the refiling of her claims because the applicable limitations period has
run. We agree that the practical effect of the order precludes further litigation of Ashley’s claims.
We therefore review the order under the standards applicable to merits preclusive or “death
penalty” sanctions. See Chrysler Corp. v. Blackmon, 841 S.W.2d 844, 849 (Tex. 1992).
B. Sanctionable Conduct
Ashley next contends that the sanctions imposed in this case were inappropriate because the
trial court failed to determine whether the false interrogatory response was attributable to her or
her counsel. Because Ashley testified that counsel instructed her to lie and counsel denied doing
so, Ashley contends that there is nothing in the record indicating that Ashley was responsible for
the sanctionable conduct. We disagree that this dispute prevented the trial court from sanctioning
Ashley.
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There is no question that Ashley’s conduct was sanctionable. She admitted that she knowingly
provided a false sworn discovery response. When confronted with that response at trial, she did
not attribute it to mistake or failed recollection; she testified that she had lied and claimed her
attorney instructed her to do so. Her attorney denied that accusation under oath. The trial court
observed the testimony firsthand and expressly found Ashley’s conduct deliberate rather than
inadvertent. Therefore, regardless of who suggested the false response, the trial court was entitled
to attribute the misconduct to Ashley and sanction her for it. See TransAmerican, 811 S.W.2d at
917. The issue, then, is not whether the trial court could sanction Ashley, but whether it could
impose the type of sanction it did.
C. Direct Relationship
Ashley argues that a death penalty sanction is unwarranted because her false interrogatory
response did not justify a presumption that her personal injury claims lack merit. Therefore,
according to Ashley, the sanction does not bear a direct relationship to the misconduct. Conversely,
the trial court found a direct relationship between Ashley’s misconduct and the sanction imposed
because her false discovery response related to “the heart” of her proof and credibility.
We agree that Ashley’s prior accidents, which were the subject of her false interrogatory
answer, were relevant to her present personal-injury claims. Evidence of prior injuries or accidents
could bear on causation and damages, and Ashley’s admitted dishonesty plainly implicated her
credibility. But that relationship alone does not justify a sanction that precludes consideration of
her claims on the merits. A merits preclusive sanction demands more than merely some connection
between the misconduct and an issue in the case. The sanction must be directed toward the
wrongdoing and operate as a remedy for the prejudice caused by it. TransAmerican, 811 S.W.2d
at 917. It is therefore appropriate only when the sanctioned party’s misconduct justifies a
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presumption that her claims lack merit and it would therefore be unjust to permit her to present
them. See Newkirk, 718 S.W.3d at 249; TransAmerican, 811 S.W.2d at 918.
Here, Ashley disclosed her prior accidents during her deposition. Thus, in spite of the false
interrogatory response, Wyatt was not deprived of the information Ashley attempted to conceal in
her interrogatory. Indeed, Wyatt’s counsel possessed both the interrogatory response and Ashley’s
subsequent deposition testimony and used the inconsistency to impeach Ashley before the jury.
The record therefore does not demonstrate that the false response prevented Wyatt from
discovering the prior accidents or deprived Wyatt of the ability to investigate and present evidence
concerning alternative causation theories. See Chrysler, 841 S.W.2d at 850.
Nor does Ashley’s misconduct justify a presumption that her underlying personal injury claims
lacked merit. Her false answer concerning prior accidents did not establish that the underlying
accident did not occur, that Wyatt was not negligent, or that it did not result in a compensable
injury. The false response was relevant to Ashley’s credibility and potentially to causation and
damages, but it did not establish that her underlying claims are meritless.
This is an important distinction when the sanction imposed did not merely address the false
discovery response or restrict Ashley’s proof concerning the subject of that response. It eliminated
her claim altogether. Although Ashley’s misconduct warrants a substantial sanction, it does not
supply the necessary basis for presuming her personal injury claims lack merit as required by Texas
law. See Newkirk, 718 S.W.3d at 249; Chrysler, 841 S.W.2d at 852-53.
D. Excessiveness
Ashley also argues that the sanction was excessive because the trial court imposed a death
penalty sanction without first testing a lesser sanction. Ashley notes several possible alternatives,
including monetary and evidentiary sanctions.
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Before imposing a case determinative sanction, a trial court generally must consider and test
lesser sanctions. Newkirk, 718 S.W.3d at 249; Chrysler, 841 S.W.2d at 849. “This means that a
trial court must analyze the available sanctions and offer a reasoned explanation as to the
appropriateness of the sanction imposed.” Cire, 134 S.W.3d at 842. A trial court may proceed
directly to a merits preclusive sanction only in an exceptional case in which the circumstances
make it fully apparent that no lesser sanction would suffice. Id.; see GTE Communications Sys.
Corp. v. Tanner, 856 S.W.2d 725, 729 (Tex. 1993).
In this case, the trial court’s order states that it “considered all possible lesser sanctions” and
determined that none would “properly and fully punish the perjury and misconduct.” The record
likewise shows the court considered and rejected a monetary sanction, explaining that it would not
sufficiently address “the wrong that was committed to the Court.” Those findings demonstrate that
the trial court considered the seriousness of Ashley’s misconduct. They do not, however, establish
why a lesser sanction could not adequately address it.
Ashley had not previously been sanctioned for the conduct, and the trial court did not test a
lesser sanction before striking her pleadings. Although the trial court stated that it had considered
all possible lesser sanctions and found them inadequate, the record does not make it fully apparent
that lesser sanctions would have been ineffective. For example, the trial court could have imposed
monetary sanctions, evidentiary restrictions, or any of a number of other measures directed at
Ashley’s false discovery response and the resulting prejudice. Neither the order nor the record
explain why such lesser measures would have failed to address the misconduct. See Newkirk, 718
S.W.3d at 250 (concluding trial court’s statement that lesser sanctions would be inadequate was
insufficient where the court offered no further explanation); see also GTE, 856 S.W.2d at 729
(finding death penalty sanctions unjust where neither the order or the record demonstrated why
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lesser sanctions would have been ineffective). Nor do the circumstances themselves make the
ineffectiveness of lesser sanctions fully apparent.
The circumstances in Cire illustrate when it might be appropriate for a trial court to dispense
with testing a lesser sanction because the record makes its ineffectiveness clear. In that case, the
sanctioned party deliberately destroyed audiotapes that the trial court had repeatedly ordered her
to produce. Cire, 134 S.W.3d at 837–38. Because the destruction permanently deprived the
opposing party of evidence central to the litigation, no lesser sanction could restore the evidence
or cure the resulting prejudice. Id. at 841. The circumstances here are materially different. Ashley’s
false interrogatory response did not prevent Wyatt from discovering the concealed information.
Rather, Ashley later disclosed the prior accidents in her deposition, and Wyatt possessed the
information in time to use it at trial. Thus, unlike the destruction of evidence in Cire, Ashley’s
misconduct did not create an obvious prejudice that could not be addressed by a lesser sanction.
We do not minimize Ashley’s conduct. Intentionally providing false sworn discovery
responses threatens the integrity of the judicial process and warrants a meaningful sanction. But
the severity of the misconduct alone does not do away with the limitations governing death penalty
sanctions. See Chrysler, 841 S.W.2d at 849. The trial court’s findings correctly explain why Ashley
deserved serious punishment. They do not, however, establish that her misconduct justified a
presumption that her claims lacked merit or that no lesser sanction could adequately address her
abuse of the discovery process.
On this record, striking Ashley’s pleadings did more than sanction her misconduct. It
effectively adjudicated her claims even though her misconduct did not justify a presumption that
those claims lacked merit. We therefore conclude the trial court abused its discretion by striking
Ashley’s pleadings and dismissing her suit.
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CONCLUSION
We sustain Ashley’s challenge to the trial court’s sanctions order. We reverse the order
striking Ashley’s pleadings and dismissing her claims and remand the cause to the trial court for
further proceedings. Our disposition does not in any way preclude the trial court from imposing
an appropriate lesser sanction for Ashley’s misconduct on remand.
H. Todd McCray, Justice
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