TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
NO. 03-25-00913-CV
$16,475.00 U.S. Currency, a 2019 Jeep Grand Cherokee, and a Firearm
v.
The State of Texas, Appellee
FROM THE 425TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WILLIAMSON COUNTY
NO. 24-0602-C425, THE HONORABLE BETSY F. LAMBETH, JUDGE PRESIDING
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This appeal arises out of a civil-forfeiture action under Code of Criminal Procedure
chapter 59. Pending before the Court is the State’s “Agreed Motion to Dismiss Appeal for Lack
of Jurisdiction” (the Motion), agreed to by appellant Rebecca Castaneda. The Motion, its title
aside, seeks inconsistent forms of relief—on the one hand, vacatur of the trial court’s judgment
because it is void and remand of the cause to the trial court for further proceedings and, on the
other, dismissal of this appeal. See Knot Anymore, LLC v. Rod, No. 03-19-00505-CV, 2020 WL
217174, at *1 & n.1 (Tex. App.—Austin Jan. 15, 2020, no pet.) (distinguishing appellate disposition of setting aside trial court’s judgment with accompanying remand to trial court from appellate
disposition of dismissal of appeal); Wiegrefe v. Wiegrefe, No. 03-18-00275-CV, 2018 WL
5728791, at *1 & n.1 (Tex. App.—Austin Nov. 2, 2018, no pet.) (same); see also Texas Quarter
Horse Ass’n v. American Legion Dep’t of Tex., 496 S.W.3d 175, 182 (Tex. App.—Austin 2016, no pet.) (identifying concerns present when appeal is dismissed but party to appealed judgment
lacks chance to challenge judgment on its merits).
Requested relief aside, however, the parties agree that the trial court’s judgment is
void because it was rendered without a necessary party joined to the action. See Tex. Code Crim.
Proc. art. 59.04(i) (providing that certain people must “be named as a party and . . . served with
citation as provided by the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure”), (j) (providing that certain people
must “be made a party to the proceeding”). We agree that the trial court’s judgment is void. When
an appeal is taken from a void judgment, we have jurisdiction to determine that the judgment is
void and to make appropriate orders based on that determination. See Freedom Commc’ns, Inc. v.
Coronado, 372 S.W.3d 621, 623 (Tex. 2012). We therefore grant in part and deny in part the
Motion, vacate the trial court’s judgment, and remand the cause to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The State initiated this Chapter 59 action to give notice that it had seized certain
personal property and to seek its forfeiture to the State. The property is $16,475.00 in U.S. currency, a 2019 Jeep Grand Cherokee, and a semi-automatic pistol. The State sought to join two people
as parties to the action—Xavier Perez and another person, who is irrelevant to the matters that we
decide in this appeal. Perez answered with a general denial, but he died soon after.
A few months later, Castaneda intervened in the action. She filed an answer, generally denying the State’s pleadings. She is Perez’s mother. At the final trial, the court, on the
State’s objection, forbade Castaneda from participating based on her pleadings’ purported failure
to demonstrate her standing to participate in the action. With Castaneda thus excluded, Perez
deceased and no representative of his estate properly joined as a party to the action, and the other
person defaulting, trial was had on only the State’s evidence with no other party participating. The
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court rendered judgment against both the defaulting party and Perez—even though he was dead—
forfeiting the property to the State. Castaneda filed a notice of appeal from the judgment.
Now on appeal, the State tells us in the Motion that the trial court’s judgment is
void because the court proceeded to judgment without proper joinder of Perez’s estate’s representative as a party to the action. Castaneda agrees with this argument, and so do we.
As noted above, certain people must be joined as parties to a Chapter 59 action.
See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 59.04(i), (j); $27,920.00 in U.S. Currency v. State, 37 S.W.3d 533,
537 & n.1 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2001, pet. denied). The State and Castaneda agree that while
Perez was alive, he had to be joined as a party.1 Under relevant precedent, he was a defendant in
the action. See, e.g., $1,411.26 US Currency v. State, No. 03-22-00011-CV, 2023 WL 4828401,
at *2–4 (Tex. App.—Austin July 28, 2023, no pet.); Six Thousand & Thirty Six & 00/100 Dollars
($6,036.00) in U.S. Currency v. State, No. 13-24-00546-CV, 2026 WL 915683, at *3–5 (Tex.
App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Apr. 2, 2026, no pet.); Four-Thousand-Five-Hundred Twentyeight Dollars ($4,528.00) in U.S. Currency v. State, No. 08-03-00239-CV, 2004 WL 1576779, at
*1–2 (Tex. App.—El Paso July 15, 2004, no pet.); see also Tex. Code Crim. Proc. arts. 59.04(b),
(i), 59.05(a), (b), (f) (aligning much of the procedure for Chapter 59 actions, including rules of
pleading, with that used in civil actions more generally); Tex. R. Civ. P. 45(a)–(b) (providing for
mode of pleading in civil suits to be by “petition and answer” of “plaintiff” and “defendant”);
accord Tex. R. Civ. P. 51(a), 64, 83–85, 121. For example, the State’s live pleading called for
Perez to be served with citation to appear in the action because of his status as a necessary party
1 The State told the trial court, referring to Article 59.04: “It requires the State to notice and cite anyone with a potential interest in property. We did that because at the time Mr. Perez was the only person that had any interest in the vehicle, the gun or the money.”
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under Article 59.04, and such a citation “shall . . . be directed to the defendant[ and] . . . contain
the time within which these rules require the defendant to file a written answer with the clerk who
issued citation.” See Tex. R. Civ. P. 99(b). The citation to Perez notified him that he was a
defendant in the action.
Because Perez was a necessary defendant in the action but died before trial, before
the court could proceed to final judgment, the proper representative of Perez’s estate should have
been joined as a party to the action.2 The procedure for joining the proper party to replace a deceased defendant is addressed by Rule of Civil Procedure 1523:
Where the defendant shall die, upon the suggestion of death being entered of record
in open court, or upon petition of the plaintiff, the clerk shall issue a scire facias for
the administrator or executor or heir requiring him to appear and defend the suit
and upon the return of such service, the suit shall proceed against such administrator
or executor or heir.
But when this procedure is not followed and the deceased defendant was a necessary party to the
suit, the trial court cannot proceed to final judgment. See Richard D. Davis, L.L.P. v. Knott,
No. 14-24-00581-CV, 2025 WL 684741, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 4, 2025, no
pet.); Klose v. N-Tex Sand & Gravel, LLC, No. 06-24-00017-CV, 2024 WL 4116885, at *3–4
(Tex. App.—Texarkana Sept. 9, 2024, no pet.); Hegwer v. Edwards, 527 S.W.3d 337, 339 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2017, no pet.); Bevers v. Brodbeck, No. 07-04-00475-CV, 2006 WL 2795347, at
*1–2 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Sept. 29, 2006, pet. denied); see also Est. of Pollack v. McMurrey,
2 The estate itself may not appear as a party because an estate is not a legal entity that may act as a party in litigation. See Tooke v. City of Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325, 334 & n.43 (Tex. 2006); Austin Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. Lovato, 171 S.W.3d 845, 849 (Tex. 2005).
3 The Motion expresses the State and Castaneda’s agreement that Rule 152 applies to Perez in this context.
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858 S.W.2d 388, 390 n.2 (Tex. 1993) (noting that at common law, defendant’s death abates suit
against defendant but that common-law rule is abrogated by application of scire facias procedure).
This procedure was not followed here to join to the suit Perez’s estate’s representative. And even
though Castaneda told the trial court during an oral hearing that she is the proper representative of
Perez’s estate, appearing in a suit in that capacity “require[s] some type of documentation.” See
Klose, 2024 WL 4116885, at *3. She provided none, and she agrees with the Motion’s argument
that the trial court’s judgment is void for lack of proper joinder of Perez’s estate’s representative.
Because the trial court proceeded to final judgment but the proper representative of
Perez’s estate cannot at this stage be joined as a party to the action, the trial court’s judgment is
void. See id. at *3–4; In re Coats, 580 S.W.3d 431, 435–36 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2019, orig.
proceeding). Because the judgment is void, we grant the Motion in part, vacate the trial court’s
judgment, and remand the cause to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.4 See Freedom Commc’ns, 372 S.W.3d at 624; see also Contreras v. Texas Dep’t of Fam.
4 An appellate disposition of vacatur and remand is unusual in that it is not expressed as an option in Rule of Appellate Procedure 43.2, but the disposition is available to us. In the parallel case of Freedom Communications, Inc. v. Coronado, the Supreme Court of Texas declared a trialcourt judgment void, vacated the intermediate-court judgment that had affirmed the trial-court judgment, and remanded the case to the trial court. See 372 S.W.3d 621, 623–24 (Tex. 2012). The Supreme Court’s “Types of Judgment” rule parallels the one that applies to us in that neither expressly lists vacatur and remand together as an option for handling trial-court judgments that were rendered without necessary jurisdiction (except that the Supreme Court may vacate and remand when its opinion and judgment mark a change in the law, see Tex. R. App. P. 60.2(f)). Compare Tex. R. App. P. 60.2, with Tex. R. App. P. 43.2. When the Court in Freedom Communications remanded the case to the trial court, it cited as support Rule 60.6, see Freedom Commc’ns, 372 S.W.3d at 624, which empowers that Court to “make any other appropriate order required by the law and the nature of the case,” Tex. R. App. P. 60.6. We are empowered by a similar rule: “The court of appeals may make any other appropriate order that the law and the nature of the case require.” Tex. R. App. P. 43.6. We therefore vacate and remand here under Rule 43.6 much like the Supreme Court vacated and remanded in Freedom Communications under Rule 60.6.
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& Protective Servs., No. 03-17-00102-CV, 2019 WL 4458789, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin
Sept. 18, 2019, no pet.) (another example of vacatur and remand).
Chari L. Kelly, Justice
Before Chief Justice Byrne, Justices Kelly and Theofanis
Vacated and Remanded
Filed: October 23, 2026
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