TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
NO. 03-24-00692-CR
Jordan Michael Sannicola, Appellant
v.
The State of Texas, Appellee
FROM THE 453RD DISTRICT COURT OF HAYS COUNTY
NO. CR-22-2401-C, THE HONORABLE SHERRI TIBBE, JUDGE PRESIDING
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury found Jordan Michael Sannicola guilty of failure to stop and render aid, a
second-degree felony. See Tex. Transp. Code § 550.021(a), (c)(1)(A). Following a punishment
hearing, at which he pleaded true to two prior non-subsequent felony convictions—for aggravated
assault with a deadly weapon and evading arrest or detention with a vehicle—the trial court
sentenced him to forty years’ confinement.1 See Tex. Penal Code § 12.42(b) (providing that
defendant convicted of second-degree felony may be punished for first-degree felony if it is shown
that he has been previously convicted of felony). In three issues on appeal, Sannicola contends
that the evidence was insufficient to support the finding of guilt, that the trial court abused its
discretion by admitting a photograph of the decedent, and that the trial court provided an incorrect
1 Also admitted at the hearing was the parties’ stipulation to Sannicola’s criminal history, which included five felony convictions and four misdemeanor convictions.
instruction on the State’s burden of proof for extraneous offenses. We modify the trial court’s
judgment of conviction to correct a clerical error and affirm the judgment as modified.
BACKGROUND
At 2:13 a.m. on January 3, 2022, Carlos Sotelo called 911 after witnessing an
accident on the northbound lanes of I-35. In the call, a recording of which was admitted at
Sannicola’s trial, Sotelo reported that a gray hatchback had attempted “to get on the [entrance]
ramp” and “was on the shoulder” when it was struck by “a large vehicle” similar to “a private
U-Haul.” The hatchback had tried to “speed past the U-Haul,” which either “didn’t see it or didn’t
yield.” Sotelo suggested, however, that he was “sure [the U-Haul driver] could have seen the
[hatchback’s] lights.” The two vehicles collided twice; the first impact was “hard,” and the
second—which occurred when the U-Haul sought to reenter the rightmost lane—was “small.”
After the second impact, the hatchback “lost control,” “flipped over,” and landed on the service or
access road. The U-Haul exited the highway after the accident. When asked if anyone was hurt,
Sotelo responded that “it didn’t look good.”
The hatchback’s driver, Iliana Velez, died as a result of the accident, and Sannicola,
who was identified by officers as the driver of the U-Haul (later determined to be a box truck), was
arrested and charged with failing to stop and render aid. The State’s witnesses at trial included
Sotelo, members of law enforcement, and the Travis County Deputy Medical Examiner. Sannicola
recalled one of the officers and presented testimony from Dr. John Eftekhar, an expert mechanical
engineer. The exhibits admitted at trial included maps and photographs of the crime scene,
surveillance videos from nearby businesses and from the Amazon warehouse to which Sannicola
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was making a delivery, copies of Sannicola’s driving record and phone records, and a recording
of his interview with police.
Sotelo testified about his observations on the night of January 2–3. He had gone to
dinner with a friend in San Antonio, had two drinks, and then taken a nap in the parking lot of a
New Braunfels Walmart. He was driving back to Austin in the middle lane of I-35 northbound
when he witnessed the accident. He testified that when it occurred, he was driving seventy-five
feet or “[n]ot a full football field” behind the vehicles involved; however, he elsewhere testified
that they were “right in front” of him. There were no vehicles besides his in the accident’s vicinity.
Sannicola’s box truck was in the rightmost lane, and Velez’s hatchback was
entering the highway “[o]n the same shoulder” or on the on-ramp. Velez appeared to accelerate
to enter the highway ahead of the truck. When the two vehicles were parallel, they “rubbed once
and nothing really came of it”; they “continued on” for around forty seconds. After the first impact,
the truck moved to the center lane before returning to the rightmost lane “to keep its lane.” Velez
again tried to pass the truck, and “[t]hat’s when the actual real accident happened.” During the
second impact, “there was a clip hit from the back, but the actual major hit was from the—between
the two doors . . . but [closer] to the [driver’s side] rear.” The hatchback “lost control and
eventually got into the middle lane and, sort of, tried to correct itself.” It spun to face Sotelo before
rolling off the highway, across a grass median, and onto the access road. The truck took the next
exit, and Sotelo called 911 because he “didn’t see the box truck render aid so someone had to call.”
He “knew someone got hurt” when he saw the rollover.
On cross-examination, Sotelo clarified that the first impact was between the
hatchback’s door and the truck’s passenger-side step “because it is a higher vehicle.” During the
second impact, which happened soon after the first and as part of the “same motion,” the truck’s
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front right corner clipped the rear of the hatchback’s driver’s side. Sotelo agreed that he had
previously testified under oath to having seen both vehicles on the on-ramp at the same time but
testified at trial that he had been incorrect.
San Marcos Police Department (SMPD) Officer Andrew Wisener, who oversaw
the investigation into the crash, testified concerning the investigation and his conclusions. He had
been on SMPD’s collision investigation team for around seven years by the time of trial and had
received training in intermediate and advanced collision investigation and accident reconstruction.
The stretch of highway on which the accident occurred had been undergoing
construction work for two or three years at the time of the collision. Velez’s hatchback was heavily
damaged from the rollover, and she had been ejected from the vehicle. Notable to Officer Wisener
was “debris in the roadway that was a result of the collision” because it was consistent with “a
severe rollover collision.” He determined that the initial contact had occurred on the highway;
skid marks on the shoulder, tire tracks in the grass median, and gouge marks on the access road
indicated that the hatchback left the highway “at an angle.” Velez’s tattoo and her personal items,
which were scattered around the scene, helped officers to identify her.
Officer Wisener inspected the hatchback at a tow yard and determined that damage
to the vehicle’s left rear quarter panel—specifically, semicircular white scratch marks and black
marks—revealed “the point of contact between the two vehicles that were involved in the
collision.” He opined that the white scratch marks were caused by a lug nut or the rim of the
truck’s tire and that the black marks were rubber transfer from tire contact.
From a business in the area, Officer Wisener obtained surveillance video that
showed Velez’s hatchback entering the on-ramp around 2:11 a.m. while parallel to a box truck
with partial yellow coloring that was in the middle or the rightmost lane. Additional video showed
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that the truck, which matched a description given by Sotelo, eventually exited the highway and
made a U-turn onto the southbound access road before turning into a residential area. From
responding officers’ dash-cam videos, it was evident that by 2:18 a.m., the truck had reentered the
highway and was headed northbound again. Cameras at an Amazon warehouse in Kyle recorded
the truck arriving around 2:30 a.m. and captured the driver, identified by Amazon as Sannicola,
walking into the facility.
Officer Wisener obtained Sannicola’s cellphone records, and tower pings for the
phone tracked the truck’s path. The records also showed that prior to the accident, Sannicola had
been on the phone with his girlfriend for around twenty-eight minutes and that the call ended at
approximately 2:13 a.m., when the accident occurred. Sannicola’s next call was made to his friend
at approximately 2:17 a.m., around the time that the truck reentered I-35.
During Officer Wisener’s investigation, he learned that Sannicola’s driver’s license
had been suspended and was invalid at the time of the accident. He also learned that Sannicola
had active felony arrest warrants.
Officers discovered the truck on February 5, 2022, around a month after the offense
and a week after Sannicola was arrested. Officer Wisener testified that the cab had been painted
white in a manner that suggested it was not done professionally; some yellow spots had not been
painted over, a number of locations had overspray, and the paint smelled “very fresh.” The truck’s
state was “substantially different” from its state at the time of the accident.
From his investigation, Officer Wisener concluded that Sannicola’s truck had
contacted Velez’s hatchback and that “a PIT [Precision Immobilization Technique or Pursuit
Immobilization Technique] maneuver of some sort [occurred]—the front passenger side of his
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truck most likely came in contact with the back driver’s side of her car to cause it to spin out and
ultimately lose control.”
Officer Wisener testified on cross-examination that although there was construction
equipment positioned along the northbound I-35 access road at the time of the accident, he did not
recall the parking lots of businesses along the road being closed off. There was no debris on the
highway nor any indication that Velez flipped over a construction barrier. He did not know for
how long Sannicola had left the highway, but from the surveillance videos and the speed at which
Sannicola was driving, Officer Wisener saw no indication that he stopped after the accident. The
officer acknowledged, however, that he did not know if Sannicola “pulled over on [the] side of the
road and hopped out and checked his truck out and hopped back in and then proceeded to 35.”
Officer Wisener elaborated on his conclusions regarding the damage to the
hatchback’s left rear quarter panel. He was not “100 percent” sure what caused the damage, but
he arrived at his explanation for the white scratch marks using “a little bit of common sense and
[his] police experience.” His rubber-transfer determination was “also somewhat speculation based
on what [he had] seen before, kind of, a guesstimate.” He did not conduct an accident
reconstruction but instead relied on Sotelo’s account. Officer Wisener believed that the rollover
“was a result of the initial collision on the interstate.” It was his opinion that the contact between
the vehicles had been minimal, that there was only “a very minor impact,” and that the accident
lasted less than ten seconds. However, he also believed that Sannicola knew he had been involved
in a collision and that it would have caused noise because “[c]ollisions typically create a lot
of noise.”
Asked about his inspection of Sannicola’s truck, which Officer Wisener noted
Sannicola did not own, the officer testified that it had no damage connecting it to the accident. Its
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bumper had not been repainted, the passenger’s side had not been altered, and he did not know
who had painted it. The truck had “several spots that indicated damage, but nothing that would
definitively tie th[e] truck to being involved in the accident,” and “there were no scuff marks on
the tire.” However, Officer Wisener defended his conclusion that Sannicola knew he had been
involved in an accident, testifying that Sannicola had motive to flee the crash because of his
suspended driver’s license and active warrants and that his awareness was evidenced by “[t]he
immediate actions after the collision that [he] took exiting the highway and driving through a
neighborhood that he wouldn’t normally be driving through and going to his destination, and then
the truck being painted by somebody.”
Lucas Wiek, the deputy medical examiner, testified that Velez’s manner of death
was accident and that her cause of death was blunt trauma. He also testified that she “had multiple
blunt force injuries,” including multiple skull fractures; a subdural hemorrhage; and lacerations to
the lungs, liver, spleen, and left kidney.
Medina County Sheriff’s Office Deputy Samuel Sellers testified that he located
Sannicola’s truck in a vacant lot on February 5, 2022, and that the owner of the residence adjoining
the lot told him that the truck belonged to her son’s friend; she gave Sellers the name and phone
number of the truck’s owner.
SMPD Officer Kevin Blackwood, a member of the traffic and collision unit with
“specialized training in crash investigations” as well as training in accident reconstruction, testified
about his role in the investigation and about Sannicola’s interview with law enforcement.
Sannicola provided officers with his truck’s location. In addition to the alterations discussed by
Officer Wisener, Officer Blackwood noted that the front and rear license plates had different
numbers, that the truck was not registered in Texas or had not been registered recently, that a
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company logo or lettering had been removed, and that someone had attempted to scrape off or
repaint numbers on the truck’s side. And unlike Officer Wisener, Officer Blackwood observed
damage to the truck: there was damage to the “very edge of th[e] front bumper” that was consistent
with the damage officers believed would have resulted from the accident; part of the front
passenger’s side tire “looked like it could be a white or lighter color”; and a portion of the tire’s
rim had lost its white paint.
Officer Blackwood, like Officer Wisener, considered the damage to Velez’s vehicle
to have been caused by an accidental PIT maneuver, which he defined as involving contact
between a front quarter panel of an officer’s vehicle and a rear quarter panel of a target vehicle,
intended to spin the target vehicle 180 degrees and immobilize it. On the hatchback’s “rear bumper
just behind the rear tire,” Officer Blackwood observed “evidence of possible contact with another
vehicle,” including semicircular lug-nut scratches and rubber transfer. His theory was that as Velez
was entering the highway from the on-ramp, “the rear of her vehicle made contact with the front
corner tire of Mr. Sannicola’s truck, which caused her to spin out of control, which led her to
eventually go off the roadway and flip.” Although he agreed that it was possible Sannicola had
not felt the impact, Officer Blackwood explained that the nature of the accident would have caused
the hatchback to swerve in front of the truck so that he was “not quite sure how [Sannicola] would
not have seen that.” The rollover likely occurred when Velez overcorrected after being pulled in
front of the truck, which “sen[t] the car back in the opposite direction.”
Like Officer Wisener, Officer Blackwood thought that Sannicola’s post-accident
conduct was further evidence of his guilt. None of the parking lots of the businesses along the
northbound access road were blocked by construction, which had yet to begin on the roadway
despite the presence of construction barrels. Instead of pulling into one of the lots, Sannicola made
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a U-turn and entered “a neighborhood where a commercial vehicle would not normally be driven.”
And Sannicola did not appear to have stopped based on the surveillance video. Officer Blackwood
thought that Sannicola went into the residential area to avoid police detection and to identify
possible pursuers.
Officer Blackwood testified that during the interview, officers gave Sannicola the
opportunity to address their concerns, but he did not do so. Sannicola consistently denied that any
collision occurred and maintained that Velez “did not physically at all touch my truck,” which
showed “no damage at all.” He told officers that he had felt nothing, that his truck had not
wobbled, and that he had been in the middle lane. At first, he said that he had noticed Velez
swerving and “thought that [his] mudflap flew off and hit her”; however, after getting off the
highway, stopping, and checking his truck, he realized that “nothing had hit her.” Later, he claimed
that he had exited the highway to get fuel. He also admitted that he had seen Velez not only swerve
but “swerve off the road . . . to the median or whatever it’s called on the side of the road.” He had
not thought he was involved in an accident but had to check his equipment to be sure. He denied
being aware of his warrants and stated, “See, the thing is when you’re involved in an accident, you
stop, straight up. Yes, I wasn’t aware of no accident that I caused.”
Recalled by the defense, Officer Wisener testified that Sannicola provided him with
three phone numbers, none of which was the number he had used to communicate with his friend
and girlfriend around the time of the accident. The officer also testified, “[W]hen I asked him for
the phone number that was his, he gave me a separate phone number that wasn’t his, nor was it—
I don’t believe it was even in service or an active phone number.”
During the defense’s case-in-chief, Dr. Eftekhar, the mechanical engineering expert
with forty-five years of experience, testified with respect to the results of accident-reconstruction
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and line-of-sight analyses that he performed and for which he used “sister” or “clone” vehicle
“platforms” rather than the exact types of vehicles involved in the accident. He disagreed with
Officer Wisener and Officer Blackwood about the accident’s cause and opined that it was a
“sideswipe accident,” meaning the vehicles “touch[ed] each other,” and there was no “direct
impact” or “momentum transfer.” Had the accident been an accidental PIT maneuver, Dr. Eftekhar
explained, the hatchback would have been “dragged by the truck along the highway.”
The striations on the hatchback’s left rear quarter panel were from the rubber of the
truck’s tire and not a lug nut, which would have pierced the panel. The only point of contact was
between “the right side tire of the truck with the left rear end of the car”; there was “no side damage
to the car from the front bumper of the truck.” The vehicles were likely in contact for half a
second—“[a]bout a blink”—and the separation process took another half-second. Around two
seconds after the initial impact, Dr. Eftekhar testified, there was a “steering input” that caused the
hatchback to begin “rotating and going down.” He could not simulate the input because he did not
“know how much steering input was there.” He concluded that it would have been physically
impossible and would have defied “all the laws of physics” for the hatchback to spin so that its
headlights were facing Sotelo, as he reported on the 911 call. Dr. Eftekhar’s accident
reconstruction showed that “practically there was no force on the truck” and that the “feeling of
the impact is not going to get to the truck driver.” He testified that there would have been no sound
from the impact. He did not calculate the vehicle’s speeds because he did not survey the area.
Regarding his line-of-sight analysis, Dr. Eftekhar noted that Sannicola’s truck
lacked both a hood mirror and a rearview mirror; it had “lots of obstructions from the side and
from the back,” and the hatchback was under five feet in height. Sannicola’s range of vision would
have been “[v]ery limited”; the “first point on the ground that you can see is about 30 feet away
10
from the front of the truck.” His side view was similarly obstructed, and he likely would have had
to look out of the window at the right time to see the hatchback. On cross-examination,
Dr. Eftekhar agreed that he did not know how Sannicola’s seat and side mirrors were positioned
at the time of the accident and that drivers can adjust their mirrors to “cover” or “view” blind spots.
However, doing so would only “move [a blind spot] five feet to the left or five feet to the right
depending on how you adjust your mirror.” Dr. Eftekhar testified that Sannicola had stated that
“he adjusts his mirrors every time he sits behind [the wheel of] a truck.”
After hearing the evidence and the parties’ arguments, the jury found Sannicola
guilty of failing to stop and render aid. A punishment hearing was held before the trial court,
which sentenced him to forty years’ confinement.
DISCUSSION
I. Evidentiary Sufficiency
In his first issue, Sannicola contends that there was insufficient evidence to prove
that he knew a collision occurred or that the collision “was of the type that would cause injury
or death.”
Due process requires that the State prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, every element
of the crime charged. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 313 (1979); Lang v. State, 561 S.W.3d 174,
179 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
conviction, we consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine
whether, based on that evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson,
443 U.S. at 319; Temple v. State, 390 S.W.3d 341, 360 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). “Circumstantial
11
evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor, and circumstantial
evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt.” Acosta v. State, 429 S.W.3d 621, 625 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2014). We measure the sufficiency of the evidence against the hypothetically correct
jury charge. Garcia v. State, 667 S.W.3d 756, 762 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023).
The trier of fact is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence.
Zuniga v. State, 551 S.W.3d 729, 733 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); see Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 36.13
(explaining that “the jury is the exclusive judge of the facts”). Thus, when performing an
evidentiary-sufficiency review, we may not re-evaluate the weight and credibility of the evidence
and substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder. Arroyo v. State, 559 S.W.3d 484, 487 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2018). We presume that the trier of fact resolved conflicts in the testimony, weighed
the evidence, and drew reasonable inferences in a manner that supports the verdict. Jackson,
443 U.S. at 318; Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512, 517 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); see Musacchio
v. United States, 577 U.S. 237, 243 (2016) (reaffirming that appellate sufficiency review “does not
intrude on the jury’s role ‘to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw
reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts’” (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319)). We
must “‘determine whether the necessary inferences are reasonable based upon the combined and
cumulative force of all the evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict.’”
Murray v. State, 457 S.W.3d 446, 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (quoting Clayton v. State,
235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)). The factfinder may rely on common sense and
apply observation and experience gained in ordinary affairs when drawing inferences from the
evidence. Acosta, 429 S.W.3d at 625. Our concern is whether the factfinder reached a rational
decision. Arroyo, 559 S.W.3d at 487; see Morgan v. State, 501 S.W.3d 84, 89 (Tex. Crim. App.
2016) (observing that reviewing court’s role on appeal “‘is restricted to guarding against the rare
12
occurrence when a fact finder does not act rationally’” (quoting Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 633,
638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010))).
Section 550.021 of the Transportation Code provides that
[t]he operator of a vehicle involved in a collision that results or is reasonably likely
to result in injury to or death of a person shall:
(1) immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the collision or as
close to the scene as possible;
(2) immediately return to the scene of the collision if the vehicle is
not stopped at the scene of the collision;
(3) immediately determine whether a person is involved in the
collision, and if a person is involved in the collision, whether that
person requires aid; and
(4) remain at the scene of the collision until the operator complies
with the requirements of Section 550.023.2
Tex. Transp. Code § 550.021(a). The statute makes it an offense “if the person does not stop or
does not comply with the requirements of this section.” Id. § 550.021(c). If the collision results
in death, the offense is a second-degree felony. Id. § 550.021(c)(1)(A).
In short, the elements of the offense are that a defendant: (1) operated a motor
vehicle; (2) knew that he was involved in an accident; (3) knew that the accident was reasonably
likely to result in death or injury to a person; and (4) failed to immediately stop or return to the
scene of the accident, determine whether any injured person required aid, and remain at the scene
to comply with the requirements of Section 550.023. See id. § 550.021; see also Polanco v. State,
2 Section 550.023 requires the operator of “a vehicle involved in a collision resulting in the injury or death of a person or damage to a vehicle that is driven or attended by a person” to provide certain information as well as “reasonable assistance” to any person injured in the collision. See Tex. Transp. Code § 550.023.
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690 S.W.3d 421, 429 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2024, no pet.); Boudreaux v. State, 631 S.W.3d 319,
327 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, pet. ref’d).
Following 2013 amendments to the statute, “the State no longer has to prove that
the driver knew a person involved in the accident was injured or killed (although such proof will
still suffice).” Curry v. State, 622 S.W.3d 302, 309 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019). “Now it can allege
that a driver failed to stop and render aid because the driver knew that he was involved in an
accident that was reasonably likely to injure or kill another person, if another person was
involved.” Id.; see Boudreaux, 631 S.W.3d at 327–28 (“The culpable mental state for FSRA
[failure to stop and render aid] is established by showing that the accused had knowledge of the
circumstances surrounding his conduct, meaning the defendant had knowledge that an accident
occurred, and the accident was reasonably likely to result in injury or death of a person.”). The
corollaries to the amendments are that a driver does not have to stop and render aid (1) “if he does
not know that he was involved in an accident”; (2) “if he knows that he was involved in an accident
and knows that it did not result in injury to or the death of a person”; or (3) “if he knows that he
was involved in an accident, but it was not reasonably likely that the accident would result in injury
to or the death of another person.” Curry, 622 S.W.3d at 309. “There is no requirement under the
statute that the driver cause[d] the accident or that an eyewitness must see the accident and testify
that the driver knew that he was involved in an accident.” Id. at 311 n.7.
A. Knowledge of Accident
We turn first to Sannicola’s claim that the evidence failed to show that he knew an
accident had occurred. Failure to stop and render aid is a “circumstances surrounding the conduct”
offense. Polanco, 690 S.W.3d at 431. A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect
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to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware that the circumstances exist. Tex.
Penal Code § 6.03(b).
Direct evidence of a defendant’s culpable mental state is not necessary. See Hart
v. State, 89 S.W.3d 61, 64 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). “Indeed, mental culpability is of such a nature
that it generally must be inferred from the circumstances under which a prohibited act or omission
occurs.” Hernandez v. State, 819 S.W.2d 806, 810 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (internal citations
omitted), overruled on other grounds by Fuller v. State, 829 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992);
see Moore v. State, 969 S.W.2d 4, 10 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (“Mental states are almost always
inferred from acts and words.”). A factfinder may infer a defendant’s mental state from “any facts
which tend to prove its existence,” including the acts, words, and conduct of the accused. Hart,
89 S.W.3d at 64; see Gonzalez v. State, 616 S.W.3d 585, 594 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020).
There was ample evidence presented at trial that Sannicola knew he had been
involved in an accident. On the 911 call, Sotelo stated that he was “sure” the truck’s driver saw
the hatchback’s lights. Sotelo reported that after the initial impact, the truck moved from the
rightmost to the middle lane, suggesting that Sannicola was aware of the impact. Sotelo testified
at trial that the first impact was “hard,” that both impacts occurred as part of the “same motion,”
and that Velez’s hatchback spun to face both the truck and Sotelo’s vehicle after being clipped by
the truck’s front. Although Dr. Eftekhar testified that this would have been impossible, we
presume that the jury resolved the contradiction in testimony in favor of its verdict. See Zuniga,
551 S.W.3d at 733. Echoing Sotelo’s statement on the 911 call, Officer Blackwood opined that
the hatchback swerved in front of the truck and that he was “not quite sure how [Sannicola] would
not have seen that.” Officer Wisener testified that Sannicola would have been aware of the impacts
15
because “[c]ollisions typically create a lot of noise.” Again, we presume that the jury credited this
testimony over Dr. Eftekhar’s testimony that the impact would have been nearly silent. See id.
Sannicola’s phone records and interview statements further supported an inference
that he was aware he had been involved in an accident. His almost thirty-minute conversation with
his girlfriend ended at the time the accident occurred, and his next call was not made until the truck
reentered the highway, according to officers’ dash-cam videos. During the interview, he first
stated that he had believed his truck was responsible for Velez’s swerving, possibly because of a
detached mudflap. And he later told officers that he had actually seen her swerve off of the
highway. Thus, his own statements demonstrated a belief that he had been involved in an accident.
According to Sannicola, he only changed his mind about his involvement after exiting the
highway, stopping in a residential area, and examining his vehicle. However, his remark, “I wasn’t
aware of no accident that I caused,” suggested an awareness that he had been involved in an
accident for which he believed he was not responsible.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the strongest evidence of
Sannicola’s knowledge was his conduct after the accident occurred. The evidence showed that he
took the next exit and, rather than pulling into one of the accessible, well-lit parking lots lining the
northbound access road, made a U-turn and drove through a residential area “where a commercial
vehicle would not normally be driven.” He reentered the highway around three or four minutes
later, and in addition to the brevity of his detour, there was nothing in the surveillance videos to
suggest that he stopped anywhere along the route. Moreover, he offered a shifting account for
leaving the highway—at one point claiming he exited to refuel—and at times hedged his initial
certainty that he had examined the truck. The facts that his license was suspended and that he had
16
active warrants provided a motive for his failure to stop. See Guevara v. State, 152 S.W.3d 45, 50
(Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (“Motive is a significant circumstance indicating guilt.”).
At some point, the truck was moved to a vacant lot not directly connected to
Sannicola or to the truck’s owner, which the jury could have inferred was intended to delay its
discovery. It was sloppily repainted by a non-professional after the accident and was heavily
altered. The truck had new door handles, a company logo or lettering had been removed, and a
number on the truck’s side had been partially scraped off or modified with paint.
Moreover, Sannicola provided Officer Wisener with multiple phone numbers
during his police interview, none of which was the number Sannicola had been using before and
after the accident and one of which was not even in service. Sannicola also contradicted Sotelo’s
911 call and testimony and the surveillance video of Velez entering the on-ramp by telling officers
that he had been in the middle lane of I-35, not the rightmost lane. The jury could have inferred
that this was a deliberate misstatement calculated to minimize his involvement in the accident.
We conclude that this evidence was sufficient for a rational juror to find that
Sannicola knew he had been involved in the accident.
B. Reasonable Likelihood of Injury or Death
We next turn to Sannicola’s argument that the evidence was insufficient to show
the accident was “of the type that would cause injury or death.” Specifically, he argues that the
rollover from which Velez’s death resulted was proximately caused not by the impact between
their vehicles but by her own “maneuvers” and that he could not have seen the rollover because of
the speed at which he was traveling.
17
With respect to the former, we reject Sannicola’s invitation to be guided by “the
civil concept of proximate causation.” As the Court of Criminal Appeals has noted, there is no
requirement that an offender cause the accident in section 550.021, which does not specify “how
the accident must have been caused or how the driver was involved in the accident, only that he
was involved.” See Curry, 622 S.W.3d at 311 n.7 (citing Tex. Transp. Code § 550.021(a)). As
discussed above, there was substantial evidence, including from Dr. Eftekhar, Sannicola’s expert,
that Sannicola was involved in the accident and that any overcorrection or steering input by Velez
was the direct result of the two vehicles’ impact. That evidence of involvement is all that is needed;
causation and fault are entirely ancillary matters.
Sannicola’s assertion that he could not have seen the rollover is contradicted by his
own statement to police during his interview. He explicitly acknowledged that he had seen Velez
leave the roadway and cross the median. Considering that statement together with Sotelo’s 911
call and his testimony that Velez “lost control” and “flipped over,” “fell,” or “rolled” off the
highway with enough force to reach the access road, the jury could have reasonably inferred that
the hatchback had already begun to roll by the time it left the roadway and that Sannicola therefore
saw the rollover.
Sannicola’s assertion is based on the premises that Officer Wisener testified that
the hatchback came to a stop ten seconds after the initial impact and that Sannicola was traveling
seventy miles per hour at the time of the accident and thus would have traveled 308 yards in nine
seconds. There are, however, problems with these premises. First, Officer Wisener testified that
he “can’t say for sure” how long it took “[f]rom the moment of impact to the moment of [the
hatchback] coming to a final rest” but estimated only that “the whole event would have lasted less
than 10 seconds” (emphasis added). Second, even accepting the validity of the ten-second
18
estimate, it referred to the length of time until the hatchback stopped moving on the access road,
not when it began to rollover. Third, the evidence showed that the hatchback and truck continued
on the highway for some time after the initial impact and that the hatchback left the roadway at an
angle, but Sannicola’s figure of 308 yards seemingly assumes that the hatchback ceased moving
forward after the initial impact (understanding Sannicola to argue that he was 308 yards from the
hatchback at the time of the rollover). And fourth, there was no evidence that Sannicola was
moving at seventy miles per hour. Officer Wisener and Dr. Eftekhar each used the speed in
hypotheticals, but both testified that they had not calculated the vehicles’ speeds. Moreover, if
Sannicola saw the hatchback lose control and swerve off the roadway while going over seventy
miles per hour, the fact would substantially support a finding that he knew the accident was
reasonably likely to result in injury or death.3
This accident involved a particularly horrific rollover, in which the hatchback’s
door was almost torn off, and Velez’s body was ejected from her vehicle. When asked if anyone
was hurt, Sotelo stated on the 911 call that “it didn’t look good.” He later testified that he “knew
someone got hurt” as soon as he saw the hatchback leave the highway, something that Sannicola
also admitted to seeing. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find
that Sannicola knew the accident was reasonably likely to result in injury or death. We overrule
his first issue.
II. Photograph of Velez
In his second issue, Sannicola contends that the trial court abused its discretion by
admitting a photograph that depicted Velez’s body at the accident scene.
3 Notably, Dr. Eftekhar testified that the hatchback was driving faster than the truck.
19
The photograph’s admissibility was discussed at two pretrial hearings. The
following exchange occurred during the first hearing:
DEFENSE COUNSEL: There are very many graphic photos. This accident was
just a travesty. The young woman she was disfigured, she was ejected five feet
from her vehicle. So there’s some very graphic photos . . . .
THE COURT: Well, that comes in. I think that they could probably show one
photograph of her to identify her, you know, as the victim.
THE STATE: And I have culled—obviously, all of the photos produced in
discovery are not going to be admitted.
THE COURT: Pick your top few.
THE STATE: I have culled it down, and I have one that has her when she’s been
rolled over and then a close-up of a tattoo that was used to identify that just shows
her arm. In fact, I think I cropped it.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Did you show the one where she was rolled over and her
whole face is peeled off? [S]he’s disfigured. I mean, it’s bad.
THE STATE: Yes. But I still have to prove the victim.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: They did it by the tattoo and not by the face, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Let me look at the photos before we admit them, all right.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: There’s some pretty bad ones. So on—I guess have the
court review the photos that you want to admit of her after the accident.
At the second hearing, the State offered two photographs, State’s Exhibits 34 and
35, both of which depicted Velez’s body. Defense counsel objected to the photographs’ admission
under Rule of Evidence 403 and expressed his willingness to stipulate to what “they’re purporting
to prove with that.”4 The trial court initially admitted both photographs.
4 Counsel did not object to State’s Exhibit 36, the cropped, close-up photograph of Velez’s forearm tattoo.
20
State’s Exhibit 34 was published for the jury during Officer Wisener’s testimony
with little questioning about its content. The officer identified Velez in the photograph; agreed
that it depicted “how she was originally found by first responders”; and testified about the
possibility—eventually discounted by law enforcement—that gloves she was wearing, which were
visible in the photograph, suggested involvement in criminal activity. As Officer Wisener was
testifying about the photograph, the trial court called the parties to the bench and changed its ruling
on the admissibility of State’s Exhibit 35 (the photograph that defense counsel characterized as
depicting Velez “disfigured” and with her face “peeled off”), sustaining defense counsel’s Rule
403 objection.
“As with other admissibility decisions, we review a trial court’s decision to admit
or exclude photographic evidence for abuse of discretion.” Parker v. State, 727 S.W.3d 38, 70
(Tex. Crim. App. 2025), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 2663 (May 18, 2026). An abuse of discretion
does not occur unless the trial court acts “arbitrarily or unreasonably” or “without reference to any
guiding rules and principles.” State v. Hill, 499 S.W.3d 853, 865 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (quoting
Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 380 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990)). In other words, we may not
reverse the trial court’s ruling unless the “decision falls outside the zone of reasonable
disagreement.” Johnson v. State, 490 S.W.3d 895, 908 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016); see also Henley
v. State, 493 S.W.3d 77, 83 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). An evidentiary ruling will be upheld if it is
correct on any theory of law applicable to the case. Henley, 493 S.W.3d at 93 (citing De La Paz
v. State, 279 S.W.3d 336, 344 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)).
“The Constitution leaves to the [trial] judges . . . ‘wide latitude’ to exclude
evidence” that, among other things, “poses an undue risk of ‘harassment, prejudice, [or]
confusion of the issues.’” Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 689–90 (1986) (quoting Delaware
21
v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986)). To that end, Rule of Evidence 403 provides that a trial
court “may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger
of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue
delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Tex. R. Evid. 403. “Probative value” means
more than relevance; it “refers to the inherent probative force of an item of evidence—that is, how
strongly it serves to make more or less probable the existence of a fact of consequence to the
litigation—coupled with the proponent’s need for that item of evidence.” Gigliobianco v. State,
210 S.W.3d 637, 641 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). “Unfair prejudice” refers to a “tendency to suggest
decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one.” Id.; see
Inthalangsy v. State, 634 S.W.3d 749, 758 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). Under the rule, there should
be “reluctance on the part of an appellate court to reverse trial court decisions which admit or
exclude evidence.” Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 378. Although “it is most helpful to reviewing
courts,” “a trial judge is not required to articulate his Rule 403 analysis on the record.” State v.
Mechler, 153 S.W.3d 435, 444 n.8 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
In conducting a Rule 403 analysis, the trial court must balance the claimed
probative force of the proffered evidence along with the proponent’s need for the evidence against:
(1) any tendency of the evidence to suggest that the case would be decided on an
improper basis; (2) any tendency of the evidence to confuse or distract the jury from
the main issues; (3) any tendency of the evidence to be given undue weight by a
jury that has not been equipped to evaluate the probative force of the evidence; and
(4) the likelihood that presentation of the evidence will consume an inordinate
amount of time or merely repeat evidence already admitted.
Henley, 493 S.W.3d at 93 (citing Gigliobianco, 210 S.W.3d at 641–42). These factors may blend
together in practice. Gigliobianco, 210 S.W.3d at 642.
22
When applying Rule 403 to photographs, courts have listed additional factors for
consideration, including
the number of photographs, the size of the photograph, whether it is in color or
black and white, the detail shown in the photograph, whether the photograph is
gruesome, whether the body is naked or clothed, and whether the body has been
altered since the crime in some way that might enhance the gruesomeness of the
photograph to the appellant’s detriment.
Shuffield v. State, 189 S.W.3d 782, 787 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Courts may also consider
“whether they are close-up shots,” “the availability of other means of proof,” and “other
circumstances unique to the individual case.” Rojas v. State, 986 S.W.2d 241, 249 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1998). The decision whether to admit a photograph is within the sound discretion of the trial
court. Shuffield, 189 S.W.3d at 786. “A photograph is generally admissible if verbal testimony
about the matters depicted in the photograph is also admissible.” Parker, 727 S.W.3d at 70.
Moreover, photographs are not inadmissible merely because the facts of which they are probative
are also the subject of oral testimony. See Chamberlain v. State, 998 S.W.2d 230, 237 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1999).
State’s Exhibit 34, which occupies approximately three-quarters of a page, depicts
Velez lying prone on the ground with a puddle of blood around her face, which is not visible. Her
right arm is bent upward at a natural angle with her right hand next to her head; the glove on her
hand is partially removed. Her left arm is bent downward by her side, also at a natural angle. Her
body is surrounded by debris and items from the car. She is fully dressed, but her lower back is
visible because her shirt has ridden up. No injuries to her body are directly visible. Many details
are apparent, but the photograph is not a close-up and captures the area around Velez’s body, which
had not been altered since the offense.
23
The probative value of the photograph was substantial. It was the only admitted
photograph showing Velez’s full body and was probative of elements of the offense, including
through its depiction of the crime scene and the accident’s severity. See Williams v. State,
958 S.W.2d 186, 195 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (recognizing that crime scene photographs “aid the
jury in determining many things”). It was the only visual evidence showing her body was ejected
from the hatchback and where it was positioned relative to the vehicle, which was visible in the
photograph. And it was also evident from the photograph that she was deceased, which although
not an element, raised the offense to a second-degree felony. See Tex. Transp. Code
§ 550.021(c)(1)(A). The fact that the jury also heard testimony about the photograph’s contents
“does not necessarily reduce the relevance of the visual depiction.” See Shuffield, 189 S.W.3d
at 787.
Although the State had other means of proof available, including Sannicola’s
stipulation to the photograph’s contents, those other means would likely not have been as
probative. See Chamberlain, 998 S.W.2d at 237 (“Visual evidence accompanying testimony is
most persuasive and often gives the fact finder a point of comparison against which to test the
credibility of a witness and the validity of his conclusions.”). Moreover, while an autopsy
photograph would have likely been admissible to prove Velez’s death, it would also likely have
been more graphic than State’s Exhibit 34. See Rojas, 986 S.W.2d at 249 (“Autopsy photographs
are generally admissible unless they depict mutilation of the victim caused by the autopsy itself.”).
Indeed, the trial court excluded State’s Exhibit 35, which despite more clearly showing Velez’s
injuries was significantly more gruesome.
The photography was likely to evoke an emotional response but was not
unnecessarily gruesome or intrusive with respect to the facts of which it was probative. See id.
24
Our analysis of the Shuffield factors likewise supports the conclusion that the risk of the
photograph causing the jury to decide the case on emotional grounds was not particularly high.
See Shuffield, 189 S.W.3d at 787. And while the photograph depicted a dead body and the scene
of a terrible crash, to do so was no more than to depict the reality of what occurred in this case and
to emphasize the severity of the accident in which Sannicola was involved and for which he failed
to stop and render aid. See Chamberlain, 998 S.W.2d at 237 (“The photographs are gruesome in
that they depict disagreeable realities, but they depict nothing more than the reality of the brutal
crime committed. And it is precisely because they depict the reality of this offense that they are
powerful visual evidence, probative of various aspects of the State’s case.”).
We also note that the State in its closing argument explicitly cautioned the jury not
to be swayed by the emotion provoked by Velez’s death:
Defense counsel told you your verdict cannot be based on emotion. [Velez]’s loss
is terrible, and if Carlos Sotelo hadn’t picked up the phone and called 911, God
knows how long she would have laid there. It is a terrible and awful thing, but that
is not what you should base your verdict on. That emotion, the sympathy you feel
for her loved ones, that is not what convicts this Defendant.
Because the photograph’s probative value directly concerned the offense’s
elements, because what it depicted was straightforward, and because it took less than a page of an
over-300-page record to present, it did not have a tendency to confuse or distract the jury and
needed little time to develop. See Gigliobianco, 210 S.W.3d at 641 (explaining that “confusion of
the issues” refers to tendency to confuse or distract jury from main issues in case and that evidence
that consumes “an inordinate amount of time to present or answer” might tend to confuse or
distract); cf. Lane v. State, 933 S.W.2d 504, 520 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (factor weighed in favor
25
of admission where extraneous-offense testimony amounted to “less than one-fifth” of
trial testimony).
The photograph’s probative value concerned “matters easily comprehensible by
laypeople”; thus, it was not prone to be given undue weight. See Gaytan v. State, 331 S.W.3d 218,
228 (Tex. App.—Austin 2011, pet. ref’d). It did not pertain to scientific or technical evidence and
did not run the risk of misleading the jury for reasons, other than emotional ones, that jurors were
unequipped to handle. See Valadez v. State, 663 S.W.3d 133, 142 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022).
From our analysis of both the Gigliobianco and Shuffield factors, we conclude that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting State’s Exhibit 34. See Parker, 727 S.W.3d
at 70. We overrule Sannicola’s second issue.
III. Rule 404(b) Instruction
In his third issue, Sannicola contends that the trial court erred by failing to instruct
jurors that they could only consider extraneous offenses that they found beyond a reasonable doubt
he had committed. See Valadez, 663 S.W.3d at 142 (recognizing that “[e]xtraneous misconduct
evidence must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt”). The State responds that because Sannicola
failed to request a limiting instruction at the time the extraneous-offense evidence was admitted,
he has waived any complaint about the trial court’s sua sponte limiting instruction for appeal. The
two extraneous acts that are identified by Sannicola’s appellate brief and that are evident from the
record are his driving with a suspended driver’s license and his active felony warrants.
A trial court is statutorily obligated to instruct the jury on the “law applicable to the
case.” See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 36.14; Mendez v. State, 545 S.W.3d 548, 552 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2018). The jury charge should tell the jury what law applies and how it applies to the case.
26
Delgado v. State, 235 S.W.3d 244, 249 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The trial court’s duty to instruct
the jury on the “law applicable to the case” exists even when defense counsel fails to object to
inclusions or exclusions in the charge. Vega v. State, 394 S.W.3d 514, 519 (Tex. Crim. App.
2013). The trial court is “‘ultimately responsible for the accuracy of the jury charge and
accompanying instructions.’” Mendez, 545 S.W.3d at 552 (quoting Delgado, 235 S.W.3d at 249).
We review alleged jury-charge error in two steps: first, we determine whether error
exists; if so, we then evaluate whether sufficient harm resulted from the error to require reversal.
Alcoser v. State, 663 S.W.3d 160, 165 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022).
The trial court included the following limiting instruction—which was not
requested by Sannicola—in its written jury charge:
Evidence of Other Crimes or Bad Acts by the Defendant
During the trial, you heard evidence that the defendant may have committed
wrongful or criminal acts not charged in the indictment. The State offered this
evidence to show motive, intent, lack of mistake, identity, or a common scheme or
plan for the charged act. You are not to consider evidence of such a wrongful act
at all unless you find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant did, in fact,
commit the wrongful act.
Even if you do find that the defendant committed a wrongful act, you may consider
this evidence only for the limited purposes I have described. To consider this
evidence for any other purpose would be improper.
Citing article 37.07 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Sannicola argues that the
instruction’s first sentence established a “‘wrongful/criminal’ act dichotomy” in the minds of
jurors and that because the remainder of the instruction referred only to “wrongful acts,” jurors
were allowed to consider evidence of “criminal acts” even if they did not find beyond a reasonable
doubt that Sannicola had committed the acts.
27
As an initial matter, we note that article 37.07 is inapplicable to Sannicola’s claim
because the challenged instruction was in the guilt-innocence charge (the trial court assessed his
punishment), and the relevant provision of article 37.07 involves the introduction of extraneousoffense evidence in the punishment phase of a non-capital trial. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc.
art. 37.07, § 3(a)(1) (pertaining to admission of evidence of “any matter the court deems relevant
to sentencing,” including “any other evidence of an extraneous crime or bad act that is shown
beyond a reasonable doubt by evidence to have been committed by the defendant”). Because the
provision is statutory, it is “the law applicable” to all non-capital punishment proceedings, and
“the trial judge must sua sponte instruct the jury at the punishment phase concerning that law,
including the fact that the State must prove any extraneous offenses beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Delgado, 235 S.W.3d at 252.
The admission of punishment-phase extraneous-offense evidence under article
37.07 stands in contrast to “the general rule that a trial court is not required to instruct the jury sua
sponte on the burden of proof to be used when considering evidence of an extraneous offense
during the guilt phase.” Id. at 254. When, as here, a defendant does not request a limiting
instruction or object at the time extraneous-offense evidence is admitted, the omission of a limiting
instruction—including one about the State’s burden of proof when offering evidence of extraneous
acts—is typically not erroneous. See Harmel v. State, 597 S.W.3d 943, 960–61 (Tex. App.—
Austin 2020, no pet.)
The State argues that it is this general rule that bars Sannicola from challenging the
burden-of-proof instruction on appeal. We disagree. The rule recognized in Delgado involves a
defendant’s procedural default of a claim challenging the omission of a burden-of-proof
instruction, not a claim challenging a trial court’s sua sponte instruction. See 235 S.W.3d at 253–
28
54. Underlying the rule was the recognition that a defendant’s decision not to request an
extraneous-offense limiting instruction is frequently a matter of trial strategy. Id. at 250. For
instance, defense counsel may conclude
he is better off without an instruction than with one, in that an instruction would
serve only to remind the jury of what it has heard or to re-emphasize the evidence
in the minds of the jurors, and perhaps to suggest to the jury a use for the evidence
which is best left unmentioned.
Id. at 250 & n.25 (quoting Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 41
at 219–20 (2d ed. 1994)). The preference to hold a defendant to his strategic choices is, conversely,
absent from the present case, in which the trial court gave the burden-of-proof instruction despite
Sannicola’s silence. Thus, we conclude that Sannicola is not barred from bringing the present
issue on appeal.
Having decided that Sannicola’s issue was not procedurally defaulted, we must
address whether the instruction was erroneous. The admission of extraneous-offense evidence at
the guilt-innocence phase of trial is governed by Texas Rule of Evidence 404(b), which refers to
“[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act.” Although it would likely have been better practice
to have tracked the rule’s language, cf. Riddle v. State, 888 S.W.2d 1, 8 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994)
(“A jury charge that tracks the language of a particular statute is a proper charge on the statutory
issue.”), instructions referring under the rule to “wrongful acts” are by no means rare, see, e.g.,
McDonnell v. State, 674 S.W.3d 694, 699 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2023, no pet.); Thomas
v. State, 651 S.W.3d 102, 106 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2021, pet. ref’d); Perez v. State,
562 S.W.3d 676, 685 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2018, pet. ref’d).
We agree with Sannicola that the instruction was erroneous by limiting the
burden-of-proof instruction to “evidence of such a wrongful act.” We presume that the jurors
29
followed the instruction to the letter and therefore did not apply it to acts they found to be criminal
but not wrongful.5 See Resendiz v. State, 112 S.W.3d 541, 546 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (“The jury
is presumed to have followed the court’s instruction.”). It is reasonable to conclude that they
would have understood the instruction’s limitation to wrongful acts and its silence as to criminal
acts as signifying that the latter were not subject to the burden of proof.
We turn next to the question of harm. The parties agree that because Sannicola did
not object to the charge, we must determine whether he was egregiously harmed by the error. See
Gonzalez v. State, 610 S.W.3d 22, 27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020). “Jury charge error is egregiously
harmful if it affects the very basis of the case, deprives the defendant of a valuable right, or vitally
affects a defensive theory.” Allen v. State, 253 S.W.3d 260, 264 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). “The
purpose of the egregious-harm inquiry is to ascertain whether the defendant has incurred actual,
not just theoretical, harm,” Swearingen v. State, 270 S.W.3d 804, 813 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008,
pet. ref’d), and “reversal for an unobjected-to erroneous jury instruction is proper only if the error
caused actual, egregious harm to” the defendant, Arrington v. State, 451 S.W.3d 834, 840 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2015). The standard is difficult to meet. Ellison v. State, 86 S.W.3d 226, 227 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2002). Reviewing courts “consider: (1) the jury charge as a whole, (2) the arguments
of counsel, (3) the entirety of the evidence, and (4) other relevant factors present in the record.”
Reeves v. State, 420 S.W.3d 812, 816 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). The analysis is “fact specific and
5 Significantly, whereas “wrongfulness” may evoke questions of justice or fairness, “criminality” is concerned only with legal sanction for an act. Compare Wrong, Merriam-Webster Dictionary, available at https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/wrong (last accessed Oct. 22, 2026) (“an injurious, unfair, or unjust act : action or conduct inflicting harm without due provocation or just cause”; “something wrong, immoral, or unethical”), with Criminal, Merriam-Webster Dictionary, available at https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/criminal (last accessed Oct. 22, 2026) (relating to or involving “an illegal act for which someone can be punished by the government”).
30
is done on a ‘case-by-case basis.’” Arrington, 451 S.W.3d at 840 (quoting Gelinas v. State,
398 S.W.3d 703, 710 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (plurality op.)).
The written guilt-innocence charge instructed the jury that Sannicola was presumed
innocent, that the “burden of proof throughout the trial is always on the State,” that Sannicola
“does not have the burden to prove anything,” and that jurors could find him guilty of failing to
stop and render aid only if the State proved each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
The charge further instructed the jury to consider only admitted evidence, for which it was the
exclusive judge of credibility. Each of these instructions mitigated the error’s harm by placing the
burden of proof on the State, focusing jurors on the charged offense, or reminding them that they
were responsible for evaluating evidence.
Additionally, the trial court’s extraneous-offense instruction included a second
error, one which benefited Sannicola. Because he did not request a limiting instruction when
evidence of his suspended driver’s license or of his felony warrants was admitted, the evidence
was admitted for all purposes. As the Court of Criminal Appeals explained in Delgado:
Once evidence has been admitted without a limiting instruction, it is part of the
general evidence and may be used for all purposes . . . . [A] limiting instruction
concerning the use of extraneous offense evidence should be requested, and given,
in the guilt-stage jury charge only if the defendant requested a limiting instruction
at the time the evidence was first admitted.
235 S.W.3d at 251; see Williams v. State, 273 S.W.3d 200, 230 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (“A failure
to request a limiting instruction at the time evidence is presented renders the evidence admissible
for all purposes and relieves the trial judge of any obligation to include a limiting instruction in
the jury charge.”). The instruction in this case thus benefitted Sannicola “by limiting the purposes
for which jurors could consider extraneous-offense evidence despite its being admitted for all
31
purposes.” See Lane v. State, --- S.W.3d ---, ---, No. 03-24-00579-CR, 2026 WL 913150, at *2–4
(Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 3, 2026, no pet.); see also Fair v. State, 465 S.W.2d 753, 754–55 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1971) (determining that unrequested limiting instruction benefitted defendant).
The state of the evidence further supports the conclusion that the challenged error
did not harm Sannicola. We discussed the evidence of guilt at length in our analysis of his first
issue and need not do so here. See Campbell v. State, 664 S.W.3d 240, 252 (Tex. Crim. App.
2022) (noting that state of evidence weighed against finding of harm where “State’s case for guilt
was exceedingly strong”). We note, however, that while the extraneous acts provided a motive for
him not to stop and render aid, the evidence of his post-accident conduct was particularly probative
of his guilt and was largely uncontested by the defense, which focused primarily on whether he
could have perceived the accident. Even in the absence of evidence for why he fled, there was
plenty of evidence that he had in fact done so. See Rodriguez v. State, 486 S.W.2d 355, 358 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1972) (stating that although motive “is relevant as a circumstance tending to prove the
commission of an offense,” it is “not an essential element of a criminal offense” and “need not be
proved in order to establish the commission of the offense”).
Although the State mentioned both extraneous acts in its closing argument and
rebuttal, the mentions were relatively brief—amounting to approximately four paragraphs out of
twenty-four pages of argument—and Sannicola did not reference either extraneous act in his
closing. The State’s discussion of the acts, moreover, occurred exclusively as part of a larger
review of the evidence, and the State’s attorney—who framed the central issue as what Sannicola
knew—cautioned the jury that the acts should not be considered as evidence of propensity:
I’m not saying that the Defendant is a bad person or deserves to be convicted of
this offense because he was driving on a suspended license, but it’s important
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because it shows you some of the motive, the reasoning behind the decisions that
he made. He knows it’s an offense, and he knows he’s going to be in trouble. He
knows that truck isn’t registered and it’s probably going to get towed. Even if he’s
not at fault in the accident, he’s going to be in trouble. It’s not minor trouble either
because you know he had those felony warrants, and again, you don’t get to say
just because he had felony warrants he’s a bad person and I should convict him of
this offense. No. Nobody is telling you that. What we are telling you is this
shows motive.
See Campbell, 664 S.W.3d at 253 (noting that State’s argument “undoubtedly helped to remedy
the alleged error in the charge”); French v. State, 563 S.W.3d 228, 238 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018)
(explaining that State’s closing arguments focused jury’s attention in way that rendered charge
error harmless); Gelinas, 398 S.W.3d at 709 (emphasizing “that jury arguments bear significantly
on an Almanza analysis”).
As for other relevant matters, we note only that nothing in the record suggests that
the jury, which submitted no questions during its deliberations, was confused by the charge. See
Shavers v. State, 985 S.W.2d 284, 292 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1999, pet. ref’d) (highlighting that
“[t]here is no evidence the jury was confused about the instructions in the charge”); see also
Murrieta v. State, 578 S.W.3d 552, 556 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2019, no pet.) (noting that “the
jury did not send any notes to the trial court regarding” jury instructions).
From our resolution of these factors and in recognition of the difficulty of satisfying
the egregious-harm standard, we conclude that the record does not show Sannicola suffered actual
harm that affected the very basis of the case, deprived him of a valuable right, or vitally affected a
defensive theory. See Arrington, 451 S.W.3d at 840; Allen, 253 S.W.3d at 264; Ellison, 86 S.W.3d
at 227. We overrule his third issue.
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IV. Modification of the Judgment
Whereas the judgment form gives the “Statute for Offense” as “550.021(c)(1)(A)
Penal Code,” the statute criminalizing failure to stop and render aid is in fact section 550.021 of
the Transportation Code. See Tex. Transp. Code § 550.021(a), (c)(1)(A). Appellate courts have
the authority to correct or reform a judgment when the necessary information is available to do so.
See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(b) (authorizing court of appeals to modify trial court’s judgment and
affirm as modified); Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). Accordingly,
we modify the judgment in trial court cause number CR-22-2401-C to reflect that the “Statute for
Offense” was “550.021(c)(1)(A) Transportation Code.”
CONCLUSION
Having overruled each of Sannicola’s issues and having modified the judgment in
trial court cause number CR-22-2401-C to reflect that the “Statute for Offense” was
“550.021(c)(1)(A) Transportation Code,” we affirm the trial court’s judgment as modified.
Maggie Ellis, Justice
Before Chief Justice Byrne, Justices Crump and Ellis
Modified and, as Modified, Affirmed
Filed: October 23, 2026
Do Not Publish
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