TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
NO. 03-26-00384-CV
Karla Cecilia Contreras Ocampo, Appellant
v.
Manuel Lopez Galvan, Appellee 1
FROM THE 421ST DISTRICT COURT OF CALDWELL COUNTY
NO. DCCV-24-111, THE HONORABLE AMANDA MONTGOMERY, JUDGE PRESIDING
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Karla Cecilia Contreras Ocampo filed a notice of appeal challenging
the trial court’s “Final Judgment and/or Order granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant
Manuel Lopez Galvan.” Upon initial review of the notice of appeal and a motion for emergency
stay filed by Contreras Ocampo (which was denied), the Clerk of this Court sent Contreras
Ocampo a letter informing her that this Court appears to lack jurisdiction over the appeal because
there was no indication that the trial court’s order had disposed of her claims against the other
named defendant, Carlos Negrete Ocampo. Thus, there did not appear to be a final and
appealable judgment, and our jurisdiction is limited to appeals in which there exists a final or
1 Appellant’s notice of appeal identified appellee as both Manuel Galvan Lopez (in the case style) and Manuel Lopez Galvan (in the body of the notice). Our review of the record reflects that appellee’s name is Manuel Lopez Galvan, so we have restyled the case to reflect appellee’s correct name and to remove another defendant, Carlos Negrete Ocampo, who is not affected by the trial-court order that appellant challenges.
appealable judgment or order. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.012; Lehmann v. Har-Con
Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001) (explaining that appeal generally may only be taken from
final judgment that disposes of all pending parties and claims in record unless statute provides
for interlocutory appeal).
The Clerk requested a response from Contreras Ocampo explaining any basis that
exists for this Court’s jurisdiction. Both Contreras Ocampo and Lopez Galvan filed responses.
In her response, Contreras Ocampo contended that Negrete Ocampo had never been served and
he was not an active defendant, meaning that we could regard the judgment as final for purposes
of appeal. See M.O. Dental Lab v. Rape, 139 S.W.3d 671, 674-75 (Tex. 2004) (reaffirming rule
that order that does not dispose of all parties may be final if party who was not disposed of “was
never served with citation and did not file an answer, and nothing in the record indicated that the
plaintiff in the case ever expected to obtain service upon the remaining party” (citing
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Penn, 363 S.W.2d 230, 232 (Tex. 1962))). Contreras Ocampo
argued in the alternative that we should abate the case to allow the order to be finalized. Lopez
Galvan informed the Court that he had affirmative claims still pending in the trial court, and the
trial court’s summary judgment in his favor had not disposed of those affirmative counterclaims.
After the clerk’s record was filed, Lopez Galvan filed an opposed motion to
dismiss Contreras Ocampo’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. In his motion, Lopez Galvan
reiterates his argument that the trial court has not signed a final and appealable order disposing of
all claims and parties and argues against Contreras Ocampo’s alternative argument for an
abatement. He contends that an abatement is inappropriate here, where he has unresolved
counterclaims and more is required to achieve a final order than a simple ministerial act, such as
signing a nonsuit order.
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Our review of the clerk’s record and of the trial court’s “Order Granting
Defendant Manuel Lopez Galvan’s Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment” confirms that
the order is not an appealable interlocutory order because it does not finally dispose of all claims
and all parties. See Stary v. DeBord, 967 S.W.2d 352, 352-53 (Tex. 1998) (“Appellate courts
have jurisdiction to consider immediate appeals of interlocutory orders only if a statute explicitly
provides appellate jurisdiction.”); see also Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014 (specifically
permitting appeal of various interlocutory orders but not permitting appeal from partial
summary-judgment order). The order disposes only of Contreras Ocampo’s affirmative claims
against Lopez Galvan and does not address Lopez Galvan’s pending counterclaims. In addition,
the order expressly reserves for future consideration Lopez Galvan’s request for an order
invalidating a lis pendens filed by Contreras Ocampo.
There are a few ways for a trial court’s order to become a final judgment without
a trial. See Sealy Emergency Room, L.L.C. v. Free Standing Emergency Room Managers of Am.,
L.L.C., 685 S.W.3d 816, 820 (Tex. 2024). A trial court’s order is final if it (1) actually disposes
of all remaining parties and claims then before the court (regardless of whether it includes
unequivocal finality language), or (2) includes unequivocal finality language that expressly
disposes of all claims and parties. Id. (citing Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 200); see also In re
Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse of McAllen, Inc., 167 S.W.3d 827, 830 (Tex. 2005) (orig.
proceeding) (concluding default judgment that did not purport to dispose of all parties and all
claims, did not actually dispose of punitive-damages claim, and lacked unequivocal finality
language was not final and appealable judgment); McNally v. Guevara, 52 S.W.3d 195, 196
(Tex. 2001) (per curiam) (“Because the judgment does not appear final on its face, and because it
did not dispose of the defendants’ claim for attorney fees, it was not an appealable judgment.”).
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In addition, “[a]s a rule, the severance of an interlocutory judgment into a separate cause makes
it final.” Sealy Emergency Room, 685 S.W.3d at 820 (quoting Diversified Fin. Sys., Inc. v. Hill,
Heard, O’Neal, Gilstrap & Goetz, P.C., 63 S.W.3d 795, 795 (Tex. 2001)). None of those
circumstances are present here, and accordingly, the summary judgment is not yet final and
appealable. See Bonsmara Nat. Beef Co., LLC v. Hart of Tex. Cattle Feeders, LLC, 603 S.W.3d
385, 390 (Tex. 2020) (“When a trial court renders a final judgment, the court’s interlocutory
orders merge into the judgment and may be challenged by appealing that judgment.”).
While in an appropriate case, we may abate the appeal and remand the case to the
trial court for entry of a signed, written order, we decline to do so under the circumstances
present here. Compare Davidson v. Davidson, No. 03-19-00542-CV, 2019 WL 7042942, at *1-2
(Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 20, 2019, order) (per curiam) (abating appeal and remanding for entry
of final order where record reflected that trial court had rendered oral ruling), with e.g., Cobb
v. Campbell, No. 03-20-00037-CV, 2020 WL 828652, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin Feb. 20, 2020,
no pet.) (mem. op.) (dismissing for want of jurisdiction because no final and appealable
judgment); In re X.M.P., No. 05-18-01416-CV, 2019 WL 180698, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas
Jan. 14, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (dismissing without prejudice to filing new notice of appeal
after trial court signs judgment); see also Ganesan v. Reeves, 236 S.W.3d 816, 817 (Tex. App.—
Waco 2007, pet. denied) (explaining that appellate courts are not required “to docket and hold an
appeal open until there is an appealable judgment or order at some future date”).
Accordingly, for the reasons explained above, we grant Lopez Galvan’s motion to
dismiss, and we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a).
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Gisela D. Triana, Justice
Before Justices Triana, Crump, and Ellis
Dismissed for Want of Jurisdiction
Filed: October 23, 2026
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