TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
NO. 03-26-00490-CV
T. R. and P. M., Appellants
v.
Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, Appellee
FROM THE 480TH DISTRICT COURT OF WILLIAMSON COUNTY
NO. 25-0034-CPS480, THE HONORABLE TERENCE M. DAVIS, JUDGE PRESIDING
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Mother T.R. and Father P.M. appeal the trial court’s order terminating their parental
rights to their child, A.M. (born 2021). Mother challenges the trial court’s findings that (1) the
Department made reasonable efforts to return the child to her before trial and that, despite those
reasonable efforts, a continuing danger remains in her home, and (2) termination of her parental
rights is in the child’s best interest. Father’s court-appointed attorney has filed an Anders brief
concluding that his appeal is frivolous and without merit. Because we find the evidence legally
and factually sufficient to support the findings challenged by Mother and agree that Father’s appeal
is frivolous and without merit, we affirm the trial court’s amended final order terminating Mother’s
and Father’s parental rights.
BACKGROUND
This is the second case the family has had with the Department. As documented in
the removal affidavit for this case, the first case started after numerous referrals concerning Mother
and Father engaging in domestic violence in the child’s presence, leaving the child unattended in
a running vehicle and at an apartment, abusing drugs and alcohol, physically fighting with
neighbors and family, and engaging in public intoxication.
During both cases, when the autistic, non-verbal child was removed from the
parents (the first time at age 3 and the second time at age 4), she was placed with T.F., her maternal
grandmother, in Boerne. Mother did not agree with that placement, given her own
experience growing up under T.F.’s care. At the end of the first case seeking termination, on
November 15, 2024, the trial court signed an agreed final order that named Mother the child’s
managing conservator and Father the possessory conservator with limited supervised visitation.
The order prohibited Father from going within 200 yards of Mother’s residence at all times;
prohibited both parents from consuming alcohol or illegal drugs for twenty-four hours preceding
and during any period of possession of the child; and barred Mother from serving as Father’s
supervisor for visits or agreeing to allow Father unsupervised visitation absent a court order.
In March 2025, the Department learned that Mother called law enforcement
reporting that Father sexually assaulted her in her garage. She was incoherent, making bizarre
accusations and could not initially give her address. Officer Megan Fowler responded. She saw
the child up in the second story window above the garage, crying but unharmed. Mother did not
initially cooperate. She was frantic and saying her phone was recording her and her applications
were being deleted. She said Father had raped her while she was blacked out. Father, in an
interview, denied assaulting her, but admitted they had been in Port Aransas together, and that he
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had been staying with her since they got back. Fowler “checked in with detectives the next day.”
“They said that [Mother] was refusing to meet with victim services in the hospital and that she had
since had consensual sex with [Father].” Father was not charged with the incident.
In April 2025, Mother contacted the Department and reported that she believed
Father was drugging her and, once she was asleep, raping her in front of the smart television and
selling the videos on the dark web. She was in Florida at the time. The following day, a Florida
child welfare investigator informed the Department that she found Mother and the child together
and that Mother’s urinalysis drug test was positive for amphetamine and marijuana.
Once back in Texas, the child was removed again, and again placed with T.F. The
Department referred Mother to tailored services and does not dispute that Mother completed them.
But Mother could not stay away from Father or out of trouble.
In October 2025, the couple committed a trespass and felony theft together. They
stole $3,500 worth of Mexican pottery. In December 2025, Mother was arrested for the theft. She
was later put on a mental health diversion program for the charge. Then, in January 2026, Mother
reported Father assaulted her in an HEB parking lot. Mother said they were arguing about him
taking her prescription medicine and “he pushed my throat and face back.” The arrest affidavit
stated that Mother “had visible red marks on her neck and” that she “complained of trouble
swallowing.” Father was arrested and charged with family violence assault. While he was in jail,
Mother took several of his calls.
When Father got out of jail, he initially lived out of his truck. In March 2026, the
child’s paternal grandfather, R.M., paid for a hotel room. R.M. knew Father and Mother were
together there at the hotel because he had learned from the manager that a woman had tried to pay
for some incidentals with a card with Mother’s name.
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In May 2026, following a two-day bench trial at which fifteen witnesses testified,
the trial court signed an order terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights and naming the
Department the child’s permanent managing conservator. The trial court made the findings
required in a subsequent suit to terminate, including that the parents committed a predicate act
listed under section 161.001(b) before the date the order denying termination was rendered; and
that termination is in the best interest of the child. Tex. Fam. Code § 161.004(a). It also found
that the Department made reasonable efforts to return the child to the parents before
commencement of trial and despite those reasonable efforts, a continuing danger remains in their
homes that prevents the return of the child to either parent, and termination is in the best interest
of the child. Id. § 161.001(f), (g). These appeals followed.
ANALYSIS
Applicable Law and Standard of Review
The involuntary termination of a natural parent’s rights implicates fundamental
constitutional rights and divests the parent and child of all legal rights, privileges, duties, and
powers normally existing between them, except for the child’s right to inherit from the parent.
Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985). The State cannot terminate a parent’s rights
unless it establishes, by clear and convincing evidence, the legal grounds to terminate the parent’s
right. In re J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d 304, 311 (Tex. 2021). Appellate courts must strictly scrutinize
involuntary termination proceedings in favor of the parent. Id. A court may terminate the
parent-child relationship after rendition of an order that previously denied termination of the
parent-child relationship if: the petition under this section is filed after the date the order denying
termination was rendered; the circumstances of the child, parent, sole managing conservator,
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possessory conservator, or other party affected by the order denying termination have materially
and substantially changed since the date that the order was rendered; the parent committed an act
listed under section 161.001 before the date the order denying termination was rendered; and
termination is in the best interest of the child. Tex. Fam. Code §§ 161.004(a); 161.001(b)(1)
(A)-(U). At a hearing in such a case, “the court may consider evidence presented at a previous
hearing in a suit for termination of the parent-child relationship of the parent with respect to the
same child.” Id. § 161.004(b). Both parties assume, and therefore we will too, that the trial court,
in such a case, must also make the reasonable efforts/continuing danger finding set out in section
161.001(f). Id. § 161.001(f). In making that finding, the court must describe the reasonable efforts
“with specificity” in a separate section of its termination order. Id. § 161.001(g).
In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s
findings, we look “at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding to determine
whether a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding was
true.” In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 344 (Tex. 2009). We assume that the factfinder resolved
disputed facts in favor of the finding if a reasonable factfinder could do so, and we disregard all
evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved or found to be incredible. In re J.P.B.,
180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005).
Factual sufficiency in the same circumstances, “in comparison, requires weighing
disputed evidence contrary to the finding against all the evidence favoring the finding.” In re A.C.,
560 S.W.3d 624, 630–31 (Tex. 2018). “Evidence is factually insufficient if, in light of the entire
record, the disputed evidence a reasonable factfinder could not have credited in favor of a finding
is so significant that the factfinder could not have formed a firm belief or conviction that the finding
was true.” Id.
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When reviewing the evidence, we must “provide due deference to the decisions of
the factfinder, who, having full opportunity to observe witness testimony first-hand, is the sole
arbiter when assessing the credibility and demeanor of witnesses.” In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d 498,
503 (Tex. 2014); see also In re J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d at 311–12 (higher evidentiary burden of clear
and convincing evidence in termination suits does not dispel deference appellate court must grant
to factfinder, who heard witnesses and evaluated their credibility).
1. Father’s Appeal
On appeal, Father’s court-appointed attorney has filed an Anders brief concluding
that his appeal is frivolous and without merit. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967);
In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam) (approving use of Anders procedure in
appeal from termination of parental rights). The brief meets the requirements of Anders by
presenting a professional evaluation of the record and demonstrating why there are no arguable
grounds to be advanced on appeal. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; Taylor v. Texas Dep’t of
Protective & Regul. Servs., 160 S.W.3d 641, 646-47 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, pet. denied).
Father’s counsel has certified to this Court that he has provided Father a copy of the brief, a copy
of the motion to withdraw, a pro se motion for access to the appellate record, and a letter explaining
Father’s rights and how to request the record. To date, Father has not filed a pro se brief. The
Department of Family and Protective Services has filed a response, stating that it will not file a
brief unless requested by this Court.
Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of the record
to determine whether the appeal is wholly frivolous. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988);
Taylor, 160 S.W.3d at 647. We have conducted an independent review of the entire record,
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including the Anders brief submitted on father’s behalf, and have found nothing in the record that
might arguably support an appeal. Our review included the trial court’s endangerment finding
under parts (D) and (E) of section 161.001(b)(1) of the Family Code, and we have found no
nonfrivolous issues that could be raised on appeal with respect to that finding. See In re N.G.,
577 S.W.3d 230 237 (Tex. 2019). We agree that the appeal is frivolous and without merit.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s final decree terminating Father’s parental rights. We deny
counsel’s motion to withdraw.1
2. Mother’s Appeal
Again, Mother challenges the trial court’s findings that (1) the Department made
reasonable efforts to return the child to her before trial and that, despite those reasonable efforts, a
continuing danger remains in her home, and (2) termination of her parental rights is in the child’s
best interest.
We state at the outset that Mother has not challenged the trial court’s predicateground findings as to subsections (D) and (E) on appeal. Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(2)(D), (E).
Those findings require proof of endangerment, and subsection (D) in particular focuses on “the
child’s surroundings and environment.” In re S.B., 597 S.W.3d 571, 583 (Tex. App.—Amarillo
2020, pet. denied). A parent’s failure to challenge endangerment findings on appeal does not
establish the continuing danger element under subsection 161.001(f)(1) or the best interest finding
1 See In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam). In In re P.M., the Texas Supreme Court held that the right to counsel in suits seeking the termination of parental rights extends “to all proceedings in [the Texas Supreme Court], including the filing of a petition for review.” Id. at 27. Accordingly, counsel’s obligation to P.M. has not yet been discharged. See id. If P.M., after consulting with counsel, desires to file a petition for review, counsel should timely file with the Texas Supreme Court “a petition for review that satisfies the standards for an Anders brief.” See id. at 27-28.
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under subsection 161.004(a)(4). But unchallenged subsections (D) and (E) findings
carry significant evidentiary weight and are probative of both. See R. C. v. Texas Dep’t of Fam.
& Protective Servs., No. 03-25-00890-CV, 2026 WL 599076, at *9 (Tex. App.—Austin
Mar. 4, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.) (unchallenged endangerment findings inform sufficiency
analysis of continuing danger in subsection 161.001(f)); In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 28 (Tex. 2002)
(proof of acts or omissions under subsection 161.001(b)(1) does not relieve petitioner from proving
best interest of child, but same evidence may be probative of both issues).
The evidence is legally and factually sufficient to prove that the Department made reasonable efforts, but a continuing danger remains in the home.
Reasonable Efforts
Mother argues that the Department failed to timely refer her to therapy;
meaningfully coordinate with her established psychiatrist; relate or implement the
recommendations from her psychological evaluation; adapt its reunification strategy as Mother
addressed the identified barriers by completing every requested service; or tailor its efforts to its
domestic violence concern.
Subsection 161.001(f) is relatively new to the Family Code, but the phrase
“reasonable efforts to return the child to the parent” is not new to section 161.001, as it appears in
subsection 161.001(b)(1)(N), known as the “constructive abandonment” predicate ground. D. F.
v. Texas Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., 731 S.W.3d 726, 742 (Tex. App.—Austin 2026, no
pet.). Thus, the meaning of reasonable efforts under subsection 161.001(f) is informed by
jurisprudence construing subsection (N). Id. And much of the caselaw on “reasonable efforts” for
purposes of subsection (N) turns on whether the Department made a family plan. See, e.g., In re
M.R.J.M., 280 S.W.3d 494, 505 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, no pet.). “The reasonableness of
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the Department’s reunification efforts must also be considered against the backdrop of [the
parent’s] recent history and engagement, or lack thereof, with the Department and its reunification
efforts.” In re M.N.M., 708 S.W.3d 321, 332 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2025, pet. denied) (considering
prior termination case). The issue is whether the Department made reasonable rather than ideal
efforts. Id. at 329.
Here, the record shows that the Department had worked with Mother. The trial
court’s subsection 161.001(g) findings are that the Department:
• initiated this involvement with the family and attempted to engage the family in Family
Based Safety Service with the child in a voluntary Parental Child Safety Placement
agreement;
• maintained the child in a family placement;
• conducted a Family Strengths and Needs Assessment on Mother;
• conducted a Child/Adolescent Needs Assessment on the child;
• created and implemented a Family Plan of Service for Mother;
• created and implemented a Child’s Plan of Service for the child;
• arranged for in-person and virtual parent-child visits with Mother;
• requested and provided ongoing drug testing, a psychological evaluation, and a psychiatric
evaluation for Mother;
• requested and provided referrals for parenting classes for Mother;
• requested and provided referrals for therapists for each family member;
• made referrals for services for the parents that could be completed virtually;
• offered transportation for the parents to participate in in-person services and visits with
the child;
• visited Mother’s home to assess if it was appropriate and safe for the child should the child
be returned;
• regularly communicated with Mother via telephone, text messaging, email and in person
regarding services and progress on the service plans;
• convened family meetings and conferences to discuss the parents’ progress and child’s
well-being and progress; and
• filed reports before each hearing to update Court, parties, and advocates of Mother’s
progress and on-going concerns and barriers to reunification.
As discussed below, Mother’s complaints about the Department’s efforts do not
overcome its reasonable, if imperfect, efforts.
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Delay in therapy
Mother’s service plan was filed with the court June 10, 2025. Her therapist,
Deborah Taber testified therapy “started in August of ‘25” and she saw Mother “three to four times
a month.” Taber also testified that although Mother was making progress, that progress was
frustrated by Mother’s failure to be honest with her about her ongoing contact with Father. Taber
testified that continued therapy would not be “helpful unless she was going to be, you know, really
honest with me about all of this.” Given Mother’s lack of candor during therapy, the trial court
had reason enough not to attribute Mother’s lack of progress to the delay.
Failure to coordinate with established psychiatrist
Second caseworker Kayvona Bragg testified she got the psychiatrist’s information
from Mother in December 2025, tried to get in contact with the psychiatrist, and did not receive
an email back until March of 2026. Department supervisor Nichole Saber explained that in the
beginning, Mother would not provide the releases, but towards the end of the case, she was able
to get in touch with the treating psychiatrist. That psychiatrist told her that Mother checks in with
him about every three months, and that he prescribed her medication for her mental health
conditions including “PTSD, anxiety, depression, and bipolar.” The trial court was entitled to
credit the Department’s testimony about its efforts, and to interpret them as reasonable. See In re
J.W., 645 S.W.3d 726, 745 (Tex. 2022) (factfinder evaluates witness credibility and appellate court
may not reweigh evidence).
Failure to relate or implement the recommendations from her psychological evaluation
The evaluation recommended Mother participate in a psychiatric evaluation,
continue participating in individual therapy, including trauma-focused cognitive behavioral and
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EMDR (eye movement desensitization and reprocessing) therapy, and participate in parenting,
anger management, and domestic violence classes. First caseworker Felicia Cook testified she
received the results of the evaluation and sent them to Mother, but acknowledged she did not
review them with her. The record showed Mother had a treating psychiatrist and had completed
two prior psychiatric evaluations; Mother had done EMDR with a prior therapist and it had “really
helped”; Therapist Taber, who does “cognitive behavioral,” “EMDR,” and is “trauma focused”
saw Mother some “25 times, approximately.” Mother, at trial, testified that she completed all
required classes and was fit for a return of the child in part because she had participated in the
above therapies and classes. The trial court had before it evidence that the lack of communication
did not detract from Mother’s undisputed completion of the recommended services.
Failure to adjust its reunification strategy
Mother complains that “the Department’s strategy remained largely static even as
Mother materially changed her circumstances”—completing all services, maintaining housing and
employment, remaining under psychiatric care, building a support network, and staying drug free
through forty-odd drug tests. Specifically, she complains that the Department ignored her request
for increased visitation and stopped its transportation assistance for the commute to and from
Boerne, thwarting its ability to meaningfully test whether return was possible. Caseworker Cook
testified that the Department stopped the transportation assistance because of Mother’s erratic
behavior towards the Department. There was no direct testimony from the Department about why
Mother’s requests for more visits went unheeded, but T.F. testified that the child is “often
dysregulated” after the visits with Mother. “Sometimes a little bit violent. She’ll start going—
kind of reverting back to things that she used to do when she first came the second time around”
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like “ripping plants out of the thing” and “throw[ing] things off the shelves, and she’ll—you know,
she’s got a good arm, and she’ll pitch a toy across the living room, which she knows that she
doesn’t do.” T.F. sees “a little regression there with mood and temper and things like that.” T.F.
did not attribute the regression to the child wanting to have more time with Mother because of
“how ready she is to get in the vehicle.” The trial court had before it some evidence that the
limitations on Mother’s right to access the child did not exceed those required to protect the best
interest of the child.
Failure to focus services on the breaking of the cycle of domestic violence
Mother argues that once she “made progress in therapy, developed safety plans,
created a support network, and reported ending her relationship with Father, the Department did
not identify what additional intervention she needed to complete before reunification could be
pursued.” The Department stressed throughout its case that its concern was that Mother continued
the relationship with Father during the case and was not candid about that with her therapist. That
lack of candor is not on the Department, and the trial court had before it evidence that it frustrated
the quality of the completed therapy, as discussed above.
Looking at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the reasonable-efforts
finding, we hold a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that the
finding was true. In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 344. Likewise, the disputed evidence is such that a
reasonable factfinder could have resolved it in favor of the reasonable-efforts finding, making the
evidence factually sufficient. In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d at 631.
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Continuing Danger
Mother argues the Department failed to establish that, after it made reunification
efforts, the danger nevertheless continued to exist at the time of trial. She argues the Department
relied on the circumstances that caused removal to prove continuing danger, but “evidence that a
relationship was historically cyclical is not itself evidence that the danger continued to exist after
nearly a year of proceedings.” According to Mother, there was no evidence of continuing danger.
She notes caseworker Bragg’s acknowledgment that there was no evidence Mother and Father
remained in communication other than the January jail calls and the March hotel stay and that there
were no immediate dangers or safety concerns in Mother’s home. Mother herself testified she had
not spoken with Father for several months before inadvertently answering a single telephone call
in March, without realizing it was him, and that she had obtained a two-bedroom apartment on a
one-year lease and maintained a separate bedroom for the child.
Courts have held that “continuing danger” requires the Department to prove by
clear and convincing evidence that a danger (1) is ongoing or persisting—not just historical;
(2) exists in the parent’s home, and (3) is of sufficient severity to prevent the return of the child to
the parent. See In re T.R.C., ___ S.W.3d ___, No. 09-26-00019-CV, 2026 WL 1953219, at *25
(Tex. App.—Beaumont July 6, 2026, no pet. h.); In re T.R., ___ S.W.3d ___, No. 01-25-00924-CV,
2026 WL 958570, at *14 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 9, 2026, no pet.).
Again, Mother has not challenged the predicate-ground findings as to subsections
(D) and (E) on appeal. Those findings support the continuing-danger finding. See In re R. C.,
2026 WL 599076, at *8. And although Mother testified that the dangers were in the past, the trial
court heard predictive evidence that the endangerment would continue and would be of sufficient
severity to prevent the return of the child to Mother. Therapist Taber testified that exposure to the
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cycle of domestic violence “is very damaging on very young children,” and their brain
development, causing hypervigilance, somatic issues, and autoimmune issues. Taber testified she
had concerns about a return given “issues here in the recent past in December and then back in
October.” She was “very concerned that there would be continued events of domestic violence
and that [the child] would be in a stressful home environment if—if [Mother] allowed and
continued to have any kind of engagement with [Father].” Taber testified that “there hasn’t been
an indication that that stopped with a year into the—into the case. Typically, we would see all of
that stopping, and that something had occurred as late as December, that, for me, is a big concern.”
She did not have confidence that the two would remain separated. She was not alone in that
prediction, as caseworker Bragg, guardian ad litem Lacy Mullowney, and grandfather P.M. also
testified that they had no faith that the parents would remain separated. The trial court even heard
evidence, albeit hearsay that Mother denied knowledge of, that Father had put in an application to
the same apartment complex Mother had just moved to.
Given the expressed ongoing concerns, and the trial court’s role as the “sole arbiter
of the witnesses’ credibility and demeanor,” we hold that the evidence is legally and factually
sufficient to support its continuing-danger finding. See In re J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d at 312; In re
J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 344; In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d at 630-31.
We overrule Mother’s sufficiency challenges to the subsection 161.001(f) finding.
The evidence is legally and factually sufficient to prove that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest.
Mother argues that the evidence of her past relationship with Father cannot support
the best-interest finding given the lack of evidence that Mother and Father were still
communicating and the abundance of evidence of Mother’s late, but complete, rehabilitation.
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Mother likens this case to the recent Supreme Court of Texas case, In re H.S., ___ S.W.3d ___,
No. 24-0307, 2026 WL 1614496 (Tex. June 5, 2026). There, the court reversed the jury’s bestinterest finding regarding the mother where the Department’s case was centered on the father’s
violence directed at her and her refusal to get away from him. Id. at *9, *19 (cautioning
Department to proceed with caution in such cases). Mother also argues the Holley factors weigh
against termination.
The best-interest inquiry is prospective and entirely child-centered, focusing on the
child’s well-being, safety, and development. In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d at 504; In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d
at 631. When reviewing best-interest findings, factors that courts consider include (1) the child’s
wishes, (2) the child’s emotional and physical needs now and in the future, (3) emotional or
physical danger to the child now and in the future, (4) the parenting abilities of the parties seeking
custody, (5) programs available to help those parties, (6) plans for the child by the parties seeking
custody, (7) the stability of the proposed placement, (8) the parent’s conduct that may indicate that
the existing parent–child relationship is improper, and (9) any excuses for the parent’s conduct. In
re J.W., 645 S.W.3d at 746; Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976). This list is
not exhaustive, not all factors need be proven to establish best interest, and proof of only one
factor may in a particular factual context support termination. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27.
Evidence probative under the statutory predicate grounds may be probative of best interest as well.
In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d at 631–32. Again, Mother has not challenged the trial court’s endangerment
findings. See J. S. v. Texas Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., No. 03-24-00751-CV,
2025 WL 1409720, at *10 (Tex. App.—Austin May 14, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.) (appellate court
is bound by unchallenged endangerment findings).
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On the one hand, the trial court heard evidence that Mother had the capacity to
provide for the child’s well-being, safety, and development. Mother points to the undisputed
testimony that she had a strong and loving relationship with the child. Caseworker Cook testified
Mother “is very comforting with her daughter.” Caseworker Bragg testified the visits go well, the
child is happy to see Mother, and Mother and the child are bonded. Father testified he was “not
concerned about her ability to parent, no. I think she makes a great mom, and she is very caring
and loving.” Mother’s sister Chelsea Rich testified, “She’s very attentive. She’s very loving.
She’s patient. She’s sweet.” Mother’s long-term friend, Lakeway Police Officer Trent Martin,
testified that Mother was “Good, caring, attentive.” He also testified she was perfectly capable of
providing a safe and stable household for the child; “she had a good handle on who she needs to
be and how she needs to be.” Mother testified she has plans to put the child into ABA and Building
BLOCS to address her autism.
Also on that hand, the trial court heard evidence that T.F. did not have the capacity
to provide for the child’s well-being, safety, and development. That evidence came from Mother,
and Mother’s sister C.R. Mother testified that T.F. lacked parenting ability—relying on her own
experiences growing up, where she was exposed to drugs and sexual assault, and T.F. failed to
protect her. She also testified that she was concerned about the child’s safety because T.F. “drives
erratically,” is “slamming dishes around the house, constantly yelling.” Mother’s sister C.R.
testified that her own 13-year-old daughter lives with T.F. and her daughter has reported that T.F.
gets angry and has a bad attitude if she asks to see C.R. She, too, testified that T.F. was not
protective when she and Mother were young and left them to fend for themselves. And she also
reported that T.F. was not attentive to the child, often leaving her own daughter to look after her.
C.R. said that at Easter, when her family was at T.F.’s, she saw that T.F. “doesn’t tend to [the
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child]. She doesn’t take care of her. She literally sat down and didn’t even move for her.” And
“[a]nytime [the child] needed to be redirected, she would send my 13-year-old daughter after her.”
“Anytime she does interact with [the child], she’s frustrated and just not—I mean, she’s just not
nice. She’s not pleasant.”
On the other hand, several witnesses testified that Mother could not meet the child’s
emotional and physical needs on a long-term basis. Supervisor Saber testified that, before the
removal, when Mother left with Father to go to Florida to avoid CPS, Mother “unenrolled her child
from school.” This was a concern because the child was not receiving any services for her autism.
T.F. testified that the last time she talked to Mother, Mother had said, “I’m taking her to California,
and you better enjoy your time with her now because you’re not going to have any more time with
her when I get her back.” And throughout the case, there were concerns about Mother’s mental
stability because of the several law-enforcement records that reflected Mother “being erratic on
the phone, having mental health concerns, not making any sense.” In one call Mother alleged that
Father “had set up listening devices throughout the home, had hacked her Wi-Fi, had hacked her
phone, hacked almost anything that was electronic in her home that she wanted to send over to the
FBI.” And although Mother would report to the Department that she never saw Father, “he was
always there in their reports.” The “concern is she’s allowing that violence around her child, which
could have negative emotional effects on the child’s well-being.”
Caseworker Bragg testified that termination would be in the child’s best interest
given the fact that the Department had been working with the family for years, yet the concerns
about Mother remained the same:
Q. And I understand the relationship concern between her and [Father]. If there is
a protective order in place, if there are precautions in place, if she’s continuing in
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therapy, why has the Department never recommended a monitored return or even
beginning to lift the supervision requirements?
A. Because those things were put in place, and ten days after [the child] was
returned to [Mother], another intake came in. And the protective order was in place,
and [Father] wasn’t allowed to be around [the child] unsupervised. His name was
on the lease. He was found at the home with just [Mother] alone. There’s an
emergency protective order in place now and bond conditions. They were speaking
on the phone. So those things have been put in place, and they both have gone
against those things, so it’s—what’s changed?
The child’s grandfather, R.M., also thought Mother had not acted in the child’s best
interest when Mother took the child out of her special services and therapies. He agreed the child
had been subjected to an unstable environment, in part because of Mother’s several moves. He
said Father constantly asked him for money and then gave that money to Mother. The two had
transportation issues as well, making it hard to take the child to services. Incidents seemed to
follow the two—some missing Xanax leading Mother to confront people who then pulled a knife
on her; multiple trespasses. “There’s always a crisis somewhere.” R.M. stated the couple “have
had, since the very beginning, a very toxic, turbulent relationship.” He also testified that Mother
has hit Father. “I do know that she has hit him. He’s shown up with black eyes and busted lips.
She–you know, I’ve witnessed a fight that they had together in a parking lot where they were
throwing things at each other, yelling at each other, cursing at each other.” R.M. stated that the
chaos was not good for the child, who “needs to be in a safe, secure place where there’s no threat
of, you know, possible harm from somebody else.”
Mullowney, who served as guardian ad litem for the child in both cases, testified
that she thought termination was in the best interest of the child because Mother could not put the
child first.
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Q. I guess turning first to [Mother], why do you think—why do you think that is
true for her?
A. [Mother] is very wedded to the idea that she has PTSD and she has all these
mental health issues that she has to work through. That doesn’t really work well
with a special-needs child, because you need to put the special-needs child first.
And I know that’s hard, but then you take care of you. It doesn’t sound to me, from
the entire time I’ve known [Mother], that she is capable of putting a child first
before her own needs, and she—she has railed against her mother, and that doesn’t
show growth to me. I mean, she can say, “My mother was a jerk when I was
younger,” but it’s almost 20 years ago, maybe more. At some point in time you
have to say, “I’m an adult, and I can take care of a child.” But she’s still sounding
like, “I’m a child, and I’m mad at my mommy.”
She also stated she did not believe Mother can maintain an apartment and “an autistic child doesn’t
need to be moved over and over and over again. Stability isn’t a joke. It’s actually what
she needs.”
Also on the other hand, several witnesses testified that T.F. could meet the child’s
emotional and physical needs on a long-term basis. At the time of trial, the child, diagnosed on
the autism spectrum Level 2, with underlying ADHD, had been in speech and occupational
therapy. The child was signed up for baseball through Kinetic Kids group and had friends at
church. Child safety specialist Yvonne Palmer, who worked with T.F. and the child during both
cases, described the child’s relationship with T.F. as “very good.” She testified that child was
non-verbal during the first case, but “she was receiving all of her services” and she seemed to be
thriving, doing well physically and emotionally without many behavioral issues. When she
encountered T.F. and child the second time, in April of 2025, the child was completely different,
“completely dysregulated.” She was aggressive, hitting, spitting, putting stuff in her mouth.
Palmer felt the behavior reflected “she wasn’t receiving those same services when she went home”
with Mother. Now that she has been in T.F.’s care again, she has seen improvement.
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Guardian ad litem Mullowney testified that T.F., in both cases, “sacrificed for the
benefit of [the child]” who was thriving in her care. T.F. meets the child’s needs. The child “is
now learning how to be verbal. She is in public school, and they have sections of ABA therapy in
public school. Grandma is working to maintain a stable environment.” “So not only has she put
in regular love and attention into [the child], she’s got [the child’s] cousin, and she went ahead,
upon CPS advice, and decided to become licensed, and she’s in that process.”
Grandfather R.M. testified he had no concerns about the child being placed with
T.F.; T.F. had remained in communication with him and his wife and was committed to
maintaining their relationship with the child.
This collective evidence—that the placement for the child had been positive and
that the trial court must have found credible—sets this case apart from In re H.S., the case Mother
argues should control here.
There, as here, throughout trial, “the department, the children’s attorney ad litem,
and their witnesses emphasized not only Father’s violence but also Mother’s alleged inability
or unwillingness to protect the children by distancing herself from Father.” In re H.S.,
2026 WL 1614496, at *4. There, as here, the mother had successfully completed services. Id.
The court reversed the jury’s best interest finding regarding the mother because the trial court did
not give the mother enough time to complete the service plan; the Department did not give the
mother a clear directive regarding her relationship with the father; and (3) the children’s conditions
were worsening while in foster care. Id. at *13. The court repeatedly emphasized that the children
had gone downhill after removal—they were “foundering in the foster system”; “all three children
had significant behavioral issues that worsened throughout the department’s custody”; “[t]o say
that they were not thriving would be an understatement”; “we again emphasize that the children
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were not thriving at the time of trial, nor were they in adoptive placements,” instead, “the children
had shown a sharp decline since being separated from their parents.” Id. at *3, *7, *8, *13, *17.
The court stated, “According to the counselor, and consistent with ordinary human experience,
‘removal from parents for children can be a very traumatizing event’ because the children are
‘taken from their family[,] they’re not given much explanation,’ and then they ‘go with a stranger
to a strange . . . house.’” Id. at *3. In this case, the child did not “go with a stranger to a strange
house.” Instead, she went with her grandmother to her grandmother’s house, which was familiar
to her. T.F. testified that she had stepped up because, “I don’t want to see her in the system. I
don’t want to see her at a—at a foster care. I don’t want to see her in a group home.” And, as
discussed above, the trial court heard considerable testimony that the child was thriving in
T.F’s home.
Looking at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the best interest finding,
we hold a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that it was true. In
re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 344. Likewise, the disputed evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder
could have resolved it in favor of the best-interest finding. In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d at 631. We
overrule Mother’s challenge to the trial court’s best-interest finding.
CONCLUSION
Because we find the evidence legally and factually sufficient to support the findings
challenged by Mother and again, we agree that Father’s appeal is frivolous and without merit, we
affirm the trial court’s amended final order terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights.
Again, we also deny Father’s counsel’s motion to withdraw.
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Chari L. Kelly, Justice
Before Chief Justice Byrne, Justices Kelly and Theofanis
Affirmed
Filed: October 23, 2026
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