United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 25-1979
CHRISTOPHER WRIGHT, ROBERT MANNING, ELLIOT CHEFITZ,
JOSHUA STEISS,
Plaintiffs, Appellees,
v.
UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION, USAA
GENERAL INDEMNITY COMPANY,
Defendants, Appellants.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Allison D. Burroughs, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Barron, Chief Judge,
Lynch and Gelpí, Circuit Judges.
Kahn A. Scolnick, with whom Daniel R. Adler, Sean F. Howell,
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Robert A. Whitney, and McAngus
Goudelock & Courie, LLC were on brief for appellants.
Matthew A. Seligman for appellees.
Cyrus Mehri, with whom Michael D. Lieder, Mehri & Skalet,
PLLC, Edward F. Haber, Michelle Blauner, Ian McLoughlin, and
Shapiro Haber & Urmy LLP were on brief for appellees.
October 28, 2026
LYNCH, Circuit Judge. This appeal presents issues as to
whether under Massachusetts law or the federal filed rate doctrine,
motor vehicle insurance policyholders are barred from bringing
suit against their insurers under Mass. Gen. Laws Chapter 93A
regarding insurance rates approved by the Commissioner of the
Massachusetts Division of Insurance under Mass. Gen. Laws Chapter
175E.
We hold that Massachusetts law, not federal law, governs
these issues, and that resolution of the issues may dispose of the
case. We certify the state law questions involved to the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. See Mass. S.J.C. R. 1:03.
I. Background
This suit concerns rates approved since 2019 by the
Commissioner of Insurance for Defendants General Indemnity Company
(GIC) and United Services Automobile Association (United
Services), which provide motor vehicle insurance to present and
former members of the U.S. military.1 In 2023, current and former
insurance policyholders sued under Chapter 93A in federal court
against their insurers.2 They alleged the rates approved by the
Commissioner impermissibly considered "income" and "occupation" in
1 GIC and United Services are affiliates of the USAA
insurance company group and operate under common management and
control.
2 The policyholders pled diversity jurisdiction under the
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d).
- 2 -violation of implementing regulations. 211 C.M.R. § 79.04(12).
The rates did so, plaintiffs asserted, because GIC and United
Services determine eligibility for insurance with each affiliate
based on the policyholders' highest career military pay grade;
United Services insures members who achieved a grade of E-7 or
higher during their military career, and GIC insures members who
achieved grades from E-1 to E-6. Based on the same reason,
plaintiffs asserted that the companies' certifications of
compliance with the statutory requirements were false.3 As to
relief, they sought a declaration that the affiliates'
rate-setting practices and certifications violate Massachusetts
law; injunctions preventing those practices and requiring new,
compliant rate filings; and restitution for purported excess rates
paid by GIC policyholders.
On May 15, 2024, the district court denied GIC and United
Services' Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss and then certified for
interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) the question of law
"whether the filed-rate doctrine bars the relief Plaintiffs seek."4
3 The policyholders conceded that an additional claim for
breach of contract should be dismissed.
4 GIC and United Services argued in relevant part that the
filed rate doctrine precluded the entire action. They also argued
that the policyholders' income and occupation theory failed as a
matter of law and that their unfair and deceptive practices claims
failed for these and independent reasons. In its motion to dismiss
order, the district court reasoned in part that "at least some of
the requested remedies are not barred by the filed rate doctrine
(assuming it applies)," because they "do not directly challenge
- 3 -This court, after obtaining clarification of the question, granted
the petition for interlocutory review on October 20, 2025.5
The Commissioner must approve motor vehicle insurance
rates before they can go into effect. Chapter 175E requires
insurers to file their proposed rates and supporting information
with the Division of Insurance. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 175A, §
6(a).6 The Commissioner must not approve rates that are
"excessive," "inadequate," "unfairly discriminatory," or
"violative of public policy," id. ch. 175E, §§ 4(a), 8, or approve
the rates approved and set by the Commissioner."
5 The district court clarified that in its view, the
controlling question raises three "distinct but interrelated
questions":
1. When a federal court, sitting in diversity, needs to
determine whether the filed-rate doctrine applies to bar
a claim, should it look to state law or federal common
law to determine whether the filed-rate doctrine applies
to Massachusetts state agencies?
2. If federal common law is the appropriate source of
law, does the federal filed-rate doctrine apply to bar
claims that implicate rates set by Massachusetts state
agencies, or does it apply solely to those set by federal
agencies?
3. If federal common law would apply the filed-rate
doctrine to rates set by Massachusetts state agencies,
is the doctrine quasi-preemptive, such that it applies
to broadly bar legal or equitable challenges that
implicate filed rates, as Defendants contend, or does it
apply only to direct challenges to the rates themselves,
as Plaintiffs contend?
6 Chapter 175E incorporates consistent provisions from
Chapter 175A, which also regulates motor vehicle insurance rates.
See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 175E, § 3.
- 4 -"filing[s] . . . that . . . do[] not comply with [Chapter 175E],"
id. § 7. Parties aggrieved by a rate filing may petition the
Commissioner for a pre-approval hearing on the filing, id. ch.
175A, § 7(b), and parties aggrieved by a decision of the
Commissioner have twenty days to seek judicial review of that
decision, id. ch. 175E, § 13. No such petition or judicial review
was sought as to the rates in question. The policyholders do not
allege that Defendants' actuarial data or other data filed with
the Commissioner was false. Nor do they allege that the
Commissioner has engaged in a post-approval investigation of
Defendants' rating and underwriting practices, which can lead to
the suspension and disapproval of rates already in place. See id.
§ 8.
Implementing regulations require insurers' filings to
include the data underlying proposed rates and "descriptions of
methods used in making the [r]ates." 211 C.M.R. §§ 79.02,
79.05(4). The regulations prohibit insurers from using "income"
or "occupation" to "determine placement in a particular affiliate
within an [i]nsurance [c]ompany [g]roup." Id. § 79.04(12).
Filings must "identify the risk attributes relevant to the
insurer's decision to place a private passenger motor vehicle
insurance policy in a specific insurance company." The
policyholders do not allege that GIC and United Services violated
these procedural requirements.
- 5 -A separate statute, Chapter 12, authorizes the
Massachusetts Attorney General to "intervene in administrative or
judicial proceedings held in the commonwealth on behalf of any
group of consumers in connection with any matter involving the
rates . . . charged by any insurance company" subject to the
Division's authority. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 12, § 11F. The Attorney
General did not intervene in the administrative rate-setting
proceedings concerning these rates. Nor has the Attorney General
sought to intervene in any judicial proceedings.
Pursuant to Chapter 175E, GIC and United Services filed
their proposed rates with the Division of Insurance. The insurers
calculated rates using aggregate data about the respective groups
of members they insure. Because the groups' data differed, GIC
and United Services calculated different rates; of the two
affiliates, GIC charged the higher rates. The filings included
certifications of "compliance with all relevant laws and
regulations of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts." The
Commissioner approved the rates at issue here.
II. Discussion
A. Governing Law
Because this case does not involve any federal agency or
interpretation of a federal statute and raises no issues of federal
- 6 -concern, we conclude that state law, and not the federal filed
rate doctrine, must control.7
The federal filed rate doctrine originated "as a
judicially created bar to antitrust damages claims in the context
of the Interstate Commerce Commission's regulation of common
carrier rates." Arroyo-Melecio v. Puerto Rican Am. Ins. Co., 398
F.3d 56, 73 (1st Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). The doctrine has
"evolved over time" and is "a famously complex and sometimes
criticized set of rules." Id. (quoting in the first instance Town
of Norwood v. FERC, 217 F.3d 24, 28 (1st Cir. 2000)). But "Supreme
Court precedent . . . clarifies that" the "doctrine rests on an
interpretation of federal rate-setting statutes." Skolarus v.
Bloomberg, L.P., ___ F.4th ___, 2026 WL 3012007, at *5-6 (2d Cir.
Oct. 7, 2026) (Park, J., concurring); see also Patel v. Specialized
Loan Servicing, LLC, 904 F.3d 1314, 1328-30 (11th Cir. 2018)
(Jordan, J., dissenting) (collecting Supreme Court cases treating
the doctrine as a matter of federal statutory interpretation); cf.
E. & J. Gallo Winery v. EnCana Corp., 503 F.3d 1027, 1033-34 (9th
Cir. 2007) (affirming denial of summary judgment on state and
federal claims about rates filed with FERC and holding that the
federal filed rate doctrine could apply because "the logic
underlying the [Supreme] Court's statutory construction in Keogh
7 The parties did not contest at oral argument that Massachusetts law controls.
- 7 -[v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 156 (1922),] is equally
applicable to the [Natural Gas Act]").
The federal filed rate doctrine "limits attacks outside
the regulatory process on . . . rates filed with federal regulatory
agencies" overseeing federal regulatory schemes. Town of Norwood
v. New England Power Co., 202 F.3d 408, 416 (1st Cir. 2000)
(citation omitted) (affirming dismissal of some state and federal
claims about rates filed with FERC because of the federal filed
rate doctrine). Indeed, application of "the federal filed rate
doctrine in diversity suits about rates governed by state law
[would be] inconsistent with the Rules of Decision Act," Skolarus,
___ F.4th at ___, 2026 WL 3012007, at *6 (Park, J., concurring),
which requires federal courts sitting in diversity to apply "[t]he
laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or
treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require
or provide." 28 U.S.C. § 1652. Nor would application of the
doctrine in such circumstances as a form of federal common law be
consistent with the Supreme Court's repudiation of Swift v. Tyson,
41 U.S. 1 (1842), in Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins, 304 U.S.
64, 78-80 (1938), which confined federal common law to "a few
areas[] involving uniquely federal interests[] [that] are . . .
committed by the Constitution and laws of the United States to
federal control." Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500,
504, (1988) (internal citation omitted); see also Skolarus, ___
- 8 -F.4th at ___, 2026 WL 3012007, at *6 (Park, J., concurring) ("In
the absence of congressional authorization, common lawmaking must
be necessary to protect uniquely federal interests." (quoting
Rodriguez v. FDIC, 589 U.S. 132, 136 (2020)); Patel, 904 F.3d at
1330 (Jordan, J., dissenting) (arguing that a state law claim about
a rate approved by a state agency did not "touch[] on those matters
committed to federal control").
This circuit's prior filed rate doctrine cases have
concerned the federal doctrine and are consistent with this view.
These cases did not address whether and under what circumstances
the federal doctrine might apply to rates filed with state agencies
because they have only applied the doctrine to rates filed with
federal agencies. See, e.g., Arroyo-Melecio, 398 F.3d at 73
(citations omitted) (declining to apply the doctrine to a federal
claim about rates filed with a state agency because "there [was]
no direct relationship at all" between the claim and the rates);
Town of Norwood, 217 F.3d at 29 (declining to apply the doctrine
to a federal claim about rates filed with a federal agency because
the challenged action did not "contradict any extant filing"); PNE
Energy Supply LLC v. Eversource Energy, 974 F.3d 77, 86-87 (1st
Cir. 2020) (affirming dismissal of state and federal claims about
rates filed with FERC because of the doctrine); Breiding v.
Eversource Energy, 939 F.3d 47, 52-56 (1st Cir. 2019) (same).
- 9 -Here, there is no federal statute, constitutional
provision or principle, or treaty at issue; the regulatory scheme
is entirely the product of state law, and the insurers' rates were
filed with and approved by a state agency. Nor is there any
suggestion or reason to think that a uniquely federal interest
committed to federal control is at stake here.8 In fact, "[s]tates,
as a matter of tradition and express federal consent, have an
important interest in maintaining precise and detailed regulatory
schemes for the insurance industry." Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 517 U.S. 706, 733 (1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring). In these
circumstances, state law applies. See Knevelbaard Dairies v. Kraft
Foods, Inc., 232 F.3d 979, 992-93 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that
California's filed rate doctrine did not preclude a state law claim
about rates set by a state agency); Coll v. First Am. Title Ins.
Co., 642 F.3d 876, 886-87 (10th Cir. 2011) (holding that New
Mexico's filed rate doctrine precluded state law claims about an
insurance rate filed with a state agency); In re N.J. Title Ins.
Litig., 683 F.3d 451, 459-60 (3d Cir. 2012) (applying New Jersey's
filed rate doctrine to bar state law claims about insurance rates
filed with a state agency); Patel, 904 F.3d at 1325 (making an
8 For instance, no party argues for federal preemption or
that the doctrine "affect[s] federal jurisdiction." See Gunn v.
Cont'l Cas. Co., 968 F.3d 802, 807 & n.3 (7th Cir. 2020) ("There
is no . . . reason to think that any version of the filed-rate
doctrine affects a federal court's subject-matter jurisdiction.").
- 10 -Erie prediction as to whether Florida and Pennsylvania courts would
"hold that the filed-rate doctrine exists as to the [state]
regulatory scheme in question"); Granite State Ins. Co. v. Star
Mine Servs., Inc., 29 F.4th 317, 320-21 (6th Cir. 2022) (affirming
summary judgment against plaintiff's state law claim about rate
filed with state agency by applying Kentucky filed rate doctrine);
Alpert v. Nationstar Mortg. LLC, 983 F.3d 1129, 1130-31 (9th Cir.
2020) (finding that the Washington filed rate doctrine applied to
state law claims about insurance rate filed with state agency and
certifying questions to the Washington State Supreme Court); see
also Gunn v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 968 F.3d 802, 807 (7th Cir. 2020)
(rejecting federal filed-rate defense in a "case arising under
state law" because party did not "explain why . . . federal law
(let alone the narrow niches of federal common law that have
survived Erie Railroad) could be relevant at all"); Skolarus, ___
F.4th at ___, 2026 WL 3012007, at *6 (Park, J., concurring)
(concurring in the judgment but arguing the state filed rate
doctrine must apply because no federal nexus was present); Patel,
904 F.3d at 1329 (Jordan, J., dissenting) ("The vast majority of
federal and state courts look to state law to decide whether state
regulatory schemes warrant a filed rate doctrine of some kind."
- 11 -(citations omitted)). We find that Massachusetts law, not the
federal filed rate doctrine, controls.9
B. Certification Analysis
This court may certify questions to the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) where the "proceeding before it
[involves] questions of [Massachusetts] law . . . which may be
determinative" to the claims at issue and "as to which it appears
to the certifying court there is no controlling precedent in the
decisions of [the SJC]."10 Mass. S.J.C. R. 1:03. In our view,
this case meets those conditions, and "this court has a long
9 The Ninth Circuit recently certified questions of
California state law to the California Supreme Court in a dispute
involving similar claims about USAA's rate-setting practices in
California. See Coleman v. USAA, No. 25-793 (9th Cir. Sep. 10,
2026). Because the provisions at issue there do not resemble those
in Chapter 175E, that certification addresses questions with no
bearing on this case.
10 No party requested certification, but "we have discretion
to certify questions . . . sua sponte." Nicholls v. Veolia Water
Cont. Operations USA, Inc., 144 F.4th 354, 357 n.2 (1st Cir. 2025)
(citing Williams v. Am. Honda Fin. Corp., 858 F.3d 700, 701 (1st
Cir. 2017) (per curiam)). We advised the parties at oral argument
that we were considering certification and provided an opportunity
to submit questions to certify. The parties could not agree on
the formulation of those questions and submitted different
proposals. GIC and United Services also objected to certification.
We have not adopted either party's proposed questions and construe
their respective submissions as objections to the questions to be
certified. "This is not a barrier to certification, however, as
the [SJC] has previously answered questions even over the
objections of both parties." Id. (citing Knapp Shoes, Inc. v.
Sylvania Shoe Mfg. Corp., 640 N.E.2d 1101, 1102 (Mass. 1994) and
Knapp Shoes, Inc. v. Sylvania Shoe Mfg. Corp., 15 F.3d 1222, 1224
(1st Cir. 1994)).
- 12 -history of certifying appropriate questions to the SJC."
Easthampton Sav. Bank v. City of Springfield, 736 F.3d 46, 50 (1st
Cir. 2013) (collecting cases); see also, e.g., Nicholls v. Veolia
Water Cont. Operations USA, Inc., 144 F.4th 354 (1st Cir. 2025);
Gattineri v. Wynn MA, LLC, 63 F.4th 71 (1st Cir. 2023).11
Massachusetts law "may be determinative" in this case.
If Massachusetts law precludes private parties from bringing suits
under Chapter 93A to challenge motor vehicle insurance rates
approved by the Commissioner, then plaintiffs' complaint failed to
state a claim.
Under our precedent, the SJC's "requirement that there
be 'no controlling precedent' . . . prevent[s] certification in
cases when 'the course the state court would take is reasonably
clear.'" Nicholls, 144 F.4th at 358 (citation modified) (quoting
In re Engage, Inc., 544 F.3d 50, 53 (1st Cir. 2008)). We cannot
say that the course that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
would take as to the policyholders' suit is reasonably clear for
11 We acknowledge and appreciate that the SJC has
affirmatively responded to numerous requests for certification
from this court. See, e.g., Nicholls v. Veolia Water Cont.
Operations USA, Inc., 281 N.E.3d 966 (Mass. 2026); Zurich Am. Ins.
Co. v. Med. Props. Tr. Inc., 237 N.E.3d 733 (Mass. 2024); Gattineri v. Wynn MA, LLC, 221 N.E.3d 742 (Mass. 2023); Patel v. 7-Eleven,
Inc., 183 N.E.3d 398 (Mass. 2022); Easthampton Sav. Bank v. City
of Springfield, 21 N.E.3d 922 (Mass. 2014); Real Estate Bar Ass'n
for Mass., Inc. v. Nat'l Real Estate Info. Servs., 946 N.E.2d 665
(Mass. 2011); Ropes & Gray LLP v. Jalbert, 910 N.E.2d 330 (Mass.
2009); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Beacon Hill Architectural Comm., 659
N.E.2d 710 (Mass. 1996).
- 13 -several reasons. The SJC's relevant cases do not use the term
"filed rate doctrine." They have never addressed Chapter 175E,
the most recent case was decided over forty years ago, and all of
the cases involve different Massachusetts statutes concerning
administrative agency rate setting and concerning different
enforcement powers granted to regulators and to the Massachusetts
Attorney General. See City of Bos. v. Edison Elec. Illuminating
Co. of Bos., 136 N.E. 113 (Mass. 1922); Sullivan v. Bos. Consol.
Gas Co., 97 N.E.2d 535 (Mass. 1951); Lowell Gas Co. v. Attorney
General, 385 N.E.2d 240 (Mass. 1979); Spence v. Bos. Edison Co.,
459 N.E.2d 80 (Mass. 1983).
In City of Boston, the SJC affirmed dismissal of a
consumer's claims against an electricity provider regarding rates
approved by the Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities
(DPU), holding that Mass. Gen. Laws Chapter 164 took away the right
of injured parties to "recover[] back [excess utility rates] in an
action at common law" against utility providers that charged rates
approved by the DPU. 136 N.E. at 115. The court explained that
"the plaintiff is confined to [Chapter 164's] provisions as
affording a comprehensive, simple and practical means for
redress." Id. at 117. When the case was decided in 1922, those
means included petitioning the DPU for a public hearing on the
company's utility prices or quality, after which the DPU could
order a reduction in price or improvement in quality and, if
- 14 -necessary, sue to enforce its orders. Id. at 116 (citing Mass.
Gen. Laws ch. 164, §§ 79, 93 (1921)).12
This scheme changed in 1927, when utility companies were
required to file proposed rates with and receive approval from the
DPU before charging the rates, and the DPU was empowered to
investigate rates on its own motion. See 1927 Mass. Acts ch. 316.
In the Sullivan case in 1951, the SJC affirmed dismissal
of consumers' claims seeking refunds from a utility company for
excess gas rates approved by the DPU where the DPU had mistakenly
required the company to increase its rates even though its supply
costs were fixed by federal regulations. See 97 N.E.2d at 536-38.
Plaintiffs here rely heavily on the SJC's decision in
Lowell Gas. There, the Massachusetts Attorney General brought
Chapter 93A and common law fraud claims alleging gas providers had
committed fraud by charging short-term debt interest expenses to
customers, failing to answer specific questions concerning their
accounting practices required by DPU regulations, and deliberately
concealing this from the DPU. 385 N.E.2d at 242-43. The SJC first
affirmed that "suits directly challenging public utility rates as
determined by the [DPU]" are barred unless brought under the
provisions governing judicial review of DPU decisions, Mass. Gen.
12 Such petitions could only be initiated by twenty customers
of the utility company or the elected representatives of the city
or town utilizing the service. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 164, § 93
(1921).
- 15 -Laws ch. 25, § 5. Id. at 244. The SJC nevertheless allowed the
suit to proceed, saying in part that the "essential character" of
the claim was that the gas companies engaged in "deceptive conduct
. . . intended to subvert the very rate structure whose protection
they seek." Id. at 244, 248. The SJC also reasoned that the
Attorney General's statutory authorization to institute legal
proceedings was broader than that of private parties and that
Chapter 164 required the DPU to notify the Attorney General of
utility providers' violations of law, "impl[ying] an expectation
that the Attorney General take appropriate action once notified."
Id. at 244-45.
The decision in Lowell Gas is distinguishable and does
not give us certainty on "the direction of state law in the present
context." In re Engage, 544 F.3d at 56. As ever, "there is the
danger of unmooring language from the facts of a case and the
precise issue presented in the context of those facts." Id. The
plaintiffs here are private party policyholders and not the
Attorney General. Their assertions of fraud are nothing like the
fraud assertions in Lowell Gas. They make no allegation that GIC
or United Services submitted false actuarial or other data to the
Commissioner or were required to seek approval of their
classification practices independent of the obligations imposed by
Chapter 175E and implementing regulations.
- 16 -GIC and United Services, by contrast, point to the SJC's
decision in Spence. There, the SJC declined the Boston Housing
Authority's request that a court independently interpret the
meaning of the term "apartment" in a DPU-approved rate filing.
Spence, 459 N.E.2d at 85. There was no allegation of fraud or
deception on the agency, so the Housing Authority's request
amounted to "questioning . . . the interpretation of a rate," which
must be done by the agency, not courts. Id. at 87.
In sum, we find that "the existing case law does not
provide sufficient guidance to allow us reasonably to predict the
course of Massachusetts law." In re Engage, 544 F.3d at 57. To
determine whether certification is appropriate, we have considered
whether "the issues before us involve important questions of state
law and public policy with significant implications, not only for
the parties before us, but also for other industries in the state."
See Gattineri, 63 F.4th at 94 (certifying questions about the
enforceability of an agreement under the Massachusetts Gaming Act
and regulatory scheme); In re Engage, 544 F.3d at 57 (certifying
questions about the Massachusetts attorney's lien statute because
"answers to the questions in this case . . . clearly have
implications which go beyond these parties" (citation omitted));
Real Estate Bar Ass'n for Mass., Inc., v. Nat'l Real Est. Info.
Servs., 608 F.3d 110, 119 (1st Cir. 2010) (considering whether
resolution of state law question "raises serious policy concerns
- 17 -. . . that will . . . impact future cases" before certifying to
the SJC); see also Nicholls, 144 F.4th at 359 (describing the
"significant policy choices" before certifying questions of state
law to the SJC); Easthampton Sav. Bank, 736 F.3d at 52-53
(similar).
Whether to allow private citizen suits when a statute
assigns decision-making and enforcement authority to a state
administrative agency and to the state attorney general involves
important questions of public policy. Cf. Medina v. Planned
Parenthood S. Atl., 606 U.S. 357, 369 (2025) ("[T]he decision
whether to let private plaintiffs enforce a . . . statutory right
poses delicate questions of public policy.").
Because "any answer a federal court may give on this
state law question is not a final answer" and "[o]nly the SJC can
give a final answer in this case," In re Engage, 544 F.3d at 57,
certification here involves no "waste of judicial resources," id.
at 55 (quoting Armacost v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 11 F.3d 267, 269
(1st Cir. 1993)). Indeed "our answering the important policy
questions raised in this appeal 'may offend the comity due to local
courts, since [Massachusetts] courts have never addressed this
specific issue.'" Gattineri, 63 F.4th at 95 (quoting
Santiago-Hodge v. Parke Davis & Co., 859 F.2d 1026, 1033 (1st Cir.
1988)).
- 18 -III. Certified Questions
We certify the following questions to the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court:
1. On the facts of this case, under
Massachusetts law, are private parties
authorized to bring suit under Chapter 93A for
alleged violations of state law arising out of
motor vehicle insurance rates approved by the
Commissioner of the Division of Insurance?
2. Does the answer to the first question
differ as to the declaratory, injunctive, and
restitutionary relief plaintiffs seek?
We would also welcome any other comments that the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court may wish to offer on any
relevant points of Massachusetts law. The Clerk of this court is
directed to forward to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court,
under the official seal of this court, a copy of the certified
questions and our opinion in this case, along with copies of the
briefs and appendix filed by the parties. We retain jurisdiction
over this appeal pending resolution of the certified questions.
So ordered.
- 19 -