In Re: D.C., Case No. 427, Sept. Term, 2025, Opinion by Berger, J.
JUVENILE – PROBATION – EX POST FACTO LAWS -- APPLICATION OF
INTENT-EFFECTS TEST
Juvenile proceedings are not criminal, but rather, civil in nature. Juvenile probation is not a form of punishment and not subject to Ex Post Facto Clauses. Under the intent-effects test, there is no violation of the prohibition against ex post facto laws because: (1) there is no clear proof that the General Assembly intended juvenile probation to be punishment; and (2) juvenile probation is not so punitive in effect so as to warrant application of the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the State and federal constitutions.
Circuit Court for Frederick County
Case No. C-10-JV-24-000100
REPORTED
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF MARYLAND
No. 427
September Term, 2025
IN RE: D.C.
Berger,
Zic,
Eyler, James R.
(Senior Judge, Specially Assigned),
JJ.
Opinion by Berger, J.
Filed: October 28, 2026
Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal
Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State
Government Article) this document is authentic.
2026.10.28
'00'04- 15:21:10
Gregory Hilton, Clerk
At a juvenile adjudication hearing on October 29, 2024, fourteen-year-old D.C.
admitted involvement relating to motor vehicle theft and rogue and vagabond. At the time
of D.C.’s conduct in May 2024, the maximum initial term of juvenile probation that a
juvenile court could impose was one year. On November 1, 2024, however, a statutory
amendment took effect increasing the maximum initial term of juvenile probation to two
years. On April 1, 2025, at D.C.’s disposition hearing, the State requested, and the juvenile
magistrate approved, a period of two years’ probation.
D.C. filed exceptions arguing that application of the statutory amendment, which
became effective after his conduct and which allowed for the imposition of a longer initial
term of juvenile probation, violates the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the State and federal
constitutions. The juvenile court concluded that juvenile probation is not a punishment
and that, under the intent-effects test, the disposition does not violate the prohibition against
ex post facto laws. Accordingly, the juvenile court imposed two years’ probation in D.C.’s
case. D.C. noted a timely appeal.
On appeal, D.C. presents one question for our review, which we have rephrased as
follows:1
Whether D.C.’s disposition of two years’ probation, which
would have been unlawful at the time of the offense, violates
the State and federal constitutional prohibition against ex post
facto laws.
1
D.C. phrased the question as follows:
Did the juvenile court err and violate constitutionally
guaranteed ex post facto principles by ordering a term of
probation that would have been unlawful at the time of the
offense?
For the reasons herein, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
Statutory Background
Central to the resolution of this case is the probation provision of Section 3-8A-19.6
of the Juvenile Causes subtitle of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJP”) of
the Maryland Code. Accordingly, we begin with the pertinent background of that
provision.
During the 2022 Legislative Session, the General Assembly passed the Juvenile
Justice Reform Act (“JJRA”). 2022 Md. Laws Ch. 41 (S.B. 691). Prior to the effect of the
JJRA, juvenile courts were vested with the authority to place a child on probation until age
21, provided a child’s conduct would constitute a felony if the child were an adult. CJP § 3-8A-19(d)(1)(i) (amended 2022). Effective June 1, 2022, however, the JJRA placed
limitations on the discretion of juvenile courts related to the maximum term of probation
that can be imposed on a juvenile offender:
Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, if the
most serious offense committed by a child would be a felony
if committed by an adult, the court may place the child on
probation for a period not exceeding 1 year.
CJP § 3-8A-19.6(e)(1) (amended 2024) (emphasis added).2
2
Notably, the statute also gives juvenile courts discretion to extend the term of “probation by periods not exceeding 3 months” -- and not to exceed two years -- upon a finding that: “1. There is good cause to extend the probation; and 2. The purpose of extending the probation is to ensure that the child completes a treatment or rehabilitative program or service.” CJP § 3-8A-19.6(e)(2) (amended 2024). Further, juvenile courts were vested with the discretion to extend the period of probation for a total term of three years after a hearing and finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that: “1. There is good
2
During the 2024 legislative session, the General Assembly amended the JJRA’s
probation limitations (“2024 amendment”). Those amendments took effect on
November 1, 2024, and provide, among other things that:
Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, if the
most serious offense committed by a child would be a felony
if committed by an adult, the court may place the child on
probation for a period not exceeding 2 years.
CJP § 3-8A-19.6(e)(1) (emphasis added).3
Factual Background
On October 29, 2024, D.C. admitted at an adjudication hearing that he was involved
in two counts arising from events that took place in May 2024: one count of theft of a motor
vehicle and one count of rogue and vagabond for entering another vehicle with the intent
to commit theft. Thereafter, D.C. was released into his parent’s custody and placed on predisposition supervision until his disposition hearing. D.C.’s disposition hearing was
initially scheduled for December 18, 2024. The hearing, however, was postponed several
times while D.C. was in a residential stabilization program in Utah and the juvenile court
awaited the program’s evaluation.
On April 1, 2025, a disposition hearing was held before a juvenile magistrate at
which time the State asked for two years of unsupervised probation. D.C. argued that,
cause to extend the probation; and 2. Extending the probation is in the best interest of the child.” CJP § 3-8A-19.6(e)(3) (amended 2024).
3
Along with this amendment, the General Assembly amended CJP § 3-8A19.6(e)(2) to provide that juvenile courts may extend the total period of probation for a term not to exceed three years. Similarly, CJP § 3-8A-19.6(e)(3) was amended to allow for probation to be extended for a total period not to exceed four years.
3
because his offenses occurred prior to the 2024 amendment, imposing a probation term of
two years -- which would have been unlawful under CJP § 3-8A-19.6(e)(1) since it was in
effect in May 2024 -- would violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws embodied in
the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the Maryland and federal Constitutions (collectively, “Ex
Post Facto Clauses”). The State argued that, at the time of the adjudication, it had made
clear that the law would change to allow for probation of up to two years. Further, the
State contended that, because the disposition hearing was occurring after the 2024
amendment, imposing a term of probation of two years would not violate the ex post facto
prohibitions because CJP § 3-8A-19.6 dictates only what a juvenile court may impose at
disposition hearings. The juvenile magistrate recommended unsupervised probation for a
term of two years.
Thereafter, D.C. filed exceptions arguing again that applying the 2024 amendment
to impose probation for a term of two years for conduct conducted prior to the date that
amendment took effect violated the prohibition against ex post facto laws. The State argued
that juvenile causes are civil in nature, rather than criminal, and that resulting dispositions
are not punitive. According to the State, therefore, the intent-effects test should be applied
to determine whether application of the 2024 amendment to D.C. violates the prohibition
against ex post facto laws.
After applying the intent-effects test, the court concluded that applying the 2024
amendment to D.C. did not violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws because
juvenile probation is not punitive. The court, therefore, denied D.C.’s exceptions and
4
approved the magistrate’s recommendation of a term of two-years’ probation. D.C. filed
a timely appeal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“Whether the prohibition against ex post facto laws contained in Article 17 of the
Maryland Declaration of Rights” and Article I, Section 10, Clause 1 of the United States
Constitution precludes application of the amended probation provisions of CJP § 3-8A19.6(e)(1) to D.C.’s juvenile disposition is a “question of law that we review de novo.”
Rodriguez v. State, 221 Md. App. 26, 35 (2015) (citing Davis v. Slater, 383 Md. 599, 604
(2004)).
DISCUSSION
I. The juvenile court did not violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws by
imposing a term of probation that would have been unlawful at the time D.C.
committed the underlying offenses.
On appeal, D.C. argues that, by imposing probation for a term of two years, the
juvenile court violated the prohibition against ex post facto laws because such a disposition
would have been unlawful at the time D.C. engaged in the underlying conduct. D.C.’s
reasoning is two-fold. First, D.C. contends that, because juvenile probation is a form of
punishment, the Ex Post Facto Clauses apply. Retroactively applying the 2024 amendment
to the JJRA to impose two years of juvenile probation for conduct that occurred prior to
the amendment, and when an initial term of probation was limited to one year, therefore,
violates the prohibition against ex post facto laws. Accordingly, D.C. argues that the
inquiry should have ended there, and that the intent-effects test should not have been
applied. Next, D.C. contends that, even if juvenile probation is not punitive and the intent5
effects test was properly applied, the juvenile court erred in concluding that juvenile
probation is not so punitive in its effect as to negate the General Assembly’s intent to deem
it civil.
The State counters that juvenile delinquency proceedings are civil in nature and that
juvenile probation is not a form of punishment. The State reasons that, because juvenile
probation -- and juvenile courts more broadly -- are intended as a form of treatment to
protect and rehabilitate juvenile offenders and their parents, juvenile probation, unlike adult
probation, is not a form of punishment. The State, therefore, contends that application of
the intent-effects test was proper. Under the intent-effects test, the State argues there is no
violation of the prohibition against ex post facto laws because: (1) there is no clear proof
that the General Assembly intended juvenile probation to be punishment; and (2) juvenile
probation is not so punitive in effect so as to warrant application of the Ex Post Facto
Clauses despite the Legislature’s intent. The State, therefore, urges us to affirm. As we
shall explain, we agree with the State and affirm.
A. Legal framework.
Ex post facto laws are prohibited under the United States and Maryland
Constitutions. U.S. Const., art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . pass any . . . ex post facto
Law[.]”); Md. Decl. of Rts., Art. 17 (“That retrospective Laws, punishing acts committed
before the existence of such Laws, and by them only declared criminal are oppressive,
unjust, and incompatible with liberty; wherefore, no ex post facto Law ought to be made;
nor any retrospective oath or restriction be imposed, or required.”). The Supreme Court of
Maryland has explained that “The Ex Post Facto Clauses of the United States Constitution
6
and Maryland Declaration of Rights have been viewed generally to have the ‘same
meaning’….” Khalifa v. State, 382 Md. 400, 425 (2004) (citation omitted).
“[T]he Latin phrase ‘ex post facto’ literally encompasses any law passed ‘after the
fact[.]’” Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 41 (1990) (citing Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386,
390-92 (1798)). The constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws, however, has
long been recognized to apply “only to penal statutes which disadvantage the offender
affected by them.” Id. (citing Calder, 3 Dall. at 390-92). Indeed, “[b]y enacting the Ex
Post Facto Clause, ‘the Framers sought to assure that legislative Acts give fair warning of
their effect. . . .’” Khalifa, 382 Md. at 425 (quoting Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28
(1981)). The Ex Post Facto Clauses, therefore, are understood to “protect[] liberty by
preventing governments from enacting statutes with ‘manifestly unjust and oppressive’
retroactive effects.” Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 611 (2003) (quoting Calder, 3
Dall. at 391).
Historically, four types of laws have been recognized as violating the prohibition
against ex post facto laws:
1st. Every law that makes an action done before the passing of
the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; and
punishes such action. 2d. Every law that aggravates a crime,
or makes it greater than it was, when committed. 3d. Every
law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater
punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when
committed. 4th. Every law that alters the legal rules of
evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony, than the
law required at the time of the commission of the offence, in
order to convict the offender.
Id. at 612 (quoting Calder, 3 Dall. at 390-91) (emphasis omitted).
7
The prohibition against ex post facto laws applies to all criminal and penal laws.
See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n for Rational Sexual Offense L. v. Stein, 112 F.4th 196, 202 (4th Cir.
2024) (quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 370 (1997)) (“The Ex Post Facto Clause
‘forbids the application of any new punitive measure to a crime already consummated.’”);
State v. Raines, 383 Md. 1, 26 (2004) (describing elements required “for a criminal or penal
law to be ex post facto”). Penal laws are those that impose punishment. See Hendricks,
521 U.S. at 371.
Criminal laws are not the only type of law that is penal. Indeed, civil laws can be
penal in nature. We utilize a two-step framework to determine whether a statute is
“penal/punitive in character, or whether it was intended to be merely civil in nature.”
Raines, 383 Md. at 27. This well-established framework -- the “intent-effects” test -- was
set forth by the Supreme Court of the United States in Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003):
We must [first] “ascertain whether the legislature meant the
statute to establish ‘civil’ proceedings.” Kansas v. Hendricks,
521 U.S. 346, 361, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997).
If the intention of the legislature was to impose punishment,
that ends the inquiry. If, however, the intention was to enact a
regulatory scheme that is civil and nonpunitive, we must
further examine whether the statutory scheme is “‘so punitive
either in purpose or effect as to negate [the State’s] intention’
to deem it ‘civil.’” [Id.] (quoting United States v. Ward, 448
U.S. 242, 248-249, 100 S. Ct. 2636, 65 L.Ed.2d 742 (1980)).
Id. at 92. We now endeavor to apply this legal framework to the present case.
B. Juvenile proceedings are civil in nature and the imposition of probation
on a juvenile offender is not punishment.
The first step in our analysis is to determine whether the relevant statute -- the 2024
amendment to the JJRA increasing the allowable initial term of juvenile probation from
8
one year to two years -- was intended to be civil in nature.
We “ordinarily defer to the legislature’s stated intent,” Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361,
so “‘only the clearest proof’ will suffice to override legislative intent and transform what
has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty[.]” Smith, 538 U.S. at 92
(quoting Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 100 (1997)). “[W]hether [the] legislature
meant for the statute to be criminal or civil in nature [i]s a matter of statutory construction”
that requires first “consider[ing] the statute’s text and structure.” Raines, 383 Md. at 28
(citing Smith, 538 U.S. at 92).
In Maryland, juvenile delinquency proceedings such as D.C.’s are conducted under
a separate legal system pursuant to the Juvenile Causes subtitle of the Courts and Judicial
Proceedings Article of the Maryland Code. CJP §§ 3-8A-01 to 3-8A-35. This separate
system of law has long been understood to be civil -- rather than criminal -- in nature. See
In re Victor B., 336 Md. 85, 94 (1994) (“From an analysis of the Juvenile Causes Act and
case law, it is clear that it was the intent of the General Assembly to create a separate
system of courts, procedure and method of treatment for juveniles. This extensive system
is civil in nature and is not a criminal proceeding.”); In re Areal B., 177 Md. App. 708, 714
(2007) (“Juvenile causes are civil, not criminal proceedings.”); In re J.B., 261 Md. App.
274, 279 (2024) (quoting In re Franklin P., 366 Md. 306, 328-29 (2001)) (“This separate
system reflects the General Assembly’s intent to place juveniles in a process that is ‘civil,
not criminal, [in] nature.’”).
The statutorily defined purposes of the Juvenile Causes subtitle include, among
other things:
9
(1) To ensure that the Juvenile Justice System balances the
following objectives for children who have committed
delinquent acts:
(i) Public safety and the protection of the
community;
(ii) Accountability of the child to the victim and the
community for offenses committed; and
(iii) Competency and character development to assist
children in becoming responsible and productive
members of society;
(2) To hold parents and children found to be delinquent
responsible for the child’s behavior and accountable to the
victim and the community;
(3) To hold parents and children found to be delinquent or in
need of supervision responsible, where possible, for
remedying the circumstances that required the court’s
intervention;
(4) To provide for the care, protection, and wholesome mental
and physical development of children within the provisions
of this subtitle; and to provide for a program of treatment,
training, and rehabilitation consistent with the child’s best
interests and the protection of the public interest;
(5) To conserve and strengthen the child’s family ties and to
separate a child from his parents only when necessary for
his welfare or in the interest of public safety[.]
CJP § 3-8A-02(a).4 Our courts, therefore, “have repeatedly noted that the Legislature
intended the juvenile justice system to be ‘guided generally by principles of protection and
4
“This kind of statute, ‘a rarely used express statement of legislative intent,’ is enacted ‘to underscore the importance’ of the law and serves as the clearest possible instruction from the legislature to courts on how to implement it.” Hicks v. State, 270 Md. App. 174, 242 n.8 (2026) (joint concurrence) (quoting Wash. Gas Light Co. v. Md. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 460 Md. 667, 671 (2018)).
10
rehabilitation of the individual rather than a societal goal of punishment and retribution.’”
Smith v. State, 399 Md. 565, 580 (2007) (quoting Moore v. Miley, 372 Md. 663, 672-73
(2003)).
These statutorily defined purposes are effectuated by judges through juvenile
dispositions upon a finding of delinquency. Pursuant to CJP § 3-8A-19(d), such
dispositions include: (i) “plac[ing] the child on probation or under supervision in [the
child’s] own home or in the custody or under the guardianship of a relative or other fit
person, upon terms the court deems appropriate, including community detention;” (ii)
“commit[ting] the child to the custody or under the guardianship of the Department of
Juvenile Services, the Maryland Department of Health, or a public or licensed private
agency on terms that the court considers appropriate to meet the priorities set forth in § 3-8A-02 of this subtitle . . . ;” or (iii) “[o]rder[ing] the child, parents, guardian, or custodian
of the child to participate in rehabilitative services that are in the best interest of the child
and the family.”
Any juvenile delinquency disposition -- including juvenile probation -- “must
balance the ‘competing objectives’ of public safety, accountability, and rehabilitation.” In
re S.F., 477 Md. 296, 325 (2022) (quoting Moore, 372 Md. at 673-74). As D.C. properly
points out, rehabilitation is viewed, in the context of sentencing an adult convicted of a
crime, as one of the core purposes of criminal sentencing that include specific and general
deterrence, rehabilitation and retribution. Although our cases have compared juvenile
probation to adult probation, the two are distinct. Indeed, the Supreme Court of Maryland
has explained that:
11
Unlike adult probation, juvenile probation is not considered a
punishment for a crime, nor does juvenile probation follow a
conviction. Compare Doe v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety and Corr.
Servs., 430 Md. 535, 561, 62 A.3d 123, 139 (2013) (“It is wellsettled in this State that [adult] probation is a form of a criminal
sanction.”) (citation omitted), with In re Ann M., 309 Md. 564,
570, 525 A.2d 1054, 1057 (1987) (“Under the Juvenile Causes
Act, no disposition of a juvenile petition, whether of a
delinquent, CINA or a CINS, may result in a criminal
conviction.”) (citation omitted); In re Appeal Misc. No. 32, 29
Md. App. 701, 704, 351 A.2d 164, 165 (1976) (citation
omitted) (“Judges in juvenile cases do not think in terms of
guilt, but rather in terms of the need of the child for protection,
guidance, or rehabilitation.”).
In re S.F., 477 Md. at 325 n.16.
From this, we conclude that the General Assembly intended juvenile probation, and
juvenile delinquency proceedings more broadly, to be civil in nature. Moreover, it is
evident that juvenile dispositions -- including juvenile probation -- are not intended to be
punishment.
D.C. urges us to reach the opposite conclusion but fails to provide “the clearest
proof” to override the explicit intent of the General Assembly. Smith, 538 U.S. at 92
(quoting Hudson, 522 U.S. at 100). To be sure, D.C.’s argument that juvenile probation is
a form of punishment relies principally on out-of-state cases and cases extending other
constitutional protections, such as due process protections, to children in juvenile
delinquency proceedings. As to the former, the way in which juvenile courts and
dispositions are treated in other jurisdictions has no bearing on the intent of the legislature
in this State. Regarding the latter, as the State aptly notes, the fact that children are afforded
due process protections in adjudication and violation-of-probation proceedings does not
12
mean that the General Assembly had the same intent in promulgating the Juvenile Causes
subtitle as it did in promulgating adult sentencing statutes.
D.C. contends that probation is a restriction on the probationer’s liberty. Indeed, it
is this restriction on liberty that requires juvenile courts to afford the children before them
with due process protections. See In re W.Y., 228 Md. App. 596, 617-18 (2016) (quoting
Sinhogar v. Parry, 412 N.Y.S.2d 966, 973 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979)) (“The requirement that
the juvenile and his parent must have notice and an opportunity to be heard is rooted in the
principle that out-of-state placements of delinquent children ‘are similar to probation or
parole supervision,’ and thus a restriction on liberty that cannot be imposed without due
process.”). It does not follow, however, that the General Assembly intended juvenile
probation to be punishment. Accordingly, we conclude that the Juvenile Causes subtitle is
a civil statutory scheme, and that juvenile probation is nonpunitive.
C. Application of the intent-effects test was proper.
D.C. argues that the juvenile court erred in applying the intent-effects test to
determine whether application of the 2024 amendment to his case violated the prohibition
against ex post facto laws. According to D.C., the intent-effects test is inapplicable to his
case and the juvenile court should have instead analyzed whether there was an ex post facto
clause violation by applying the disadvantage test. The State counters that the intenteffects test was properly applied and that the disadvantage test has not been adopted by the
Supreme Court of Maryland. As we shall explain, we agree with the State.
In Young v. State, 370 Md. 686 (2002), the Supreme Court of Maryland adopted the
intent-effects test “to determine whether Maryland’s sex offender registration statute
13
constitutes punishment.”5 Id. at 712. The Young Court explained that the intent-effects
test is a two-part inquiry that considers “whether (1) the legislature intended the sanction
to be punitive, and (2) the sanction is ‘so punitive’ in effect as to prevent the court from
legitimately viewing it as regulatory or civil in nature, despite the legislature’s intent.” Id.
at 706-07 (quoting Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079, 1087 (9th Cir. 1997)). As the Young
Court explained, “absent conclusive evidence of [legislative] intent as to the penal nature
of the statute,” the Supreme Court of the United States has outlined factors to be considered
“in determining whether a statute is punitive for the purposes of determining whether
criminal prosecution safeguards are required.” Young, 370 Md. at 698 (citing Kennedy v.
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963)). The so-called Mendoza-Martinez factors are:
(1) whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or
restraint; (2) whether it has historically been regarded as a
punishment; (3) whether it comes into play only on a finding
of scienter; (4) whether its operation will promote the
traditional aims of punishment—retribution and deterrence; (5)
whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime; (6)
whether it lacks an alternative purpose to which it rationally
may be connected; and (7), if such alternative does exist,
whether the statute appears excessive in relation to it.
Id. (citing Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168-69).
Thereafter, “there was confusion in Maryland as to what test should be used in
determining whether” a law violates Article 17 of the Maryland Declaration of Right’s
5
We acknowledge that the Court in Young applied the intent-effects test to a due process, rather than ex post facto, question. Young, 370 Md. at 711. As we explain, our courts, however, have utilized the intent-effects test to determine whether there is an ex post facto clause violation in subsequent cases. See, e.g., Long v. Md. State Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr. Svcs., 230 Md. App. 1 (2016).
14
prohibition against ex post facto laws. Long v. Md. State Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr.
Svcs., 230 Md. App. 1, 13 (2016). “The competing tests” were the intent-effects test
discussed by the Supreme Court of the United States in Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003)
and adopted by the Supreme Court of Maryland in Young “and the ‘disadvantage test,’
which was utilized by a plurality” of the Supreme Court of Maryland in Doe v. Dep’t of
Pub. Safety & Corr. Svcs. (“Doe I”), 430 Md. 535, 551-52 (2013). Id. We addressed this
confusion in In re Nick H. (“Nick H.”), 224 Md. App. 668 (2015).
We first explained the pertinent facts underlying Doe I:
In 2006, Doe pled guilty to and was convicted in the Circuit
Court for Washington County of a single count of child sexual
abuse arising out of an incident involving inappropriate contact
with a thirteen-year-old student that occurred during the 1983-84 school year when Doe was a junior high school teacher.
Doe was sentenced to ten years incarceration, with all but four
and one half years suspended, and three years supervised
probation upon his release. Although Doe’s plea agreement
did not address registration as a sex offender as one of the
conditions of probation, Doe was ordered at sentencing to
“register as a child sex offender.” He was also ordered to pay
a $500 fine. Following his sentencing, Doe filed a Motion to
Correct an Illegal Sentence challenging both the fine and the
requirement that he register as a child sex offender. The Circuit
Court agreed with Doe and issued an order striking the fine and
the registration requirement. Doe was released from prison in
December 2008. On October 1, 2009, Doe’s probation officer
directed him to register as a child sex offender. Doe
maintained that he did not agree with the requirement, but,
against the advice of counsel, he registered as a child sex
offender in early October 2009.
Nick H., 224 Md. App. at 681-82 (citation omitted). We went on to explain that, in Doe I,
“[t]he requirement that Doe register as a sex offender was a result of [a 2009 statutory
amendment] retroactively requiring offenders who were convicted on or after October 1,
15
1995, but committed a sexual offense before that date, to register for the first time.” Id. at
682 (citation omitted). Doe brought a declaratory judgment action “seeking an order that
he was not required to register as a sex offender.” Id. (citation omitted). The circuit court
agreed with the State that the registration requirement did not violate the prohibition against
ex post facto laws and we affirmed. Id. (citation omitted).
As we thoroughly discussed in Nick H., the then Court of Appeals granted certiorari
and reversed:
In a plurality opinion, the Court of Appeals held that “requiring
[Doe] to register as a result of the 2009 and 2010 amendments
violates the prohibition against ex post facto laws contained in
Article 17 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.” The threejudge plurality explained that “in many contexts,” the
Maryland Declaration of Rights offers broader protections than
the United States Constitution. The plurality further
determined that ex post facto claims under Article 17 should be
analyzed using the “disadvantage” standard, under which “any
law passed after the commission of an offense which . . . in
relation to that offense, or its consequences, alters the situation
of a party to his [or her] disadvantage” violates Article 17.
Specifically, under the disadvantage standard, “Article 17
prohibits the retroactive application of laws that have the effect
on an offender that is the equivalent of imposing a new
criminal sanction or punishment.” The plurality determined
that requiring Doe to register had “essentially the same effect”
as placing him on probation, that “probation is a form of a
criminal sanction,” and that “applying the statute to [Doe]
effectively imposes on him an additional criminal sanction” for
a crime committed in the 1980s. The plurality also concluded
that the dissemination of Doe’s information pursuant to [the
statute at issue] was “tantamount to the historical punishment
of shaming,” and thus imposed an additional sanction for
Doe’s crime. Therefore, according to the plurality, the
retroactive application of [the statute at issue] to Doe, which
had the effect of imposing the additional sanction of probation
16
and shaming, violated the ex post facto prohibition contained
in Article 17 if the Maryland Declaration of Rights.
Id. at 682-83 (citation omitted).
We went on to discuss, however, that only a plurality of three judges endorsed
application of the disadvantage test under Article 17 in Doe I:
Judge McDonald (joined by Judge Adkins) concurred with the
plurality’s conclusion that the statute violated Article 17, but,
in contrast to the plurality, read Article 17 in pari materia with
Article I, § 10 of the United States Constitution. Judge
McDonald’s concurrence stated further that “the cumulative
effect of [the] 2009 and 2010 amendments of the State’s sex
offender registration law took the law across the line from civil
regulation to an element of the punishment of offenders.”
Although his concurrence did not expressly state the test that
was used, both the language of the concurrence and the two
law review articles cited therein lead us to conclude that Judge
McDonald analyzed the issue under the “intent-effects test.”
Judge Harrell, writing separately, concurred in the judgment
that Doe was entitled to relief, because his 2006 plea agreement
“d[id] not indicate that sex offender registration was a term” of
the agreement. Judge Harrell, however, would have denied
Doe’s ex post facto claims under the “intent-effects” test
established in Smith v. Doe. Lastly, Judge Barbera (now Chief
Judge) dissented and, using the “intent-effects” test, would
have upheld the 2009 and 2010 amendments to [the statute at
issue] under both the State and federal constitutions.
Id. at 684 (citation omitted).
We then proceeded to analyze the narrowest ground that garnered the support of a
majority in Doe I:
Because Doe I is a plurality decision, we employ the Marks
Rule to determine the Court’s holding: “‘[W]hen a fragmented
Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the
17
result enjoys the assent of [four judges], the holding of the
court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members
who have concurred in the judgment on the narrowest
grounds.’” Wilkerson v. State, 420 Md. 573, 594, 24 A.3d 703
(2011) (quoting Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188. 193, 97
S. Ct. 990, 51 L.Ed.2d. 260 (1977)). Thus the Marks Rule
requires us to determine the common thread running through
the plurality and concurring opinions of Doe I. . . .
In Doe I, the decision that [the statute at issue] violates the
Article 17 ban on ex post facto laws is the common
denominator representing the position taken by five judges
who agreed that Doe should be granted relief. See 430 Md. at
568, 578, 62 A.3d 123. Because the Marks Rule directs us to
the narrowest ground common to the plurality and the
concurrence, Judge McDonald’s interpretation of Article 17 as
read in pari materia with the less expansive federal ex post
facto clause represents the “position taken by those Members
who concurred in the judgment on the narrowest grounds.” . . .
We recognize, however, that in reaching its holding in Doe I,
three members of the Court applied the disadvantage test (the
plurality opinion), while only two applied the intent-effects test
(Judge McDonald’s concurrence). See Doe I, 430 Md. at 568,
578, 62 A.3d 123.
Id. at 684-86. Although “neither test commanded a majority of the Court,” we determined
that the “intent-effects test is the proper test to determine whether [the statute at issue]
violates Article 17 as applied to [Nick H.].” Id. at 686. Accordingly, we agree with the
State that the intent-effects test is the appropriate method for determining whether a statute
violates the Ex Post Facto Clauses of both the State and federal constitutions.6
6
The State contends that the intent-effects test was recently reaffirmed by the United States Supreme Court in Ellingburg v. United States, 607 U.S. 163, 165, 165 n.1 (2026).
18
D. Application of the intent-effects test to the instant case.
We now apply the intent-effects test to the instant case to determine whether the
2024 amendment to the JJRA caused the juvenile delinquency statutory scheme to become
punitive in nature. As we shall explain, we conclude that the 2024 amendment does not
undermine the civil, nonpunitive, intent of juvenile probation, or the Juvenile Causes
subtitle more broadly.
As discussed supra, delinquency proceedings under the Juvenile Causes subtitle are
civil, rather than penal or punitive, in nature. In creating a separate legal system for
juvenile offenders, the General Assembly did not intend to punish children. Rather, as we
explained supra, our courts have repeatedly concluded that, from the express purposes
listed in CJP § 3-8A-02(1), it is clear “that the Legislature intended the juvenile justice
system to be ‘guided generally by principles of protection and rehabilitation of the
individual rather than a societal goal of punishment and retribution.’” Smith, 399 Md. at
580 (2007) (quoting Moore, 372 Md. at 672-73).
This nonpunitive intent -- specifically related to the 2024 amendment’s increase in
the permissible term of probation -- is, as the State aptly notes, evident in the legislative
history. Indeed, several proponents of the 2024 amendment expressed that the increase in
the potential probationary period would facilitate juvenile rehabilitation. The Maryland
Judicial Conference submitted written testimony in support of the 2024 amendment,
specifically the juvenile probation provision at issue here, explaining that the “expansion
of the length of probation [] will better enable the juvenile court to identify and secure
admission for the child to needed resources.” Md. Legis., H.B. 814 (2024 Reg. Sess.),
19
Written Testimony to House Judiciary Committee by Maryland Judicial Conference,
Feb. 5, 2024, available at https://perma.cc/RC2Q-BX74 (last visited July 29, 2026).
Similarly, Baltimore City State’s Attorney Ivan J. Bates submitted testimony
endorsing the amendments, especially the longer probation durations, explaining that:
In regards to probation, it does a disservice to both public
safety as well as to the juvenile offender when a child is given
an arbitrary time frame for probation without taking into
account the amount of time it takes to accept a child ordered to
programming or services, coupled with the time it will take that
child to complete said programming. A six-month to one-year
minimum for misdemeanor and felony charges, respectively,
are simply not enough time to ensure the successful completion
of services for that child. The offer to extend this period of
time will assist not only those responsible for ensuring these
children’s rehabilitation, but also help that child fully
appreciate the services provided and complete any such
program so ordered by the courts.
Md. Legis., H.B. 814 (2024 Reg. Sess.), Written Testimony to House Judiciary Committee
by State’s Attorney Ivan J. Bates, Feb. 8, 2024, available at https://perma.cc/GTN2-YJC7
(last visited October 13, 2026).7
This written testimony underscores that, just like the intent behind the Juvenile
Causes subtitle, the intent of the 2024 amendment extending the permissible of
probationary periods is nonpunitive. Rather, the legislative history reflects that the intent
of the 2024 amendment furthers one of the principal purposes of the Juvenile Causes
subtitle more broadly: to ensure the treatment and rehabilitation of children subject to the
Notably, the Office of the Public Defender voiced their opposition to the 2024
7
amendment to the JJRA.
20
jurisdiction of juvenile courts. We, therefore, conclude that the General Assembly did not
intend the 2024 amendment to impose punishment.
Accordingly, we move on to step two of the intent-effects test and consider the
Mendoza-Martinez factors discussed supra. The first factor is “whether [juvenile
probation] involves an affirmative disability or restraint[.]” Young, 370 Md. at 698 (citing
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168-69). It is arguable that any term of juvenile probation
-- which subjects the probationer to reporting requirements and other terms of supervision
-- constitutes an affirmative disability or restraint. See, e.g., In re S.F., 477 Md. at 325
(2022) (citing CJP § 3-8A-19(d)(1)) (“Juvenile courts have broad discretion in establishing
conditions of probation.”).
The second factor is “whether [juvenile probation] has historically been regarded as
a punishment[.]” Young, 370 Md. at 698 (citing Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168-69).
As we concluded supra, juvenile probation has not historically been considered a
punishment. We acknowledge, as D.C. argues, that adult probation is a form of punishment
and that our courts have compared juvenile probation to adult probation. We disagree,
however, that merely comparing juvenile probation to adult probation means the former
has historically been treated as punishment.8
8
D.C. contends that the juvenile court and the State misconstrue In re S.F., 477 Md. 296 (2022) as distinguishing adult and juvenile probation. According to D.C., although the In re S.F. Court noted that, unlike adult probation, juvenile probation is not a punishment, the Court proceeded to equate the two forms of probation and utilize adult probation cases to analyze the juvenile probation terms at issue in that case. We agree with D.C. that the Court relied on adult probation cases in analyzing the probation terms at issue in In re S.F. We do not, however, conclude that such a comparison renders juvenile probation a punishment for purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clauses. Moreover, we do not
21
Next, we consider “whether [juvenile probation] comes into play only on a finding
of scienter[.]” Id. (citing Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168-69). Juvenile courts have
jurisdiction to impose a disposition, such as juvenile probation, following an adjudication
in which a child is found involved. As the State concedes, a finding that a child is involved
encompasses a finding of the requisite mens rea for the relevant delinquent conduct. In
some cases, therefore, juvenile probation only comes into play upon a finding of scienter.
The fourth factor is “whether [juvenile probation’s] operation will promote the
traditional aims of punishment—retribution and deterrence[.]” Id. (citing MendozaMartinez, 372 U.S. at 168-69). The parties disagree about whether juvenile probation
promotes retributivism. D.C. argues that, by seeking to engender accountability for
delinquent acts, the Juvenile Causes subtitle promotes retributivism. The State counters
that “[r]etribution is clearly disavowed by the Juvenile Causes subtitle.” We agree with
the State. Although CJP § 3-8A-02(1) speaks of accountability and responsibility for
delinquent acts, as we explained supra, the paramount goal of the juvenile justice system
has long been understood to be to protect and rehabilitate. See, e.g., Smith, 399 Md. at 580
(quoting Moore, 372 Md. at 672-73) (“[T]he Legislature intended the juvenile justice
system to be ‘guided generally by principles of protection and rehabilitation of the
individual rather than a societal goal of punishment and retribution.’”). The parties agree
that juvenile probation’s operation promotes deterrence by reducing the chance of further
conclude that the Court’s statements distinguishing juvenile and adult probation in In re S.F. were undermined by the Court’s use of adult probation cases in analyzing the terms of S.F.’s probation.
22
delinquent acts by the probationer through treatment and rehabilitation. “A deterrent
purpose, however, does not alone render the statute punitive.” In re Nick H., 224 Md. App.
at 696 (citing Smith, 538 U.S. at 102).
Next, we must consider “whether the behavior to which [the statute] applies is
already a crime[.]” Young, 370 Md. at 698 (citing Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168-69). Although juvenile dispositions do not flow from criminal convictions, as the State
concedes, a delinquent act is “an act which would be a crime if committed by an adult.”
CJP § 3-8A-01(l). Additionally, juvenile delinquency proceedings can only be initiated by
prosecutors and such a “proceeding is a prosecution in lieu of criminal proceedings.” In re
Anthony W., 388 Md. 251, 266 (2005), abrogated on other grounds, State v. Jones, 466
Md. 142 (2019) (citations omitted).
This factor alone, however, is insufficient “to render a regulatory statute punitive.”
In re Nick H., 224 Md. App. at 697 (quoting Young, 370 Md. at 714). Indeed, because
legislatures often “attach both criminal and civil sanctions to the same act or omission,”
the sanction has an equally strong connection to the legitimate civil purpose of the Juvenile
Causes subtitle discussed supra. Young, 370 Md. at 714. Accordingly, we give this factor
only limited weight. See id. (“Thus, although the connection between sex offender
registration and past criminal behavior is clear, we accord only limited weight to this factor
in light of the equally strong connection between registration and legitimate civil
purposes.”).
Next, we consider “whether [the statute] lacks an alternative purpose to which it
rationally may be connected[.]” Id. at 698 (citing Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168-69).
23
As we discussed supra, CJP § 3-8A-02(a) defines multiple alternative purposes for the
Juvenile Causes subtitle including public safety, accountability, competency and character
development, treatment, rehabilitation, and strengthening ties between the juvenile and
their family.
Finally, we consider whether, “if such an alternative does exist, [] the statute appears
excessive in relation to it.” Id. (citing Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168-69). This factor
is “[w]eigh[ed] the heaviest” in In re Nick H. 224 Md. App. at 698. See also Wallace v.
State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 383 (Ind. 2009) (affording the final Mendoza-Martinez factor
“considerable weight,” and citing cases from three other jurisdictions that found this factor
to be the most significant). We, therefore, afford this factor significant weight here. The
2024 amendment increased the maximum initial term of juvenile probation from one year
to two years. This increase is not excessive. To be sure, even before the 2024 amendment,
juvenile courts were vested with discretion to extend a juvenile’s probation to a term of
two years upon a finding of good cause to extend for the purpose of completing treatment
or other programs. CJP § 3-8A-19.6 (amended 2024). Although, as D.C. notes, such an
extension required additional findings, we are satisfied that the 2024 amendment is not
excessive in relation to its nonpunitive goals.
Considering the Mendoza-Martinez factors as a whole, we conclude that D.C. has
failed to provide “‘the clearest proof’ that ‘the statutory scheme [is] so punitive either in
purpose or effect as to negate [the General Assembly’s] intention’ to deem it ‘civil.’”
Ellingburg, 607 U.S. at 165 n.1 (quoting Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361). The longer
maximum initial term of juvenile probation has an element of scienter, applies to conduct
24
that is already considered criminal in nature, and promotes deterrence. These factors,
however, are outweighed by the alternative purposes of the statute -- namely public safety,
treatment, and rehabilitation -- and the fact that juvenile probation has not historically been
treated as a punishment. In sum, the 2024 amendment is not so punitive as to override the
General Assembly’s express intent to create a civil and nonpunitive juvenile justice system.
Accordingly, we conclude that the juvenile court did not err in determining that applying
the 2024 amendment to D.C. did not violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws under
either the State or federal constitutions.
CONCLUSION
We hold that the juvenile court did not err in concluding that application of the
statutory amendment -- which became effective after D.C. was involved in the underlying
conduct and which allowed for the imposition of a longer term of juvenile probation -- does
not violate the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the State and federal constitutions. Accordingly,
we affirm the judgments of the Circuit Court for Frederick County.
JUDGMENTS OF THE CIRCUIT COURT
FOR FREDERICK COUNTY AFFIRMED.
COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.
25