Ye v. State

Andrea Ye v. State of Maryland, No. 709, September Term, 2025. Opinion by Graeff, J.

FIRST AMENDMENT — TRUE THREATS — STANDARD OF REVIEW —

MENS REA — SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law (“CR”) § 3-1001(b) (2021 Repl. Vol.), prohibits knowingly making a threat of mass violence. “True threats” of violence is a “historically unprotected category of communications” under the First Amendment. Counterman v. Colorado, 600 U.S .66, 74 (2023). To determine whether a communication constitutes a “true threat,” courts consider: (1) “‘[t]he context in which the words were’ communicated”; (2) “the specificity of the threat,” and (3) “the ‘reaction of a reasonable recipient familiar with the context’ in which the words were spoken.” Rovin v. State, 488 Md. 144, 219 (2024) (quoting Abbott v. State, 190 Md. App. 595, 615, 620 (2010)).

In certain contexts where First Amendment interests are implicated, courts “ha[ve] an obligation to ‘make an independent examination of the whole record’” to ensure that “the judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression.” Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of the U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 499 (1984) (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 284-86 (1964)). Here, appellant is challenging only whether the evidence was sufficient to find that his statements in the book constituted a true threat. Because a true threat is not constitutionally protected speech, and it involves a determination that requires only “‘ordinary principles of logic and common experience’ rather than legal judgment,” United States v. Hunt, 82 F.4th 129, 136 (2d Cir. 2023), de novo review by this Court is not necessary. The appropriate standard of review to apply in assessing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding that appellant made a true threat is the traditional sufficiency of the evidence standard, giving deference to the findings of the circuit court judge as the fact finder.

The evidence was sufficient to support appellant’s conviction under CR § 3-1001. The statements in appellant’s book, “I want to shoot up my school” and “This gun is going to change lives tomorrow,” when viewed in context with appellant’s expressed desire to engage in a school shooting and his statements that his writing was based on his own thoughts and experiences, permitted a reasonable inference that appellant was going to act on his expressed desire to commit a school shooting. The evidence was sufficient to support the circuit court’s finding that appellant’s communications were a true threat.

Recklessness is the minimum constitutionally required mens rea that the State must prove in true threats cases. Counterman, 600 U.S at 74. Here, the General Assembly has expressly stated that knowledge is the required mens rea for a conviction under CR § 3-1001. Accordingly, the State was required to show a mens rea of “knowingly” to properly convict appellant of making a true threat. The evidence supported the court’s finding that appellant understood that his statements regarding wanting to engage in a school shooting would be taken as a threat, particularly because the recipient expressed concern that appellant would act on his homicidal impulses. The evidence was sufficient to support the circuit court’s finding that appellant sent the communication knowing that Maxwell would perceive the words in the book as a threat.

Circuit Court for Montgomery County

Case No. C-15-CR-24-000665

REPORTED

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF MARYLAND

No. 709

September Term, 2025

ANDREA YE

v.

STATE OF MARYLAND

Graeff,

Zic,

Zarnoch, Robert A.

(Senior Judge, Specially Assigned),

JJ.

Opinion by Graeff, J.

Filed: October 28, 2026

Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal

Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State

Government Article) this document is authentic.

2026.10.28

'00'04- 15:31:58

Gregory Hilton, Clerk

On January 8, 2025, Andrea “Alex” Ye,1 appellant, was convicted of making a threat

of mass violence in violation of Maryland Code, Criminal Law § 3-1001, after a two-day

bench trial in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. The court sentenced appellant to

10 years of incarceration, all but 12 months suspended, with five years of supervised

probation. On October 14, 2025, the court reduced the unsuspended portion of the sentence

to 140 days.

On appeal, appellant presents two questions for this Court’s review,2 which we have

consolidated and rephrased slightly, as follows:

Was the evidence legally sufficient to convict appellant of making a

threat of mass violence under Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law (“CR”) § 3-1001 (2021 Repl. Vol.)?

1

Appellant uses male pronouns and goes by the name “Alex.”

2

Appellant presents the following questions for review:

1. Whether speech is a constitutionally unprotected “true threat”

depends on its language, context, and likely effect on an

objectively reasonable recipient familiar with the context in which

it was communicated. Was the evidence sufficient to establish a

“true threat” where Appellant privately transmitted his manuscript

to solicit writing feedback from two trusted friends, both of whom

understood it was a work of fiction?

2. To establish that Appellant acted “knowingly,” the State must

prove recklessness—that Appellant communicated his message

with a conscious disregard that it would be viewed as threatening

violence. Was the evidence sufficient to establish that Appellant

acted recklessly?

For the reasons set forth below, we shall affirm the judgment of the circuit

court.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The charged offense in this case arose from the opening paragraph of a book that

appellant wrote and sent via electronic messaging to two friends on March 3, 2024.3 The

opening lines of the 129-page book stated: “I want to shoot up my school. I’ve been

preparing for it for the past few months.” The next couple of lines discussed an AR-15

style semi-automatic rifle and then stated: “This gun is going to change lives tomorrow.”

The next couple of paragraphs of the book explained that the protagonist, a ChineseAmerican, transgender teen named James Wang, wanted to be a mass shooter to “have fun,

get a bit of fame and glory before I die, and not be forgotten.” The book stated that the

protagonist had looked at his classmates and pictured himself hunting them down, picked

the classrooms that were the easiest targets, and would carry out his plan tomorrow.

One of the people to whom he sent the book, Maxwell, who had engaged in prior

conversations with appellant about appellant’s homicidal ideations regarding a school

shooting, called the police after reading the first few pages of the book. Police responded

and investigated the incident, obtaining a search warrant for appellant’s home, phone

records, social media history, and internet search history. At the time, appellant was a

student at Wootton High School (“Wootton”), but he was enrolled in virtual school after

The Instagram messages show that appellant sent Maxwell the book at 12:46 a.m.

3

on March 3, 2024.

2

expressing suicidal and homicidal ideations, including “some rather intense homicidal

ideation around a school shooting,” and the school had issued a no-trespass order.

On April 16, 2024, the police arrested appellant, and he was later charged with one

count of knowingly threatening to commit a crime of mass violence under CR § 3-1001(b).

On December 9, 2024, a two-day bench trial began in the Circuit Court for Montgomery

County.

I.

Trial Testimony

A.

Corporal Jessica Rogers

On March 3, 2024, Corporal Rogers, a member of the Rockville City Police

Department, received a call regarding a report that appellant had “made mentions of some

sort of a school shooting.” At approximately 2:26 p.m., Corporal Rogers and her partner,

Office Thrasher, went to appellant’s home. Corporal Rogers asked appellant if he had

mentioned “shooting up a school, wanting to harm himself, [or] harm anybody else.”

Appellant stated that he did not want to harm himself or anybody else, and he did not make

any threats against his school. Appellant told Corporal Rogers that he did not have access

to any weapons. Corporal Rogers did not go inside to confirm there were no weapons in

the house.

Corporal Rogers then spoke to appellant about his book, which appellant described

as a story about “events leading up to [an individual] being placed in [a] psychiatric

hospital,” including the “mention of a school shooting.” Appellant sent the story to two

3

individuals, one who Corporal Rogers said was unnamed, the second who went by

Maxwell. Corporal Rogers did not follow up with the unnamed person who received the

book.4

Appellant and his father both told Corporal Rogers that the book was fiction.

Appellant stated that the setting of the book was late 2022 to early 2023, and he planned to

publish it. Corporal Rogers suggested that, “due to the nature of [the book],” appellant

should note at the beginning that it was fiction to avoid any miscommunication. Corporal

Rogers did not read the book.

B.

Sergeant Justin Saffar

Sergeant Saffar, supervisor of the Montgomery County Police Behavioral

Assessment Unit, testified that his unit handled and investigated “all school threats, bomb

threats, [and] threats to the general public.” In December 2023, Douglas Nelson, the

principal of Wootton, contacted Sergeant Saffar “to be part of a behavioral assessment.”

A behavioral assessment involves a collaboration of school officials, non-school officials,

police, and school resources officers to address students who pose a threat or danger to the

community.

In January 2024, a behavioral assessment meeting took place to determine whether

appellant, who was under a no-trespass order due to prior disclosures of homicidal ideation,

could return to school in-person. Appellant was not permitted to return to the Wootton

4

As discussed, infra, an individual named Kierstan was the second recipient of the book.

4

campus at that time because the assessment team wanted additional information from

appellant’s parents before making a decision. Between January and March of 2024,

Sergeant Saffar continued to receive updates from the school and monitor appellant’s

behavior.

On March 3, 2024, the Rockville City Police notified Sergeant Saffar of a critical

alert incident involving a student who had written a book indicating a plan to shoot up a

school. Sergeant Saffar immediately recognized appellant’s name as “someone that MCPS

. . . considered an elevated threat.” Sergeant Saffar contacted Maxwell the next morning

to obtain additional information, and based on that information, he began drafting a search

warrant. The search warrant was for appellant’s Google account, and it included any

written documents in the Google Drive from March 1, 2024, to March 4, 2024.

Appellant’s book, admitted over objection as an exhibit, was among the records

obtained from Google. Sergeant Saffar testified that he read through the entire document.

The book recovered from Google included an author’s note at the top, stating:

This is a work of fiction. All the names, characters, businesses, places, events

and incidents in this book are either the product of the author’s imagination

or used in a fictitious manner. Any resemblance to actual persons, living or

dead, or actual events is purely coincidental. This is not a threat of violence,

nor does it represent the author’s beliefs.

Sergeant Saffar was not able to access prior versions or history of the document.

Sergeant Saffar also obtained 2,200 pages of records from Instagram pursuant to the

search warrants. He testified to similarities between the book’s narrator and appellant’s

life, including the narrator’s transgender identity, race, disclosures to the school counselor,

prior hospitalizations and an escape attempt, God complex, and thoughts of shooting

5

children. Multiple comments in appellant’s Instagram posts pertained to media attention.

Appellant stated that “killing random people gets more attention in the media,” and he

wanted “to glow up other shooters who were not attractive in their [publicized] pictures.”

Appellant’s Instagram records indicated that he considered his book to be an

autobiography.

Sergeant Saffar next discussed his review of the Google records he obtained related

to internet searches appellant conducted from March 1, 2024, to March 4, 2024. Appellant

had searched for written descriptions of an AR-15, “[w]hat an AR[-15] sounds like,” the

minimum age for entrance to a gun range, and information on previous school shooters. A

much broader investigation of appellant’s Google history revealed searches for targets of

mass violence events and additional school shooters, including Aiden Hill, a transgender

shooter in Tennessee, and Nikolas Cruz, from the Parkland, Florida shooting. Appellant

also searched for “Salad Days,” a reference to the song Nikolas Cruz listened to during the

Parkland shooting. The song originated from Shakespeare, related to making youthful

decisions, and had become “kind of a rallying cry or a song that other wannabe school

shooters listen to.”

Another Google search appellant conducted was for a book called “Forgive Me,

Leonard Peacock” by Matthew Quick, “a book about a high school student who shoots his

best friend, and then plans on shooting himself.” Sergeant Saffar testified that “essentially

every school shooting you can name [wa]s somewhere in [appellant’s] history during the

extended search.”

6

Sergeant Saffar next discussed the records obtained related to appellant’s Discord

app.5 Appellant was a member of several Discord chat groups that discussed and offered

to share photos from the Columbine shooting, and he requested to be invited to the “TC

Group,” which law enforcement interpreted to mean the “Trench Coat” group, a reference

to the coats the Columbine shooters wore. Sergeant Saffar explained the trench coat was

“one of those kind of legacy tokens that shooters gravitate towards as wannabe or

copycats,” and law enforcement considered the Columbine anniversary in deciding when

to charge appellant. The police charged appellant once there was “enough evidence to

charge him.”

The search of appellant’s iPhone revealed a map of Wootton and the image of “a

stick figure drawing of people being shot at by a subject with a gun.” The images said “me

and you,” and the images labeled “you” appeared to be “deceased stick figures.” Sergeant

Saffar did not know who took the photographs of the map or of the stick figure drawing,

when they were taken, or if they were sent to appellant by someone else. Documents from

the hard drive of appellant’s computer, as well as journals, notebooks, and newspaper

clippings from his home, were also obtained pursuant to a search warrant. One of the

notebooks was like a scrap book and contained ripped out newspaper clippings of

“generally violent things,” including drownings, abortion, and numerous school shootings.

There were also political clippings, LGBTQ articles, and cut outs of cartoon newspaper

articles in the scrap book.

Discord is a social media app “where people communicate most often about video

5

games” and other topics.

7

The journals also contained lists of novel ideas and discussions that appellant

wanted to write a novel. In several journals, there were “bucket list goals,” which stated

“publish novel” and “publish a book.”

Sergeant Saffar participated in behavioral assessment meetings with the school

system to implement mitigation strategies during the investigation and after appellant was

arrested. Appellant was not arrested until 44 days after the police became aware of the

writing at issue in this case.

Sergeant Saffar acknowledged that appellant never committed any type of school

shooting, nor did James Wang, the narrator in appellant’s book. He also acknowledged

that James Wang did not injure anyone in the book or attempt to shoot anyone in the book.

Sergeant Saffar agreed that the majority of appellant’s book described James Wang’s

“journey from hospitalization to his release [from] hospitalization.”

After reviewing the book to refresh his recollection, Sergeant Saffar stated that,

based on passages about a New Year’s Eve party and James Wang’s hospitalization,

appellant’s book was set in 2022 and ended in 2023. Sergeant Saffar next testified

regarding differences between the book and appellant’s real life. For example, in the book,

police found an AR-15 semiautomatic rifle gun case in the bedroom of James Wang’s

parents, but no firearm was ever found in appellant’s house.6

6

The police did not search the entirety of appellant’s home. They searched his parent’s closet with consent, but they did not check under the bed or other places in their bedroom.

8

Defense counsel went through the book chapter by chapter with Sergeant Saffar. At

the end of Chapter One, James Wang states: “I’m starting to think that this is a bad idea.”7

At the beginning of Chapter Two, he states: “I’m filled with doubt as the sun rises,” and “I

don’t know if I really want to go through with my plan.” James Wang then decides to go

see the school counselor in hopes that “a counselor can help save [him] from [his] thoughts”

and “help [him] not think this way.” By the end of Chapter Two, James Wang is

hospitalized, but he has been “isolated after some incidents.” In Chapters Three through

Nine, James Wang continues his hospitalization, he introduces several new characters from

the hospital, and he describes his first kiss and sexual experience.

In Chapter 10, James Wang contemplates suicide and begins hiding pills in his

mouth to collect for an overdose. At one point, he states: “I might have anger issues

because I want to find a doctor and shoot a bullet through his brain. Maybe normal people

don’t think this way.” After hospital staff discover pills in James Wang’s room, he is put

in an isolation room, attempts to escape the facility, and is eventually injected with

medication. The book continues with discussions between James Wang and a staff member

about his mental thoughts, frustrations, and coping mechanisms, including boxing. James

Wang eventually returns to the group from isolation and resumes group activities.

7

The rest of that paragraph, however, states:

I can’t back out. My brain tells me to imagine all the kids that will lose their

friends, all the good people that will die. I want to scream. Another part of

me urges that it will be so much fun and lots of people die any day anyway.

I wouldn’t even be torturing them. In fact, I’d be merciful to give them a

quick death. I bite my lip so hard it bleeds. Blood is what I’ll be smelling

tomorrow.

9

In Chapter 13, there are discussions between James Wang and his doctor, and then

there is a family meeting. Investigators in the book had recovered a firearm from James

Wang’s locker. A fight breaks out between James Wang and another patient and James

returns to isolation. At the end of the chapter, two of his friends leave the hospital, and

hospital staff confiscate the paper with the friends’ contact information. James becomes

violent again and is administered an injection to sedate him.

As the book continues, James believes that he is Jesus, which was similar to the

police findings about appellant. After a clergyman visited James Wang at the hospital,

James states: “I’m starting to think I may not be Jesus.” James then discusses possible

step-down residential facilities with a staff member. He learns of a shooting at an

elementary school: “How many people are killed, [he] asked excited?”

In Chapter 17, James Wang is taken by EMT to a residential facility and meets a

new character named Hannah. He gets his cellphone back and begins texting friends and

conducting internet searches of school shootings, as well as the March for Our Lives

website. The next day, he attends a residential day program. When Hannah drives James

back to the group home, he thinks: “Kill her, kill her, kill her. I have a hard time shutting

up the thoughts, but I tell myself not to do it. She’s a nice person.”

James Wang does not kill anyone in the book. In the last chapter, during a walk

with Hannah, James Wang discusses his college essays and “the struggles that he’s had

with thoughts of school shootings.” He contemplates giving advice to other “kids that have

similar thoughts” and telling “them that it’s a bad idea.” James Wang eventually leaves

the residential program. In the last paragraph of the book, it states:

10

I think about how last year, I was dead set on shooting up my school. Now,

I really don’t want to do that anymore. Of course, I still get violent thoughts

sometimes, but I realize that I’ll really fuck up my life and the lives of those

harmed if I act on them. I have bigger dreams that I don’t want to mess up.

I want to become a politician, go to college, spend time with friends, read

more books, play sports, explore new places, and stay out of prison.

Everyone else also has things that they want to do and things that they care

about, and it’ll be a total asshole move to come out with an AR-15 and mow

them down.

I hope that I live a good life. And I hope that I don’t kill anyone.

Sergeant Saffar explained that appellant was charged based on the content of the

book as evaluated in the totality of the circumstances. The Instagram and Discord records,

Google searches, and appellant’s admissions of having an “evil” plan and being

“unethical” and “selfish,” when considered together, indicated that appellant “was

someone who was making a threat of mass violence, and was telling people that he had a

plan.”8

C.

Nicole Fuller

Nicole Fuller, a special agent with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”),

assisted Sergeant Saffar in the investigation of appellant. She assisted with the review of

extractions from four electronic devices seized pursuant to the search warrant, including

one cell phone, two laptops, and an iPad. Ms. Fuller verified that text messages, browsing

history, and Google searches introduced as evidence by the State were fair representations

of the data retrieved from appellant’s devices. The court overruled defense counsel’s

8

Appellant argues that some of these records were not relevant to the issue here, but he did not raise as an issue on appeal that the court erred in admitting them.

11

objections to messages referencing appellant’s purchase of a BB gun, finding that

appellant’s statement that he “bought a BB gun and told the school therapist [he] was

going to pretend to shoot up the school” was relevant to the case.

D.

Maxwell

Maxwell, a senior in high school, first met appellant in January of 2021 or 2022.

They interacted in person for approximately one week, and a few weeks later, they met up

at a food mall. Later, Maxwell interacted with appellant exclusively online via Instagram.

On March 3, 2024, Maxwell called 911 after receiving a Google document through

a link sent by Instagram. Maxwell told the police about receipt of a document threatening

a school shooting, and Maxwell told the police the name of appellant’s school.

During Maxwell’s testimony, the State introduced appellant’s book, marked as

State’s Exhibit 1, and Maxwell recognized it from the first line, which read: “I want to

shoot up my school.” The remainder of the first paragraph read:

I’ve been preparing for it for the past few months. As I sit in front of my

dad’s gun case and stare at the sleek, black gun inside, all I can think about

is my finger on the trigger, taking aim, and killing people. The gun is an AR15 style semi-automatic rifle. It’s the kind of gun with a long barrel and a

stock you put up against your shoulder. This gun is going to change lives

tomorrow.

Maxwell contacted the police after reading only a couple of pages. The fiction

disclaimer at the top of the copy of the book that the State introduced into evidence was

not in the version that Maxwell received, and if it had been, Maxwell may not have called

the police. Maxwell subsequently spoke with an FBI agent and local police.

12

Maxwell did not read the part of the book where the main character went to a mental

health facility and no school shooting occurred. An hour or two after contacting police,

Maxwell no longer had access to the Google document sent by appellant.

The topic of school shootings had come up in previous conversations between

Maxwell and appellant. Appellant told Maxwell that he wanted to commit a school

shooting and hoped “to gain notoriety from it.” Maxwell testified:

I remember specifically he referenced how certain like killers would go to

court and people would simp for them or like become attracted to them and

he wanted to just become a spectacle like I believe an example he wanted to

be like is the Sandy Hook shooters.

The State introduced into evidence Instagram messages between Maxwell and

appellant, which included a lot of conversations about school shootings. In September

2023, appellant told Maxwell that he wanted to shoot and bomb his school because it

seemed fun. In December, he said his homicidal ideation was getting worse, to the point

that he might act on it eventually. Appellant said he wanted to “publish a book and

promote it.” When Maxwell asked if appellant was really going to do it, appellant said,

at one point, that schools were closed, and at another point, that there was no danger

because he did not have a gun. When appellant asked if Maxwell was going to report him

to the police, Maxwell said that he would not at that point because appellant said he was

not going to do it then, but Maxwell was not going to let him commit a mass murder.

Maxwell was worried and asked for appellant’s parents’ number. Appellant stated that

there were multiple reasons he had not done it yet, mostly because he did not have a gun,

but also he did not want to do it before he published a book.

13

Maxwell advised appellant to focus on other goals, and appellant said he wanted to

be a published author, but he did not think he was a good writer. Appellant sent a draft of

the first paragraph (which did not include the sentence that the gun was going to change

lives tomorrow), Maxwell gave some comments, and they agreed that Maxwell would

read more when the book was done.9 Appellant said the book was basically based on his

life and how he went to the hospital, and because it was from the point of view of an

“almost school shooter,” it would be controversial. He said he would “make it ‘fiction’

technically,” so he could talk about the thoughts more.

On March 3, 2024, appellant sent Maxwell the book. Maxwell subsequently told

appellant on Instagram that the book was “very interesting so far,” and Maxwell asked if

appellant was “actually going to do it tho,” asking if he was “gonna shoot up ur school.”

Appellant said no and asked Maxwell to give him “feedback on what’s working and

what’s not working in the book” because appellant wanted to improve the book. Maxwell

texted: “I thought it was real like you were going to shoot it up tomorrow and I was like

oh damn, skull emoji.” Appellant responded: “No, it’s all fiction. I don’t even have a

9

Appellant sent Maxwell the following paragraph:

I want to shoot up my school. I’ve been preparing for it for the past

few months. All I can think about nowadays is my finger on the

trigger, taking aim and killing them one by one. Smelling the fresh

blood, hearing the wretched screaming, and hearing the deafening

boom of my gunshots. I want to see the fear in their wild eyes. I smile

just thinking about it. My hands are slick with sweat, jittery, shocks

zigzag through my body. I’ll walk through the boring school doors

just like anyone else and leave as a villain.

14

gun.” Appellant stated that he was “feeling better” and did not “feel like [committing a

mass shooting] anymore.”

Maxwell asked appellant about his treatment and what changed.10 Appellant

responded: “I changed because I care more about living a better life and becoming a

politician and publishing a book, like college and stuff like that so I care more about that

than killing people.” Appellant told Maxwell that he had shared his book with one other

friend.11 Appellant wanted to share it with “a teen writers group.” He said he would tell

most people he shared it with that it was fiction and completely made up.

When asked about the timing of events, Maxwell stated that, after thinking about it,

the text conversation where appellant said he was not planning on doing a mass shooting

anymore was prior to Maxwell contacting the police. Maxwell called the police after

receiving the book because Maxwell “thought it was 100 percent a threat.”

10

Maxwell testified that he asked questions because he wanted to be a psychiatrist and “to learn more and like making sure that he’s like telling the truth, that he’s actually getting good treatment.”

11

Appellant sent the book to another friend named Kierstan, whom Maxwell

referred to as a “friend from a different psych ward.” Appellant messaged her before sending it, stating: “I wrote a book inspired by my experiences in the psych ward let me know your gmail if you want to read it . . . Ok!! And give me feedback plz on it[.]” Kierstan replied: “ITS SO GOOD . . . I REALLY LIKENIT . . . ITS LIKE READING A GENUINE BOOK.” Appellant told Kierstan he had been working on the book for a year and implored her to “tell me the negatives too if you have any[,] I want to improve the book.”

15

E.

Kathryn Omerso

Kathryn Omerso, a mental health therapist with the Sheppard and Enoch Pratt

Hospital, worked in the Montgomery County Public Schools through the “A Bridge to

Wellness” program. The program placed a mental health therapist, care manager, and

youth development specialist at Wootton to provide mental health counseling, resources,

and support. Ms. Omerso met appellant through the program and made three disclosures

to the school administration after meeting with him. Ms. Omerso made the third

disclosure in December 2022, based on a therapy session with appellant in which he was

agitated, experiencing ongoing suicidal ideation, but also “now homicidal ideation.” After

appellant shared his ideations, Ms. Omerso continued her assessment to gather

information in support of a disclosure, including whether appellant had a plan, means to

carry out a plan, and specifics regarding his “thoughts and ideations.” Ms. Omerso

determined that appellant had “intense homicidal ideation around a school shooting,” and

she notified the school administration, school social worker, and appellant’s parents. Ms.

Omerso called ahead to a hospital to ensure that appellant “got to a higher level of care.”

On cross-examination, Ms. Omerso acknowledged that, in March 2024, she had not

had any contact with appellant for more than a year. She had not “read the content of the

book at issue.”

16

F.

Douglas Nelson

Douglas Nelson was the principal of Wootton when appellant was a student there.

In December 2022, Mr. Nelson learned of an issue with appellant from Ms. Omerso and

the assistant principal who “was working on that threat.” The administration convened a

behavior threat assessment team. In January 2023, the chief of safety and security issued

a “no trespass order” to appellant. The order was issued via a system-wide letter “to ensure

that [appellant] was not permitted on MCPS property.”

In December 2022, the behavior threat assessment team deemed appellant a

moderate to high threat, which required Mr. Nelson to contact the Central Office and

involve the Department of Psychological Services, the Office of School Safety, and

emergency management. A “cross-functional team” in the Montgomery County Public

School system also was brought in to manage the threat. The behavior threat assessment

process continued from 2022 until appellant graduated in 2024.

In March 2024, Sergeant Saffar contacted Mr. Nelson to inform him of the book

written by appellant and sent to Maxwell. Mr. Nelson convened the central behavior threat

assessment team, which implemented heightened monitoring at Wootton, including

sharing appellant’s pictures, watching entrances, and having additional security staff

present on campus. Mr. Nelson also alerted the cluster principals at the middle and

elementary schools, who took similar steps to increase security, including the circulation

of a school resource officer to appellant’s elementary school. The team increased

appellant’s risk level to high after learning of his book because it was concerned that

17

“within the written document could possibly be a plan.” Heightened security measures

continued until the end of the school year in 2024.

On cross-examination, Mr. Nelson acknowledged that he had “not personally read

the writing that was referred to by police,” and it was never provided to him. Although

he was concerned about appellant having a plan, he did not know whether the book

actually contained a plan to carry out a school shooting, but Sergeant Saffar alerted him

“to the fact that this was a concern.” Mr. Nelson testified that, between the beginning of

March 2024 through the end of April 2024, appellant never came to Wootton and never

attempted to conduct a school shooting.

II.

Motion for Judgment of Acquittal

Appellant moved for a judgment of acquittal at the end of the State’s case, arguing

that the State had not met its burden to submit the case to the fact finder. Appellant argued

that Maxwell’s testimony, as well as the book itself, showed that appellant did not plan to

carry out a school shooting. The book was set in the past, described the narrator’s decision

not to commit a shooting, and focused on his mental health treatment journey, and

therefore, there was no indication of an imminent or future threat. Appellant asserted that

the writing did not “rise to the level of [a] true threat,” which was demonstrated by

Instagram messages in which appellant stated he did not intend to “shoot up the school,”

and the school’s response was “based off a book that they didn’t even read” or have

“access to.”

18

The State responded that it met its burden to establish a prima facie case that

appellant violated the statute criminalizing threats of mass violence. It argued that the

statute did not require “completion . . . of a crime” or “even an attempt to commit”; it

merely required a threat. The State asserted that appellant’s book, sent to others on March

3, 2024, established the existence of a true threat because it contained details indicating

that the narrator, whose life paralleled appellant’s, had a plan to shoot up the school. The

State contended that the writing must be considered “in the context of all the other threats

and statements that [appellant] had made to others,” as well as his search history. The

State argued that appellant was aware that his writing could be perceived as a threat, and

therefore, it proved the required mental state of recklessness because he published it

“consciously disregard[ing] a substantial risk that his communications would be viewed

as threatening violence.”

The court denied the motion for judgment of acquittal, concluding that the State had

made a prima facie case based on the evidence presented. Appellant did not testify or

present any evidence on his behalf. Appellant then renewed his motion for judgment of

acquittal, which the court ultimately denied, finding that the evidence and all reasonable

inferences were legally sufficient for consideration by the finder of fact.

III.

Verdict

On January 8, 2025, the court issued its verdict. After reviewing the evidence and

applicable law, the court found appellant guilty of making a threat of mass violence under

CR § 3-1001.

19

The court noted, citing Abbott v. State, 190 Md. App. 595, 615, 629 (2010), that a

threat is defined as “an ‘expression of a determination or intent to injure presently or in the

future.’” The court then stated that, according to the Maryland Pattern Jury Instructions:

A threat is not idle or careless talk, exaggeration, or something said in a

joking manner. A statement is a threat, if it was made under such

circumstances that a reasonable person, hearing or reading the statement,

would understand it as a serious expression of an intent to kill, physically

injure, or kidnap. Whether a particular statement −− whether a particular

communication constitutes a true threat, depends on both its language and its

context.

See Maryland Pattern Jury Instructions (“MPJI-Cr”) 4:12.2 (addressing the crime of

making a threat against a state or local official pursuant to Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 3-708 (2024 Supp.)).

The court explained that the context of the writing in this case was important, noting

that the backdrop of the case was that, in December of 2022, appellant made a disclosure

to a therapist, who later determined that appellant had “intense homicidal ideation around

a school shooting.” The court found that appellant had acknowledged “researching guns,

gun laws, and how to kill someone with a BB gun,” and he had “expressed thoughts of

shooting up his elementary school,” with “no concern about small children dying in front

of him.” The court noted that appellant wanted to be famous and had “delusions that he

was God.” Based on the therapist’s assessment, appellant was hospitalized and Wootton’s

behavioral threat assessment team convened and met regularly to monitor his threat risk.

When appellant was released from the hospital in January 2023, his threat risk was assessed

as high, and in February 2023, the school issued a no-trespass letter to appellant. When

20

appellant’s phone was searched, a diagram of Wootton high school was found, as well as

photos of stick figures with someone shooting an AR-15.

With regard to the book sent to Maxwell in March 2024, the court rejected

appellant’s assertion that it was fiction, stating that appellant’s own description of the book

to others belied his claim. The court found that appellant stated that the book was an

account of “his time in the psych ward.” Although appellant had changed his name and

the names of individuals he met while hospitalized, “substantive details” of the book were

“clearly a direct correlation . . . to [appellant’s] life,” including, among other things: James

Wang, the narrator, was, similar to appellant, “a transgender Asian male who was a junior

in high school when he made a disclosure to the school therapist that he wanted to shoot

up his school” and both James and appellant had a no-trespass order for their high school.

The court found that the book was “not a work of fiction, but . . . an account of [appellant’s]

life and his thoughts.”

The court noted that appellant had shared his book with Maxwell, a friend with

whom he had discussed on Instagram his desire to shoot up or bomb his school. Appellant

stated in his September 2023 texts that what he was saying counted as “terroristic threats”

and could “be a felony.” When Maxwell clarified that appellant wanted to shoot and bomb

his school, appellant responded with a thumbs up. When asked why, he said it “just seems

fun.” Maxwell asked if appellant really wanted to do it, and appellant said that he “[didn’t]

want to go to jail . . . so I guess not. Are you going to report me? LMAO.” In December

2023, appellant said that his homicidal ideation was getting worse, but he did not think he

21

would take action on it soon because he could not legally buy a gun. Appellant stated that

he wanted to kill to get attention.

Appellant told Maxwell that he “was trespassed for wanting to shoot up his school.”

The court highlighted conversations from late December 2023 in which appellant discussed

“drawing kids out that are hiding in a classroom,” using chemical weapons to kill more

people, and how it was “cool” that the two Columbine shooters could “make such a big

impact on the world and have so much notoriety.” Appellant also discussed working with

someone else or “stabbing up a school” because he did not have access to a firearm.

Maxwell expressed concern that appellant would act on his thoughts and asked appellant

for his contact information to call his parents. Appellant refused. Appellant said there was

no danger at that point because he could not buy a gun.

The court discussed messages from appellant on the Discord app, where appellant

praised the September 11th terrorist attacks and school shooters. Appellant stated that he

“almost got charged with a crime” for “[t]hreatening mass violence and threatening

terrorism or something like that.” Appellant also shared in an unprompted message that he

was trying to get his no-trespassing order lifted, which prevented him from stepping foot

in any school in his county. He stated that he was never arrested but “did kind of have a

motive. I wanted to be infamous, and I thought it would be fun.” When the Discord

conversation had a delay, appellant wrote: “Help. I’m paranoid that you’re going to report

me to the FBI.” The court noted that, in another Discord message, appellant stated that he

would “be in jail” if the police obtained his phone and journals because of “[t]oo much

22

planning mass violence and searching about it.” He ended the conversation with: “It would

be so cool if we worked together to repeat Columbine.”

The court discussed evidence of the topics appellant searched in the four months

leading up to his arrest, which included, among other things, numerous school shootings,

gun rights, pop culture references concerning school shootings, firearm descriptions, a

school shooting game, the end of the school year for Wootton seniors, school shooting

music playlists, and a failed terrorist attack. Based on this “backdrop,” the court found that

appellant had “an unhealthy obsession with school shootings and their shooters.”

The court found that Maxwell read the first few pages of appellant’s book before

calling 911, and reporting that he received a document threatening to shoot up a school.

The court found that Maxwell’s Instagram conversation with appellant, where appellant

said he was better and did not feel like shooting up a school anymore, took place after

Maxwell called the police, but it was unclear whether it took place before or after appellant

had spoken with the police.12

The court then applied its factual findings to the law, explaining that “[w]hether a

particular communication constitutes a true threat depends on both its language and its

context.” With regard to whether appellant acted knowingly, the court stated that appellant

was smart and “fully aware of the impact of his statements based upon his own words,”

noting that, after speaking with the police, appellant added the “author’s note disclaimer”

to his book, which the court found indicated a level of “consciousness of guilt.” Moreover,

12

We note that Maxwell testified that his conversation with appellant was before he called the police, but that factual issue is not dispositive of our resolution of the case.

23

in other texts, appellant acknowledged that his statements were felony terroristic threats,

he had expressed concern that someone would report him to the police, and he stated that

he would “be in jail if the police” discovered his search history.

The court found that, based on text messages and Maxwell’s testimony, it was clear

that Maxwell was concerned that appellant would actually commit a school shooting.

Maxwell asked for appellant’s contact information and his parents’ phone number,

informing appellant more than once that Maxwell would not “just let” appellant commit a

shooting.

Citing Abbott v. State, 190 Md. App. at 615, 629, the court explained that “the

factors to be considered in determining whether a communication constitutes a threat”

were: “the language used, and whether a reasonable person hearing or reading the words

and knowing all of the circumstances would have considered the words to be a threat.” It

found that Maxwell was “the reasonable person in this case, with knowledge of all the

circumstances, and [Maxwell] obviously certainly considered it to be a threat.” The court

found that, after observing the witnesses, determining their credibility, and measuring the

weight of all of the evidence, appellant’s “words in his book were not jokes, were not jest

or just talk, nor were his words protected speech.” It found that appellant’s “words or his

communications, based on their context, constituted a threat to shoot up his high school,”

which “would place five or more people at substantial risk of death or serious physical

injury.” Accordingly, the court found appellant guilty.

24

On January 17, 2025, appellant filed a motion for a new trial on the grounds that the

court improperly admitted certain evidence and witness testimony. On February 7, 2025,

the court denied the motion.

This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

Appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of

making a threat of mass violence. His brief does not dispute the court’s finding that he had

“an unhealthy obsession with school shootings and their shooters.” He argues, however,

that the court “conflated the issue of whether [he] made a threat with whether he, as a

generally troubled teenager, might pose a threat.”

Appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for

two reasons. First, he argues that his book did not constitute a true threat. Second, he

argues that there was insufficient evidence that he acted “‘knowingly,’ that is, recklessly,

by consciously disregarding a substantial risk that Max or Kierstan, trusted friends from

whom he solicited writing feedback, would believe that his novella threatened actual

violence.” We will address both arguments, in turn.

I.

True Threat

Appellant argues that his action in emailing the book was not a “true threat” for

several reasons. First, the book did not identify a real school as its target or “attribute a

prospective attack to any real person.” Second, the court could only understand the book

25

to be a threat by reading the first two chapters without the context of the remaining 14

chapters, which address his psychiatric treatment journey, coming of age experiences, and

ultimate recovery. Third, he sent the book to a friend seeking feedback on his writing,

explained that the book was written “from the [point-of-view] of an almost school shooter,”

and told Maxwell after he sent the book that it was fiction inspired by his life. Appellant

asserts that, in this context, the words communicated “inescapably establish a consensual

sharing of artistic expression, not the statement of an intent to commit violence,” and “[a]n

objectively reasonable recipient familiar with the context would not have considered [his]

request for writing feedback an actual threat against Wootton.”

The State contends that the evidence was legally sufficient to support appellant’s

conviction. It asserts that there is no question that the words used in the book, “I want to

shoot up my school . . . I’ve been preparing for it for the past few months. . . . This gun is

going to change lives tomorrow,” were threatening, and Maxwell “100 percent” considered

the words to be a threat. The only question was whether, considered in context, a

reasonable person would have concluded that the book constituted a true threat. It argues

that, when considered in the context of appellant’s “prior communications about wanting

to commit a school shooting,” appellant’s book acted as a vehicle for his thoughts (“I feel

like given it’s fiction technically I could talk about the thoughts more”), and Maxwell

“reasonably viewed this as a threat” based on appellant’s prior disclosures of intrusive

thoughts and ongoing homicidal ideation.

The State argues that it was the factfinder’s role to determine whether the book was

fiction, whether the ending of the book negated the threat in the opening paragraph, and

26

whether Maxwell’s reaction to the book was reasonable. It asserts that appellant’s

arguments on appeal “go to the weight that the trial court should have placed on certain

testimony or evidence, not its sufficiency.”

“The First Amendment to the United States Constitution, applicable to the states

through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits [states] from making any law ‘abridging the

freedom of speech.’” Brasse v. State, 264 Md. App. 740, 749-50 (2025) (quoting Virginia

v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003)). “The hallmark of the protection of free speech is to

allow ‘free trade in ideas’ – even ideas that the overwhelming majority of people might

find distasteful or discomforting.” Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003) (quoting

Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)). Accord Texas

v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (“If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First

Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply

because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”).

As we explained in Brasse, 264 Md. App. at 750, however, there are limits to this

protection:

The right to freedom of speech . . . is “not absolute at all times and

under all circumstances.” Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571,

62 S.Ct. 766, 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942); Black, 538 U.S. at 359, 123 S.Ct. 1536.

The First Amendment “is not an impenetrable shield which protects any

speech or conduct, whatsoever, with disregard to its harm and effect.”

Galloway v. State, 365 Md. 599, 646, 781 A.2d 851 (2001) (quoting Kansas

v. Whitesell, 270 Kan. 259, 13 P.3d 887, 900 (2000)), cert. denied, 535 U.S.

990, 122 S.Ct 1547, 152 L.Ed.2d 472 (2002). “[F]reedom of speech has its

limits.” [Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 245, 122 S.Ct.

1389 (2002)].

* * *

27

For example, defamation, incitement, and obscenity do not constitute

protected speech. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 246, 122 S.Ct. 1389.

Additionally, a state may ban “fighting words,” i.e., “conduct that itself

inflicts injury or tends to incite immediate violence.” R.A.V. v. City of St.

Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 380, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992) (quoting

In re Welfare of R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507, 510 (Minn. 1991)); [Lipp v. State,

246 Md. App. 105, 112, 227 A.3d 818 (2020)].

“‘True threats’ of violence is another historically unprotected category of

communications.” Counterman v. Colorado, 600 U.S .66, 74 (2023). Accord Black, 538

U.S. at 358-59; Abbott, 190 Md. App. at 619.

“True threats are ‘serious expression[s]’ conveying that a speaker means to ‘commit

an act of unlawful violence.’” Counterman, 600 U.S. at 74 (quoting Black, 538 U.S. at

359). A “true threat” falls outside the protections of the First Amendment and is “distinct

from ‘words as mere political argument, talk or jest.’” Abbott, 190 Md. App. at 619

(quoting United States v. Dysart, 705 F.2d 1247, 1256 (10th Cir. 1983)).

As indicated, appellant’s challenge here involves CR § 3-1001(b), which prohibits

knowingly making a threat of mass violence. It provides as follows:

A person may not knowingly threaten to commit or threaten to cause

to be committed a crime of violence . . . that would place five or more

people at substantial risk of death or serious physical injury . . . if the

threat were carried out.[13]

Violation of Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law (“CR”) § 3-1001(b) (2021 Repl.

13

Vol.) is a misdemeanor, and a person found guilty of violating this provision “is subject to imprisonment not exceeding 10 years or a fine not exceeding $10,000 or both.”

28

Appellant asserts that this case presents issues of first impression, stating that “no published

Maryland opinion has construed CR § 3-1001 or the meaning of its pivotal terms

‘knowingly’ and ‘threaten.’”

The Maryland appellate courts, however, have interpreted the statutory term

“threat” in other contexts, noting that to convict a defendant under a statute criminalizing

threats, the State must prove a “true threat.” See Rovin v. State, 488 Md. 144, 217-18

(2024) (statutory term “threat,” construed consistent with the First Amendment as a “true

threat,” is a communication that conveys “a serious expression of intent to inflict physical

harm”); Abbott, 190 Md. App. at 619 (in discussing the “true threat” doctrine, defining a

threat as a “an expression of ‘a determination or intent to injure presently or in the future’”)

(quoting Martin v. United States, 691 F.2d 1235, 1240 (8th Cir. 1982)).

To determine whether a communication constitutes a “true threat,” courts consider:

(1) “‘[t]he context in which the words were’ communicated”; (2) “the specificity of the

threat,” and (3) “the ‘reaction of a reasonable recipient familiar with the context’ in which

the words were spoken.” Rovin, 488 Md. at 219 (quoting Abbott, 190 Md. App. at 620).

Prohibitions on true threats are “constitutionally permissible regardless of whether the

speaker intends to carry out the threat” because such prohibitions protect people from both

the threatened violence and the fear of the threatened violence, as well as any related

disruptions caused. Id. at 217. Accord Black, 538 U.S. at 359-60 (speech can be a true

threat even if speaker did not intend to carry out the threat).

To prove that a statement is a true threat, such that a speaker may be criminally

liable, a person must have “some subjective understanding of the threatening nature of his

29

statements.” Counterman, 600 U.S. at 69. The defendant must have communicated the

threat with a mens rea of, at a minimum, recklessness, which means that the “speaker is

aware ‘that others could regard his statements as’ threatening violence and ‘delivers them

anyway.’” Id. at 79 (quoting Elonis v. United States, 575 U.S. 723, 746 (2015)).

A.

Standard of Review

Before addressing the substance of the parties’ arguments, we must address the

appropriate standard of review that this Court should apply in determining whether there

was sufficient evidence to support appellant’s conviction for knowingly making a threat of

mass violence under CR § 3-1001. As the State notes, we typically review a claim

regarding the sufficiency of the evidence in a bench trial as follows:

The test for legal sufficiency of evidence is whether any rational fact finder

could find “the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”

State v. Morrison, 470 Md. 86, 108, 233 A.3d 136 (2020) (quoting State v.

Coleman, 423 Md. 666, 672, 33 A.3d 468 (2011)). On review of a criminal

bench trial, we review “the law and the evidence to determine whether in law

the evidence is sufficient to sustain the conviction, but the verdict of the trial

court shall not be set aside on the evidence, unless clearly erroneous.” Rivera

v. State, 248 Md. App. 170, 178-79, 240 A.3d 77 (2020) (quoting Williams

v. State, 5 Md. App. 450, 454, 247 A.2d 731 (1968), cert. denied, 252 Md.

734 (1969)). Moreover,

[t]he Court’s concern is not whether the verdict is in accord

with what appears to be the weight of the evidence, but rather

is only with whether the verdicts were supported with

sufficient evidence — that is, evidence that either showed

directly, or circumstantially, or supported a rational inference

of facts which could fairly convince a trier of fact of the

defendant’s guilt of the offense charged beyond a reasonable

doubt. We must give deference to all reasonable inferences

[that] the fact-finder draws, regardless of whether [the

appellate court] would have chosen a different reasonable

30

inference. Further we do not distinguish between

circumstantial and direct evidence because [a] conviction may

be sustained on the basis of a single strand of direct evidence

or successive links of circumstantial evidence.

Hammond v. State, 257 Md. App. 99, 125 (2023) (quoting DeGrange v. State, 221 Md.

App. 415, 420-21 (2015)).

Appellant contends, however, that the issue presented in this case is whether his

speech was constitutionally protected under the First Amendment. He argues that whether

his written communication contained an unprotected true threat is a question of law that

this Court must review de novo.

To be sure, in certain contexts where First Amendment interests are implicated,

courts “ha[ve] an obligation to ‘make an independent examination of the whole record’” to

ensure that “the judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free

expression.” Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of the U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 499 (1984)

(quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 284-86 (1964)). In Bose, where the

Court addressed whether a libelous statement was made with “actual malice,” the Court

held that independent review was necessary, in part, because the term was “given meaning

through the evolutionary process of common-law adjudication.” Id. at 502.

Since Bose was decided, courts have addressed the appropriate standard of review

when assessing the sufficiency of the evidence in the context of determining whether a

defendant made “true threats.” Courts have reached conflicting results.

Some courts have held that an independent review of the evidence is required. See

United States. v. Keyser, 704 F.3d 631, 638 (9th Cir. 2012) (appellate courts must engage

31

in independent review of any constitutional facts, such as whether statements were true

threats); United States v. Bly, 510 F.3d 453, 457 (4th Cir. 2007) (“Whether a written

communication contains either constitutionally protected ‘political hyperbole’ or an

unprotected ‘true threat’ is a question of law and fact that we review de novo.”); United

States v. Hayner, 371 F. Supp. 3d 700, 705-06 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (independent review of

the evidence required when a defendant was convicted for engaging in speech involving a

true threat); State v. Taveras, 271 A.3d 123, 130 (Conn. 2022) (reviewing de novo

determination of whether statements constituted a true threat); People v. Brown, 510 P.3d

579, 586 (Colo. App. 2022) (“[W]hether a statement constitutes a true threat is a matter

subject to independent review.”); State v. Johnson, 127 P.3d 707, 712-13 (Wash. 2006)

(whether statement constitutes a true threat is a matter subject to independent review); In

re George T., 93 P.3d 1007, 1015 (Cal. 2004) (“Independent review is particularly

important in the threats context because it is a type of speech that is subject to categorical

exclusion from First Amendment protection, similar to obscenity, fighting words, and

incitement of imminent lawless action.”).

Other courts, including this one, have applied the traditional sufficiency standard in

determining whether the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction requiring a true

threat. See Abbott, 190 Md. App. at 619. In Abbott, we addressed whether the content of

an email to the then-Governor constituted a true threat. Id. at 629. In the email, the

defendant stated, in pertinent part: “If i[sic] ever get close enough to yoy [sic], I will rap

[sic] my hands around your throat and strangle the life from you.” Id. at 605. We held that

“it was for the trier of fact to determine whether the content of the e-mail constituted a true

32

threat to harm the Governor, rather than politically protected speech that merely voiced

opposition to illegal immigration.” Id. at 629. Based on the traditional sufficiency of the

evidence review, we held that the evidence, which showed that the defendant personally

transmitted the email to the Governor’s office, hoping that he would read it, “was more

than sufficient to find that appellant willfully and knowingly made a true threat to injure

the Governor.” Id.

Other courts similarly have applied the traditional sufficiency of the evidence

standard of review in cases involving “true threats” and found that the issue of whether a

statement is a true threat is a finding of fact for the fact finder. For example, in United

States v. Hunt, 82 F.4th 129, 136-37 (2d Cir. 2023), the court rejected the argument that

the “constitutional fact doctrine,” which requires independent appellate review, applied in

the context of the determination whether the defendant made a “true threat.” Id. at 135-37.

The court distinguished the holding in Bose, which applied independent review to the

determination whether a libelous statement was made with “actual malice,” because the

term “actual malice” was given meaning through the evolutionary process of common-law

adjudication. Id. at 136. The court stated that the true threat determination, by contrast,

“relies upon the sensibilities of ordinary people,” and it “involves no legal principles

warranting independent review of the [fact finder’s] conclusion.” Id. at 136-37. The court

concluded that this holding aligned with the “well-established view that ‘whether words

used are a true threat’ is ‘a question of fact’ for the jury to which we defer.” Id. at 137

(quoting United State v. Amor, 24 F.3d 432, 436 (2d Cir. 1994)).

33

Similarly, in United States v. Parr, 545 F.3d 491, 496-97 (7th Cir. 2008), the court

addressed the sufficiency of the evidence that the defendant made a true threat. The court

stated that, if Parr was making an argument about the scope of the true threat doctrine or

the proper definition of a true threat, de novo review would be appropriate, but where Parr’s

claim involved whether there was evidence to support a finding that his statements were

threats, that was a question for the jury. Id. at 497. Accord United States v. Schiefen, 139

F.3d 638, 639 (8th Cir. 1998) (applying traditional sufficiency of the evidence review to

jury’s determination that the statement was a true threat). See also United States v.

Wheeler, 776 F.3d 736, 742 (10th Cir. 2015) (whether statements amount to true threats is

a question best left to the jury); United State v. Burger, 170 F.4th 395, 406 (5th Cir. 2026)

(“Whether a statement is a true threat is generally a question for the jury.”).

In addition to the true threat cases discussed above, we find the analysis in State v.

McGagh, 472 Md. 168, 197 (2021), instructive. In that case, the Supreme Court of

Maryland explained that:

In some cases, this Court has supplemented the [sufficiency] standard with a

de novo review when a constitutional right is at issue. The independent

examination ensures this Court’s protection of fundamental rights. Our case

law demonstrates the proper application of de novo review when the State,

through action or statute, seeks to regulate or control protected speech.

Id. at 195.

For example, in Polk v. State, 378 Md. 1, 3 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 951

(2004), the defendant was charged with disobeying a lawful order after she responded with

profanity to the officer’s order to be quiet and leave the hospital. Polk’s conviction turned

on whether the order was an unlawful order attempting to control the content of her speech

34

or a lawful order to prevent a disturbance of the public peace. Id. at 5-7. The Court in

McGagh, 472 Md. at 196, explained that de novo review was necessary in Polk “to

determine whether a State action [the officer’s order], regulation or statute may have

violated protected speech under the First Amendment.”

In McGagh, by contrast, McGaugh’s conviction was for perjury, and she did not

challenge the constitutionality of the perjury statute. Id. at 197. The Court noted that

“[p]erjurious speech does not receive First Amendment protection,” and “[u]nprotected

speech renders unnecessary an independent review of the record for First Amendment

violations.” Id. at 196-97. It stated that merely suggesting that facts triggered First

Amendment issues was insufficient to invoke de novo review. Id. at 197. The Court

concluded that the defendant’s First Amendment rights were not implicated in the case,

and the traditional sufficiency of the evidence standard applied because the issue was

“whether the State presented sufficient evidence to prove the elements of perjury and false

report,” not “whether the State infringed upon her protected speech.” Id.

Similarly, here, appellant is not challenging the constitutionality of CR § 3-1001.

Rather, he is challenging whether the evidence was sufficient to find that his statements in

the book, in context, constituted a true threat. Because a true threat is not constitutionally

protected speech, and it involves a determination that, as one court has observed, requires

only “‘ordinary principles of logic and common experience’ rather than legal judgment,”

Hunt, 82 F.4th at 136 (quoting Bose, 466 U.S. at 501 n.17), de novo review by this Court

is not necessary. Based on the case law, we hold that the appropriate standard of review to

apply in assessing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding that appellant made

35

a true threat is the traditional sufficiency of the evidence standard, giving deference to the

findings of the circuit court judge as the fact finder.

With that background, we review the merits of appellant’s claims.

B.

Analysis

As indicated, in determining whether appellant’s book constituted a true threat, we

consider the specificity of the threat, the context in which the words were communicated,

and the reaction of a reasonable recipient familiar with that context. Abbott, 190 Md. App.

at 620. Beginning with the words alleged to be a threat, the State argues, and the circuit

court found, that the opening phrases of appellant’s book, stating: “I want to shoot up my

school. I’ve been preparing for it for the past few months,” in conjunction with the next

sentence discussing an AR-15 style semi-automatic rifle and then stating: “This gun is

going to change lives tomorrow,” were threatening. In isolation, that does not seem to be

debatable.

The more difficult issue in this case is the context in which the statements were

made. “[T]o be a ‘true threat,’ the statement, ‘when taken in context,’ must convey a real

possibility that violence will follow.” Burger, 170 F.4th at 402 (quoting Counterman, 600

U.S. at 74). See In re Douglas D., 626 N.W.2d 725, 740-41 (Wis. 2001) (“crude and

repugnant” story about beheading teacher was not a true threat because it was written

during creative writing class, in third person, with no mention of the defendant, and

contained “hyperbole and attempts at jest”).

36

In assessing context here, appellant focuses on the context that the words were part

of a book sent to a friend for feedback on writing. In late December 2023, a few months

before he sent the book, appellant had told Maxwell that he had been working on publishing

a book about an “almost school shooter” that was “basically based on [his] life.” Appellant

stated that he would “make it ‘fiction’ technically,” and that it would be “about how [he

went] to the hospital and stuff.”14 Appellant explained to Maxwell that, “given it’s fiction

technically I could talk about the thoughts more,” and characters were “fictionalized but

inspired by multiple real people.”15

Moreover, appellant argues that, when the whole book is considered, it is clear that

it is a story of a student who contemplates committing a school shooting but then

reconsiders after telling a counselor and receiving treatment at a psychiatric facility. By

14

The cases that appellant cites in support of his suggestion that fictional writing inspired by the author’s own experience does not constitute a true threat are distinguishable. For example, in In re George T., 93 P.3d 1007, 1017 (Cal. 2004), the Supreme Court of California discussed a poem involving a fictional character reflecting the defendant’s personal feelings. In that case, the defendant wrote a poem stating, in relevant part, “For I can be the next kid to bring guns to kill students at school. So parents watch your children cuz I’m BACK!!” The Court held that this did not constitute a true threat because it was not an unequivocal threat, noting that it failed to show “an immediate prospect that [the] minor would bring guns to school and shoot students.” Id. Here, by contrast, the opening paragraph of the book indicated an intent to go to school with a gun and “change lives.”

15

The disclaimer found on the copy of the book admitted into evidence was not on the book that appellant sent to Maxwell. In any event, we note that the inclusion of a disclaimer that a statement is fiction does not insulate a defendant from the finding that the statement was a true threat. See Dominguez v. State, 432 So.3d 1192, 1201 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2026) (disclaimer on video threatening school shooting did not shield the defendant from prosecution where disclaimer could be viewed as a “veiled attempt to hide . . . true motives”).

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chapter two, the narrator is “filled with doubt” and decides to visit a guidance counselor in

the hope that the counselor “can help save [him] from [his] thoughts.” The remainder of

the book chronicles appellant’s treatment at the psychiatric facility, various setbacks he

experiences, his ongoing struggle with intrusive thoughts and violent outbursts, a coming

of age experience, and his eventual release to an outpatient residential treatment center. By

the end of the book, the narrator contemplates that, just one year prior, he “was dead set on

shooting up [his] school,” but now he “really d[id]n’t want to do that anymore.”

Finally, when Maxwell talked to appellant later in the day on which appellant sent

the book, after Maxwell read a part of it, appellant stated that the book was “all fiction.”

When Maxwell asked: “So u aren’t planning on doing a mass shooting anymore?” appellant

replied: “Yeah I’m feeling better I don’t feel like doing it anymore.” Appellant told

Maxwell that he cared “more about living and my future and about the world.” In this

context, appellant argues that the book cannot be considered a true threat.

The State frames the context in which appellant sent the book differently. It argues

that, although appellant claims “he was engaged in novel writing protected by the First

Amendment,” the context of his prior communications with Maxwell permitted a

reasonable inference that his words were a true threat. We agree.

The opening words of the book, which reasonably conveyed that the protagonist

was going to commit a mass shooting the next day, must be viewed in context with

Maxwell’s many conversations with appellant about appellant’s desire to commit a school

shooting, his intrusive thoughts, and his homicidal ideation. At one point, appellant told

Maxwell that his homicidal ideation was getting worse, and he “might act on it eventually.”

38

Maxwell was concerned with appellant’s statements and repeatedly asked whether

appellant was going to go through with committing a school shooting. Maxwell was so

concerned about the content of appellant’s messages that he asked for the contact

information for appellant’s parents so Maxwell could notify them of appellant’s plan to

shoot up a school. When appellant refused, Maxwell stated an intent to report any plan to

appellant’s school, texting: “If u tell me ur going to commit mass murder[,] im not going

to just let u do that.” In this context, and with the knowledge that the book was based on

appellant’s experiences and acted as a vehicle for appellant’s thoughts, Maxwell viewed

the book as a threat. Indeed, Maxwell testified that, upon receipt of the completed book

from appellant, Maxwell called the police because Maxwell believed “it was 100 percent

a threat.”16

To be sure, the test is not based on Maxwell’s subjective belief upon receipt of the

book. Rather, the appropriate analysis in considering whether words were a true threat

looks at “the reaction of a reasonable recipient familiar with the context in which the words

were written.” Abbott, 190 Md. App. at 620. “[I]f a reasonable person would foresee that

an objective rational recipient of the statement would interpret its language to constitute a

serious expression of intent . . . that message conveys a true threat.” Id. (quoting United

States v. Miller, 115 F.3d 361, 363 (6th Cir. 1997)). Nevertheless, Maxwell’s reaction is

significant in the analysis. See Burger, 170 F.4th at 404-05 (reactions of the recipients of

16

Appellant contends that Maxwell’s decision to call the police was at the urging of Maxwell’s sister. As the State notes, although Maxwell testified to contacting the police after talking with Maxwell’s sister, there was no testimony that the call to the police was at Maxwell’s sister’s urging.

39

a communication “can be useful in determining whether an objectively reasonable person

would interpret a statement as a threat”).

Here, the evidence, including the words in the beginning of a book, “I want to shoot

up my school” and “This gun is going to change lives tomorrow,” must be read in the

context of the numerous statements that appellant made to Maxwell expressing his desire

to engage in a school shooting. These statements, and appellant’s statements that the

writing was based on his own thoughts and experiences, permitted a reasonable inference

that appellant was going to act on his expressed desire to commit a school shooting.17 Such

an inference was permissible even though appellant’s words were in a book – whether

fictional or autobiographical – because, at the time he was writing the book, he was also

expressing a continued desire to commit a school shooting.

Although appellant characterizes the book as one detailing psychiatric treatment and

recovery, there is a different way to view it. In addition to the opening paragraph that

contains a plan to shoot up a school the next day, the remainder of the book contains

numerous references to violent impulses, including multiple references to wanting to

“shoot up a school” and wanting to kill people because it is fun. In the last five pages, the

17

Appellant argues that a “true threat” requires a specific target, citing Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 389 (2003), for the proposition that the threat must be a communication of violent intent “to a particular individual or group of individuals.” The Court in Black, however, said “only that true threats ‘encompass’ – i.e., include – threats intended to be interpreted as such, without necessarily excluding other kinds of expression.” Interest of J.J.M., 265 A.3d 246, 302-03 (Pa. 2021). In any event, as the State notes, the language in the book stated: “I want to shoot up my school.” Appellant was a student at Wootten at the time of the writing, and the students in attendance there were the target of his threat. Even if required, appellant’s words can be read to sufficiently target “a particular individual or group of individuals.” Black, 538 U.S. at 359.

40

narrator continues to state that he wants to “shoot up a school,” and in the final sentence,

the narrator states that he hopes he does not kill anyone. A reasonable recipient of the book,

in the context of appellant’s prior statements, could view this as a true threat. The evidence

was sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that appellant’s statements constituted a

true threat.

II.

Mens Rea

Appellant next contends that the “evidence was insufficient to prove that [he] acted

recklessly.” He notes that, although the existence of a “true threat” is an objective test,

based on how a reasonable person would construe a statement in context, the First

Amendment requires proof that he had a substantive understanding of the threatening

nature of his statements. Appellant argues that the State was required to prove that he

“understood, but consciously disregarded, a substantial risk that Max[well] or Kierstan

would perceive his manuscript as an actual threat of violence.” Appellant asserts that the

circumstances of his communication, including that he shared the manuscript through

private channels, he characterized the writing as a fictional book from the perspective of

an “almost school shooter,” and he asked the recipients for feedback on his writing,

indicated that appellant was not on notice that Maxwell would feel threatened. Although

appellant had expressed concerns about others reporting him to the police based on his

thoughts, he argues that it is significant that he did not express these concerns related to his

book. Finally, appellant contends that “private exchanges of artistic work generally do not

satisfy recklessness.”

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The State contends that the circuit court “properly concluded that [appellant] had

the requisite mens rea” to support a conviction under CR § 3-1001. It argues that the

evidence met the “standard of knowledge required by the statute” because a reasonable fact

finder could conclude that sending the book to a person he previously had told that he

wanted to commit a school shooting was sufficient to show awareness that the person

would believe the words were a threat. Indeed, appellant previously had expressed

concerns that his past statements, journals, and internet history could be perceived as

threatening mass violence.

We begin with the proper mens rea requirement in CR § 3-1001. Appellant argues

that the correct standard is recklessness. The State argues that a higher standard,

knowingly, applies.

CR § 3-1001 states, in relevant part, that: “A person may not knowingly threaten to

commit or threaten to cause to be committed a crime of violence . . . that would place five

or more people at substantial risk of death or serious physical injury.” (Emphasis added).

Appellant argues that the term “knowingly” means that he “comprehend[ed] the meaning

of the words uttered,” Abbott, 190 Md. App. at 619, and the United States Supreme Court,

in Counterman, 600 U.S. at 69, held that the State must also show recklessness, “a higher

standard than mere comprehension.” The State argues that the statute imposes the standard

of “knowingly,” which is a higher standard than recklessness.

In Counterman, the question was whether, in a prosecution for making a true threat

of violence, the First Amendment “requires proof that the defendant had some subjective

understanding of the threatening nature of his statements.” 600 U.S. at 69. The Court held

42

that it did, and “a mental state of recklessness [wa]s sufficient.” Id. In determining the

minimum subjective mens rea required by the First Amendment in true threat cases, the

Court explained:

The law of mens rea offers three basic choices. Purpose is the most culpable

level in the standard mental-state hierarchy, and the hardest to prove. A

person acts purposefully when he “consciously desires” a result—so here,

when he wants his words to be received as threats. United States v. Bailey,

444 U.S. 394, 404, 100 S.Ct. 624, 62 L.Ed.2d 575 (1980). Next down, though

not often distinguished from purpose, is knowledge. Ibid. A person acts

knowingly when “he is aware that [a] result is practically certain to follow”—

so here, when he knows to a practical certainty that others will take his words

as threats. Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). A greater gap separates

those two from recklessness. A person acts recklessly, in the most common

formulation, when he “consciously disregard[s] a substantial [and

unjustifiable] risk that the conduct will cause harm to another.” Voisine v.

United States, 579 U.S. 686, 691, 136 S.Ct. 2272, 195 L.Ed.2d 736 (2016)

(internal quotation marks omitted).

Id. at 78-79. In balancing the constitutional interest in free expression with the value in

“protecting against the profound harms, to both individuals and society, that attend true

threats of violence,” the Court held that recklessness was the minimum constitutionally

required mens rea that the State must prove in true threats cases. Id. at 80-82. As noted

by Justice Barrett, however, the recklessness standard created in Counterman is merely the

“constitutional floor for true threats,” and the legislature is “always free to exceed the

floor.” Id. at 116-17 (Barrett, J., dissenting). Accord State v. Calloway, 585 P.3d 1270,

1272 (Wash. 2026) (en banc) (“Counterman requires a mens rea standard of at least

‘recklessness.’”); People v. Casper, 577 P.3d 489, 498 (Colo. App. 2025) (upholding

conviction where jury found defendant satisfied “more culpable and difficult to prove mens

rea standard” of knowingly as opposed to recklessness standard required in Counterman).

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Here, the General Assembly has expressly stated that knowledge is the required

mens rea for a conviction under CR § 3-1001. Accordingly, we agree with the State that it

was required to show a mens reas of “knowingly” to properly convict appellant of making

a true threat.18 An individual “acts knowingly . . . when he knows to a practical certainty

that others will take his words as threats.” Counterman, 600 U.S. at 79.

Here, the circuit court found that appellant “was fully aware of the impact of his

statements based upon his own words,” noting that appellant previously “recognized his

statements were terroristic threats, which he himself had classified as a felony.” The court

noted appellant’s “repeated concerns” that Maxwell and the Discord user would report him

to law enforcement based on his online statements. The court also stated that appellant

acknowledged that he was, once before, “almost charged with” making threats of mass

violence and that, if the police searched his phone, journals, and house, he would be “in

jail.” In Instagram messages to Maxwell, appellant noted that his school considered

pressing charges against him, a forensic psychiatrist investigated him, and that the

“attorney general had to approve [his] stay to residential.”

Sending his book to Maxwell, after Maxwell expressed clear concerns that appellant

was going to engage in a school shooting, supports the court’s finding that appellant had

18

In Rovin v. State, 488 Md. 144, 218-19 (2024), the Supreme Court of Maryland applied the recklessness standard set forth in Counterman in its analysis of a prosecution for making a true threat under Maryland’s jury intimidation statute. The statute at issue in that case, however, did not contain an express mens rea standard, and therefore, the Court properly applied the constitutionally required minimum standard of recklessness. See CR § 9-305(a) (“A person may not, by threat, force, or corrupt means, try to influence, intimidate, or impede a juror, a witness, or an officer of a court of the State or of the United States in the performance of the person’s official duties.”).

44

knowledge that his statements would be perceived as a threat. In Instagram message

exchanges, Maxwell admonished appellant, “BOY DON’T SHOOT UP A SCHOOL.”

Maxwell asked for appellant’s address or his parents’ phone number stating, “If u tell me

ur going to commit mass murder[,] im not going to just let u do that.” When appellant

pushed back at Maxwell’s request, Maxwell told appellant that his address was unnecessary

because Maxwell would just notify his school if appellant intended to commit a shooting.

Appellant’s responses to Maxwell and others online indicated that he understood that his

statements regarding wanting to engage in a school shooting support the circuit court’s

finding that appellant knew his words would be taken as a threat, particularly by Maxwell,

who had expressed concern that appellant would act on his homicidal impulses. The

evidence was sufficient to support the circuit court’s finding that appellant sent the

communication knowing that Maxwell would perceive the words in the book as a threat.19

19

We decline to adopt appellant’s argument that the sharing of his book was a private exchange of artistic work that cannot constitute “reckless speech.” One case on which appellant relies, Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d. 608, 611 (5th Cir. 2004), involved a threatening drawing that the defendant kept at home and was only inadvertently discovered when the defendant’s brother took the sketchpad to school two years later. Because the defendant intended to keep the drawing private other than to those in his own home, the “accidental and unintentional exposure” at school was not sufficient to constitute a threat outside the protection of the First Amendment. Id. at 617-18. Here, appellant did intend to share his book and purposefully sent it to Maxwell and Kierstan after Maxwell had already expressed serious concerns about his homicidal ideation. Porter is not analogous to the present case. In J.S. by M.S. v. Manheim Twp. Sch. Dist., 263 A.3d 295, 318 (Pa. 2021), the context of the holding that memes on Snapchat did not constitute a true threat included that the person to whom the communication was sent had no reason to believe that J.S had a propensity to engage in violence and did not perceive the communication to constitute a threat, factors that do not apply here.

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Accordingly, we hold that there was sufficient evidence to support appellant’s conviction

under CR § 3-1001.

JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT

FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY

AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY

APPELLANT.

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