242 October 28, 2026 No. 1038
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
M. Q.
Petitioner-Respondent,
v.
DANNI MAR,
Respondent-Appellant.
Marion County Circuit Court
25PO07705; A188800
Amy M. Queen, Judge.
Argued and submitted September 9, 2026.
Jason E. Thompson argued the cause for appellant. Also
on the brief was Thompson Law, LLC.
No appearance for respondent.
Before Joyce, Presiding Judge, O’Connor, Judge, and
DeVore, Senior Judge.
O’CONNOR, J.
Reversed.
Cite as 354 Or App 242 (2026) 243
O’CONNOR, J.
Respondent appeals from an order granting a
petition for a restraining order under the Family Abuse
Prevention Act (FAPA), ORS 107.700 to 107.735, and from the
order continuing the FAPA order, which prohibits him from
contact with petitioner. Respondent raises two assignments
of error. In his first assignment of error, respondent argues that the trial court erred in granting the petition for the
FAPA order ex parte because there was insufficient evidence
that petitioner was in imminent danger from respondent. In
his second assignment of error, respondent argues that the
trial court erred when it continued the FAPA order because
there was insufficient evidence that respondent posed a credible threat to petitioner. Petitioner does not appear on appeal. We conclude that there was insufficient evidence to find that respondent posed a credible threat to petitioner under ORS
107.716(3)(a)(C) and, thus, that the trial court erred when it continued the FAPA order. Accordingly, we reverse.1
ORS 107.718(1) provides that a trial court shall
issue an ex parte FAPA order
“[u]pon a showing that the petitioner has been the victim
of abuse committed by the respondent within 180 days
preceding the filing of the petition, that there is an imminent danger of further abuse to the petitioner and that the
respondent represents a credible threat to the physical
safety of the petitioner or the petitioner’s child[.]”
ORS 107.716(3) further provides that a trial court may continue a FAPA order if the court finds that abuse has occurred within 180 days of the filing of the petition, the petitioner reasonably fears for their physical safety, and the respondent represents a credible threat to the physical safety of
the petitioner.
Respondent does not request de novo review, and
this is not an exceptional case that merits exercising our
1
Although respondent also challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s issuance of the FAPA order after the ex parte hearing, it is not necessary for us to resolve that issue on appeal because we reverse the continuance of the FAPA order. On remand, the trial court should cancel the FAPA order. See ORS 107.716(3)(b) (authorizing the court to “cancel” any order issued under ORS 107.718). That renders moot the challenge to the issuance of the order after the ex parte hearing.
244 M. Q. v. Mar
discretion to do so. See ORS 19.415(3)(b) (authorizing this
court to review the facts de novo as a matter of discretion); ORAP 5.40(8) (limiting exercise of de novo review to exceptional cases). Therefore, we review the trial court’s conclusions regarding a FAPA order for legal error and are bound
by the trial court’s express and implied factual findings if they are supported by any evidence in the record. J. V.-B. v. Burns, 284 Or App 366, 367, 392 P3d 386 (2017).
We state the facts in accordance with that standard. On August 6, 2025, petitioner filed an ex parte petition for a restraining order under FAPA. The following day,
the trial court held an ex parte hearing on the petition. The trial court granted the petition and issued the FAPA order
prohibiting respondent from contact with petitioner. The
provisions of the FAPA order were in effect for a period of
two years, or until the order was withdrawn, amended, or
superseded.
Respondent opposed the restraining order and
requested a hearing. At the hearing, petitioner and respondent both testified and petitioner offered one exhibit, which consisted of an email exchange between her and respondent.
Petitioner testified that after a disagreement over text message on the morning of July 16, 2025, she ended her relationship with respondent via text message. Petitioner did not
live with respondent at that time. In response, respondent
sent her numerous text messages and emails. She blocked
his phone number and email.
Petitioner testified that around 10:30 p.m. on
that same day, July 16, respondent came to her home and
knocked on the door a number of times. After she opened
the door, respondent entered her home. Petitioner attempted
to get respondent to leave and was eventually able to get
him to exit by pushing the door closed. She locked the door. Petitioner “had a hard time walking for three days after how much [she] had to try and push on the door to get [respondent] out” of her home. Petitioner and respondent then sent
a series of emails to each other, which were included in petitioner’s exhibit. Petitioner testified that he continued to send her emails, and that respondent also texted her brother and
interacted with her friends over social media. Petitioner
Cite as 354 Or App 242 (2026) 245
also testified that none of the messages that respondent sent included any threats to physically harm her, but rather were “bid[s] for [them] to see each other.”
Over email, petitioner and respondent agreed that
they needed to stay in communication to settle shared accounts and finances. Petitioner testified that all of those tasks were taken care of by July 29 or 30. The last time respondent was in petitioner’s physical presence was when he exited her
home on July 16, and petitioner testified that respondent had not attempted to be in her physical presence or attempted
to come to her house since then. Petitioner testified that she thought that respondent had been out of the country from
sometime in July until August 9, after she filed the petition for the FAPA order, which is one reason she believed that he had not attempted to be in her physical presence.
At the close of petitioner’s case, respondent moved
for a directed verdict, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to show that petitioner had a reasonable fear for her physical safety or that respondent posed a credible threat.
The trial court denied the motion. Respondent then presented evidence. In closing argument, respondent argued
that petitioner had not established that he “was a credible
threat to her physical safety moving forward” and that there was no evidence of “ongoing abuse.”
Relying primarily on the July 16 incident, the trial
court found that petitioner had met her burden to show: (1)
that abuse was committed by respondent within the 180 days
of filing the petition; (2) that petitioner reasonably feared for her physical safety; and (3) that respondent posed a credible threat to petitioner’s physical safety. The trial court also found that petitioner and respondent were in a qualifying
relationship. The trial court issued an order continuing the FAPA order pursuant to ORS 107.716(3). In that written
order, the trial court memorialized the findings it made at
the contested hearing. Respondent filed this appeal.
We conclude that there was insufficient evidence to
support a determination that respondent posed a credible
threat to petitioner’s physical safety as required by ORS
107.716(3)(a)(C). Even relying on petitioner’s own testimony, 246 M. Q. v. Mar
there was no evidence that respondent returned to petitioner’s home after the July 16 incident or threatened to do so. Although respondent sent numerous messages to petitioner,
based on petitioner’s testimony, respondent never threatened to harm petitioner in those messages. See A. J. T. v. Croft, 311 Or App 574, 575-77, 492 P3d 778 (2021) (holding that
there was insufficient evidence that the respondent posed a
credible threat to the petitioner when “[t]here [was] no evidence that * * * communications” from the respondent “were
threatening, abusive, or inappropriate”). Rather, respondent’s messages in this case expressed unhappiness that
the relationship was ending and a desire to see petitioner
again. Based on the evidence presented at the contested
hearing, the last email that respondent sent to petitioner
was on August 6, the day before the FAPA order was issued,
and stated that he would “honor” petitioner’s “request for
no contact from here forward.” In all, there was insufficient evidence that respondent posed a credible threat to petitioner’s physical safety. See id. (insufficient evidence of a credible threat when there were multiple emails and messages
from the respondent expressing his unhappiness about a
breakup, but those communications eventually stopped).
Therefore, the trial court erred in ordering that the FAPA
order be continued.
Reversed.