Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed October 28, 2026.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
No. 3D25-1191
Lower Tribunal No. 22-11854-CA-01
Bloktech Wynwood Atrium LLC, Fahad J. Khan,
Migel A. Jennings, Jose Arguelles, Christina Suarez,
William Scherer, Rodrigo Bedoya Olivella,
Mitelan Kumarasamy, Ryan W. Glasco, Francesco Quatraro,
KLS Florida Group LLC, Damiomiami Society Corp.,
Lior Sabag, and Sunburst, LLC,
Appellants,
vs.
BD FL Notes, LLC, 136NW 126 ST Project, LLC, Hernando
Anthony Carrillo, Sherry Johnson Carrillo, and
Capital Holdings Funding, LLC,
Appellees.
An Appeal from a non-final order from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Robert T. Watson, Judge.
Vogel Law Firm, PLLC, and David Michael Vogel and Hal S. Vogel (Davie), for appellants.
COHN & DUSSI, LLC, and James J. Webb (Boston, MA.), for appellee BD FL Notes, LLC.
Before LOGUE, GORDO and GOODEN, JJ.
GOODEN, J.
The Appellants are contract purchasers of pre-construction
condominium units at Wynwood Atriums, which were being constructed by
the Appellee Developer, 136 NW 126 ST Project, LLC. They appeal an
order granting in part and denying in part their motion to intervene. The
Purchasers assert that the order effectively denied their motion. 1
For the purchase and construction of Wynwood Atriums, the Developer
executed a mortgage with Triumph Capital Partners. The mortgage stated:
Section 2.4 Liens. Mortgagor shall not, directly or indirectly,
create or suffer or permit to be created, or to stand, against the
Property . . . any lien, charge, mortgage, deed of trust, adverse
claim or other encumbrance . . . whether senior or junior in lien
to this Mortgage. . . .
Section 5.4 Subordinate Financing. If Mortgagor, without the
prior written consent of Mortgagee, executes or delivers any
pledge, security agreement, mortgage or deed of trust covering
all or any portion of the Property . . . Mortgagee may . . . declare
the Obligation to be immediately due and payable.
1
We review this order for an abuse of discretion. See Mendoza v. Kendall Park Plaza, Ltd., 429 So. 3d 1082, 1084 (Fla. 3d DCA 2026).
2
To purchase the units, the Purchasers executed purchase agreements
with the Developer. These agreements contained a subordination clause:
18. Subordination of Purchase Agreement to Mortgage Liens:
The Purchaser agrees that all terms and provisions of this
Agreement are, and shall be, subject and subordinate to the lien
of any mortgage heretofore or hereafter made or placed Upon
the subject property, subject lands, or the Condominium, and to
any advances heretofore or hereafter made thereon, to the full
extent thereof, without the execution of any further legal
documents by the Purchaser. Nothing by reason of the
execution of this Agreement shall be construed as giving or
granting unto the Purchaser any lien upon the Unit, Purchaser
hereby expressly waiving and relinquishing any lien or lien rights,
legal or equitable, which might otherwise accrue or be available
to Purchaser by operation of law or otherwise.
The Developer did not complete construction by the mortgage’s
maturity date. Triumph Capital extended the maturity date of the loan, but
ultimately initiated foreclosure in February 2022. During that litigation,
Triumph Capital assigned its interest to the Appellee, BD FL Notes.
Thereafter, by way of an agreement, BD FL Notes allowed the Developer to
continue to close on units to pay down the mortgage. The Developer,
however, failed to close on the agreed upon number of units. Thus, BD FL
Notes declared the agreement in default. The trial court entered final
judgment of foreclosure on July 6, 2023.
3
Soon after, the Purchasers moved to intervene. They sought to vacate
the foreclosure so that they could close on their units. 2 The trial court
conducted five evidentiary hearings. It granted the Purchasers’ request in
part, finding that they had a junior interest and adding them as parties to the
post-foreclosure judgment.
The Purchasers argue that they should have been added as junior
lienholders. Post-judgment intervention is permitted only in rare
circumstances, when the proposed intervenor demonstrates a sufficient
interest in the property. See Wags Transp. Sys., Inc. v. City of Miami Beach,
88 So. 2d 751, 752 (Fla. 1956) (permitting post-judgment intervention by
non-party because “the petition to intervene showed such an interest in the
res that the ends of justice require that it be granted”).
But this argument fails because their purchase agreements expressly
disclaim and waive any lien rights. In the purchase agreement, the
Purchasers agreed: “Nothing by reason of the execution of this Agreement
shall be construed as giving or granting unto the Purchaser any lien upon
the Unit, Purchaser hereby expressly waiving and relinquishing any lien or
lien rights, legal or equitable, which might otherwise accrue or be available
2
While not raised in their motion to intervene, the Purchasers later stipulated that they were aware of the litigation since October 2022—nine months before the stipulated final judgment of foreclosure.
4
to Purchaser by operation of law or otherwise.” “We are bound to give effect
to that agreement.” Summit Aviation, Inc. v. MSP Recovery Aviation, LLC,
51 Fla. L. Weekly D1815, *2 (Fla. 3d DCA Sept. 2, 2026). See Barakat v.
Broward Cnty. Hous. Auth., 771 So. 2d 1193, 1195 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (“A
fundamental tenet of contract law is that parties are free to contract, even
when one side negotiates a harsh bargain.”).
Because the Purchasers expressly waived the lien rights on which their
claim to junior lienholder status depends, they failed to establish the property
interest necessary to warrant post-judgment intervention. See Dickinson v.
Segal, 219 So. 2d 435, 436–37 (Fla. 1969); Lewis v. Turlington, 499 So. 2d
905, 907 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Idacon, Inc. v. Hawes, 432 So. 2d 759, 761
(Fla. 1st DCA 1983). Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
Affirmed.
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