Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed October 28, 2026.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
No. 3D25-1343
Lower Tribunal No. 25-67863-CC-26
Maria Gimenez,
Appellant,
vs.
Bargain Properties, Inc.,
Appellee.
An Appeal from the County Court for Miami-Dade County, Lawrence D. King, Judge.
Maria Gimenez, in proper person.
No appearance on behalf of appellee.1
Before MILLER, LOBREE, and GOODEN, JJ.
1
Appellee was precluded from filing an answer brief after failing to heed our directive to do so within a specified period.
MILLER, J.
In this eviction dispute, appellant, Maria Gimenez, the tenant, appeals
from a final judgment of removal rendered in favor of appellee, Bargain
Properties, Inc., the landlord.2 We have jurisdiction. See Fla. R. App. P.
9.030(b)(1)(A). The tenant raises two issues on appeal. First, she contends
the trial court erred in granting removal because she filed a viable answer
and counterclaim; second, she asserts she established she was entitled to
relief from the terms of a partial settlement she negotiated with the landlord.
For the reasons below, we disagree and affirm.
I
In April 2025, the landlord filed an eviction lawsuit against the tenant.
The landlord attached a three-day notice of nonpayment, and the complaint
alleged the tenant failed to pay past due rent for a four-month period.
The tenant filed a document titled “Answer Counterclaim
Recoupment,” alleging that her rent was current and the landlord’s neglect
rendered the premises uninhabitable. The trial court scheduled a rent
determination hearing. In lieu of proceeding forward on the hearing, the
parties entered into a negotiated partial settlement. The tenant would be
2
Given our decision, we summarily deny review of the denial of the tenant’s motion to stay.
2
permitted to reside in the premises, rent free, until July 12, 2025. On that
date, she would voluntarily vacate the property and the landlord, in turn,
would file a voluntary dismissal. The parties also agreed that the tenant
would amend her counterclaim within twenty days. The trial court ratified the
stipulation.
Rather than file an amended counterclaim within the prescribed period,
the tenant filed her “Amended Answer.” But contrary to the title, she sought
two forms of affirmative relief: (1) to recoup past paid rent under a theory of
retaliatory conduct; and (2) to remain in possession of the premises until
December 2025.
The landlord moved to dismiss, contending that the pleading failed to
state a cause of action and violated the expedited procedures set forth in the
summary eviction procedure statutes. The trial court granted the motion,
without prejudice, and authorized further amendment within fifteen days.
The tenant again amended, this time filing an Amended Answer and
Counterclaim, alleging substantially similar theories.
On July 13, 2025, the day after the tenant agreed to vacate the
property, the landlord filed a motion for final judgment of removal. The
motion sought immediate possession and included an affidavit of
noncompliance. The affidavit stated that the tenant refused to relinquish
3
possession of the property, contrary to the terms of the settlement
agreement. The tenant filed an emergency motion to extend the previously
agreed upon habitation period. The trial court summarily entered a final
judgment for removal. This appeal ensued.
II
A
In enacting the Florida Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (the “Act”),
the legislature made an express decision to provide an expedited process
for determining the right of possession. § 51.011, Fla. Stat. (2025); ch. 83,
Fla. Stat. (2025). The right of possession is paramount, operating essentially
in a vacuum “without the necessity of deciding all other issues between the
parties.” Camena Invs. & Prop. Mgmt. Corp. v. Cross, 791 So. 2d 595, 597
(Fla. 3d DCA 2001). Unless the tenant interposes the defense of payment,
the failure to deposit the amount of rent alleged as unpaid in the complaint
in the court registry serves as a waiver of all defenses to possession.
§ 83.232(1), Fla. Stat.
The tenant correctly posits that section 83.64, Florida Statutes,
prohibits “retaliatory conduct,” and provides that it is a valid defense to
possession. Among the retaliatory acts prohibited are decreases in services
or increases in rent precipitated by tenant complaints to the landlord. Id.
4
§ 83.64(1). But the Act further provides that this defense is inapplicable “if
the landlord proves that the eviction is for good cause.” Id. § 83.64(3).
“Good cause” includes “good faith actions for nonpayment of rent.” Id.
B
Here, the tenant timely alleged in her Amended Answer and
Counterclaim that she paid her rent but that the landlord retaliated against
her for complaining about the condition of the property and improperly raised
her rent. But that does not end our analysis. Rather than proceed with the
evidentiary hearing on the amount of rent, if any, that should be paid into the
court registry during the pendency of the case, the tenant agreed to
relinquish possession on the specified date. In so doing, she waived any
defenses to possession.
Her subsequent failure to abide by the terms of the agreement did not
revive her affirmative defenses. See Scarborough Assoc. v. Fin. Fed. Sav.
and Loan Ass’n of Dade Cnty., 647 So. 2d 1001, 1003–1004 (Fla. 3d DCA
1994) (holding that a superseding modification agreement waived
preexisting defenses). It instead entitled the landlord to immediate relief,
enforcing the bargained-for terms.
5
C
To the extent that the tenant claims the trial court erred in rejecting her
contention that the agreement was the product of duress or coercion, this
issue evades our review. She has failed to provide us with any transcripts
of the proceedings or establish any error on the face of the orders under
review. See Applegate v. Barbett Bank of Tallahassee, 377 So. 2d 1150,
1152 (Fla. 1979) (“Without a record of the trial proceedings, the appellate
court can not properly resolve the underlying factual issues so as to conclude
that the trial court’s judgment is not supported by the evidence or by an
alternative theory. Without knowing the factual context, neither can an
appellate court reasonably conclude that the trial judge so misconceived the
law as to require reversal.”).3 Accordingly, we affirm the order under review.
Affirmed.
3
Despite the tenant’s contention to the contrary, the judgment does not reach the counterclaim; it expressly self-limits to removal.
6