Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 505
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION IV
No. CV-25-771
AMANDA ENGLEMAN Opinion Delivered October 28, 2026
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
V. COMMISSION
[NO. H404754]
WASHINGTON REGIONAL MEDICAL
CENTER AND RISK MANAGEMENT
RESOURCES, CARRIER/TPA
APPELLEES
AFFIRMED
ROBERT J. GLADWIN, Judge
Amanda Engleman appeals the September 25, 2025 decision of the Arkansas
Workers’ Compensation Commission that reversed the April 18, 2025 opinion of the
administrative law judge (ALJ) and denied her claim for compensable injuries to both
shoulders. On appeal, she argues that the Commission improperly required objective
medical findings to establish causation and arbitrarily rejected her credibility. Because the
Commission separately found that she failed to prove a causal connection between the June
2, 2023 workplace incident and the shoulder conditions at issue, and because that finding
provides a substantial basis for denying relief, we affirm.
I. Facts and Procedural History
Engleman worked as an operating-room circulator for Washington Regional Medical
Center. Her duties included preparing operating rooms, moving patients and equipment,
and positioning patients during surgery. On June 2, 2023, a patient began sliding from an
operating table. Engleman went beneath the table to support the patient, pushed upward for
approximately three to five minutes, felt a pop in her left shoulder, and experienced pain in
both shoulders. She promptly reported the incident, was sent to the employee-health nurse,
and completed an injury report identifying both shoulders. Appellees do not materially
dispute that the incident occurred.
Engleman sought treatment the same day at Conservative Care Occupational Health.
She reported a pop and sharp left-shoulder pain and subsequent right-shoulder pain. X-rays
revealed bilateral degenerative changes, including spurring at the left acromion, but no
fracture or acute abnormality. Amanda Bell, APRN, diagnosed bilateral shoulder pain,
restricted her work, referred her to physical therapy—which she began at Total Spine at
Washington Regional on June 14, and observed that the symptoms appeared to be related
to work activities.
The physical therapy did not alleviate Engleman’s symptoms, and she saw the
physician, Dr. Konstantin Berestnev, on June 9. Dr. Berestnev continued restrictions, and
after her condition remained unchanged after a week, she received a steroid injection.
Engleman reported that the continued physical therapy aggravated her symptoms and that,
even after a second injection, she felt they were getting worse. Dr. Berestnev returned her to
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regular duty on June 30 and released her without restrictions on August 8, noting that her
shoulder pain had improved.
The record before us also reveals that Engleman had previous shoulder complaints.
In early February 2022, Engleman was painting at home and fell from a barstool onto her
left shoulder, and she sought treatment for left-shoulder pain. An x-ray was negative. She
testified that the pain resolved after about three weeks. She also described an April 2023
incident that involved moving her approximately fifty-pound dog across a vehicle seat;
subsequent medical histories varied as to whether the dog jerked or wrenched her shoulder.
After returning to unrestricted employment, Engleman continued her regular duties
until June 2024. At a February 26, 2024 chiropractic visit, she reported problems beginning
approximately two years earlier and identified January 1, 2021, as an injury date, marking
the left shoulder and neck on an intake diagram. On March 26, Engleman saw Dr. J.
Clayton, who recorded that she had reported experiencing left-shoulder pain since moving
a dog in a car about two years earlier. On April 16, his record instead identified a fall onto
her shoulder as the inciting event.
A May 7, 2024 left-shoulder MRI disclosed mild AC-joint degenerative change and a
small amount of subacromial-bursal fluid consistent with bursitis or tendonitis. Dr. Clayton
wanted Engleman to see his partner, Dr. Greg Jones, but before that occurred, she was
treated by Dr. T. Zimmerman. On May 17, Dr. Zimmerman performed ultrasound-guided
corticosteroid injection into her left shoulder and described in his notes her chronic
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shoulder pain of multiple possible etiologies and recorded symptoms extending more than
two years to the barstool fall.
On May 29, at her first visit with Dr. Jones, he noted a history of symptoms beginning
approximately two and a half years earlier with a painting-related fall along with dog-related
incidents. His initial history noted work activities that exacerbated symptoms but did not
identify the June 2, 2023 operating-room incident.
On June 13, 2024, Dr. Jones operated on Engleman’s left shoulder. His operative
observations included biceps-tendon subluxation and a longitudinal split, tenosynovitis, ACjoint meniscus arthropathy with torn AC meniscus elements, and moderately severe
subacromial bursitis with the rotator cuff intact. He performed a biceps tenotomy, AC
resection, and bursectomy. Dr. Jones subsequently concluded that the June 2023 incident
had a substantial work-related component and, responding to an October 2024 inquiry from
counsel, opined that it was more than 50 percent responsible for the injury, symptoms, and
need for surgery. Later right-shoulder imaging showed AC arthropathy and slight distalclavicle displacement. Dr. Jones suggested a similar AC sprain on that side.
An ALJ held a hearing on January 21, 2025. The issues included compensability of
both shoulders, medical and temporary total-disability benefits, and attorney’s fees. On April
18, the ALJ found bilateral compensable injuries and awarded medical treatment and
temporary total-disability benefits beginning on June 13, 2024. Appellees appealed to the
Full Commission, and on September 20, 2025, the Commission reversed, with one
commissioner dissenting. The majority emphasized the nonacute initial imaging, subsequent
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return to regular work duties, inconsistent accounts of symptom onset and earlier events,
and the changing foundation for Dr. Jones’s causation opinion. It found Engleman not
credible concerning the claimed origin of her condition, assigned minimal weight to Dr.
Jones’s later causation opinion, and expressly determined that she had not proved that the
June 2, 2023 incident caused internal or external physical harm to either shoulder.
II. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
We view the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the
Commission’s findings and affirm if they are supported by substantial evidence. Melius v.
Chapel Ridge Nursing Ctr., 2025 Ark. App. 406. Evidence is substantial if reasonable minds
could have reached the same conclusion without resort to speculation or conjecture. Id.
When the Commission denies benefits because the claimant has failed to meet his or her
burden of proof, the substantial-evidence standard of review requires this court to affirm the
Commission’s decision if the opinion displays a substantial basis for the denial of relief. Id.
Credibility questions and the weight to be given to witness testimony are within the
Commission’s exclusive province. See id.; Watson v. Highland Pellets, LLC, 2022 Ark. App.
132, 643 S.W.3d 267.
A compensable specific-incident injury must arise out of and in the course of
employment, cause internal or external physical harm requiring medical services or resulting
in disability or death, and be caused by a specific incident identifiable by time and place.
Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(A)(i) (Repl. 2025). The claimant must establish
compensability by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. § 11-9-102(4)(E)(i). A compensable
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injury must be established by medical evidence supported by objective findings, which are
findings beyond the patient’s voluntary control. Id. § 11-9-102(4)(D), (16)(A)(i). But objective
medical evidence is required to establish the existence and extent of an injury, not necessarily
to establish the causal relationship between an injury and a workplace occurrence. Mohler v.
Young, 2026 Ark. App. 105, 731 S.W.3d 395 (holding that while objective medical evidence
is required to establish the existence and extent of an injury, causation may be established
by a preponderance of other nonmedical evidence); see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
VanWagner, 337 Ark. 443, 990 S.W.2d 522 (1999).
III. Discussion
Engleman first contends that the Commission conflated objective proof of an injury
with proof of causation. She correctly notes that medical evidence supported by objective
findings is not independently required to prove that a diagnosed injury resulted from a
specific workplace incident. VanWagner, supra. Nor is the existence of degenerative pathology
necessarily fatal to compensability. See N. Ark. College v. Sparks, 2026 Ark. App. 367, __
S.W.3d __. An aggravation of a preexisting condition may constitute a compensable injury
if the statutory requirements are established. See id. But the presence of objective pathology
and the occurrence of a workplace incident do not, standing alone, compel a finding that
the incident caused the pathology.
Here, the Commission expressly recognized that the objective-findings requirement
applies only to the existence and extent of an injury. Although portions of its opinion do
refer to a failure to establish a compensable injury through objective findings, the
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Commission did not rest solely on the absence of objective evidence connecting Engleman’s
shoulder abnormalities to the June 2 workplace incident. It separately found that Engleman
“did not prove that the June 2, 2023 incident caused internal or external physical harm to
the left shoulder or right shoulder” and that the later left-shoulder operative findings and
right-shoulder radiographic abnormalities had not been proved causally related to the work
incident. This independent causation determination by the Commission is central to our
decision to affirm.
The record before us does contain evidence favorable to Engleman: (1) the workplace
event was promptly reported; (2) Engleman experienced pain that day and received treatment
and restrictions to work; and (3) later surgery revealed objective abnormalities in her left
shoulder. Dr. Jones also ultimately connected her shoulder conditions to the workplace
incident. But the Commission was not required to accept that evidence as establishing
causation. Initial x-rays showed degeneration without an acute abnormality. Also, Engleman
was released to and resumed unrestricted work and continued her physically demanding job
for months. Most importantly, several later medical histories attributed the commencement
of her persistent symptoms to the earlier barstool fall at home or dog-related events. And Dr.
Jones’s first evaluation described a lengthy preexisting history without identifying the June
2, 2023 workplace event.
The Commission was also entitled to consider the development of Dr. Jones’s
opinion. His October 2024 notes followed his initial examination and surgery, and those
recorded histories emphasized earlier events as well as a later inquiry that specifically asked
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about the June 2, 2023 incident. That later opinion provided evidence supporting
Engleman’s claim, but the Commission had the authority to consider its foundation and
assign it minimal weight in light of both the contemporaneous and earlier records. This
court’s task is not to decide whether another fact-finder could have credited Dr. Jones’s
opinion or inferred an aggravation of a preexisting injury. It is whether fair-minded persons
could reach the Commission’s conclusion. Melius, supra.
Engleman also argues that a specific-incident claimant seeking medical and temporary
benefits need not show that the incident was the major cause of the need for treatment. See
Estridge v. Waste Management, 343 Ark. 276, 33 S.W.3d 167 (2000). Instead of a major-cause
requirement, the Commission determined that Engleman did not prove the threshold causal
connection between the identified workplace event and a compensable physical injury to
either shoulder. In light of the record before us, the Commission’s conclusion displays a
substantial basis for the denial of relief.
Engleman next challenges the Commission’s adverse credibility finding, arguing that
it lacked an articulated, reasonable basis. Although it is true that we defer to the Commission
on the weight of evidence and credibility of witnesses, the Commission may not arbitrarily
disregard testimony and is not so insulated that it renders appellate review meaningless.
Humphries v. FNA Grp., LLC, 2025 Ark. App. 304, 716 S.W.3d 196. But that is not what
occurred here. The Commission identified specific inconsistencies: (1) the chiropractic
intake information indicating an earlier onset; (2) Dr. Clayton’s differing histories relating
symptoms to the dog and a prior fall; (3) the histories given to Drs. Zimmerman and Jones
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describing symptoms lasting more than two years; and (4) the omission of the June 2, 2023
event from Dr. Jones’s first recorded history. It also noted the absence of corroboration for
Engleman’s testimony that Dr. Berestnev declined additional diagnostic testing or referral.
The Commission’s findings need not be construed as a rejection of the fact that the
operating-room episode occurred or that Engleman reported pain afterward. Those
circumstances were substantially corroborated. Rather, the Commission questioned
Engleman’s account of the origin and continuity of the conditions ultimately treated in
2024. Because its credibility determination rests on identified record evidence rather than
an unsupported assertion, we cannot say that the Commission arbitrarily disregarded
Engleman’s testimony. The ALJ’s contrary assessment and the dissenting commissioner’s
analysis do not authorize us to reweigh the evidence.
In sum, the Commission acknowledged the proper distinction between medical proof
of injury and proof of causation, expressly found that the June 2, 2023 incident was not
shown to have caused compensable physical harm to either shoulder, and provided recordsupported reasons for its evaluation of credibility and medical-opinion evidence. We
therefore affirm.
Affirmed.
VIRDEN and TUCKER, JJ., agree.
Walker Law Group, PLC, by: Eddie H. Walker, Jr., for appellant.
Worley, Wood & Parrish, P.A., by: Melissa Wood, for appellees.
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