Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 506
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION II
No. CR-26-54
Opinion Delivered October 28, 2026
CHRISTOPHER TATE APPEAL FROM THE POPE
APPELLANT COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. 58CR-24-524]
V.
HONORABLE JACK “JAY” T.
STATE OF ARKANSAS PATTERSON II, JUDGE
APPELLEE
AFFIRMED
BRANDON J. HARRISON, Judge
Christopher Tate appeals the revocation of his probation and argues that the circuit
court abused its discretion by not properly considering his request for a change of appointed
counsel. We hold that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion and affirm.
In September 2024, the State charged Tate with possession of a controlled substance
(methamphetamine, less than two grams) (58CR-24-524). On September 23, Deputy
Public Defender Cody Bassham entered his appearance as Tate’s appointed counsel. Tate
pled guilty and was placed on six years’ probation.
In May 2025, the State petitioned to revoke Tate’s probation because he had been
discharged from drug court and failed multiple drug screens. 1 An amended revocation
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The State also filed petitions to revoke Tate’s probation in three other cases: 58CR22-56, 58CR-21-526, and 58CR-20-777. All four cases were consolidated for the revocation proceedings.
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petition later detailed that Tate had failed a drug screen by testing positive for a controlled
substance on 11 April 2025; attempted to falsify or adulterate a drug test on April 4, April
11, and April 17; been discharged from the Pope County Drug Court Program on April
17; admitted to the use of controlled substances on April 11 and September 9; and failed to
pay his financial obligations. In July 2025, Bassham once again entered an appearance on
behalf of Tate.
On 23 October 2025, eleven days before the scheduled revocation hearing, Tate sent
a letter to the circuit court and requested a new public defender due to “a total breakdown
in communication and trust” with Bassham. He explained that he and Bassham
“fundamentally disagree[d]” on strategy for the revocation hearing and that Bassham had
dismissed Tate’s alternative-sentencing suggestions. Tate also said that Bassham had
pressured him to accept the State’s thirty-six-month plea offer “without exploring defenses
or evidence.” He claimed that Bassham’s “ineffective assistance” violated his Sixth
Amendment rights and asked for an expedited hearing on his request.
At the revocation hearing on November 3, Bassham explained to the court that Tate
had filed a motion asking for different appointed counsel and that Tate’s criticism of him
did not affect his ability to represent Tate. The colloquy continued:
MR. BASSHAM: He’s not happy with me telling him what I think
will happen at a PTR hearing and his options in which
he—
THE COURT: Doesn’t like his options, so he’s blaming you for
it?
MR. BASSHAM: That—that would be one version of describing.
I’m gonna—
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THE COURT: Let me just stop you right there. This isn’t onestop shopping, Mr. Tate. If you want to hire your own
attorney, you’re welcome to do so, sir. Mr. Bassham’s
been in my court a number of times, and he’s a good
lawyer. You’re lucky to have him at no cost to you. So
that motion is denied.
The hearing proceeded, and after hearing testimony from Tate’s probation officer,
the court found that Tate was in willful violation of his conditions of probation. The court
sentenced him to five years’ imprisonment and twelve months’ suspended imposition of
sentence. Bassham filed a timely notice of appeal on Tate’s behalf.
A defendant’s right to counsel of choice is grounded in the Sixth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and is also guaranteed by article 2, section 10 of the Arkansas
Constitution. While constitutionally guaranteed, the right to counsel of one’s choosing is
not absolute and may not be used to frustrate the inherent power of the court to command
an orderly, efficient, and effective administration of justice. Bullock v. State, 353 Ark. 577,
111 S.W.3d 380 (2003). Once competent counsel has been obtained, any request for a
change in counsel must be balanced against the public’s interest in the prompt dispensation
of justice. Raino v. State, 2021 Ark. App. 331. Once a defendant has accepted representation
by an attorney, the fact that the defendant is dissatisfied with counsel’s efforts does not entitle
him to appointment of a different attorney. Bullock, supra. In addition, “the right to counsel
of choice does not extend to defendants who require counsel to be appointed for them.”
United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 151 (2006).
Factors to be considered by the circuit court in determining whether to grant a
continuance for the purpose of obtaining new counsel include whether there was adequate
opportunity for the defendant to employ counsel; whether other continuances have been
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requested and granted; the length of the requested delay; whether the requested delay is for
legitimate reasons; whether the motion for a continuance was timely filed; whether the
defendant contributed to the circumstances giving rise to the request for a continuance; and
whether the reason for the discharge of existing counsel was solely for the purpose of
obtaining a continuance. Brewer v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 335, 525 S.W.3d 24. However,
the caselaw does not require that the circuit court consider every factor and does not require
the circuit court to make any findings on those factors. King v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 531,
589 S.W.3d 420. The circuit court must look at the particular circumstances of the case at
bar, and the issue must be decided on a case-by-case basis. Liggins v. State, 2015 Ark. App.
321, 463 S.W.3d 331.
A circuit court retains broad discretion to grant or deny a continuance for purposes
of obtaining new counsel. Brewer, supra. A circuit court’s denial of a continuance will not
be overturned absent a showing of abuse of that discretion. Raino, supra. An abuse of
discretion occurs only when the circuit court acts improvidently, thoughtlessly, or without
due consideration. Brewer, supra. Further, even if the circuit court abused its discretion, an
appellant must also demonstrate prejudice amounting to a denial of justice. Raino, supra.
Tate argues that when a defendant requests a change in appointed counsel, a proper
exercise of discretion requires the circuit court to consider the defendant’s interests. He
compares his case to Arroyo v. State, 2013 Ark. 244, 428 S.W.3d 464, 2 in which the
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Tate acknowledges that Arroyo is a “denied choice of counsel” case, which is not what he is arguing here. But he asserts that the same “rules” are used in similar cases involving requests to change or dismiss appointed attorneys.
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defendant was represented by counsel, but on the day before the trial was set to begin, newly
retained counsel entered an appearance and sought a continuance so he could prepare. The
circuit court declined to hear from substitute counsel about why a continuance was
necessary and failed to conduct any inquiry into appellant’s request.
The supreme court held that “[a]ppellant’s motion for continuance to substitute new
counsel was wrongly denied because the circuit court failed to consider [a]ppellant’s interests
when deciding the motion.” Arroyo, 2013 Ark. 244, at 8–9, 428 S.W.3d at 470. The Arroyo
court explained that there was no evidence in the record that the circuit court balanced
appellant’s right to choice of counsel against the needs of fairness and the demands of its
calendar; there was no evidence that appellant made the request primarily for the purpose
of delay; the circuit court made no attempt to determine why appellant requested the change
or whether appellant had acted diligently in seeking the change; nor had the circuit court
considered any of the other relevant factors.
Tate asserts that the circuit court appeared to be unaware of the arguments he made
in his pro se motion, and it never asked Tate directly why he wanted a new lawyer. Thus,
the court did not evaluate the “particular circumstances” of his request, nor did it consider
the relevant factors in the caselaw. See Brewer, supra.
Tate further argues that the allegations he made in his pro se motion—specifically,
the breakdown in communication with his attorney—demonstrate prejudice, because “a
breakdown in communication highlights a problem potentially resulting in a denial of
justice.” In addition, his allegation that Bassham was “not exploring defenses or evidence”
also demonstrates prejudice resulting in a denial of justice. Tate concludes, “Given the
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consequences of plea bargaining and Tate’s need for working communications with his
appointed attorney, then again, Tate has alleged particular facts that show prejudice resulting
in a denial of justice.”
The State responds that when a defendant’s written motion reflects nothing more
than disagreement over strategy, further inquiry is not required by the circuit court. The
State compares this case to King, supra, in which the defendant requested different counsel
just before the revocation hearing was set to begin. He complained that his public defender
was “not representing [him] right” and was “not working with [him].” 2019 Ark. App.
531, at 2, 589 S.W.3d at 422. King’s counsel explained that he had conveyed a plea offer
from the State and that King wanted him to negotiate further. The circuit court denied
King’s request to obtain new counsel.
On appeal, King argued that the circuit court failed to make the proper inquiry into
his request for new counsel, failed to properly consider the various factors necessary to make
such a decision, and failed to balance his choice of counsel against the needs of fairness and
the demands of the court’s calendar. In affirming the circuit court, this court held that King
did not offer compelling reasons for wanting the change of counsel; he expressed
dissatisfaction with his counsel’s efforts at negotiating with the State, but he did not allege
that counsel was incompetent. We also explained, “The trial court could have determined
that King’s request was not timely made and was not based on legitimate concerns . . . such
that a further inquiry was not necessary.” Id. at 6, 589 S.W.3d at 424.
The State argues that like King, Tate requested substitute counsel shortly before his
scheduled revocation hearing. He expressed disagreement on strategy with his attorney and
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wanted his attorney to “push[] back” on the State’s plea offer. He also asked for a
continuance to “ensure fair preparation time” for his new counsel. The State contends that,
as in King, Tate’s issues with his public defender stemmed from advice concerning plea
negotiations, and he did not allege incompetence. So, according to King, the circuit court
was not required to make any further inquiry before denying Tate’s request.
Alternatively, the State asserts that even if the circuit court had abused its discretion,
Tate has not demonstrated prejudice. The State cites Raino, supra, in which the defendant
filed a request for new counsel ten days before his revocation hearing. Raino alleged that
his appointed counsel had said that he was not obligated to “make my legal requests,” that
his counsel had not attempted to file any motions, and that his appointed counsel was “acting
in complicity” with the prosecuting attorney. Id. at 2–3. At the revocation hearing, the
court allowed Raino to briefly speak and then denied his motion. On appeal, this court
explained,
Raino’s reasons for wanting new counsel were expressed as dissatisfaction with
counsel’s representation, and Raino’s primary complaint involved the
prosecutor’s proceeding with the case. Raino never identified new counsel,
and he cannot demonstrate prejudice from the circuit court’s refusal to
continue the revocation hearing.
Id. at 9–10.
The State contends that, similar to Raino, Tate does not show that the circuit court’s
decision to proceed with the revocation hearing caused him prejudice. He argues that the
alleged breakdown in communication with his attorney could potentially result in prejudice,
but he does not show any actual prejudice. Tate does not dispute that Bassham had advised
him of the State’s plea offer but asserted in his pro se motion that he wanted Bassham to
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“push[] back” on the offer. Also in his motion, he complained that Bassham had dismissed
his suggestions for sentencing alternatives. But after the court had revoked Tate’s probation,
Bassham read into the record a request for alternative sanctions written by Tate, and Bassham
also articulated Tate’s request: “Judge, to summarize, my client is looking for alternative
sanctions of outpatient—inpatient treatment followed by outpatient. If that’s not acceptable
for the Court, he would ask for the probation reinstatement with a CCC sanction, where
he has a period—an exact period of time.” The State concludes that Tate has not shown
that the circuit court’s denial of his motion to substitute counsel caused him prejudice.
In reply, Tate distinguishes King by noting that the circuit court actually questioned
King about his request, while the circuit court did not speak to Tate at all. Tate also argues
that neither Arroyo nor King condition the circuit court’s duty to inquire upon the type of
problem raised by a defendant. So even if Tate’s written motion can be characterized as
merely “disagreement over strategy,” the circuit court still had a duty to inquire about Tate’s
reasons.
Tate also distinguishes Raino by noting that (1) there was an inquiry by the circuit
court to learn the reason for Raino’s request to replace his public defender, so Raino had a
chance to explain his grievance; and (2) Raino’s primary complaint was targeted toward the
prosecutor. In contrast, Tate argues that his motion set forth specific problems with his
appointed attorney and “supports the prejudice identified in his opening brief.” He insists
that the circuit court had to question him and that talking to his attorney was not sufficient.
We hold that this case is similar to King; the only significant difference is that the
circuit court in King questioned the defendant directly before denying his request for new
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counsel. While that may be the better practice, we have no caselaw requiring the court to
question the defendant directly. In addition, Tate has not shown prejudice amounting to a
denial of justice. As to the plea offer, it was solely his decision whether to accept it, and
Bassham read into the record Tate’s request for alternative sanctions for sentencing purposes.
Finally, we note that Tate was not sentenced to the maximum sentence. He did receive
the maximum term of imprisonment (six years), but he did not receive the maximum fine
allowed (maximum fine possible was $10,000, and Tate was fined $3500). See Wilcoxon v.
State, 2022 Ark. App. 458, 655 S.W.3d 686 (defendant who faced twenty years’
imprisonment and a fine up to $10,000 could not demonstrate prejudice when he received
a twenty-year sentence but no fine).
Affirmed.
THYER and HIXSON, JJ., agree.
D. Franklin Arey III, for appellant.
Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Mallory Wood, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.
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