Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 522
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISIONS I & II
No. CV-25-273
CONNIE AND DELMAR ALLEN Opinion Delivered October 28, 2026
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM THE BENTON COUNTY
CIRCUIT COURT
V. [NO. 04CV-22-647]
CATHERINE AND JEFFREY WYANT
APPELLEES HONORABLE CHRISTINE HORWART,
JUDGE
AFFIRMED
WAYMOND M. BROWN, Judge
Appellants Connie and Delmar Allen (“Allen”) appeal the February 11, 2025 order of the
Benton County Circuit Court resolving issues raised in their motion to enforce easement deed and
motion for contempt. On appeal, Allen argues that (1) reversal is required because the circuit court’s
ruling was unclear; (2) the circuit court improperly ignored the easement deed attached to the
parties’ settlement agreement; and (3) the circuit court enforced an invalid settlement agreement.
We affirm.
In March 2022, Allen filed a complaint seeking a prescriptive easement over and across the
property of the adjoining landowners, appellees Catherine and Jeffrey Wyant (“Wyant”). Allen
alleged that his property is landlocked, with Wyant’s property providing the only route to access it,
aside from reaching it by boat from Beaver Lake.
Before the hearing on the complaint, the parties reached a settlement agreement that was
incorporated into the amended final order entered by the circuit court on July 25, 2023. According
1
to the agreement, Allen would pay Wyant $8,000 for an easement; Wyant would execute an
easement deed; both parties would agree to any gates on the road; and Allen would pay to have the
easement surveyed and a formal legal description prepared.
The settlement agreement included exhibit A, a diagram depicting the parties’ respective
properties with a line drawn between two X’s along the southern border of Wyant’s property. Allen
satisfied payment in accordance with the agreement, and Wyant signed and recorded the easement
deed granting Allen an easement across Wyant’s property. The easement deed contained the
following easement description:
AN EIGHTEEN-FOOT-WIDE EASEMENT COMMENCING FROM OLD BILL EVANS
ROAD THENCE WEST TO THE BOUNDARY OF THE WYANT PROPERTY AND THE
BOUNDARY OF THE ALLEN PROPERTY MORE SPECIFICALLY DESCRIBED BY A
SURVEY TO BE PREPARED BY GRANTEE AND TO BE MADE PART OF THE
EASEMENT DEED UPON COMPLETION BY WAY OF SCRIVENER’S AFFIDAVIT.
On February 15, 2024, Allen moved to enforce the easement deed, alleging that after a survey
was conducted, Wyant refused the surveyed easement location and would not permit construction
to begin. Wyant countered that the survey’s proposed easement location resulted in an easement
that runs in a northwesterly direction from Old Bill Evans Road and cutting through his property,
and not west from Old Bill Evans Road along his property’s southern boundary as detailed in the
settlement agreement and in the easement deed. Wyant opposed the proposed easement location
for noncompliance with the settlement agreement.
Allen filed a motion for contempt alleging that despite the clear and unambiguous terms of
the settlement agreement, Wyant willfully failed and refused to allow him to begin construction of
the northwesterly easement. Allen also filed a motion for summary judgment stating that there is no
genuine issue of material fact; the summary-judgment motion was denied.
2
Following the hearing on the motions for contempt and to enforce the easement deed, the
circuit court denied the contempt citation and granted the motion to enforce easement deed, finding
that the “modified dotted line on the southern boundary of Wyant’s southern border” shown in
defendant’s exhibit 3 “most closely aligns with Exhibit A attached to the Settlement Agreement of
the parties” and shall serve as the location for the easement.
On appeal from the circuit court’s decision relating to the enforcement or interpretation of
a settlement agreement, the circuit court’s findings will not be reversed unless they are clearly
erroneous.1 A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the
reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.2 Determining
the credibility of witnesses and resolving disputed facts is within the province of the finder of fact. 3
Allen first asserts that the circuit court’s ruling was unclear and should be reversed for
clarification and further adjudication. He argues that the court’s ruling is “subject to multiple
interpretations” because defendant’s exhibit 3 depicts two possible easement routes. Allen argues
that he asked the court to clarify which easement it was ordering, but the court responded, “It was
presented to me that Defendant’s 3 was the most closely correlated easement across [Wyant’s]
property pursuant to the parties’ agreement. That was Mr. McKelvin’s testimony [the surveyor].
That’s what I’m going with.”
1 Mercy Hosp. Fort Smith v. Lesley, 2024 Ark. App. 315.
2 Id.
3 Id.
3
Allen argues that the written order drafted by Wyant stating that the easement is evidenced
by “a modified dotted line on the southern boundary of” his property reflects Wyant’s interpretation,
not what the circuit court actually held. We disagree.
At the hearing, plaintiff’s exhibit 1 and defendant’s exhibits 2 and 3 were entered into
evidence. Plaintiff’s exhibit 1, the first survey, depicts an easement that begins at a point on Old Bill
Evans Road and runs generally in a northwesterly direction across Wyant’s property. The second
survey, defendant’s exhibit 2, also depicts an easement that begins at a point on Old Bill Evans Road
and runs in a northwesterly direction through a portion of Wyant’s property, terminating at a point
further south than the easement in plaintiff’s exhibit 1. Defendant’s exhibit 3 depicts an easement
that runs along the southern boundary of Wyant’s property in a westerly direction from Old Bill
Evans Road. Although the line from plaintiff’s exhibit 1 is still depicted, only the southern easement
is labeled as “Proposed 18' Access Easement.” The line that runs northwesterly is not designated as
a proposed easement in defendant’s exhibit 3. Furthermore, the circuit court made clear in its oral
ruling that it ordered the easement to correspond with the location indicated in exhibit A of the
parties’ settlement agreement. Only the route along the southernmost border of Wyant’s property
does so. There can be no genuine confusion that the southernmost dotted line on defendant’s exhibit
3 was the order of the court.
Allen next argues that the circuit court improperly ignored or discounted the easement deed
that was attached to the parties’ settlement agreement. Specifically, he asserts that the easement
deed granted a “blanket easement” because it states that the precise location of the easement will be
“more specifically described by a [future] survey.” A blanket easement is described as one in which
the precise location of the easement is not specified but instead describes the entire tract of the
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landowners.4 Stated again, a blanket easement is one that applies to an entire property rather than
being limited to a specific, defined area. When the exact location of a right-of-way or easement is
not described, its bounds will be determined by lines of reasonable enjoyment.5 Blanket easements
are most common in the context of utility and pipeline easements. Allen states that according to the
plain language of the easement deed, “[he] shall have an 18-foot easement over and across the entirety
of [Wyant’s] parcel.” He contends that because the easement deed here failed to designate the
location of the easement, he obtained a blanket easement, the location of which it could determine
subject to reasonableness. Allen’s argument is not well taken.
The easement deed and the settlement agreement both state the path and location of the
easement. The deed’s description of the location is not as vague as Allen would have this court
believe. It does more than simply name the dominant and servient tracts. The easement deed granted
an easement described as “[a]n 18-foot-wide easement commencing from Old Bill Evans Road thence
west to the boundary of [Wyant’s] property and the boundary of [Allens’] property.” The deed
further stated that the location would be more specifically described by a survey to be prepared by
Allen. The use of the phrase “more specifically” indicates that the location of the easement was
already designated with some specificity. Also, the easement deed and settlement agreement
expressly and unambiguously pinpointed the location and direction of the easement—the location is
along the southern boundary of Wyant’s parcel, and the direction is west from Old Bill Evans Road.
Further, the easement deed described in words the location of the easement depicted on the diagram
4 John H. Parker Constr. Co. v. Aldridge, 312 Ark. 69, 847 S.W.2d 687 (1993).
5 Bradley v. Ark. La. Gas Co., 280 Ark. 492, 659 S.W.2d 180 (1983).
5
in exhibit A. Both the easement deed and exhibit A of the settlement agreement indicate that the
easement would follow a path running west from Old Bill Evans Road along the southern boundary
of appellee’s property. The deed does more than designate the entire tract of the landowners. It
identified a specific area or strip of Wyant’s land for the easement location. We affirm on this point.
Allen’s last argument is that because there was no meeting of the minds, the circuit court
enforced an invalid settlement agreement. This argument fails. Importantly, we observe that Allen
himself moved to enforce the settlement agreement. He cannot now complain that the circuit court
ultimately enforced the agreement. An appellant cannot complain of an erroneous action of the
circuit court on appeal if it has induced or acquiesced in that action. 6
Furthermore, Allen contends that after the settlement agreement was signed and attached to
the order of the court, the parties went back and forth on the specific location of the easement,
serving as proof that there was no meeting of the minds between the parties. Whether there is a
meeting of the minds is a question of fact.7 During this action, Allen moved for summary judgment,
stating that “there is no genuine issue of fact as to the Parties’ unambiguous Settlement Agreement.”
Again, Allen cannot now argue that an issue of fact exists regarding the settlement agreement and
contract formation.
6 See Rothwell v. Rothwell, 2025 Ark. App. 613, 725 S.W.3d 901.
7 Id.
6
Also, an argument that a contract lacked a meeting of the minds must be preserved at the
circuit court level before it can be raised on appeal. Arguments not raised below are waived. 8
Because Allen did not object at the first opportunity, this issue is not preserved for review on appeal.
Moreover, Allen suggests that although the parties agreed on an easement, there was no
meeting of the minds regarding the precise location of the easement. We disagree. Exhibit A of the
parties’ settlement agreement shows the easement path drawn by a line with two X’s on either end
running along Wyant’s southernmost boundary and west from Old Bill Evans Road to the boundary
of the Allen’s property. Exhibit A is also congruent with the location details in the easement deed
describing the path as running west from Old Bill Evans Road. The record indicates that the
placement of the easement only became an issue once Allen discovered that the agreed-on route
carried a high cost due to factors such as sloping and water drainage. Because Allen agreed to purchase
an easement along an expensive route does not make the contract unenforceable.
Affirmed.
TUCKER, WOOD, and HIXSON, JJ., agree.
BARRETT, J., concurs.
HARRISON, J., dissents.
STEPHANIE POTTER BARRETT, Judge, concurring. I agree with the majority’s decision to
affirm the circuit court’s order. I write separately to address the dissent’s characterization of the
agreement and its reliance on cases concerning the reasonable location of an undefined easement.
8 Turnbo v. Hamlett, 2024 Ark. App. 128, 686 S.W.3d 813.
7
The dissent miscomprehends the nature of this case. The case below and this appeal concern
the enforcement of a settlement agreement, not the creation of an easement. Allen filed a complaint
against Wyant to enforce the parties’ previous settlement agreement. After hearing the testimony of
both parties and surveyors and reviewing the various surveys, the circuit court determined that the
easement along the southern boundary of Wyant’s property most closely aligned with Exhibit A
attached to that agreement. The dissent relies on cases holding that when the location of an easement
is undefined, its location must be reasonable for both parties. See Howard v. Cramlet, 56 Ark. App.
171, 175, 939 S.W.2d 858, 860 (1997). However, those cases are inapposite. Here, the parties
entered into a settlement agreement that included a diagram depicting the contemplated location of
the easement and also described the location as extending west from Old Bill Evans Road. Although
the parties contemplated a subsequent survey, the settlement agreement and easement deed
sufficiently identified the easement’s location. As the majority explains, the deed’s language that a
more specific description would be provided did not leave the easement’s location entirely
undetermined.
The dissent also emphasizes that multiple surveys were prepared to determine the easement’s
location. The deed expressly provided that the easement would be more specifically described by a
survey. The circuit court considered the proposed locations and determined which one most closely
aligned with the parties’ agreement. A court cannot make the parties’ contract but, instead, can only
construe and enforce the contract the parties have made. Terra Land Servs., Inc. v. McIntyre, 2019 Ark.
App. 118, at 12, 572 S.W.3d 424, 432 (citing DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Smelser, 375 Ark. 216, 289
S.W.3d 466 (2008)). In a proceeding to enforce a settlement agreement, the circuit court’s role was
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to interpret the parties’ agreement, not to rewrite the terms of the agreement and to select a different
easement location simply because it might be more convenient or advantageous to one of the parties.
The dissent dismissively compares Exhibit A to a drawing made on a Waffle House napkin.
While the drawing may have been crude, the parties nonetheless specifically incorporated the
drawing into the settlement agreement as Exhibit A. The circuit court relied on it in determining the
location of the easement. The simplicity of the drawing does not make it any less a part of the parties’
agreement.
Finally, the dissent emphasizes the expense and difficulty of construing the easement along
the southern boundary. The dissent also questions whether the easement can be constructed at that
location. However, those concerns do not establish that the circuit court clearly erred in interpreting
the parties’ agreement. The fact that the easement may be more expensive or difficult to construct
than Allen anticipated does not alter the terms of the agreement. See Carden v. McDonald, 69 Ark.
App. 257, 263, 12 S.W.3d 643, 647–48 (2000) (citing Helms v. Helms, 317 Ark. 143, 875 S.W.2d
849 (1994)). An unfavorable outcome does not make the agreement unenforceable.
BRANDON J. HARRISON, Judge, dissenting. The circuit court imposed a right-of-way to
drive off a cliff into a 60-to-80-foot gorge. The majority affirms it on the strength and detail of what
could satirically pass for a watercolored-napkin drawing completed at a Waffle House booth. Unless
the Allens fill the gorge, they will have to boat to their property. To fill the gorge will take an
exorbitant expense and effort relative to the right-of-way’s cost to obtain in the first place. The
bargained-for easement is, then, something of a legal mirage. Jarring. But true.
*
9
We have said that an express right-of-way is defined or “specifically described” if a surveyor
could go onto the land and locate it from the deed description. Doug’s Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Miller, 79
Ark. App. 28, 35, 83 S.W.3d 425, 429–30 (2002) (citing Wilson v. Johnston, 66 Ark. App. 193, 990
S.W.2d 554 (1999)). Add a second surveyor and the test is clearer: could they independently locate
the same easement? If not, no problem. Unlike a deed conveying a fee interest, the grant of an
easement does not fail for want of a specific description. Instead, the missing detail can be supplied
after the grant by this rule of law:
Where such right-of-way is reserved, or expressly granted and not defined, the owner
of the servient estate, in the first instance, has the right to delimit it, and, in the event
of his failure to do so, it may be selected by the grantee of the easement; but, in either
case, the location must be a reasonable one, taking into consideration the interest and
convenience of both the dominant and servient estates.
Carroll Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Benson, 319 Ark. 68, 73, 889 S.W.2d 756, 759 (1994) (emphasis original)
(quoting Fulcher v. Dierks Lumber & Coal Co., 164 Ark. 261, 271, 261 S.W. 645, 648 (1924)).
That rule contemplates that parties will supply any undefined particulars, even if some
particulars are defined: “Where the grant of a right-of-way is not bounded in the deed it is to be
bounded by lines of reasonable enjoyment.” Hatfield v. Ark. W. Gas Co., 5 Ark. App. 26, 28, 632
S.W.2d 238, 240 (1982) (supplying a reasonable width where none was defined). Key concepts
alert: Reasonable Location, convenience & enjoyment. Do the Allens get to check any
facet of Reasonableness for the $8,000 paid to the Wyants? Certainly not. Did the circuit court
hold that the easement it imposed was reasonable? No, it did not. That is why its decision, and the
majority’s opinion, run against common sense and the law as the Arkansas Supreme Court has laid it
out.
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The majority holds that the easement deed and settlement agreement “expressly and
unambiguously” put the location of the easement “along the southern boundary of Wyant’s parcel.”
Not so. At least, not exactly so. If the agreement had done that, then the parties would have had no
need for a survey or more specifics. Nor would three competing surveys have been generated. And
a truly “unambiguous” and “express” settlement agreement wouldn’t have birthed an action to
enforce it and a resulting appeal that split a six-judge panel.
The easement deed specifies an 18-foot width for the right of way. It must begin at Old Bill
Evans Road (the Road) and run west to “the boundary of the Allen property and the boundary of the
Wyant property.” The deed makes no reference whatsoever to the Wyants’ south boundary. On its
four corners, the deed cannot “specifically describe” just one easement. The property boundary
where the easement must end is 1015.38 survey feet long. Though the surveys plot only three points
along the Road where the easement must start, that is enough to show it extends at least 50 feet north
of the Wyants’ south boundary and runs within the property for at least 280 feet.1
Even the known 50-foot northern stretch of the Road offers many places to put an 18-foot
west-running easement. In fact, it could accommodate two of them with room to spare. So no
surveyor could determine from the deed alone where on the Road the easement should begin. 2 Here,
Regrettably, the survey maps only show the Road where it intersects a proposed easement
1
route. Two proposed routes intersect it 280 feet apart; maps in the record that do not purport to be drawn to scale show the Road turn sharply north near what appears to be the Wyants’ eastern boundary.
2If an easement corresponds to a feature that exists on the land—an old road, say—it can be specifically described by reference to the feature despite lacking explicit details in the grant. See Branscum v. Nelson, 2022 Ark. App. 354, 654 S.W.3d 343 (remanding to determine width of prescriptive easement along readily identifiable road). This was a new grant on an imaginary line.
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the circuit court was presented with three easement-placement options—each backed by a separate
survey—and a fourth option to choose “none of the above” and send the parties back to the drawing
board. (That’s what I would do today.) The circuit court did not determine whether the route it
chose was reasonable, as the supreme court ordered to be done on remand in the first Carroll Electric
appeal. Carroll Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Benson, 312 Ark. 183, 848 S.W.2d 413 (1993). And it chose the
most unreasonable option to one of the parties. The majority follows suit. But why choose an option
that would be wholly unreasonable, maybe even unusable, for one of the settling parties while
providing a practical windfall to the other?
I agree the Allens’ “meeting of the minds” argument fails. But it fails because the parties’
minds did not have to meet on the location of the right-of-way. In fact, after the Allens accepted the
deed, the parties did just what the grantor and grantee of a right-of-way with no definite location
would have done. And what the law permits them to do. The Allens hired a road contractor to mark
out a convenient route between the specified Road and the specified boundary line in the right general
direction. Their first pick was the centerline of an existing road the Road crosses. They needed a
survey, and the easement deed anticipated they would affix one. Why? Because they would have to
decide on and describe a course along the land. And the Wyants objected to their proposed routes,
consistent with their right to delimit where the easement could go. E.g., Ark. Valley Elec. Coop. Corp.
v. Brinks, 240 Ark. 381, 400 S.W.2d 278 (1966). Whether it was the Allens or the Wyants who
ultimately chose the route, “[t]he location must be reasonable in either case[,]” Bradley v. Ark. La. Gas
Co., 280 Ark. 492, 496, 659 S.W.2d 180, 182 (1983), because they had not agreed where exactly it
would go. There’s that pesky concept of reasonableness again.
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Had the majority not found a “specifically described” easement, that legal backstop would
have guaranteed both sides “a convenient, reasonable, and accessible way” considering the relative
hardships to both, if they could not agree on a location. Benson, 319 Ark. at 72, 889 S.W.2d at 759
(emphasis original); Howard v. Cramlet, 56 Ark. App. 171, 939 S.W.2d 858 (1997). Eventually,
someone told the surveyors to draw an easement along the southernmost 18 feet of the Wyants’
property. The circuit court did not find that the parties had agreed to a specifically described
easement there. But it found that, of the three routes surveyed, one “most closely aligns with the
Exhibit ‘A’ attached to the settlement agreement”—the Waffle House exhibit. Again, it recognized
the mere appearance of an easement, not a viable property right of ingress/egress that could actually
be deployed by real people and in a reasonable manner for some reasonable cost.
Here is the Waffle House exhibit:
Given three choices, it was inevitable one would “most closely” align with that drawing. The test,
though, was whether the parties’ agreement identified one specific easement that could be located
on the ground. It simply did not. The Waffle House exhibit shows the Wyants wanted to put the
easement as far south as they could. The circuit court could weigh that desire heavily when it selected
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a mutually reasonable place to put it. But on a featureless rectangle that gives no hint about the
corresponding topography, the exhibit did not locate the easement so specifically that nothing the
Wyants wanted—the start point, the end point, the bearing—would have to give if it proved
unusable for the Allens.
These surveys measure to the hundredth of a survey foot; the rectangle marked “Wyant” is a
parcel one quarter mile tall. I doubt any two surveyors in the world could agree exactly how far
from Wyants’ south boundary this ballpoint easement is supposed to begin. But none of them should
put it zero feet away, where the Allens’ easement is now. And if they did, it could not be sustained
because this bargained-for easement must be at a reasonable location and be reasonably convenient
to both the Allens and the Wyants. Both families gave up something in the bargained-for exchange
and settlement agreement. Or so two levels of courts should have recognized.
*
To my concurring colleague. I appreciate the concern, but I comprehend this case with
pristine clarity. My colleague concludes, “An unfavorable outcome does not make the agreement
unenforceable,” and therefore misses the circuit court’s error and the thrust of my dissent. I am not
arguing that the agreement should not be enforced; quite the contrary. I would enforce the
agreement. But I would do so in accord with Arkansas property law, which happens to embody good
ol’ fashioned economic sense and fair play when parties exchange a deed for a right-of-way without
committing to exactly where it will go. I’ll explain.
The Allens moved to enforce an easement deed the parties had annexed and incorporated as
Exhibit B to their settlement agreement. The Wyants agreed to and did sign the deed in exchange
for $8,000. The unscaled map above was Exhibit A to the settlement agreement. The agreement
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incorporated it for a particular purpose—to identify the parcels involved. (Hence the names.) It
made sense to do that because the Allens owned two landlocked parcels; only one was at issue in this
deal. The differentiation and identification of which Allen parcel was in play was therefore critical.
That said, the parties clearly knew they’d need to memorialize the course of the easement for their
successors in interest. They agreed that a scrivener’s affidavit would supplement the deed with a
specific location after a survey. I discussed this point above and reiterate it here.
Back to the hand-penned line on Exhibit A. The parties’ agreement did not incorporate the
line on Exhibit A for any purpose. The deed didn’t either. But even if it had, the twain would not
specifically describe the location of a right-of-way under the “can-a-surveyor-locate-it?” standard.3
Surely that statement is beyond dispute in the sense that atoms exist and memento mori. None of my
colleagues has explained how the squiggly line above, on a parcel a quarter-mile tall, “specifically
describes” an arrow-straight easement along the southern boundary.
Yet, despite the lack of specifics, the deal did not implode. On this my colleagues and I agree.
Why not? Because where the deed did not specifically provide otherwise, the law supplied something
mutually convenient. Enter the rule of reasonableness, which presents the opportunity—
indeed, the directive—to fill the descriptive gap as a matter of law. That rule is why the conveyance
of an undefined or partly undefined right-of-way can be enforced and not scuttled altogether. That
3Doug’s Elec. Serv., Inc., supra. Courts elsewhere have relied on maps not drawn to scale as evidence that an easement corresponded to a feature depicted in a survey, Cassani v. Northfield Sav. Bank, 893 A.2d 325 (Vt. 2005) (existing road), or an area specifically described in a deed. Bouchard v. Abbott, 488 N.Y.S.2d 275 (N.Y. 1985) (easements to use beach and lake). I am not aware of any opinion holding that such a map or drawing specifically described a new easement along an imaginary line.
15
rule is why I would direct the circuit court to enforce the agreement and locate the easement, but in
line with Arkansas law, not in contravention of it.
The reversible error here is that the circuit did not correctly apply the law to the record and
select a right-of-way that was, for both parties, “convenient, reasonable, and accessible” while
considering the relative hardships to both parties if they could not agree on a location. Benson, 319
Ark. at 72, 889 S.W.2d at 759 (emphasis original). Nor has the majority done so. That’s the whole
waffle.
*
The majority’s decision recognizes only the illusion of property rights. It does not, however,
confer any practical or meaningful legal benefit to the Allens. Instead, it has blessed a right-of-way
route that could not be traversed but by giants, seraphim, or a person who is willing and able to have
“several hundred loads” of red-clay dirt trucked into an area where it is “extremely difficult” to come
up with that material and the dump trucks to haul it. Several hundred loads of dirt. Extremely
difficult task. That holding makes no good economic sense and is not otherwise a correct application
of the law to this record.
Perhaps the Arkansas Supreme Court will review this decision, connect the property-law dots
the majority has not, and impose a just and reasonable result.
I respectfully dissent.
Matthews, Campbell, Rhoads, McClure & Thompson, P.A., by: Sarah L. Waddoups, for appellants.
Watkins, Boyer, Gray & Curry, PLLC, by: Jennifer E. Gray, for appellee.
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