Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 510
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION III
No. CV-25-253
CRAIG BALLEGEER Opinion Delivered October 28, 2026
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE CRAWFORD
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
V. [NO. 17DR-15-497]
HOLLY BALLEGEER HONORABLE MICHAEL MEDLOCK,
APPELLEE JUDGE
AFFIRMED
STEPHANIE POTTER BARRETT, Judge
This is the fourth appeal arising from the division of assets and debts following the
dissolution of Holly and Craig Ballegeer’s thirty-four-year marriage. Craig appeals the
Crawford County Circuit Court’s January 20, 2025 final order resolving the division of the
parties’ marital business, Groundskeeper. On appeal, Craig argues the circuit court (1) failed
to follow this court’s mandate in Ballegeer v. Ballegeer, 2024 Ark. App. 190, 686 S.W.3d 867
(Ballegeer III); and (2) clearly erred by awarding interest of 3.75 percent dating back to
October 5, 2017, the date of the parties’ original divorce decree. We affirm.
I. Relevant Background
We begin with the procedural history set forth in Ballegeer III and incorporate it here.
See Ballegeer III. A more detailed account of the parties’ divorce proceedings and the first two appeals may be found there. We recount only the history necessary to place the present
appeal in context.
In Ballegeer III, Craig challenged the circuit court’s order requiring him to purchase
Holly’s one-half interest in Groundskeeper for $183,000. We reversed, holding the circuit
court incorrectly interpreted the prior mandate as requiring Craig to purchase Holly’s
interest and clearly erred by refusing to consider additional evidence concerning the value of
the business and the debt Craig paid during the intervening appeals. We explained that, on
remand, the circuit court could require either party to purchase the other’s interest,
otherwise divide the asset equally, order the business sold, or make an unequal distribution
supported by written findings. The mandate reversing and remanding the case for further
proceedings consistent with the opinion was issued on April 30, 2024, and filed in the circuit
court on May 3, 2024.
Following remand, the case was reassigned to Judge Michael Medlock, who entered
the original divorce decree. At an October 29, 2024, hearing, the parties presented evidence
concerning Groundskeeper’s value, Craig’s payments toward Holly’s interest in the business,
and the parties’ tax liabilities. CPA Cliff Hubbs testified the parties’ actual tax liabilities for
the relevant years, including penalties and interest, totaled $258,282, and Craig had paid
that amount. Hubbs further calculated Holly’s one-half share of those liabilities was
$129,141, and Craig had paid Holly $168,000 toward her interest in Groundskeeper. Holly
acknowledged Craig paid the back taxes, and she made no payments toward them. She
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nevertheless maintained Craig should retain the business because he already paid a
substantial portion of its value.
On December 10, 2024, the circuit court issued a letter ruling finding that equity
favored Holly because Craig controlled the business and received the majority of its income.
The court concluded that reducing Holly’s property settlement by a portion of the tax
payments would effectively award her less than one-half of the marital property.
On January 20, 2025, the court entered its final order requiring Craig to purchase
Holly’s one-half interest in Groundskeeper for the original value of $183,000. The court
credited Craig with forty-seven payments of $3,500—totaling $164,500—but did not credit
him for any portion of the tax liabilities he paid. The court also imposed interest at 3.75
percent beginning October 5, 2017; calculated the amount remaining due as $37,658.61 as
of February 15, 2025; and directed Craig to satisfy that amount through twelve monthly
payments.
II. Standard of Review
Domestic-relations cases are reviewed de novo on appeal, but the appellate court does
not reverse a circuit court’s findings unless they are clearly erroneous; a finding is clearly
erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire
evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Sanchez v.
Weeks, 2023 Ark. App. 531, 678 S.W.3d 907.
When the issue before us on appeal is whether, on remand, the circuit court has
followed our prior decision in the case, we review the actions of the circuit court to determine
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whether our directions, as expressed by the opinion and mandate, have been “followed
exactly and placed into execution.” City of Dover v. Barton, 342 Ark. 521, 526, 29 S.W.3d
698, 699 (2000). The jurisdiction of the circuit court is confined to the appellate court’s
directions. Id.
III. Discussion
A. Mandate in Ballegeer III
Craig first argues the circuit court failed to follow the letter and spirit of our mandate
in Ballegeer III.
An inferior court must implement both the letter and spirit of an appellate court’s
mandate and may not deviate from the directions contained therein. Jackson v. Smiley Sawmill,
LLC, 2021 Ark. App. 433, 638 S.W.3d 11. The circuit court’s jurisdiction on remand
extends only as far as that conferred by the appellate court’s opinion and mandate. Turner v.
Nw. Ark. Neurosurgery Clinic, P.A., 91 Ark. App. 290, 210 S.W.3d 126 (2005).
In Ballegeer III, we reversed because the circuit court erroneously believed Craig was
required to purchase Holly’s interest in Groundskeeper for $183,000 and refused to consider
evidence concerning the business and the parties’ debts. We directed the circuit court to
consider the evidence from the original divorce proceedings together with additional
evidence concerning Groundskeeper’s value and the circumstances affecting that value
during the intervening appeals. We also made it clear that several methods of distribution
remained available to the circuit court.
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The circuit court did precisely that. On remand, it conducted an evidentiary hearing
concerning Groundskeeper’s value and profitability, the parties’ tax liabilities, Craig’s
payment of those liabilities, and the payments Craig made toward Holly’s interest. The
circuit court expressly considered Craig’s argument that he should receive credit for the taxes
he paid but rejected that position on equitable grounds. It found that Craig controlled and
profitably operated Groundskeeper throughout the intervening years, and reducing Holly’s
settlement by the tax payments would effectively award her less than one-half of the marital
property.
The circuit court ultimately required Craig to purchase Holly’s one-half interest for
$183,000 and credited him for the payments he already made. That disposition was among
those expressly permitted by Ballegeer III. Nothing in our mandate required the circuit court
to divide the tax liability equally or to award Craig the particular credit he sought. The
mandate required the circuit court to consider the relevant evidence and exercise its
discretion in dividing the marital property; it did not dictate the result of that consideration.
Accordingly, we hold the circuit court complied with our mandate.
B. Award of 3.75 Percent Interest
Craig next challenges the circuit court’s award of 3.75 percent interest on the
$183,000 valuation of Holly’s interest in Groundskeeper beginning October 5, 2017. He
contends no judgment requiring him to pay Holly $183,000 existed on that date, and interest
therefore could not begin to accrue with the original divorce decree. We affirm the award as
prejudgment interest.
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Prejudgment interest compensates an injured party for the loss of the use of money
or property from the time of the loss until judgment. Dorsett v. Buffington, 2013 Ark. 345,
429 S.W.3d 225. The relevant inquiry is whether there is a method for determining the value
of the property at the time of the loss. Lovell v. Marianna Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 267 Ark.
164, 589 S.W.2d 577 (1979). When the amount and time of the loss are ascertainable
without reliance on opinion or discretion, prejudgment interest is recoverable. See TB of
Blytheville, Inc. v. Little Rock Sign & Emblem, Inc., 328 Ark. 688, 946 S.W.2d 930 (1997).
Here, both were ascertainable. The October 5, 2017, divorce decree valued Holly’s
one-half interest in Groundskeeper at $183,000. Although the decree established a reverseauction procedure for determining which party would ultimately retain the business, the
value assigned to Holly’s one-half interest was fixed at the time of the divorce. Craig
thereafter retained possession and control of Groundskeeper throughout the ensuing
litigation.
The evidence on remand further established Groundskeeper remained profitable
while under Craig’s exclusive control. The circuit court found the business had not lost
value, and its profits since the divorce exceeded the value of the entire business as determined
in 2017. On those facts, the circuit court determined Craig should have purchased Holly’s
$183,000 interest when the original decree was entered.
Craig’s argument focuses on whether the 2017 decree constituted a money judgment
requiring him to pay Holly $183,000. However, prejudgment interest does not depend on
the existence of such a judgment. Its purpose is instead to compensate a party for being
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deprived of the use of money or property whose value was ascertainable at the time of the
loss. See DWB, LLC v. D&T Pure Tr., 2018 Ark. App. 283, 550 S.W.3d 420. The relevant loss
here was Holly’s loss of the use of her interest in Groundskeeper while Craig retained and
profited from the business during the years of litigation.
Our recent decision in Reesnes v. Reesnes, 2026 Ark. App. 356, 741 S.W.3d 321, is
consistent with this conclusion. Prejudgment interest is appropriate when the amount and
time of the loss can be determined without reliance on opinion or discretion. Walther v.
Wilson, 2020 Ark. 194, at 20, 600 S.W.3d 554, 566. Holly’s interest was valued
contemporaneously with the divorce decree. The circuit court was therefore not required to
retrospectively determine the value of her loss; the $183,000 figure had already been
established.
The reverse-auction procedure does not compel a different result. Although that
procedure left unresolved which party would ultimately purchase Groundskeeper, the circuit
court found on remand that Craig retained the business, continued to profit from it, and
should have purchased Holly’s interest at the value established in 2017. Thus, the amount
of Holly’s loss and the date from which she was deprived of the use of that property were
sufficiently ascertainable to support prejudgment interest.
We may affirm an order of the circuit court when the court reaches the right result,
even if it announces a different reason. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s award of
interest from October 5, 2017, as an award of prejudgment interest.
Affirmed.
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ABRAMSON and MURPHY, JJ., agree.
Henry Law Firm, by: Mark Murphey Henry, for appellant.
Smith, Cohen & Horan, PLC, by: Matthew T. Horan, for appellee.
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