Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 520
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION I
No. CR-25-439
DARRYL WILLIAMS Opinion Delivered October 28, 2026
APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE JEFFERSON
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
V. [NO. 35CR-19-282]
STATE OF ARKANSAS HONORABLE JODI RAINES DENNIS,
JUDGE
APPELLEE
AFFIRMED
WAYMOND M. BROWN, Judge
Appellant Darryl Williams was found guilty by a Jefferson County Circuit Court jury of
aggravated assault and possession of a firearm by certain persons. After the addition of a firearm
enhancement, he was sentenced to an aggregate term of thirty years’ incarceration in the Arkansas
Division of Correction. We affirmed his convictions on direct appeal.1 Williams now appeals the
denial of his petition for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure
37.1.2 We affirm.
On appeal from a circuit court’s ruling on a petitioner’s request for Rule 37 relief, this court
will not reverse the circuit court’s decision granting or denying postconviction relief unless it is
1 Williams v. State, 2023 Ark. App. 222.
2 (2023).
clearly erroneous.3 A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the
appellate court after reviewing the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been made.4
The benchmark for judging a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is “whether counsel’s
conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be
relied on as having produced a just result.”5 Pursuant to Strickland, we assess the effectiveness of
counsel under a two-prong standard. First, a petitioner raising a claim of ineffective assistance must
show that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed
the petitioner by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 6 A petitioner making an
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim must show that counsel’s performance fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness.7 A court must indulge in a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct
falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.8
Second, the petitioner must show that counsel’s deficient performance so prejudiced
petitioner’s defense that he or she was deprived of a fair trial.9 The petitioner must show there is a
3 Kemp v. State, 347 Ark. 52, 60 S.W.3d 404 (2001).
4 Id.
5 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 669 (1984).
6 Williams v. State, 369 Ark. 104, 251 S.W.3d 290 (2007).
7 Abernathy v. State, 2012 Ark. 59, 386 S.W.3d 477 (per curiam).
8 Id.
9 Id.
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reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the fact-finder would have had a reasonable
doubt respecting guilt, i.e., the decision reached would have been different absent the errors. 10 A
reasonable probability is one that is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial.11
Unless a petitioner makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction resulted from a
breakdown in the adversarial process that renders the result unreliable. 12 Additionally, conclusory
statements that counsel was ineffective cannot be the basis for postconviction relief.13
In Williams’s June 7, 2023, petition seeking postconviction relief, he alleged that his counsel
provided ineffective assistance because counsel failed to (1) inform him of his right to file a posttrial
motion for new trial; (2) file various motions, including a motion to suppress, motion to sever,
motion to disclose Rule 404(b) evidence, motion to exclude evidence, and a motion requiring
investigative officers to retain their “rough notes”; (3) investigate evidence, put on a defense, impeach
witnesses, and otherwise adequately prepare for trial; and (4) present “viable issues” on direct appeal.
The circuit court denied Williams’s petition for postconviction relief, finding his claims unsupported
by facts or the requisite prejudicial showing.
On appeal, Williams contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failure to (1) raise a
claim of a speedy-trial violation; (2) challenge the State’s amendment of the criminal information for
enhancement purposes; (3) object to an illegally imposed sentence enhancement; and (4) challenge
10 Howard v. State, 367 Ark. 18, 238 S.W.3d 24 (2006).
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Anderson v. State, 2011 Ark. 488, 385 S.W.3d 783.
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the court’s departure from the presumptive sentencing range outlined in Arkansas Code Annotated
section 16-90-803. The entirety of Williams’s arguments on appeal differs from the arguments raised
in his Rule 37 petition; thus, the newly raised arguments are barred on appeal.14
Affirmed.
KLAPPENBACH, C.J., and WOOD, J., agree.
Darryl Williams, pro se appellant.
Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: James Hill, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.
14 Crawford v. State, 2023 Ark. App. 341, 669 S.W.3d 889.
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