Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 504
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION IV
No. CR-25-512
RONALD ROBINSON Opinion Delivered October 28, 2026
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE POPE
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
V. [NO. 58CR-21-764]
STATE OF ARKANSAS HONORABLE JAMES DUNHAM,
APPELLEE JUDGE
AFFIRMED
ROBERT J. GLADWIN, Judge
Appellant Ronald Robertson appeals the Pope County Circuit Court’s order denying
his petition for postconviction relief under Rule 37.1 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal
Procedure (2025). On appeal, Robinson does not challenge the denial of the petition on its
merits; rather, he contends that the circuit court erred by denying his motion for leave to
amend and enlarge the Rule 37 petition and for denying the petition without a hearing. We
affirm.
I. Background Facts
A Pope County jury convicted Robinson of disorderly conduct, resisting arrest,
criminal trespass, and two counts of second-degree battery for an incident that occurred at
the Orr Auto Mall. Robinson was sentenced to an aggregate of twenty years’ imprisonment
and $10,000 in fines. On direct appeal, Robinson argued that the circuit court erred by allowing the admission of evidence that he had previously attacked police officers while
resisting arrest. Robinson maintained that his prior battery conviction was not
independently relevant, and the risk of unfair prejudice was immense. We affirmed his
conviction in Robinson v. State, 2024 Ark. App. 401, 697 S.W.3d 719.
On December 3, 2024, Robinson filed a Rule 37 petition and asserted the following
claims: (1) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to introduce evidence that he had a
“horrendous experience” with local law enforcement in 2011, which resulted in a civil
settlement; (2) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to improper opening
statements and closing arguments from the State; and (3) appellate counsel was ineffective
for failing to raise a hearsay argument on appeal.
Along with his petition, Robinson filed a motion for leave to file an
amended/enlarged petition. Robinson asserted that he needed to do more investigation and
requested six months to amend the petition. Moreover, Robinson argued that the ten-page
restriction prevented him from raising additional claims of ineffective assistance of counsel,
including “failure to file for motion for change of venue, failure to present mitigation
evidence, failure to object to taser restraints during trial, and failure to admit relevant critical
evidence at trial.” Specifically, Robinson maintained:
Those who practice post-conviction work are in an impossible position. Attempt to
cram as many points as possible with limited factual background due to page
limitations or omit specific arguments with merit so that fewer points can be more
detailed. This counsel has put forth several points but, if this motion were to be
granted, he would set forth greater factual and legal support and additional claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel as mentioned above.
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Subsequently, on February 7, 2025, Robinson filed a motion for leave to amend his
Rule 37 petition. The motion was made in response to the circuit court’s order in another
case involving Robinson finding that his petition in that case was deficient because he failed
to specifically plead that he was in custody serving a sentence. On March 25, 2025, the court
entered an order addressing the custody issue and granted Robinson leave to amend his
petition. The court granted Robinson leave to file the amended petition regarding whether
or not he was in custody on December 3, 2024, under a sentence of the Pope County Circuit
Court. The order, however, noted that “[n]o other amendment is permitted.”
Robinson filed the amended petition as directed by court. Thereafter, the circuit
court denied the petition on its merits—without a hearing. This appeal followed.
II. Standard of Review
A circuit court’s denial of leave to amend a petition is reviewed under an abuse-ofdiscretion standard. Butler v. State, 367 Ark. 318, 239 S.W.3d 514 (2006). Abuse of discretion
is a high threshold that does not simply require error in the circuit court’s decision, but
requires that the circuit court act improvidently, thoughtlessly, or without due consideration.
Id. Additionally, a circuit court has discretion, pursuant to Rule 37.3(a), to decide whether
the record is sufficient to sustain the court’s findings without a hearing. See Sanders v. State,
352 Ark. 16, 98 S.W.3d 35 (2003). Where a Rule 37 petition is denied without a hearing
pursuant to Rule 37.3(a), we review the circuit court’s written findings setting forth that the
petition is wholly without merit or that it is conclusive on the face of the record that the
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petitioner is entitled to no relief for clear error. Wood v. State, 2015 Ark. 477, 478 S.W.3d
194.
III. Points on Appeal
Robinson argues on appeal that (1) the circuit court erred by refusing to grant his
motion to file the amended/enlarged petition, and (2) the circuit court erred by denying his
Rule 37 petition without a hearing.
IV. Discussion
A. Enlarged Petition
First, Robinson asserts that the circuit court erred by not granting his request to
amend and enlarge his petition. A petitioner under Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure
37.1 may demonstrate that he cannot adequately present his claims to the court in only ten
pages and may request to file a petition longer than ten pages, but he may file the overlength
petition only with the permission of the circuit court. See, e.g., Walker v. State, 2026 Ark. App.
366; see Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.2(e). If a petitioner does not receive permission to file an
overlength petition, he is obliged to proceed in accordance with our rules. See Adams v. State,
2013 Ark. 174, 427 S.W.3d 63.
Here, however, while Robinson frames his point on appeal as the court’s denial of
his motion, he acknowledges throughout his brief that the circuit court, in fact, did not issue
a ruling on his motion. As Robinson correctly concedes, the circuit court did not rule on his
motion to amend and enlarge the petition; thus, his argument is not preserved for review on
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appeal. See, e.g., Barton v. State, 366 Ark. 339, 235 S.W.3d 511 (2006) (holding that the
burden is on a defendant to get a ruling, and a ruling cannot be presumed).
B. Evidentiary Hearing
Next, Robinson argues that the circuit court committed error by denying his Rule 37
petition without an evidentiary hearing. We disagree.
Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.3(1) (2025) provides that “[i]f the petition
and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no
relief, the trial court shall make written findings to that effect, specifying any parts of the
files, or records that are relied upon to sustain the court’s findings.” It is undisputed that
the circuit court has discretion pursuant to Rule 37.3(a) to decide whether the files or records
are sufficient to sustain the court’s findings without a hearing. Wood, 2015 Ark. 477, 478
S.W.3d 194. This court has previously interpreted Rule 37.3(a) and (c) to provide that “an
evidentiary hearing should be held in a postconviction proceeding unless the files and record
of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.” Britt v. State, 2022
Ark. App. 58, at 5, 639 S.W.3d 919, 923 (quoting Wooten v. State, 338 Ark. 691, 694, 1
S.W.3d 8, 10 (1999)). If the court fails to make such findings, it is reversible error unless the
record before this court conclusively shows that the petition is without merit. Bohanan v.
State, 327 Ark. 507, 939 S.W.2d 832 (1997).
Here, Robinson contends that the circuit court’s failure to conduct an evidentiary
hearing was erroneous because there were facts outside the record that needed to be put
forth to determine if the postconviction petition had merit. We disagree. In its order denying
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Robinson postconviction relief, the circuit court held that none of his arguments have
sufficient merit to require a hearing; thus, the court’s denial of Robinson’s Rule 37 petition
was based on the files and record of the case.
When considering an appeal from a denial of a Rule 37.1 petition on the basis of
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims, the sole question presented is whether, given the
totality of the evidence under the standard set forth by the United States Supreme Court in
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the circuit court clearly erred in finding that
counsel was not ineffective. Taylor v. State, 2013 Ark. 146, 427 S.W.3d 29. The benchmark
for judging a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must be “whether counsel’s conduct
so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be
relied on as having produced a just result.” Id. at 5, 427 S.W.3d at 32 (quoting Strickland,
466 U.S. at 686).
Our standard for ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims is the two-prong analysis set
forth in Strickland. Rasul v. State, 2015 Ark. 118, 458 S.W.3d 722. Under that standard, to
prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner must show that (1)
counsel’s performance was deficient, and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced his
defense. Mister v. State, 2014 Ark. 446. Unless a petitioner makes both showings, the
allegations do not meet the benchmark on review for granting relief on a claim of ineffective
assistance. Houghton v. State, 2015 Ark. 252, 464 S.W.3d 922.
Furthermore, counsel is presumed effective, and allegations without factual
substantiation are insufficient to overcome that presumption. Henington v. State, 2012 Ark.
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181, 403 S.W.3d 55. A petitioner claiming deficient performance must show that counsel’s
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and a court must indulge
in a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance. Id. A petitioner has the burden of overcoming the presumption that
counsel is effective by identifying specific acts and omissions that, when viewed from
counsel’s perspective at the time of trial, could not have been the result of reasonable
professional judgment. Id.
For the purposes of this appeal, we must determine whether the circuit court
conclusively reached its decision solely on the basis of the petition and record. If so, then no
evidentiary hearing was required. See Montgomery v. State, 2011 Ark. 462, 385 S.W.3d 189
(finding that an evidentiary hearing was required when it could not be said that the appellant
was not entitled to relief on some of his claims on the basis of the face of the petition or
record alone).
Robinson first argued that his counsel was ineffective for failing to introduce evidence
of a 2011 incident with police wherein he received a settlement. He alleges that this evidence
would have been admissible to show potential bias on the part of the police because “local
police were aware of the incident.” In its order denying the petition, the circuit court held
that Robinson failed to assert or demonstrate how counsel’s failure to do so fell below the
objective standard of reasonableness—apart from his own conclusory statement that doing so
amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. Furthermore, the circuit court held that
Robinson also failed to explain how he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to raise the 2011
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incident. Accordingly, the circuit court held that Robinson’s conclusory statements in his
petition were insufficient to require a hearing. Because the burden is on a petitioner to
provide facts that affirmatively support his claims of prejudice, we find no error in the circuit
court’s denial of this claim without a hearing. See Dennis v. State, 2020 Ark. 28, 592 S.W.3d
646.
Robinson also maintained that the 2011-incident information should have been
offered in the sentencing phase of his jury trial. Specifically, Robinson argued in his Rule
37 petition that this evidence would have “humanized” him and “reduced the one-sidedness
of the testimony.” Robinson asserted that such information would likely have resulted in
him receiving a lower sentence or being found not guilty. As correctly noted by the circuit
court, Robinson had already been found guilty at this point in the trial, and the jury was
merely receiving evidence to determine his sentence. Furthermore, the circuit court rejected
Robinson’s argument regarding a potential lesser sentence for the same reasons as discussed
above. Because Robinson failed to demonstrate that he suffered any prejudice from the
asserted deficiency, the circuit court held that neither prong of the test for ineffective
assistance of counsel had been sufficiently pled to require a hearing. We agree with the
circuit court that the petition alone was insufficient to require a hearing on this claim.
Next, Robinson asserted that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to
certain statements made by the prosecutor during opening statements and closing
arguments. In his Rule 37 petition, Robinson argued that if purported objections had been
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made, “a different result would have occurred”; therefore, his defense fell below the standard
of care in failing to object. The circuit court rejected this argument for the following reasons:
[Robinson’s] Amended Petition is conclusory in its assertion of trial counsel
error, as is his suggestion of resulting prejudice. The Amended Petition does not
demonstrate that the remark affected the result of the trial, or the sentencing. The
comment of the prosecutor was not improper or egregious, and did not constitute an
invitation for the jury to engage in passion or emotion. In fact, it was congruent to
the defense argument that the injuries complained of were too minor to constitute
an offense. And the jury was instructed that statements of the lawyers do not
constitute evidence, and if they are not based on the evidence, they should be
disregarded.
Accordingly, the circuit court had several reasons for denying this claim on the basis of the
written record alone; thus, the circuit court did not err by denying the petition without a
hearing. Robinson’s claim on appeal that the circuit court improperly held that counsel’s
failure to object was merely trial strategy—which cannot be known without testimony from
trial counsel—is meritless. The circuit court based its denial of relief on the record and
petition.
Finally, Robinson argued that his direct-appeal attorney was ineffective for failing to
assert a hearsay argument on appeal. He asserts that one of the Orr employee’s testified that
her boss told Robinson to leave the premises, which was impermissible hearsay. Robinson
maintains that he was prejudiced by the testimony because the “lawful direction to leave”
was an element of an offense for which he was convicted. The circuit court held that because
this assertion of error pertained only to the criminal-trespass charge, for which Robinson is
not serving a sentence, the court did not have jurisdiction. We agree.
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Robinson was given a fine for his criminal-trespass conviction but received no jail
time. Accordingly, the circuit court is correct that Robinson could not receive Rule 37 relief
as to that charge. See Kemp v. State, 330 Ark. 757, 956 S.W.2d 860 (1997). Thus, no hearing
was required on this claim.
V. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of Robinson’s
Rule 37 petition.
Affirmed.
THYER and MURPHY, JJ., agree.
Seddiq Law Firm, by: Justin Eisele, for appellant.
Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Joseph Karl Luebke, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.
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