Lydia E. Morong vs. Ellen A. Spofford; Daniel Morong vs. Same

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court1914-05-22

218 Mass. 50

Summary · law.co

Holding. The defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of reasonable care only with respect to the front stairway and landing providing access to the tenant's store, but owed no duty regarding the rear stairway, and an unlocked door does not constitute an implied invitation to use that stairway. Judgment for the defendant affirmed.

A woman injured herself by falling down an unlighted rear stairway in a building owned by the defendant after opening an unlocked door on the second-floor landing. The woman had visited a milliner's store on the second floor multiple times before and was familiar with the front stairway and landing but had never accessed the rear stairway area. On the evening of the accident, she went to the landing to visit the store, found the store door locked, opened the rear stairway door (which had no lock), and fell down the unlit stairs.

The court held that although the defendant owed the woman a duty of reasonable care regarding the front stairway and landing that provided access to the tenant's store, the defendant owed her no duty concerning the rear stairway. The unlocked door did not constitute an implied invitation for the woman to use the rear stairway, and the defendant had no obligation to lock the door or provide lighting for that stairway. Because there was no evidence of negligence by the defendant, judgment was entered in the defendant's favor.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether a building owner owes a duty of care to an invitee regarding portions of the building not included in the implied invitation
Whether an unlocked door creates an implied invitation to use a particular stairway
Whether a landlord must lock or illuminate stairways retained under the landlord's control but not part of the tenant's leased space

Procedural posture

The case was before the court on a report from the presiding judge of the Superior Court after verdicts were rendered for both plaintiffs.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Crosby, J.

The female plaintiff, whom we shall refer to as the plaintiff, brings this action to recover damages for injuries received by falling down a flight of stairs in a building owned by the defendant. The action brought by Daniel Morong, the husband of the first named plaintiff, is to recover for consequential damages on account of injuries sustained by her. These cases are before us upon the report of the presiding judge of the Superior Court, after a verdict for each plaintiff.

The undisputed evidence shows that the plaintiff, on November 11, 1909, at about half past eight o’clock in the evening, ascended a flight of stairs to visit the store of one Gilchrist, a milliner, which was on the second floor of the defendant’s building; that there was a hallway or landing on the second floor with two doors leading into the Gilchrist store, and a third door leading from this landing down to the rear of the first floor. There was no lock on this door, which was at the top of the back stairway. The landing is about eight feet square and was lighted. The rear stairway was not lighted and there was no means of lighting it. The tenant Gilchrist occupied the whole of the second floor of the building, and “the plaintiff was familiar with the premises and had visited the store of said Gilchrist on the second floor on a number of occasions, and had been there earlier that day. She had, however, never been on any portion of the premises except the premises of said Gilchrist and the front stairs and landing at the top of said stairs leading to the apartments of said Gilchrist.” The defendant retained possession of the back stairway. It appeared that the plaintiff had visited the store in the afternoon of the day of the accident and was told by Mrs. Gilchrist that the latter would see her (the plaintiff) that evening in her (Gilchrist’s) kitchen, as the store would not be open. The plaintiff testified that when she reached the landing she tried Mrs. Gilchrist’s door and found it was locked; "And then I turned round and there was a door that went opposite to the door where you go down on to the street and I opened it. I said, CI guess this is the door/ opened it and it swung in over the stairs. ... I made a step forward. . . . There was n’t any landing on the other side, and I went head first down the stairs.”

C. S. Knowles, for the defendant.

T. S. Herlihy, for the plaintiffs.

While there was an implied invitation from the defendant as the owner of the premises to the plaintiff to use the front stairway and landing leading to the Gilchrist store, and the defendant owed her the duty of exercising reasonable care to provide safe and suitable approaches thereto, we are of opinion that there is no evidence which would warrant a finding that there was any invitation from the defendant to the plaintiff to open or pass through the door leading down the rear stairway, and that the defendant owed her no duty to keep the door locked. It could not be found that she had a right to assume, as the door was not locked, that it was intended that she might use it as a means of ingress to or egress from the premises. Accordingly we are of opinion that there is no evidence of negligence of the defendant. It follows that, in accordance with the terms of the report, judgment should be entered for the defendant in each case.

So ordered.

Bell, J.