HOFFMAN, Judge,
dissenting:
Appellant contends that the lower court should have granted his motion to suppress physical evidence seized as the result of his arrest because the arresting officers lacked probable cause. I agree and, therefore, would vacate the judgment of sentence and remand for a new trial.
The Commonwealth produced the following facts: During the afternoon of October 24, 1975, police officers observed appellant and another person walking along North 50th Street in Philadelphia carrying five pieces of stereo equipment. After an unidentified citizen told the officers that appellant and his companion had just run out of a house on North 50th Street, the officers stopped and frisked them. In response to the officers’ inquiry, appellant stated that he was coming from a pawn shop where he had been unsuccessful in his attempt to exchange the equipment for money because the turntable lacked a needle. When the officers saw that there was a needle in the turntable, they confiscated the equipment and took appellant into custody. Because records revealed that no burglaries had been reported, the police released appellant. Later the same day, the owner of the stereo equipment reported a burglary and claimed the equipment which had been retained by the police. The next morning, the police arrested appellant and charged him with burglary.
On January 16, 1976, the lower court denied appellant’s motion to suppress the stereo equipment and granted the motion as to appellant’s response to the officers’ inquiry because the officers had not given appellant his Miranda warnings. On the same day, after a trial without a jury, the lower court found appellant guilty of burglary and later sentenced him to five years probation on the condition that he enter the Philadelphia Psychiatric Center Drug Program. This appeal followed.
Appellant asserts that his warrantless arrest was illegal because it was not based on probable cause and that the subsequent use of the confiscated stereo equipment against him was improper as it was the fruit of the illegal arrest. Because “street encounters between citizens and police officers are incredibly rich in diversity,” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1875, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), each case must be reviewed under its own unique facts and circumstances. Amidst this diversity, there is one unchanging requirement: probable cause must be determined on the facts and circumstances known at the moment the arrest was made, not retrospectively at trial. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 148, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972). The inquiry in the instant case is whether, at the time the police detained appellant and confiscated the stereo equipment, the arresting officers possessed reasonably trustworthy information which would be sufficient to warrant a prudent person in believing that appellant had committed or was committing an offense. Adams v. Williams, supra at 148, 92 S.Ct. 1921; Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed.2d 142; Bertrand Appeal, 451 Pa. 381, 385, 303 A.2d 486, 488 (1973).
In the instant case, there were two sources of information upon which the officers might have concluded that there was probable cause to arrest appellant. First, the officers received a statement from an unidentified private citizen that appellant and another person had just run out of a house. Even assuming that the citizen accurately reported his observation, the statement was not the report of a felony or misdemeanor. At most, the statement that appellant ran out of a house could raise a good faith suspicion of unlawful activity which may have justified “[a] brief stop” of the citizen “in order to determine [his] identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily . . . .” Adams v. Williams, supra, 407 U.S. at 146, 92 S.Ct. at 1923. However, suspicion or even strong reason to suspect is not adequate to support an arrest. Therefore, the information volunteered by the private citizen could not furnish probable cause for an arrest.
Second, in response to the officers’ request for an explanation as to why appellant was carrying the equipment, appellant responded that he was returning from a pawn shop where he had been turned away in his efforts to exchange the equipment for cash because the turntable lacked a needle. The officers observed that the turntable was equipped with a needle. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision in Commonwealth v. Mackie, 456 Pa. 372, 320 A.2d 842 (1974) is helpful in determining whether such a response can furnish probable cause to arrest. In Mackie, the arresting officer saw the defendant walking in a high crime area during daylight hours with a portable television and a set of field glasses. The officer stopped the defendant and asked where he was going. When the defendant gave a suspicious response, the officer arrested him. The Supreme Court, in overturning the conviction, stated that in order for a defendant’s response to furnish probable cause, it must be “bizarre and totally incredible under all the facts and circumstances.” Commonwealth v. Mackie, supra 456 Pa. at 376, 320 A.2d at 844.
In Commonwealth v. DeFleminque, 450 Pa. 163, 299 A.2d 246 (1973), our Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s suppression motion and characterized the defendant’s response to police questioning as “totally incredible”. The police had observed the defendant coming from behind a school building at 3:20 a. m. carrying a carton containing items associated with school activities. In response to the officers’ inquiry, the defendant stated that “he had left the car to go behind the school to urinate and had taken the materials found in the trunk of the car with him because he did not wish to leave them in the car while he relieved himself. The officers went to the rear of the school building, but could observe nothing unusual.” Com monwealth v. DeFleminque, supra 450 Pa. at 164, 299 A.2d at 247. See also Commonwealth v. Browne, 221 Pa.Super. 368, 292 A.2d 487 (1972); Commonwealth v. Howell, 213 Pa.Super. 33, 245 A.2d 680 (1968).
In the instant case, while appellant’s explanation, again, might have aroused suspicion because of its apparent contradiction with the fact that the turntable had a needle, the response cannot be construed as “bizarre and totally incredible.” At most, a brief stop would have been appropriate to investigate the suspicious circumstances.
Because the foregoing sources of information, individually and collectively, did not furnish probable cause to arrest appellant, I conclude that the owner’s identification of the stereo equipment was the fruit of the illegal arrest. Therefore, this physical evidence should have been suppressed and its use during trial was reversible error. Wong Sun v. U. S., 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963); Commonwealth v. Mackie, supra 456 Pa. at 377, 320 A.2d at 844.
I would vacate the judgment of sentence and remand for a new trial.
. The Commonwealth incorporated the testimony adduced at the suppression hearing into its case in chief at trial.
. Appellant’s companion was not a codefendant in this case.
. The Crimes Code, Act of December 6, 1972, P.L.1482, No. 334, § 1; 18 Pa.C.S. § 3502.
. The lower court erred when it construed appellant’s detention for questioning and subsequent release as a kind of intermediate police response requiring something less than probable cause in order to be lawful. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has stated that an arrest can be characterized as “any act that . . . subjects him to the actual control and will of the person making the arrest.” Commonwealth v. Bosurgi, 411 Pa. 56, 68, 190 A.2d 304, 311 (1963). In the instant case, there can be no question that when the police took appellant into custody, they subjected him to their actual control. Thus, appellant was under arrest at the time of his detention at the police station.
. Our Court has stated that information furnished by private citizens “should be considered at least as reliable as information received from a regular anonymous police informer.” Commonwealth v. Cosby, 234 Pa.Super. 1, 7, 335 A.2d 531, 534 (1975); Commonwealth v. Kline, 234 Pa.Super. 12, 15-17, 335 A.2d 361, 363 (1975). See also Commonwealth v. Heyward, 248 Pa.Super. 465, 375 A.2d 191 (1977).
. “The officer testified: T asked him—I asked the defendant where was he going. The defendant told me he was going home. I asked him where did he live at. He told me in the [3100] block of Bancroft. I asked the defendant where he was coming from. He told me 3800 North 18th Street. I asked where did he get the t.v. from. He told me him and his girl friend had an argument. He took the t.v. back. So I told him it was unusual for him to be coming from 3800 North 18th Street all the way to Broad and Erie and Bancroft Street is only seven blocks away. The defendant told me that he was looking for a cab and there was no cab that passed him on the way. So I asked the defendant did he have any money to catch a cab. He said no, he was going home, let the cab take him home and pay the cab when he got home. So the story didn’t seem right. So I took the defendant in for investigation.’ ” Commonwealth v. Mackie, supra 456 Pa. at 374, 320 A.2d at 843.
. Appellant also contends that the Commonwealth could not use the suppressed statement to demonstrate that the police had probable cause to arrest him. Even assuming, as I have done, that the Commonwealth could properly use the statement for such a purpose. I conclude that there was no probable cause to arrest.
