Hinson, alias Moon, v. The State

Supreme Court of Georgia1921-11-16No. No. 2550

152 Ga. 243

Summary · law.co

Holding. The judgment of conviction is affirmed. The trial court properly admitted the defendant's confession after evidence showed it was freely and voluntarily made, and the evidence sufficiently corroborated the confession and proved the corpus delicti; the defendant failed to carry his burden of proving legal incapacity under the insanity defense, and the jury instructions on criminal responsibility were proper.

Milton Hinson was convicted of murdering his mother after entering pleas of not guilty and insanity. At trial, he confessed to the crime but challenged admission of his confession on grounds that it was not freely given and that he lacked mental capacity. The jury found him guilty with a recommendation of life imprisonment.

The court addressed several legal standards governing the case. A confession standing alone cannot support conviction; it must be corroborated by additional evidence. The jury determines whether sufficient corroboration exists. Here, the evidence provided adequate corroboration of the defendant's confession and established the corpus delicti. Additionally, when an insanity defense is raised, the law presumes the defendant was sane, and the defendant bears the burden of proving legal incapacity. The defendant failed to meet this burden.

Regarding the insanity standard itself, the court applied the established rule in the jurisdiction: a person is criminally responsible if he possesses sufficient reason to distinguish between right and wrong regarding the act he committed. The trial court properly instructed the jury on this standard and did not err in permitting examination of witnesses on whether the defendant knew the difference between right and wrong, nor did it err in refusing proposed jury instructions that were argumentative or merely restated principles already covered in the charge.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Admissibility of confession when defendant raises insanity defense
Corroboration requirement for confession evidence
Burden of proof in insanity defense
Legal standard for criminal responsibility and insanity

Procedural posture

Defendant was convicted of murder in Cook Superior Court, moved for new trial which was denied, and appealed to the appellate court.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Hill, J.

1. A confession alone, uncorroborated by other evidence, will not justify a conviction. Penal Code (1910), § 1031.

(a) The sufficiency of the corroboration is a question for the jury. Coley v. State, 110 Ga. 271 (34 S. E. 845).

(5) The evidence was sufficient to authorize the jury to find that the confession of the defendant was corroborated, and was sufficient to prove the corpus delicti.

2. Where, on the trial of one charged with murder, a plea of insanity is set up, the presumption is in favor of the sanity of the defendant. Carter v. State, 56 Ga. 463 (8); Danforth v. State, 75 Ga. 614 (4 a), 627 (58 Am. R. 480). Confessions freely and voluntarily made are prima facie admissible; and the burden of proof is upon the defendant pleading insanity to prove his legal incapacity to commit the crime, and consequently his legal incapacity to confess the crime. This burden was not carried by the defendant.

(a) It appearing that the confession was freely and voluntarily made, it was not error to admit it over the objection that it was not freely and voluntarily made, and that the defendant did not have mental capacity to make the confession.

3. The general rule in this State is that “If a man has reason sufficient to distinguish between right and wrong in relation to a particular act about to be committed, he is criminally responsible.” Roberts v. State, 3 Ga. 310 (3); Carr v. State, 96 Ga. 284 (2), 287 (22 S. E. 570); Flanagan v. State, 103 Ga. 619, 625 (30 S. E. 550); Taylor v. State, 105 Ga. 746, 775 (31 S. E. 764); Strickland v. State, 137 Ga. 115 (5), 118 (72 S. E. 922); Bowden v. State, 151 Ga. 336 (4), 339 (106 S. E. 575).

No. 2550.

November 16, 1921.

Indictmént for murder. Before Judge Dickerson. Cook superior court. March 12, 1921.

Milton Hinson, alias Milton Moon, was indicted for tbe homicide of his mother; and at the same term of court he filed his plea of not guilty, and a special plea of insanity. On the trial of the case the jury returned a verdict of guilty of murder, with a recommendation of life imprisonment; and the defendant was accordingly sentenced by the court. He made a motion for new trial, which was overruled, and he excepted.

R. A. Hendricks and T. N. Hendricks, for plaintiff in error.

R. A. Denny, attorney-general, J. D. Lovett, solicitor-general, Graham Wright, asst, atty.-gen., and Jaclcson & Jackson, contra.

(a) Accordingly it was not error for the court to permit the solicitor-general to propound to certain witnesses, and receive answers thereto, and allow the jury to consider the question and answers, as follows: “ Had the defendant sufficient mind to know the difference between right and wrong? A. He had,” as against the objection that the true rule is: “Is the defendant a person of sound and disposing mind and memory; is his memory sufficient to form the intent to commit a crime?”

(5) Nor was it error for the court to charge the jury substantially the rule which was first laid down in the Roberts case, supra, and which has been followed since; nor was it error to refuse the requests to charge on the law of insanity, the requests being argumentative. In so far as they state sound principles of law, they were covered by the charge as given by the court.

4. Other assignments of error are without merit.

5. The evidence authorized the verdict, and the court did not err in refusing a new trial.

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur, except Fish, O. J., absent because of siclcness.