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FRANK ZEGLIN v. F. J. YOST

Minnesota Supreme Court1925-05-15No. No. 24,615
163 Minn. 264

Summary

Holding. The Industrial Commission's denial of the worker's petition for a rehearing was affirmed because the evidence presented was too conflicting to establish that the commission abused its discretion in refusing to grant a new hearing.

A worker injured in an accident on June 15, 1923, suffered fractures to two ribs and his right clavicle. His employer's workers' compensation insurer paid benefits until December 1923, then ceased payments, claiming the disability had ended. A referee heard testimony in February 1924 from competing medical experts—the worker's physician testified the clavicle had not healed, while three physicians for the insurer testified that firm bony union had formed and the worker could perform his usual job. The referee ruled in the insurer's favor.

The worker later requested a new hearing, submitting additional medical reports from four physicians. Two stated the clavicle had not united (though their examinations preceded the initial hearing). Two other physicians performed surgery in June 1924, asserting before the operation that the bone fragments had not achieved firm union and were compressing nerves and blood vessels. After the surgery, the insurer's physicians reported that the previous bony union had in fact existed but was destroyed during the operation, leaving the bone in a condition requiring further surgery to heal.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

  • Whether the Industrial Commission abused its discretion in denying a petition for rehearing in a workers' compensation case
  • Standard for reviewing commission discretion to grant new hearings under Section 4319, G.S. 1923
  • Whether conflicting medical evidence regarding bone union and disability justifies rehearing

Procedural posture

The claimant sought review of the Industrial Commission's order denying his petition for a rehearing after an initial referee decision terminated his workers' compensation benefits.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion

majority opinion

Taylor, C.

The claimant met with an accident on June 15, 1923, in which two ribs and his right clavicle were fractured. His employer carried insurance covering the liability imposed by the Workmen’s Compensation Law. The insurer paid the prescribed compensation until December 8, 1923, and then, claiming that the disability had terminated, gave notice that no more payments would be made.

The claimant asserted that he was still disabled, and the Industrial Commission ordered a hearing which was held by a referee on February 8, 1924. At this hearing, the claimant presented the testimony of a physician who was an X-ray expert. He stated that one end of the broken clavicle was overriding the other, that he was unable to tell from his X-ray whether the ends of the clavicle had united, but that he had made an examination which showed that they had not. The insurer presented the testimony of three physicians including an X-ray expert. They all stated that there was a firm bony union formed by callus between the broken ends of the clavicle. ■ They further stated that one end was overriding the other, but that this was not unusual in such cases and was not of a character to interfere with the normal functions of the shoulder and arm, and that no disability resulted from it. The referee found that the claimant was not entitled to further compensation, saying that the medical testimony convinced him, “that there was a perfect bony union in said right clavicle and that said employe was fully able to perform his usual work.”

On June 23, 1924, the claimant filed a petition asking for another hearing, for the purpose of submitting further medical testimony. This petition was accompanied by the unsworn statements or reports of four physicians. Two of them say that the clavicle had not united. Their examinations were apparently made before the hearing of February 8, but it seems that the claimant did not inform his attorney of these examinations until after the decision had been made. The other two physicians performed an operation on the claimant in June, 1924. They say that their examination made before the operation disclosed that one end of the bone pressed upon the brachial plexus and blood vessels causing numbness and swelling in the arm and hand, and that there had not been a complete or firm union of the clavicle, and further say, “that the operation confirmed our examination that he did not have firm union of the above mentioned fracture.”

In August, 1924, the physicians called by the insurer again examined the claimant and made an unsworn report in which they again say that the ends of the clavicle had been united by a firm bony union, but further say that in the operation the callus was removed and the ends of the bone eburnated, and that there is now no union and owing to the eburnated condition of the bone will be none until another operation is performed. They say further, “We believe that had he not been operated upon he would have had a perfectly useful, functional shoulder.”

The Industrial Commission denied a rehearing and it is this ruling which we are asked to review.

Section 4319, G. S. 1923, provides that at any time before the award has been reduced to judgment or a writ of certiorari has issed to review it the commission may grant a new hearing for cause. Under the statute, granting a rehearing or a new hearing rests in the discretion of the commission. Stippel v. Charles Friend & Son, 161 Minn. 471, 201 N. W. 934; State ex rel. Klemer v. District Court, 134 Minn. 189, 158 N. W. 825.

There may be cases in which this court would be justified in holding that the commission had abused its discretion and acted arbitrarily in refusing a rehearing, but we cannot so hold in a case where the evidence is as conflicting as that here presented.

Order affirmed.