Adkins v. The State

Supreme Court of Georgia1939-02-15No. No. 12685

187 Ga. 519

Summary · law.co

Holding. The judgment is reversed because the evidence was insufficient to prove that Adkins was either a principal in the second degree or a conspirator in the murder, and the trial court therefore erred in refusing to grant a new trial.

Adkins was jointly indicted with three others for murder. The three co-defendants were tried, convicted, and executed as the actual killers. The evidence against Adkins showed only that he drove the three defendants and his wife from Griffin to Jackson at their request, stating they wanted to meet girls there. Upon arrival, Adkins drove his wife to his uncle's home in the countryside, where both remained during the crime's commission. The defendants later returned to Adkins's car for the ride back to Griffin. A witness testified to seeing Adkins and the other defendants together on several occasions in Griffin.

The court held that under the governing law, a person charged with murder may be convicted as a principal in the second degree (aider and abettor) or as a conspirator if the evidence shows participation, presence with intent to aid, or agreement to commit the crime or a crime of which murder was a natural consequence. However, the court found the evidence against Adkins insufficient to establish either theory. Adkins's good reputation was uncontradicted, and his presence at his uncle's home during the actual crime, combined with the innocent explanation for his initial travel, did not reasonably support a finding of guilt. The trial court erred in refusing to grant a new trial.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Sufficiency of evidence for conviction as aider and abettor or conspirator in a murder case
Whether presence at scene and prior association with perpetrators, without more, establishes guilt
Circumstances required to infer guilty knowledge or participation in a conspiracy

Procedural posture

Adkins was jointly indicted with three co-defendants for murder; the co-defendants were convicted and executed, and Adkins sought a new trial after conviction, which was denied.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Jenkins, Justice.

1. A person jointly indicted with others for the crime of murder, even though the indictment charges him with being an actual perpetrator of the crime as a principal in the first degree, may be convicted, not only upon evidence showing this, but upon evidence showing either that he was actually or constructively present, “aiding and abetting the act to be done,” as a principal in the second degree, or that he had agreed or conspired with the others to commit the homicide or a crime of which it was a natural result or accompaniment. Code, § 26-501; Bradley v. State, 128 Ga. 20 (2-4) (57 S. E. 237). “It is not necessary that the crime of murder should be a part of the original design; but it is enough if it be one of the incidental probable consequences of the execution of their design, and should appear at the moment to one of the participants to be expedient for the common purpose. The intent of the actual slayer is imputable to his co-conspirators.” Gore v. State, 162 Ga. 267, 272 (134 S. E. 36). Such a conspiracy may be proved by circumstantial as well as direct evidence. Wortham v. State, 184 Ga. 674, 680 (192 S. E. 720), and cit. The chaTge of the court was in accordance with the foregoing rules, and the grounds excepting to certain portions thereof are without merit.

No. 12685.

February 15, 1939.

2. The three other persons who have been previously tried, convicted, and executed under the joint indictment charging them together with the present defendant with the perpetration of the murder, having been, under the undisputed evidence, the actual perpetrators of the crime, and the record going merely to show that this defendant, who proved without contradiction his good reputation, took the other three defendants in his car, together with his wife, from Griffin to Jackson, Georgia, on their request, and for the stated reason that they wanted to meet some girls in Jackson, and it appearing that this defendant, upon reaching Jackson and putting out the other three defendants, drove with his wife to the home of the defendant’s uncle, who lived in the country near Jackson, and that this defendant and his wife remained there during the time the crime was committed by the other defendants and until those defendants rejoined him and his wife at the uncle’s home for the purpose of being carried back in this defendant’s car to Griffin, and it appearing that the only other fact or circumstance which might be . taken to engender a suspicion that this defendant had any sort of guilty knowledge of the criminal purpose of the other defendants was testimony by a witness that she had seen this defendant and the other defendants together on several occasions in the witness’s yard in Griffin, where this defendant and his wife lived with the witness, it can not reasonably be held that from the circumstances narrated the evidence was sufficient to show that this defendant was either a principal in the second degree, or a conspirator, within the rules stated. Therefore it was error to refuse a new trial to this defendant on the general grounds. Judgment reversed.

All the Justices concur.

A. M. Zellner and J. T. Moore, for plaintiff in error.

M. J. Yeomans, attorney-general, Franlc B. Willingham, solicitor-general, Herschel E. Smith and E. J. Glower, contra.