BRADLEY et al. v. THE STATE

Supreme Court of Georgia1907-04-09

128 Ga. 20

Summary · law.co

Holding. The judgment of conviction for murder is affirmed. The trial court did not err in refusing to grant a continuance for absent witnesses or in declining to instruct the jury that a homicide committed in the heat of passion, before blood had cooled, would necessarily constitute voluntary manslaughter rather than murder.

Henry Bradley and Bill Brankley were tried jointly and convicted of murder in the death of Jim Wright. The evidence showed that Wright had shot into a crowd of African Americans the night before, wounding several people. The next morning, the defendants and others armed themselves, located Wright in a swamp, shot at him, brought him to a railroad track, and shot him again as he lay on the ground. Wright died from his injuries the following day.

The defendants challenged their conviction on several grounds, including that the trial court improperly refused to grant a continuance due to absent witnesses, and that the court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that the homicide would constitute voluntary manslaughter rather than murder if committed in the heat of passion before emotions had cooled. The court found no error in either ruling. The trial court properly denied the continuance request because the defendants had not complied with procedural requirements for obtaining the absent witnesses' testimony. Additionally, the court properly refused the requested jury instruction because it would have improperly taken from the jury the question of what constitutes adequate cooling time.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether trial court abused discretion in denying continuance for absent witnesses
Whether jury instruction on heat of passion and cooling time in voluntary manslaughter was properly refused
Standards for establishing that absent witness testimony would be material to the defense

Procedural posture

Defendants Bradley and Brankley moved for a new trial following conviction of murder, and appealed from the trial court's refusal of that motion.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Evans, J.

Henry Bradley, Bill Brankley, and three others were jointly charged with the murder of Jim Wright. The two first-named defendants were jointly tried, and were convicted of murder, with a recommendation that they be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary for life. The case as made by the State showed that Jim Wright, the deceased, on the night previous to the homicide, shot into a crowd of negroes with a gun, and hit several of them. The next morning the defendants on trial, and others, Armed themselves and hunted up Wright. They discovered him in a swamp near the railroad track, and began shooting at him; And afterwards brought him upon the railroad track, wounded and helpless, and shot him again as he lay upon the ground. Wright died from his wounds the next day. The defendants moved for a new trial, and to the refusal of their motion they except.

The first ground of their motion is the refusal of the court to continue the case because of the absence of three witnesses. No subpoena had been requested for two of them, and it did not appear that the third had been served-with a subpoena. With respect to two of the absent persons desired as witnesses, there was no-effort to comply with the requirements of the Penal Code, §962. With respect to the third person desired as a witness the defendant deposed that he had been informed that such person would testify to certain facts, but it did not appear with sufficient distinctness that the absent person would so testify. The rule upon such a showing is aptly stated in the first headnote in Thompson v. State, 24 Ga. 297, which we have adopted in this case. See also Macon Ry. Co. v. Anderson, 121 Ga. 669 (5). The judge did notw err in refusing a continuance.

The principles enunciated in syllabi 2 and 3 are so well settled that further elaboration is unnecessary. McWhorter v. State, 118 Ga. 55 (5); Collins v. State, 88 Ga. 347; Dumas v. State, 62 Ga. 58.

The principle stated in the fourth headnote was decided in Dixon v. State, 116 Ga. 186 (8); McLeroy v. State, 125 Ga. 240.

It was no,t error to instruct the jury as stated in the fifth syllabus to this opinion. Mann v. State, 124 Ga. 760.

Counsel for the plaintiff in error requested the court to charge the jury as follows: "If you should find from the evidence in this case that these defendants were assaulted the nightbefore by the deceased, and they hunted up the deceased, Jim Wright, the next dajq before the blood had time to cool, and before reason had time to resume her sway, and killed Jim Wright in the heat of passion, you would not be authorized to convict these defendants of the crime of murder, but you might convict them of the offense of voluntary manslaughter, if you believe they killed Jim Wright.” The refusal of this request is assigned as error. It would have been erroneous for the court to have instructed the jury as matter of law that a homicide, under the circumstances described in the request, would not be murder, without leaving to the jury to determine what, might be cooling time. Hence the request was properly refused. The court did charge, however, on the subject of voluntary manslaughter, and the defendants do not complain of the correctness of the charge given.

The evidence amply authorized the verdict, and no reason appears why the defendants should have another trial.

Judgment affirmed.

Fish, G. Jabsent. The other Justices concur.