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William E. Lloyd, administrator, vs. William E. Lloyd, executor, & others

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court1899-03-04
173 Mass. 97

Summary

Holding. The testator gave his wife an absolute interest in all his real and personal property, not merely a life estate; the language expressing confidence in his wife and directions for property management stated his motives for the gift but did not create a trust or limit the absolute nature of her ownership. The administrator must pay over the fund to the executor of the widow's estate.

George Stevens died in 1894 and left his estate to his widow Martha through his will, which contained instructions that the property be maintained as a family home and managed prudently during her lifetime. The will also granted Martha all of his real and personal property, with income to support the family. Martha died in 1897, leaving her own will that bequeathed her property to a trustee for the benefit of their three children (all mentally incapacitated since birth). The estate administrator argued that Martha took only a life interest in George's property, leaving a surplus to pass to the heirs, but the court determined that the testator intended to give Martha absolute ownership of the entire estate.

The court rejected arguments that the testator's expressions of confidence in his wife and his instructions regarding property management created a trust limiting her interest to a life estate. The court found that such precatory language merely expressed the testator's motives for the gift rather than imposing binding conditions on Martha's ownership. Because Martha obtained absolute title to the property and subsequently disposed of it through her own will, the fund in the administrator's hands belonged to Martha's estate and should pass to her executor.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

  • Whether the testator intended to grant his wife a life estate or absolute ownership of his estate
  • Whether precatory language and instructions regarding property management create a trust limiting the wife's interest
  • Whether the testator died intestate as to any portion of his property

Procedural posture

The single justice ruled that the wife took absolute interest in the property and that the question of any trust for the children could not be decided in this suit, and the case was reported for appellate consideration.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion

majority opinion

Lathrop, J.

George Stevens died on August 14,1894, leaving a widow and three children, the latter all being of unsound mind from their birth. By his will, dated October 6, 1875, he appointed his wife executrix, and left to each child one hundred dollars. By the second item of his will he directs that his house and land on a street named “ shall not be sold or disposed of during the natural life of my said wife, but that said house shall be held and maintained by my said wife during her natural life as a home for herself and for our children aforesaid, that as far as possible my family may be kept together, and enjoy a common home. I hereby also direct that my property shall be kept in suitable repair, and shall be rented to the best advantage, and that no part of the real estate shall be sold during the life of my said wife, unless it is found actually necessary so to do for the use and support of my wife and family aforesaid.”

The third item of the will is as follows: “ Having full faith and confidence in my beloved wife, and knowing that she will wisely and prudently manage the affairs of the family and look after the welfare of our children, and, as a kind mother, do them each and all justice, I therefore hereby give and bequeath to my said wife Martha D. Stevens all my estate, real, personal, and mixed, of every name and description of which I may die seised, possessed, or to which I may be entitled at the time of my decease, the interest, rents, income, dividends, and profits thereof to be expended for her own use and support, and for the maintenance and support of the home for herself and our children during her natural life.”

The testator’s widow died on March 19, 1897, leaving the three children surviving her. By her will, dated November 2, 1896, she devised and bequeathed all her property, real and per sonal, after payment of her debts, to a trustee named, the net income to be used for the support and maintenance of her three children, with remainder, after the death of the last survivor, to the trustee in fee, or in case of his death before that of the last survivor of the three children, to the heirs of the trustee.

The petitioner is the administrator with the will annexed of the estate of George Stevens, and he represents that, after the settlement of the estate, there is in his hands the sum of over eleven thousand dollars, which is claimed by the testator’s heirs, on the ground that Mrs. Stevens took only a life interest, under her husband’s will, in the real and personal property left by the testator.

The single justice of this court, who heard the case and reported it for our consideration, ruled that the wife took an absolute interest in the property disposed of by the will, so that there was no intestacy; and that, if there was any trust for the children, it was personal only, for their reasonable support during their lives, and would not prevent the fund being handed over to the executor of the widow, to whom it belonged subject to the supposed trust, and that therefore the question whether there was such a trust could not be decided in this suit.

It seems to us reasonably certain that, taking the whole will together, the testator intended to give to his wife absolutely the entire estate of which he died possessed, and that he did not intend to die intestate as to any part of it, and did not do so. The words used are apt to give an estate absolute in the personal property, and a fee in the real estate. While he attempted to couple the gift and devise with directions and instructions, we find nothing to show that his wife was to take only a life estate. Joslin v. Rhoades, 150 Mass. 301. Veeder v. Meader, 157 Mass. 413.

If these directions and instructions imposed any trust, they were limited to the life of the wife, and they have been performed and the trust fulfilled.

The question whether there is any precatory trust seems to us to be disposed of by the case of Aldrich v. Aldrich, 172 Mass. 101.

That case was a much stronger one than the present in favor of the existence of such a trust; and it is clear that, if the words there used did not amount to a precatory trust, those in the will before us cannot have that effect.

The statement of the testator of his full faith and confidence in his wife, and the words that follow, state the motive of the gift, and cannot be fairly construed to affect the absolute quality of the gift.

It follows that the petitioner should pay over the fund in his hands to the executor of the will of Mrs. Stevens.

Decree accordingly.