William E. Blunt & another, executors, vs. Martin Taylor & others

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court1918-05-25

230 Mass. 303

Summary · law.co

Holding. The probate court correctly determined that while the testator intended to create a trust of the residue, the trust was too indefinite to be carried out, and therefore the property should pass to the testator's heirs at law and next of kin. The decree of the probate court was affirmed.

A testator's will contained a residuary clause giving the remainder of his estate to his executors and trustees, stating that he had communicated certain distribution purposes to them and authorizing them to divide the estate according to their judgment. The executors argued they received an absolute gift, while the probate court concluded that a trust was created but was too vague to enforce, resulting instead in a trust for the testator's heirs and next of kin.

The court held that despite language expressing confidence in the executors' honesty and discretion, the will clearly indicated a trust arrangement rather than an absolute gift. The testator's references to purposes he had communicated to them and his authorization for distribution according to their judgment demonstrated an intent to impose trust obligations. However, because the trust purposes were insufficiently definite and not charitable in nature, the trust could not be executed as written.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether language expressing confidence and discretion in trustees indicates an absolute gift or the creation of a trust
Whether a trust created by will can be enforced when its purposes are too vague or indefinite
The proper disposition of estate property when an intended trust fails for lack of sufficient definition

Procedural posture

The executors appealed from a probate court decree holding that the residuary clause created an indefinite trust that resulted in the property passing to the testator's heirs at law and next of kin.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Carroll, J.

By the ninth clause of his will, Thomas J. Taylor disposed of the residue of his estate in these words: “All the remainder of my estate both real and personal of which I may die seized and possessed, and to which I may in any way be entitled at the time of my decease, I give, bequeath and devise to my executors and trustees, in whose honesty and discretion I have reposed especial trust and confidence, for certain purposes which I have made known to them. And I hereby authorize and empower my said executors to make such distribution and division of my estate as I have indicated to them, and as they shall deem proper for the fulfillment of my wishes so well known to them, relying entirelyupon their judgment in the premises.” The executors contend that no trust was created by this clause, that there was an absolute gift of the residue to them. In the Probate Court it was held that the executors received the property upon a trust which was too indefinite to be carried into effect, and that a trust resulted for the heirs at law and next of kin of the testator; from this decree the executors appealed.

If ‘the words expressing trust and confidence in the honesty and discretion of the trustees and executors, and reliance “upon their judgment in the premises,” were omitted from the residuary clause, it probably would be undisputed that the testator did not intend an absolute gift to the trustees and executors, but to create a trust of the residue of his estate to be disposed of, they being authorized and empowered “to make such distribution and division.”

The words expressing trust and confidence in the executors and trustees did not show that the executors were to take the property absolutely as their own. These words are merely expressions of confidence that the trustees will carry out the trust and distribute the property and divide the estate according to the wishes of the testator — already “made known to them,” — according to their best judgment. The gift was not to the petitioners by name, but was a gift to them as trustees and executors of the testator’s will; and he clearly manifested his intention to give the estate to them for certain purposes, although they were to use their own best judgment in its distribution, and as they thought proper for the fulfilment of his wishes. Davison v. Wyman, 214 Mass. 192. Minot v. Attorney General, 189 Mass. 176 and cases cited. Nichols v. Allen, 130 Mass. 211.

In Lloyd v. Lloyd, 173 Mass. 97, there was an outright gift of the estate, and the words of recommendation, confidence and desire were not intended by the testator to cut down this absolute and unrestricted character of the gift. See Durant v. Smith, 159 Mass. 229; Aldrich v. Aldrich, 172 Mass. 101; Pitts v. Milton, 192 Mass. 88; Poor v. Bradbury, 196 Mass. 207.

Although a trust was attempted to be created by the will of the deceased, it was not a charitable trust, and, not being sufficiently definite, it cannot be executed. The judge of probate, therefore, was right in deciding that the residue should go to Matthew H. Taylor, Martin Taylor and Louisa J. Foster, “the heirs at law and next of kin of said testator, and the petitioners should make distribution thereof among said persons or their legal representatives in the same proportions in which they would have been entitled to intestate property of the testator.” Olliffe v. Wells, 130 Mass. 221. Wilcox v. Attorney General, 207 Mass. 198. Davison v. Wyman, supra.

Decree of the Probate Court affirmed.

So ordered.